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ABSTRACT
In the last two decades, important economic development problems in Puerto
Rico have become evident. These problems have been associated with the
deterioration of Puerto Rico's competitive capacity. Generally, several
external factors have been used to explain this deterioration and thus, to
explain Puerto Rico's economic problems. There is no doubt that the so-
called external factors have affected negatively the economic structure,
however, internal factors have not been seriously considered. In
particular, the policies and the instrument used to stimulate industrial and
economic development have had a lot to do with Puerto Rico's economic
outcome.
This research examines the role played by profit tax exemption in the
transformation of Puerto Rico's economy. The first two sections of this
research discuss the industrial tax incentives laws, and the structure of
manufacturing income and employment, respectively. The next section
evaluates the relative effect of tax exemption as a reinvestment incentive.
The last section examines whether the tollgate tax stimulates reinvestment
needs. Tax exemption might be the most important internal factor affecting
the economic structure. Since 1948, exemption from taxes has been and
continues to be the main incentive to attract U.S. industries and the key
policy-instrument to promote industrial and economic development in Puerto
Rico. During the initial decades (1948-1970), the industrial promotion
program offered to investors a combination of incentives that made tax
exemption work (tax-free profits from both U.S. and Puerto Rico taxes, low
wage environment, unrestricted access to U.S. markets, infrastructure, labor
training, low transportation costs, etc.).
Mainly since mid-1960s, when Puerto Rico's competitive capacity began to
erode, the industrial promotion policy further emphasized profit tax
exemption as the key mechanism to attract industries. Profit tax-exemption
has been and continues to be the main policy instrument for attracting firms
in the 1970s and 1980s. Promotion primarily was and is based on attracting
industries capable of paying high wages, firms not affected by energy and
transportation costs, and high-profit margin firms. Little attention has
been given, however, for promoting or for retaining labor-intensive
industries or local firms. In mid-1970s, profit tax exemption was extended
to interest income in an attempt to stimulate reinvestment of industrial
profits in designated economic development activities in Puerto Rico. Also,
a penalty levy, known as a tollgate tax, was imposed on firms that decided
to repatriate their profits without satisfying reinvestment requirements.
Tax exemption appears to attract a profitable industrial segment, but its
composition and contribution to Puerto Rico's economy has changed
dramatically during the development process. The industrial composition of
the tax-exempt segment has been rapidly changing from labor- to capital-
intensive industries. Moreover, the new tax-exempt segments have been
diminishing their contribution to economic development. Between 1970 to
1987, total manufacturing employment dropped, the manufacturing share of
Puerto Rico GDP doubled, the share of manufacturing value added paid as a
compensation to Puerto Rico's workers fell, and by 1981, about two-thirds of
manufacturing net income went to mostly non-Puerto Rico's owners of
manufacturing's real and financial assets. Also, the tax-exempt industrial
segments have caused the increased investment to produce a job in Puerto
Rico and the increased worker output from each job created.
Since 1976, the introduction of tax-free interest income under the
reinvestment incentive has affected the structure of the entire economy.
The growth of the current tax-exempt industrial-segments can be traced
directly to the new tax exemption benefits. These industrial segments have
in recent years generated more than half of their income from pure financial
transactions. As a result the financial sector in Puerto Rico underwent a
radical change. As of 1984, manufacturing firms funds in financial
institutions accounted for more than half of the growth in Puerto Rico's
commercial bank deposit base. However, bank loans, as a percentage of bank
deposits, declined during 1976-84. From 1973-84, real fixed-investment in
Puerto Rico had significant reductions. The cost of financing government
obligations, as the cost of capital to finance eligible investment, appears
not to have been reduced. Moreover, the tollgate tax seems to be poorly
applied. As a result, its contribution to increase government revenues or
to stimulate reinvestment of industrial profits appears to be minimal.
There is little evidence to support the generally accepted assumption upon
which the industrial promotion policy and the industrial tax incentives acts
are based, namely that by exempting from taxes an industrial segment, output
will increase and will result in employment, income, real fixed-investment,
revenues or new investment in Puerto Rico. Moreover, there is little
evidence to support the belief that by extending tax exemption to interest
income, reinvestment in eligible activities will be significantly increased
and will contribute to Puerto Rico's economic development. Finally, the
evidence suggests that the tollgate tax has been an ineffective mechanism to
stimulate reinvestment and or to increase revenues. Major changes to the
current system of industrial incentives, mainly, to tax exemption, are
needed to reach the desired objectives. Profit tax exemption, as the main
incentive or as the key industrial and economic development policy-
instrument for economic development, may not be adequate for the task ahead.
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ABBR ABBREVIATION
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GNMA MORTAGE BACKED SECURITIES GUARANTEED BY THE US GOVERNMENT
IIA INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVES ACT
IRC UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
IRS UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
PRIDCO PUERTO RICO INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
PRITA PUERTO RICO INCOME TAX ACT
QPSII QUALIFYING POSSESSIONS SOURCE INVESTMENT INCOME
REPO REPURCHASE AGREEMENT
SIC STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION
TEFRA TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT
US UNITED STATES
I N T R 0 D U C T IO N
This research examines the role of profit tax exemption in shaping Puerto
Rico's industrial and economic development. Since 1948, a combination of
U.S. tax exemption for possession corporations (U.S. firms operating in
Puerto Rico under Section 931 and its successor Section 936 of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC)) and Puerto Rico tax incentives has been offered to most
mainland firms which establish businesses in Puerto Rico. From 1948 to
1976, tax exemption covered property, earnings and profits, as well as
excise, municipal and other minor taxes. Exploiting the interaction of
Section 931 and its successor Section 936 of the IRC with Puerto Rico tax
laws provides U.S. investors the maximum tax benefits available. These
features of the industrial tax exemption acts have established the
legislation as the most comprehensive tax inducement ever devised in an area
politically and economically related to the United States. Moreover, since
1976, exemption from taxes on interest income has been added to the
industrial tax incentives package. This incentive allows tax-free interest
income generated from financial investments of tax exempt profits of the
possession corporations operating in Puerto Rico. The inclusion of tax
exemption for interest income has made profit tax exemption in Puerto Rico
the most attractive location incentive yet devised (including other Third
World locations) for a highly profitable U.S. industrial segment.
Profit tax exemption has been and continues to be the main policy instrument
for promoting industrial and economic development in Puerto Rico. The
combination of federal and local tax exemption from 1948 to 1976 was
provided to U.S. firms generally to (1) attract employment-producing
investment, (2) increase income, (3) expand real fixed investment or to
create new investment opportunities, and (4) increase revenues. Since 1976,
profit tax exemption was extended to interest income to stimulate
reinvestment of industrial profits in Puerto Rico in designated economic
development activities. Also, a penalty levy, known as a tollgate tax, was
imposed on firms that decided to repatriate their profits without satisfying
the reinvestment requirements. These two mechanisms, tax exemption as a
reinvestment incentive and the application of the tollgate tax, are
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considered to have significant fiscal and economic benefits for Puerto Rico.
The reinvestment of firms' financial assets is supposed to expand real
investment or industrial capacity or to help finance other industrial
projects through the availability of credit and long-term interest rates.
The tollgate tax is presumed to stimulate investment since the rate is
substantially reduced by reinvestment of profits in designated economic
development activities. In addition, the tollgate tax is believed to
contribute to increased Puerto Rico Treasury revenues.
Puerto Rico's industrial incentives laws, as well as the industrial
promotion policies since 1948, have established profit tax exemption as the
main subsidy provided to firms. Tax-exemption appears to attract a
profitable industrial segment, but the composition and contribution by the
attracted industries to Puerto Rico's economy have changed dramatically
during the development process. Profit tax exemption depends on the
existence of profits. As Puerto Rico operational costs rise, in particular
labor costs, the leverage of tax exemption has diminished. In general, the
tax exemption laws lead to a bias towards subsidizing capital inputs, and
the industrial promotion program has been heavily oriented towards capital-
intensive industries. Few incentives have been offered to industries for
whom profit tax exemption lacks significance. Moreover, neither the
reinvestment incentive nor the tollgate tax seem to have produced the best
results. A combination of technical and administrative problems and the use
of questionable practices by legal and financial institutions appear to have
made the reinvestment incentive and the tollgate tax ineffective mechanisms.
Puerto Rico's industrial program that started in 1948, was initially
designed to attract labor-intensive industries, many of them in the textile
and garment areas, as well as leather products. The industrial promotion
program offered to investors a combination of incentives that made tax
exemption work. This was, in effect, the beginning of what subsequently
became known as "Operation Bootstrap." Its centerpiece was the
offer of full tax exemption from local, municipal, and federal taxes to
those who invested in manufacturing facilities in Puerto Rico. In addition,
other incentives proposed to investors were the combination of a low-wage
environment with tax-free profits under the U.S. flag and unrestricted
access to the U.S. market. Simultaneously, a massive out-migration,
primarily of farm workers, to the United States was sponsored by the United
States and the Puerto Rican governments.
Puerto Rico's economy grew between 1948 and 1970. Real economic growth
rates were attributed, mainly, to the growth of labor-intensive
manufacturing. GNP and GDP (total, per worker, and per-capita) increased
significantly. Productivity per worker and per dollar of investment rose.
Investment in new plant and equipment generated by manufacturing growth was
the primary force behind the increase of construction jobs. Investment in
industrial and commercial buildings also increased substantially during the
period. In the aggregate, manufacturing jobs grew, significantly.
Manufacturing share of Puerto Rico's GDP increased; and the compensation to
industrial workers represent close to two-third of manufacturing value
added. Over two-thirds of manufacturing employment growth occurred in four
industries, non-sugar food products, apparel, leather goods, and electrical
machinery. These industries were labor-intensive, low-wage, and
manufactured consumer-goods.
The period of 1960 to 1970 marked almost the end of labor-intensive
industries (in terms) of promotion and attraction. However, employment
growth was low and unemployment remained high. Several external and
internal factors developed and brought labor-intensive manufacturing growth
to an end during this period. Among the primary external factors were the
impact of the federal minimum wage in Puerto Rico and the structural changes
in the world economy. The most important internal factor has been the
nature of the industrial incentives program, primarily profit tax exemption.
Low wages were traditionally an essential component of the industrial
incentives package offered to investors. Federally mandated increases in
Puerto Rico's minimum wage, however, had raised industrial wages
considerably by the mid-1960s, both in absolute terms and in relation to
those prevailing in other developing countries. Structural changes in the
world economy also had weakened Puerto Rico's position. The Kennedy Round
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had cut U.S. tariffs considerably, making it easier for foreign competitors
to break into the U.S. market. This, in turn, led many U.S. companies to
search for low-labor cost countries from which to export to the United
States. Puerto Rico clearly had ceased to belong to that category--whatever
other advantage it may have offered.
The structure of Puerto Rico's industrial incentives program, primarily tax
exemption, is the most important internal factor affecting the economy.
Generally, industrial tax-exemption in Puerto Rico is designed to subsidize
those factors of production which combine to increase manufacturing output.
The assumption is that such increases will contribute to physical fixed
investment, employment, income, and revenues in Puerto Rico. The tax-
exemptions constitute a profit incentive. As a firm becomes more
profitable, the more subsidy it obtains. Industrial promotion in Puerto
Rico was based on the existence of "natural" incentives affected by the so-
called external factors (low-labor-costs and access to the U.S. mainland
markets) that made tax exemption workable for labor-intensive industries.
Structural changes in the world economy negatively affected those external
factors benefiting Puerto Rico. As a result, the attractiveness of Puerto
Rico as a tax haven was reduced. Consequently, tax exemption became less
effective in attracting labor-intensive industries. This was mainly due to
the increases in labor costs that reduced their profit rates significantly.
As a response, in particular since the mid-1960s, Puerto Rico's industrial
promotion program as well as the industrial incentives program changed to
support mainly potentially profitable industries attracted because of the
tax exemption incentives. Little attention was given, however, to promote
or to retain employment-producing industries or local firms for whom profit-
tax exemption lacked effectiveness due to the economic trends during the
period. Thus, firms were promoted based on the profit-tax exemption
potential regardless of their contribution to employment and to Puerto
Rico's economy in general. Industrial promotion targeted high productivity
industries, sufficiently high to permit them to pay high wages. Industrial
processes in this type of industry had to be of high quality in the sense
that they should be only minimally affected by increases in operational
costs and sale prices. The industrial promotion program identified mainly
"basic" and "high-technology" industries. The most important changes in the
structure of industrial employment and income after 1970 have been
intimately related to the industrial promotion policies, based on tax-
exemption implemented in the mid-1960s. Among the most significant changes
have been the continuous decline of traditional and "low-technology"
industries, the failure of the attempt to promote petrochemical complexes,
and the growth of "high technology" industrial segments.
Since 1970, industrial growth in Puerto Rico has been in the high-technology
segment. High-technology manufacturing growth, however, has affected the
structure of manufacturing employment and income and has had consequences
for the functioning of both Puerto Rico's labor markets and its entire
economy. Between 1970 and 1987, the manufacturing share of total employment
in Puerto Rico declined slightly. After 1970, industrial employment growth
in Puerto Rico has been in a high-technology segment that is composed
primarily of chemicals, electrical machinery and scientific instruments
industries. Generally, these are capital-intensive firms and they have
produced a low level of employment. Worker compensation as a percentage of
value added in high-technology firms represent a very small percent compared
with the rest of manufacturing. Other structural changes caused by the
growth of high-technology manufacturing is the increased investment required
to produce a job and the increased worker output from each job created. As
capital-production began to dominate manufacturing growth in Puerto Rico,
fewer jobs are needed to produce additional real manufacturing output.
Also, the growth of the high-technology industrial segment helps to explain
the behavior of the GDP and the GNP. The GDP and the GNP began to diverge
significantly after 1970. Puerto Rico has experienced a rapid growth of
economic activity (measured by the gross domestic product (GDP)) but low or
even negative growth of economic welfare (measured by per capita gross
national product (GNP)). The reason for the decline in the growth rates of
both per capita and total GNP over the last decade appears to result from
the shift from labor-intensive to capital-intensive manufacturing and to the
transfers elsewhere of much of the resulting value added. The difference
between the GDP and the GNP is mainly the remittance of tax-exempt profits
and interest income to U.S. firms and investors. An increasing proportion
of total economic activity (GDP) was accounted for by capital-intensive
manufacturing and by mainly nonPuerto Rican ownership of industrial capital
in Puerto Rico. The interaction of these factors has resulted in increasing
the profitability of the high-technology industrial segment. At the same
time, however, the increased economic welfare of Puerto Rico 's residents has
been far less than that of non-residents.
Since the 1970s, Puerto Rico's economy has shown a poor performance. Real
fixed investment is lower now than in previous years. Gross internal
savings became negative in 1973, and have remained negative since.
Employment growth has been and continues to be low and unemployment has been
and continues to be extremely high. In contrast, between 1970 and 1987,
real manufacturing net income has grown substantially. Industrial
employment and workers' earnings, however, did not increase in concert with
manufacturing income. The augmented proportion of manufacturing income
after the 1970s is attributable to increases in capital inputs, intangible
assets and financial assets. Furthermore, the lack of availability and/or
reasonable cost of capital to finance new investment in Puerto Rico has been
and continues to be a development problem.
After 1976, the structural changes of Puerto Rico's economy, in particular,
industrial employment and income and the financial sector, can be traced
directly to the changes of tax exemption laws. In particular, U.S. tax
benefits with the introduction in 1976 of Section 936 and tax-free interest
income offer to possession corporations under the reinvestment incentive
introduced by Puerto Rico's Industrial Incentives Acts (IIAs) have become
the major incentive for locating United States manufacturing facilities in
Puerto Rico. The changes in the tax-exemption laws were supposed to
encourage U.S. possession corporations to invest in Puerto Rican financial
markets rather than to divert their Puerto Rican tax-exempt profits into
Eurodollar markets. Bank deposits, investments in Puerto Rico government
obligations and Puerto Rico sources of mortgages-backed guaranteed by the
U.S. government (GNMA's), were designated the main eligible activities that
qualified under the reinvestment incentive. As a result, the financial
sector underwent a radical change.
Since 1976, possession corporation deposits have accounted for more than
half of the growth in Puerto Rico's commercial bank deposit base. Also,
since 1976, these corporations have generated more than half of their income
for pure financial transactions. Moreover, possession corporations have
bought most of the Puerto Rico's public debt bond issued and the GNMA's
sources. However, the reinvestment incentive appears to be more effective
in providing possession corporations significant amounts of tax-free
investment and interest income than in reducing the cost capital or
increasing investment opportunities or physical fixed investment in Puerto
Rico. The reinvestment incentive rulings and regulations seem to have been
deficient both substantively and in technical drafting, and also to be
inordinately difficult and burdensome to administer and enforce. Financial
institutions and tax lawyers appear to have taken advantage of the defects
of these rules. Finally, the tollgate tax seems to be poorly applied. In
practice, possession corporations seem to be able to reduce their tollgate
tax regardless of their rate of profits reinvested in eligible activities or
their rate of repatriation of profits.
Major changes seem necessary within the present system of industrial
incentives, primarily that of profit tax exemption, in order to increase
employment, income, revenues, and real investment opportunities in Puerto
Rico. Profit tax exemption, including the improvements made recently to the
current framework, seems to be inadequate for the challenge of increasing
employment and income in Puerto Rico. U.S. and Puerto Rico's tax exemption
laws for possession corporations do not appear to be effectively targeted
toward creating jobs and promoting new investment. Profit tax exemption
provides no direct incentive to achieve the desired economic development
objectives. The effectiveness of the federal and local tax incentive laws
has been dependent on earnings being produced by additional jobs and
investment. To the extent that earnings are not achieved or delayed, the
impact of the incentive is reduced and, to the extent that initial losses
are expected, the effectiveness of the credit as an incentive to investment
is also reduced. Moreover, to the extent that Puerto Rico exempts all
income from U.S. corporations, including income attributable to intangibles
and income from financial investments, the incentive to create jobs, local
income, and new investment in Puerto Rico is attenuated. These tax
exemption laws appear to be more effective in providing U.S. manufacturing
firms enough incentives to generate profits. Under this approach
manufacturing output and income have increased but not employment, income,
and investment opportunities. Instead, manufacturing income appears to be
leaving Puerto Rico to pay royalties, dividends, and profits to U.S.
investors.
This thesis explores economic and administrative aspects of development
problems related to profit tax-exemption as the main policy-instrument and
key incentive for promoting industrial and economic development in Puerto
Rico. Of principal concern are the initial perceptions that (1) some
features of the tax exemption laws appear to distort investment incentives,
(2) employment and income remain low, (3) reinvestment of tax-exempt profits
seems to be a weak incentive to finance economic development projects, (4)
the tollgate tax appears to be poorly applied, and (5) tax-exemption seems
to be managed on a discretionary basis.
This study has been divided into four sections. The First Section reviews
the tax exemption statutes. Chapter One analyzes the Puerto Rico Industrial
Incentives Acts (IIAs) of 1948, 1954, 1963, and 1978 and presents a review
of the literature on tax exemption. Chapter Two reviews the U.S. IRC
provisions which provide tax incentives to U.S. corporations operating in
Puerto Rico. This section of the research examines the policy issue of
whether tax exemption laws have been effectively targeted to promote Puerto
Rico's economic development objectives. It seems appropriate to begin this
research with the review of these laws since they lay the foundation of this
study. The various amendments appear to be restricted to restructuring
primary provisions of the laws, and little attention seems to be paid to
whether another more effective and less complicated incentive would be
preferable to create jobs, promote new investment, and increase income and
revenues.
The Second Section surveys the role played by tax exemption in shaping
Puerto Rico's economy. Chapter Three, the only chapter of this section,
analyzes the effect of industrial tax exemption on the structure of
industrial employment and income in Puerto Rico. This section also has been
designed to shed some light on the main policy issues of this research.
Chapter Three studies the general macroeconomic framework in relation to
capital, labor, and investment.
The Third Section evaluates the relative impact of tax exemption as a
reinvestment incentive. Tax exemption as a reinvestment incentive currently
is intended to be one of the main policy instruments to stimulate Puerto
Rico's economic development. In the absence of a financial or an economic
model, this section examines whether possession corporation funds have been
translated into real economic activities in Puerto Rico. Financial and
economic data are used to assess the performance of possession corporation
funds. This assessment considers whether these funds have increased the
availability of credit or reduced the cost of capital to the government and
to investors in Puerto Rico. These analyses help to determine whether
financial investments made by possession corporations have resulted in
additional physical investment in Puerto Rico. In order to facilitate the
study of tax exemption as a reinvestment incentive, this third section has
been divided into four chapters, Four through Seven. Chapter Four presents
the basis of the reinvestment incentive and its relationship to the
financial market of possession corporations. Chapters Five and Six proceed
with the analysis of the effect of possession corporations funds on
qualifying economic development activities under the reinvestment incentive.
Chapter Five, in particular, evaluates the effect on Puerto Rico's economy
of possession corporation funds reinvested by commercial banks. The
following criteria are examined to determine the contribution of bank
deposits to increase the availability of credit, or to reduce the cost of
loans to borrowers: (1) types of loan activities financed with possession
corporation funds, (2) distribution of possession corporation funds between
financial institutions in Puerto Rico, (3) maturity of deposits, and (4)
determinants of interest rates. The selection of these criteria was based
on the stated objectives, as defined by laws or by Puerto Rico Treasury
rulings and regulations.
Chapter Six examines the effect of possession corporation funds on
investments in public sector obligations, in government development
projects, and Mortgage-Backed Securities Guaranteed by the U.S. Government
(GNMA's) in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico Treasury regulations require that 30
percent of possession corporation funds accumulated in Puerto Rico be
invested in public obligations and investment projects. Specific criteria
are used to determine the relative effect of possession corporation funds
reinvested in public investment for: (1) reducing the net interest cost of
public investment financing, (2) increasing the marketability of government
obligations, and (3) financing investment development projects. The two
criteria for evaluating the effect of possession corporations funds on
Puerto Rico's sources of GNMA's are: (1) the interest rates on Puerto Rican
GNMA's and (2) whether the savings provided by lower interest rates on
Puerto Rican GNMA's are passed on to Puerto Rico's homebuyers who qualify
for insurance.
Chapter Seven surveys Puerto Rico Treasury reinvestment incentive rules and
regulations. It is important to review the reinvestment incentive rules and
regulations since questionable practices and technical problems related to
these rules and regulations appear to have diluted the effect of possession
corporations funds on real investment in Puerto Rico. This chapter also
presents conclusions about the relative effect of tax exemption as a
reinvestment incentive.
The last Section, the Fourth, analyzes the role of the tollgate tax as a
fiscal and economic development mechanism. The tollgate tax has been and
continues to be intimately related to tax exemption as a reinvestment
incentive. In fact, the tollgate tax and the reinvestment incentive are
considered the two principal mechanisms of the current industrial and
economic development program in Puerto Rico. This section examines the
application of the tollgate tax rules and studies the impact of these rules.
The tollgate tax, as a fiscal mechanism, is supposed to contribute to
increased revenues through tax collection. As an economic development
mechanism, the tollgate tax is supposed to increase reinvestment in
qualified eligible activities. The tollgate tax is applied through closing
agreements executed by possession corporations and the Puerto Rico Treasury.
The closing agreements are legal documents that determine the rate of the
tollgate tax on repatriation of profits, the dividend distribution
limitations, and the reinvestment requirements applied to possession
corporations on the repatriation of their industrial income. The section
includes three chapters (Eight, Nine, and Ten).
Chapter Eight presents the criteria used to evaluate the application of the
tollgate tax as defined under the 1963 and 1978 Industrial Incentives Acts
(IIAs), regulations and closing agreements. Chapter Nine discusses general
statistics of the tollgate tax, and Chapter Ten presents the findings of a
detailed investigation of the application of the tollgate tax. This
investigation studied all the closing agreements executed during the period
between 1978 and 1985 for three parent companies: (1) a pharmaceutical &
chemicals industry, (2) a hospital, professional & scientific industry, and
(3) an electronics industry. The three case study companies have had 16
possession corporations operating in Puerto Rico. Twenty-eight closing
agreements were executed between these possession corporations and the
Puerto Rico Treasury during this period. From the examination of the case
studies, some conclusions can be drawn about the application of the tollgate
tax and about tax exemption as a reinvestment incentive.
Chapter Eleven presents the conclusions of this dissertation and offers some
recommendations for future research. Also, there are several appendices
supplementing the earlier analyses. Appendix A supplements Chapter One of
this thesis since the chapter only presents a brief summary of Puerto Rico's
IIAs. Appendices B, C, D, and E present statistical information constructed
for Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six, and Nine, respectively. Appendices
F.I, F.II, and F.III present data of the closing agreements for the three
case studies to support the findings discussed in Chapter Ten.
There are grounds for concern over the effectiveness and complexity of tax
exemption as an incentive and principal policy instrument to promote Puerto
Rico's economic development. It does not seem premature to observe that tax
exemption has proved relatively ineffective and an inordinately complex
incentive as compared with other alternatives when the economic development
objectives are to encourage job creation, income opportunities, increased
revenues, and promotion of new investment opportunities in Puerto Rico.
The retention of tax exemption in Puerto Rico for possession corporations
appears to derive much of its strength from the fear that any departure from
the historic tax exemption framework would discourage new investment or
actually encourage a flight of existing investment. What is needed is a
real effort from the federal and local governments to design a better system
of industrial incentives with the objectives of increasing employment-
producing investment, income, revenues and/or real fixed investment. The
critical economic needs of Puerto Rico demand a second look at the
effectiveness of tax exemption as a profit incentive, including the
reinvestment incentive and the application of the tollgate tax. Profit tax
exemption seems to be ineffective, burdensome, and a poor approach to
promoting Puerto Rico's economic development.
The research presented represents an effort to uncover complex policy issues
that affect Puerto Rico's economic development. Profit tax exemption seems
initially to have accomplished what it was designed to do: it has helped
attract mainland manufacturing firms to Puerto Rico and thereby has helped
to raise Puerto Rico's economic output. Profit tax exemption, including the
reinvestment incentive and the tollgate tax, has however become a maze of
legal approaches to evade taxes and to create an artificial accumulation of
private capital, while Puerto Rico's economy continues to languish.
First Section
Legal Basis of Industrial Tax
Exemption in Puerto Rico Since 1948
This section reviews Puerto Rico and the United States (U.S.) industrial
tax-exemption laws operating in Puerto Rico. These U.S. laws provide tax
incentives to mainland firms (the so-called possession corporations)
operating in Puerto Rico (and other U.S. possessions) under Section 931 and
its successor, Section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (IRC).
These tax incentive laws were created to encourage additional jobs and
investment (and simultaneously to help increase revenues and income) in
Puerto Rico. However, the Puerto Rican and U.S. laws' basic approach, that
of exempting active business and investment income from taxes through the
mechanism of a tax credit, does not appear to be effectively targeted toward
creating jobs and promoting new investment or to increasing income and
revenues. The tax credit is applicable to income, whether or not it
generates new jobs or investment. Moreover, there appears to exist grounds
for concern over the effectiveness and complexity of tax exemption laws as
an incentive to Puerto Rico's economic development. Subsequent acts over
the years appear to be restricted to restructuring primary provisions of the
laws, and little attention seems to be paid to whether another more
effective and less complicated incentive would be preferable.
This section addresses the policy issue of whether tax exemption laws have
been sufficiently effective, workable and fair in the promotion of Puerto
Rico's economic development. The first chapter reviews the Puerto Rico
Industrial Incentives Acts (IIA) since 1948, and analyzes the effect of
these laws on attracting firms and on stimulating the economy. A
comprehensive review of Puerto Rican IIAs is presented in Appendix A. The
second and final chapter of the section examines the impact of U.S. tax
exemption laws on satisfying their stated objectives, creating employment-
producing investments in Puerto Rico.
Chapter One
Industrial Tax Incentives on Puerto Rico's Economy
Since 1948, Puerto Rico has relied on an industrial development program to
increase real investment, employment, income, and revenues. Exemption from
federal, local, and municipal taxes has been and continues to be the key
mechanism used to promote Puerto Rico's industrial development program.
This chapter reviews the Puerto Rican Industrial Incentives Acts (IIA) of
1948, 1954, 1963, and 1978 to ascertain the effectiveness of the tax
exemption statute to increase manufacturing employment, income, revenues,
and real investment in Puerto Rico. Tax exemption appears to be an
effective incentive to attract U.S. industrial capital and investors.
However, it seems to be a weak instrument to reach other desired economic
development objectives, such as to increase industrial jobs, income,
revenues, and real investment in Puerto Rico.
I. Review of Puerto Rican Industrial Incentives Acts
The 1948 IIA (Law No. 184 of May 13, 1948 was a technical revision of Act
No. 347 of May 13, 1947) played a key role in Puerto Rico's large-scale
industrialization program since 1948. The main objectives of the law of
1948 have prevailed under the new IIAs introduced afterwards. Among these
objectives are to increase employment, income, real investment, and local
revenues through attracting manufacturing firms by means of profit tax
exemption.
Exempt-firms in Puerto Rico were virtually free of taxes through a
combination of the basic profit tax exemption provisions of the 1948 IIA and
other supplementary legislation. The 1948 IIA (Sections 4(a][1][2][3],
6[a][1][2], and 12, Act No. 184, May 13, 1948) provided profit tax-
exemption from three major tax levies: (1) income tax, (2) property tax and,
(3) licenses, fees and excise taxes. These three fields of exemption were
supplemented by several relief measures provided by separate legislation,
which are discussed in detail in Appendix A.
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The tax exemption statute of 1948, as well as its successors (except the law
of 1978), had a provision of limited existence. Specifically, the statute
of 1948 (Section 5, Act No. 184 of May 13, 1948) provided a 12-year period
of full exemption from July 1, 1947, to June 30, 1959, with an additional
three years of partial exemption until the expiration of the Act on June 30,
1962. Finally, the basis of the tax exemption statute of 1948 applies also
to the laws of 1954, 1963, and 1978. Consequently, only principal changes
to the tax exemption statute, which emerged after 1948, will be discussed
under the presentation of these new laws.
The 1954 IIA (Act No. 6 of December 15, 1953) maintained the tax benefits
and related tax exemption legislation of the previous law under its
provisions. This law, however, modified the expiration disposition of the
tax-exemption period established under the previous 1948 IIA. In addition,
this law provided income tax exemptions to promote industries as well as
exemptions on patents, excise taxes, and municipal taxes for a period of ten
years from the date of beginning operations. Also, this law permitted under
its dispositions, the conversion of businesses already covered by the 1948
IIA. Under conversion, firms that began operations between 1948-1959 were
provided 10 years of additional tax exemption.
The 1963 IIA (Law No. 57 of June 13, 1963) continued, in general terms, the
provisions of previous Acts, including the supportive tax exemption
legislation presented under the 1948 IIA. This law, in particular, modified
the provision defining the tax-exemption period. This new Act provided
longer than 10-year periods of tax-exemption based on three categories of
industrial location of tax-exemption periods corresponding to more-remote or
less-developed locations. Initially, the tax exemption periods of 10, 12,
and 17 years granted to firms corresponded to three zones classified by
their degree of development: "High (San Juan)," "Outside High," and
"Scarce", respectively. In 1969, the tax-exemption periods and designated
development zones were modified and by adding a fourth category, "less
development zone" (Table 1.1).
This law was supposed to expire on June 30, 1973; however, it was extended
to June 30, 1983 (Act No. 123 of June 30, 1971). This law had many
modifications during its existence. The most important legislative changes
of the 1963 Act are reviewed in Appendix A.
Table 1.1
Tax-Exemption Periods And Designated Development Zones
Designated Development Zone Period of Tax-Exemption
Hi h Development Zone 10-Year
Ou side High Development Zone 15-Year
Less Development Zone 25-year
Scarce Development Zone 30-Year
Source Puerto Rico, Act No. 100 of June 27,1969, Section 1(r).
In 1973 a tax was introduced which imposed a 15 percent tollgate tax (that
is, a withholding tax imposed on repatriation of industrial profits). This
tax, however, was rarely applicable. It only applied if the nonresident
parent corporation could claim a foreign tax credit for the tollgate tax.
Because such dividends were fully taxable to the parent company under the
U.S. IRC until 1976, whereas a liquidating distribution was free of both
U.S. and Puerto Rico taxes, firms did not ordinarily pay dividends, the
existence of the Puerto Rico tollgate tax was rarely applicable, and the
foreign tax credit barely used.
In the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1976, under Section 936 of the IRC, Congress
allowed U.S. parent companies a dividend-received deduction from their
possession corporations, but denied a foreign credit for Puerto Rico or
other taxes imposed on the dividends. This provision was suppose to
stimulate the repatriation of possession corporations' profits accumulated
in Puerto Rico to the United States. In 1976, the provision of the tollgate
tax was modified. The tax was reduced to 10 percent and applied to all
industrial income to be repatriated (Law No. 95 of June 1, 1976). In 1976,
a reinvestment incentive was introduced under the IIA of 1963 in
anticipation of the effect of the passage of Section 936 and other federal
provisions related to possession corporations.
Finally, the 1978 IIA, still in existence, maintains in general terms the
provisions of previous laws containing the tax-exemption statute. Also, it
maintains the general supplementary legislation which provides other tax
exemption benefits to firms. Major changes in this law relate to tax
exemption as a reinvestment incentive and to the tollgate tax imposed on
repatriation of industrial profits. Changes in these provisions are
considered to be the most important features of the current program of
industrial tax exemption. The apparent effect of tax exemption as a
reinvestment-incentive and the tollgate tax will be examined later in this
thesis (Chapters Four to Ten).
The 1978 IIA modified the tollgate tax provisions of the 1963 IIA. It
reduced the impact that this tax could have had on large corporations with
significant amounts of accumulated profits. The reinvestment incentive and
the tollgate tax provisions of the'1963 IIA were modified under the 1978 IIA
to solve so-called technical problems that the 1976 changes created for
firms. Supposedly, the two 1976 changes taken together had the effect of
subjecting dividends paid nonresident U.S. parent corporations to a 10
percent Puerto Rico's tax. This rate was low, however, it was considered by
the corporations to be extremely high because the potential source of
taxable dividends included not only new income earned under Section 936, but
also earnings accumulated under the previous Section 931. In particular,
the 1978 IIA affected the terms of new and of old grants of tax exemption by
providing a differentiated tax treatment for each source of dividend. It
created four definitions that contain the criteria for taxation of firms
operating under old and new grants: (1) New exemption grants, (2) Conversion
of old exemption grants, (3) Old exemption grants, and (4) Non-exempt
corporations. Some old grants were converted to qualify under the
incentives offered to them. The most important of these incentives were
shorter reinvestment periods and a reduced tollgate tax for industrial
development income (IDI) accumulated before 1979. (For more information on
this topic see Appendix A.)
II. The Effect of the Tax Exemption Statute in Puerto Rico's
Programs of Industrial Promotion and Economic Development
The revision of the IIA reveals that the tax exemption statute offers
significant incentives to firms operating with profits. Tax exemption
provides a tax credit on profits made by tax-exempt corporations, but it
does not offer direct investment and job incentives to corporations. Among
the legal implications of Puerto Rico's tax exemption statute are:
A. Profit Tax Incentives
The industrial incentive laws have been based on profit tax exemption.
Profit tax exemption depends on the existence of profits. As Puerto Rico's
labor costs rise, the leverage of the tax exemption incentive diminishes.
The leverage of the tax exemption incentive does not only depend on the
level of costs in Puerto Rico. It also depends on the profits being made in
the parent corporation as a whole. The industries that are hardest hit by
rising labor costs are so-called traditional industries and those wholly
owned by Puerto Rico's residents (two categories with a very large overlap,
as shown in Chapter Three).
Generally, the IIAs since 1948 have been structured to provide U.S.
investors, operating as possession corporations in Puerto Rico, the highest
degree of tax reduction. These laws have provided almost complete -exemption
from Puerto Rico's taxes for most U.S. firms that undertake manufacturing in
Puerto Rico. This breadth of coverage is a distinguishing characteristic of
the tax subsidy as compared to the usual type of tax exemption in the United
States, for it not only covers all major taxes on the operation of a
business but also taxes on the distribution of earnings and interest income
from financial investments. The full significance of these exemptions may
be appreciated when it is realized that the Puerto Rican income tax for the
most part is a full substitute for the U.S. tax because freedom from Puerto
Rican income taxes means virtual relief from U.S. federal taxation as well
(U.S. tax-exemption will be discussed in Chapter Two.) The tax incentive
has applied not only to business organizations, whether operated as an
individual ownership, partnership, or corporation, but also to profit
distributions under the individual income tax for residents of Puerto Rico.
B. Tax-Exemption Periods
The industrial incentives acts have provided lengthy tax exemption periods
to firms, specially to those that locate within Puerto Rico but outside San
Juan. The legal provisions assume that tax exemption periods have a
positive effect on location decisions of firms; however, these laws have
given little attention to: (1) theoretical arguments demonstrating that long
periods of tax exemption lack effect on the location decision of firms
(Thurow, 1970; Dennis and Rafuse, 1976) and (2) empirical findings
suggesting that tax exemption periods lack effect on decentralizing
industrial employment (Woodward, 1972).
Thurow (1970, p.22) presented the theoretical argument to the Puerto Rico
Planning Board that firms do not consider the length of the tax exemption
period to be important when they decide to locate in Puerto Rico. Based on
Thurow's argument, given the capital budgeting procedures used by mainland
firms when they are deciding whether to invest in Puerto Rico, the
efficiency of tax exemptions rapidly decline over time. He demonstrated, in
addition, that Puerto Rico's government discount rate is lower than the
firm's--so that the government would gain a great deal by restricting the
length of the exemption period. Based on Thurow's argument, given the
capital budgeting procedures used by mainland firms when they are deciding
whether to invest in Puerto Rico, the efficiency of tax exemptions rapidly
decline over time. A current tax exemption is worth more than a tax
exemption 10 years from now or a tax exemption 17 years from now. Using a
20 percent discount rate, $1 in profit tax exemption 17 years into the
future is counted as $0.04 in firm's investment planning and $1 in profit
tax exemption 11 years from now is counted as only $0.13 in the firm's
investment planning. Thurow recommended that tax exemption in excess of 10
years should be abolished.
Besides the theoretical arguments advanced by Thurow, another argument was
presented by Dennis and Rafuse (1976, p. 48). They informed the Puerto Rico
Government Development Bank (GDB) that firms do not consider the length of
the exemption period to be very important. Historically, they argued, the
periods of tax exemption have been extended to firms beyond those of the
initial exemption period, in which case the length of the initial grant
makes only a small contribution to a heavily discounted risk. If the length
of the exemption period does not substantially affect the initial investment
decision, then its choice should depend on whether the firm can be expected
to remain after the end of tax exemption. They concluded that in the
interest of flexibility, it would probably be a good idea to restrict the
exemption period for all firms to 10 years and allow for administratively
determined exemption beyond that.
Woodward's (1972; and 1974, pp. 261-274) empirical argument was that there
is little.evidence that long periods of tax exemption outside San Juan have
much effect on the location decisions of firms. Empirically, he
demonstrated that the rate-of-return effect on decentralization for tax
exemption periods longer than 10 years is likely to be small. He tested the
regional tax exemption program against plant construction by the Puerto Rico
Economic Development Administration (EDA) and cash grants. He found that
the most powerful decentralization incentives in Puerto Rico are capital
loans and grants, and land acquisition programs that are administered to
encourage location in parts of Puerto Rico other than in San Juan (but not
tax exemption). He evidenced that the magnitude of the incentive provided
at the time a new plant is established is rather small when the location
incentive is an increase in the length of the period of tax exemption.
Moreover, he proved that rather small capital grants, given at the time of
the establishment of a plant, would yield decentralization incentives at
least as large as those implicit in the tax exemption program. Also, Dennis
and Rafuse in their report to the GDB, using Woodward's methodology,
presented updated information that further support Woodward's findings
(1976, Tables 11 and 12, pp.52-54).
C. Capital Input Subsidies
The IIAs lead to a bias toward subsidizing capital inputs. Tax exemption
legislation seems to have been indifferent as to whether the cost of
attracting jobs differs between capital- and labor-intensive industries.
The evidence suggests that the tax-exemption statute has increased the
capital-labor ratio of tax-exempt firms in Puerto Rico. Tobin (1975, p.23)
concluded in the Interagency Strategy Committee on Puerto Rico's Economic
Development report that Puerto Rico is pricing itself out of the market for
industries which provide jobs and require little capital. In the long run,
he considered that Puerto Rico could "bring the labor up to the price" by
upgrading skills through training programs. Vocational training, subsidies
for training, and related programs can be reviewed and expanded in socially
profitable directions. His main argument, however, is that there is much
evidence to suggest that skills and work practices learned on the job form
part of the labor training. He further stated that these forms of "human
capital" simply will not be developed in an unskilled worker if he can never
find his first job.
As will be explained in detail in Chapter Three, the IIAs have been
redirected to attract mainly capital-intensive industries. There has been
an emphasis in attracting capital-intensive industries after the 1960s
because they are typically considered firms with a greater probability of
maintaining operations in Puerto Rico after their tax-exemption grant
expires. Also, since 1960, the tax-exemption legislation has been primarily
promoting capital-intensive industries because they are typically less
affected by rising labor costs. The underlying assumption of these laws is
that the phaseout problems are unlikely to be severe in capital-intensive
industries because the value of fixed depreciable assets at the end of the
exemption period would be fairly high. As a result capital-intensive
industries are considered to be better qualified to obtain tax-exemption
incentives than other industries.
D. Tax Incentives for Existing and New Firms
The tax-exemption legislation is not neutral between expansion of existing
enterprises and establishment of new enterprises by the same parent.
Typically, it has been argued that a grant of tax exemption is provided to
Puerto Rican newcomers to overcome the risk associated with the
establishment of operations in an unknown environment; however, existing
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U.S. corporations already in Puerto Rico obtain this incentive by setting up
new enterprises rather than expanding existing ones. This problem was
documented by Musgrave and Richman to the Puerto Rico Economic Development
Administration (1962, pp. 24-31). Other authors have identified the
persistance of this problem (Thurow, 1970; Tobin, 1975; and Dennis and
Rafuse, 1976).
E. Liquidation "Incentive"
The liquidation provision of the tax-exemption legislation did not encourage
tax-exempt firms to maintain operations in Puerto Rico after their tax-
exemption period expires. Holbrook's (1975) findings in his report to the
Interagency Strategy Committee on Puerto Rico's Economic Development support
this conclusion. He argued that the IIA liquidation provisions allowed
tax-exempt firms to repatriate total profits, including interest income,
free of local and federal income taxes. Before 1976, tax-exempt firms
accumulated financial rather than real assets and frequently liquidated
their investments at the end of the tax-exemption period.
F. New Products Incentive
The laws have provided that tax-exemption grants can be extended with the
introduction of new products. As such, the tax-exemption grant would be
permanent for large U.S. possession corporations. Thus, revenues from tax
collection at the end of the tax-exemption period would generally be low.
This argument was documented by Taylor in 1957 and by Booz, Allen, and
Hamilton in 1985. In particular, Booz, Allen, and Hamilton in their report
to the Puerto Rico Manufacturers Association argue that tax exemption is
being offered for the introduction of new industrial products. Firms with
large research and development components, such as pharmaceutical and
electronic firms, are characterized by their frequent introduction of new
products. The industrial tax-exemption grant could be extended since new
products could be exempted from taxes. (Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, 1985,
Chapter Two.)
G. Financing Capital Incentives
The tax-exemption legislation has contributed to the attraction and/or to
the accumulation of capital in Puerto Rico. Profit tax-exemption provided
under the IIA, has been the principal tax incentive to attract firms.
Highly profitable tax-exempt firms obtain larger incentives than less
profitable firms. Tax-exempt firms operating with loses cannot benefit from
the profit tax-exemption incentive. Tobin's example describing the
"typical" pattern of a U.S. Puerto Rican subsidiary serves to explain the
relationship between profits and taxes. As he stated:
The mainland corporation has strong -reason to locate in
Puerto Rico those of its interde endent operations which
are the most profitable. Federal tax regulations
currently prevent profits from being returned at once to
the mainland parent. Therefore the subsidiary begins to
accumulate financial assets... By the time its Puerto
Rican tax-exemption expires, the subsidiary holds
substantial financial wealth as well as its depreciated
operating capital in Puerto Rico. The assets are then
sold, the subsidiary is liquidated, and the accumulated
profit of the entire operation is absorbed into the
mainland parent, free throughout of both Puerto Rican
and federal taxes. The physical facilities are still in
Puerto Rico, of course. They will be operated only if
some firms, perhaps a new child of the old parent not a
tax-exemption can be arranged. (Tobin, 1975, p. 43)
Some of the particulars of Tobin's example have been changed by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 and the Puerto Rican reaction to it. After 1976,
industrial development in Puerto Rico is intimately linked to tax-exemption
incentives. Currently, Puerto Rico is attracting a highly profitable
industrial segment because after 1976, profits and interest income from
financial investment of profits accumulated in Puerto Rico -are exempted from
taxes. (This topic will be discussed in detail in forthcoming sections of
this research.)
One of the conclusions reached by Dennis and Rafuse (1976, pp. 45-50) is
that Puerto Rico seems to be indifferent to the fact that an exceptionally
large percentage of net income in capital-intensive industries goes to the
owners of capital rather than to labor or for additional investment. They
suggest that the Puerto Rican government believes that in the absence of tax
exemption, Puerto Rico would lose income and tax revenues, along with the
jobs and investment that might have been generated.
H. Real Industrial Profits Argument
The tax-exemption statute appeared to have created some distortions of real
industrial profits, since the profits made in Puerto Rico would be
exaggerated. This argument is analyzed by Dennis and Rafuse (1976, p.43).
They said that the rate-of-return for possession corporations operating in
Puerto Rico under a tax-exemption grant is high. U.S. corporations seeking
to set up tax-exempt subsidiaries in Puerto Rico would choose the part of
their operations that is most profitable, so as to exempt the largest
proportion possible.of corporate income. They suggest that the true rate-
of-return, in such cases, may not be as high as might appear from the profit
figures.
I. Reinvestment Incentive
The tax-exemption legislation seems to be a weak incentive to encourage
reinvestment of tax-exempt profits. This argument was first raised by
Musgrave and Richman (1962, p. 2). Their concern was that Puerto Rico's
industrial and fiscal policy was giving more emphasis to promote capital
intensive industries, industries involving purely financial operations,
and/or industries that accumulated their profits in financial assets. They
proposed a reinvestment incentive based on Puerto Rico's industrial and tax
policy. This policy should focus on attracting firms aiming to undertake
producing operations, with an emphasis on those looking forward to continued
operations in Puerto Rico. In 1962, Musgrave and Richman suggested the
basic goal of this policy should be to raise the income of Puerto Ricans,
and such may be accomplished most directly by new industries that provide
for high employment.
After 1976, a reinvestment incentive was added on the tax-exemption
legislation to encourage possession corporations to invest a portion of
their profits in Puerto Rico. If firms decide not to reinvest a portion of
their profits in Puerto Rico, dividends, rents, and interest income continue
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to be free of taxes, with the exception of a modest 10 percent tollgate tax,
upon repatriation; however, tax-exempt firms appear not to have reasons to
reinvest since the law has permitted discretion over the application of the
rules governing reinvestment, repatriation, and the rate of tollgate tax
upon repatriation of profits. The tollgate tax is administered through
closing agreements, which seem to be highly flexible (Chapter Nine).
Finally, since Puerto Rico's industrial incentives program is based on a
dual system of tax exemption, the next chapter examines the U.S. tax laws
for possession corporations.
Chapter Two
Evaluation of the United States Tax
Exemption Laws for Possession Corporations
Legislative changes have been introduced in the United States (U.S.)
Possessions Corporation System of Taxation to stimulate economic development
in U.S. possessions. This chapter examines whether this tax exemption
statute and the legislative changes have been effective in promoting
economic development in the possessions, in particular, in Puerto Rico.
Currently (1989), almost all possession corporations operate in Puerto
Rico.'
I. Overview
The main elements of the so-called "possession corporations" system of tax
exemption became part of Section 262 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
of 1921. This legislation was introduced as a means of encouraging U.S.
export trade to the Far East from a base in the Philippines by giving
possession corporations the same benefits of tax deferral that were enjoyed
by their British corporate competitors. 2 The principal argument advanced in
support of this tax-exemption provision was that U.S. firms were placed in a
tax-induced disadvantage vis-a-vis United Kingdom corporations.3 Support
for the exemption came primarily from a group of firms then operating in the
Philippines.4 Those firms argued that tax exemption would encourage U.S.
trade with the Far East from the U.S. base in the Philippines while at the
same time reducing incentives for U.S. firms operating there to incorporate
outside the United States. Little attention was paid to the effect of this
law on the Philippines economy. Other U.S. possessions were virtually
ignored in the public debate. 5
In 1954, the United States Congress introduced Section 931 of the IRC, which
exclusively contained regulations pertaining to the "Possessions Corporation
System of Taxation." This section provided tax exemption to U.S. firms
doing business in Puerto Rico and certain other U.S. possessions.6 In
particular, this section exempted from taxes all "foreign-source income" of
possession corporations.7 To qualify for the exemption of income derived
from sources outside the United States, a U.S. corporation had to meet two
gross income tests. The corporation had to derive 80 percent or more of its
gross income from the possessions and 50 percent or more of its gross income
from the active conduct of a trade or business in the possessions. 8 These
gross income tests had to be fulfilled in the tax year in which the
exemption was claimed and also in the two prior years if the corporation had
handled a trade or business in a possession during that period.
In 1976, the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives
considered repealing the Possessions Corporation System of Tax Exemption
because its original purpose of expanding U.S. trade with the Philippines
and the Far East was no longer being served, the Philippines having ceased
to be a U.S. possession in 1946; however, it was not repealed on the grounds
that it had become crucial to the economic development of Puerto Rico since
1948 when Puerto Rico enacted a program of tax exemption for manufacturing
firms. This relationship between the Puerto Rico tax incentives and U.S.
tax treatment has remained, but significant legislative changes have been
introduced to deal with a large number of perceived problems.
The U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended the tax treatment of possession
corporations to assist the possessions in obtaining employment-producing
investments by U.S. corporations. 9 At the same time this Act encouraged
those corporations to bring back to the United States the earnings from
these investments to the extent they could not be reinvested productively in
the possessions. These changes were effected by removing possession
corporations from Section 931 and placing them in a new section (Section
936) of the IRC. Section 936 also has had legislative changes to improve
the possessions system of tax exemption; furthermore, there are other
Sections of the IRC that have been amended as part of the tax reform related
to Section 936.
II. Impact of the Possessions Corporation System of Tax Exemption
This chapter proceeds with the examination of the legislative changes of
this system. As previously mentioned, it will examine whether the basic
approach of the Possessions Corporation System of Taxation, namely
exempting from U.S. taxes certain active business income from Puerto Rican
sources and qualifying investment income through the mechanism of a tax
credit, has been effective in promoting economic development in Puerto Rico.
Legal implications of these tax-exemption laws will be examined by
evaluating, first, legislative changes between Section 931 and 936 of the
IRC; and second, amendments of Section 936 as well as other changes in
legislation that have occurred after 1976. Legislative changes were
analyzed to evaluate the main problems with the tax exemption statutes and
how these problems have been solved. -
A. Legislative Changes Between Section 931 and Section 936
There are four major differences between Section 931 and Section 936. They
are the following:
1. Scope and method of effecting the tax exemption: Under Section 931,
possession corporations enjoyed tax exemption with respect to income on
investments that were made outside of the possessions where business was
conducted and that obviously did nothing to create jobs or provide capital
investment in the possessions. This topic will be discussed in Chapter
Three.
In the 1976 act, the U.S. Congress attempted to solve these problems by
replacing the exemption for income derived from foreign countries under
Section 931 with a tax credit under Section 936. This tax credit could be
elected by a qualifying corporation which met the 50 percent active business
and the 80 percent possessions-source income tests of Section 931.10 The
credit was equal in amount to the U.S. tax attributable to: (a) Income from
the active conduct of a trade or business in a possession, or from the sale
or exchange of substantially all of the active conduct of such trade or
business; and (b) Qualifying Possessions Source Investment Income (QPSII),
which is nonbusiness income derived from the possessions in which the
corporation has its trade or business and which is attributable to the
investment of funds derived from such trade or business.11 In other words,
under these rules, possession corporations with a trade or business in
Puerto Rico cannot convert interest on Eurodollar deposits, for example,
into possessions source income by routing such deposits through a bank
located in Guam.12
2. Exemption from U.S. tax on income remitted by a possession corporation
to its parent: Prior to 1976, dividends paid by possession corporations
were fully taxable to a U.S. shareholder, but an amount received upon
liquidation of a possession corporation was exempt form tax under Section
332 (liquidation). As a consequence, under Section 931, possession
corporations accumulated substantial earnings and invested them in the
Eurodollar capital market in anticipation of a tax-free liquidation, usually
upon termination of the Puerto Rican tax exemption.13
In order to encourage distribution of earnings, the 1976 Tax Reform Act,
under Section 936, permitted a dividends-received deduction for dividends
from possession corporations.14 Thus, dividends of income qualifying for
the Section 936 credit from a wholly-owned possession corporation were
rendered totally exempt from U.S. tax. The granting of the dividends-
received deduction in 1976 was expected to result in dividends from
possession corporations being exempt both from U.S. tax and from the Puerto
Rican tollgate tax. The government of Puerto Rico, however, imposed the 10
percent tollgate tax on dividends paid to non-resident U.S. corporations
whether or not it was creditable for U.S. tax purposes.15 Consequently, the
expected dividends distribution from possession corporations to their U.S.
parent corporations turned out to be a trickle; however, the resulting
increase of retained earnings from possession corporations have not been
translated into economic development activities in Puerto Rico. Eventually,
possession corporations have been able to repatriate those profits free or
almost free from tollgate taxes, i.e., most were less than four percent.
3. Requirement: Possession corporations must elect the benefits of
Section 936, and that election is irrevocable for 10 years. During this
period, it cannot join with its parent in filing a consolidated return,
although initially it can delay electing status under Section 936 until
profitable years begin. Under Section 931, as construed by a court
decision, a possession corporation that suffered a loss in a given year
could join its parent and other affiliated corporations in filing a
consolidated return for such a year.16 The parent of a possession
corporation thus avoided taxes in profitable years but was able to offset
any losses against other taxable income in unprofitable years. 17
4. Source of income rules:1 8 These rules established that income tax
exempted under Section 931 could not qualify for the credit under Section
936 if, for example, the tax exemption was received within the United
States.19 The income of most possession corporations is derived from the
sales of products manufactured by the corporation in Puerto Rico; therefore,
the most important source rule for possession corporations deals with income
from the sale or exchange of personal property.20 Under IRC Section 861
through 863, the source of income from the sale or exchange of personal
property is generally determined by the place where title to the personal
property passes to the purchaser. If a possession corporation sells goods
produced in Puerto Rico, the income derived from the sales to the parent
will be treated as Puerto R4can source income, even if the parent
subsequently resells the goods in the U.S. market.21
B. Changes in Legislation After the Tax Reform Act of 1976
The most important rules prior to 1982 deal with the treatment of income
from intangibles. Generally, U.S. corporations have constructed these rules
to increase the income that was exempt from tax under Section 936 by
transferring to an affiliated possession corporation intangible assets, such
as patents, trademarks, and tradenames, created in the United States. These
rules refer to "intercorporate transfers of assets" and "allocation of
income and deductions" defined under Sections 351 and 482 of the IRC
respectively.22 In particular, under this section, reallocation of income
between U.S. parent and affiliated possession corporations has been the
subject of controversy since 1955. The principal issue has been the
treatment of income from patents, trademarks and other intangibles developed
by a U.S. parent corporation but related to a product that is manufactured,
in whole or in part, by its possession corporations. 23
Since 1963, some U.S. parent corporations have shifted intangibles to their
possession corporations under Section 351. In computing the rightful price
for sales of goods from a possession corporation to its U.S. parent, the
parent corporations have in some cases asserted that the possession
corporations are entitled to all the return on the intangibles. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been concerned that the costs of research
and development, which produced the patents, know-how, advertising, and
other expenses that gave value to the trademarks, have been deducted for
U.S. tax purposes. The IRS has claimed that income attributable to
manufacturing and marketing intangibles acquired by a possession corporation
has to be reallocated to the parent, thereby reducing the income eligible
for tax exemption under Section 936. In many instances, corporations have
taken the position that the IRS actions are inconsistent with the law and
with Revenue Procedure 63-10.24
Two cases concerning the transfer of intangibles were held before the United
States Tax Court, Eli Lilly and G.D. Searle. The Eli Lilly case involved
four pharmaceutical products for which the research and development was
performed by the petitioner in the United States and the costs deducted
under Section 174 in the U.S. consolidated return. 25 The petitioner (Eli
Lilly) set up a U.S. subsidiary qualifying under Section 931, transferred
the manufacturing intangibles, including patents and manufacturing know-
how, to the subsidiary in a tax-free exchange under Section 351, and the
subsidiary then established manufacturing facilities in Puerto Rico. The
U.S. government, in substance, contended that income of the possession
corporation generated by the use of the manufacturing intangibles beyond
that appropriate for a contract manufacturer should be reallocated to the
petitioner under Section 482. Eli Lilly's basic position was that since the
intangibles were owned by the possession corporation, the income they
generated was earned by the corporation and could not be reallocated to the
petitioner.26
In the G.D. Searle case, both manufacturing and marketing intangibles were
transferred to the possession corporation.27 In 1984, the IRS was partially
successful in forcing these firms to reallocate some of the intangible
assets in question from possession corporations in Puerto Rico to the parent
corporation; howeverjany issues are still outstanding today (1989).
C. Changes in Legislation Under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibilities
Act of 1982 (TEFRA)
The tax-free income enjoyed by possession corporations generated by
manufacturing and marketing intangibles was targeted by a bill passed by the
U.S. Senate under The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA); however, the passage of the Senate bill touched off a period of
intense legislative activity by adversely affected taxpayers and the
government of Puerto Rico aimed at persuading Congress to soften the
provisions of the Senate bill. The Conference Committee's compromise
substantially relaxed the tightening that would have been effected by the
Senate bill.
There are three legislative changes to possession corporations' intangible
assets' treatment under TEFRA: (1) Attribution of Intangible Assets to
Shareholders, (2) Remedial Distribution to Preserve Eligibility, and (3)
Transfer of Intangibles to Foreign Corporations.28
The first legislative change was the attribution of intangible assets to
shareholders. Under TEFRA, Section 936 was amended to provide detailed
rules for the allocation of intangible income between a possession
corporation and its affiliates. This law added a new Section 936(h) to the
Code providing, as a general rule, that income from intangibles is taxable
to the U.S. shareholders of the possession corporation. Although most of
the sting of this Section was relived by giving U.S. corporations a right to
opt out of this treatment by electing between two options for allocating
income to the possession corporation. These options are a "cost-sharing"
and "50-50 profit-split."
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Under the "cost-sharing" option, a possession corporation would make a cost-
sharing payment, from the annual product area research expenditures of its
affiliates.29 The corporation would be deemed to own manufacturing
intangibles related to the product or service that it produces, in whole or
in part, in a possession. The possession corporation-would be entitled to
the full return on these manufacturing intangibles related to the product or
service that it produces, in whole or in part, in a possession. The
possession corporation would be entitled to the full return on these
manufacturing intangibles. Rules similar to the ones contained in Section
482 would be provided to determine when a possession corporation will be
considered to have developed an intangible. 30  Intangibles, such as
trademarks, tradenames, and brand names, developed under cost-sharing
agreements would not qualify as solely developed by the possession
corporation.31
The basic thrust of the cost-sharing election is thus to allow the
possession corporation to enjoy the Section 936 credit with respect to
income. This credit represents a reasonable return on manufacturing
intangibles related to the product area concerned. The credit, also
provides a generous return on certain nonmanufacturing intangibles developed
solely by it or used in connection with sales to unrelated parties for
ultimate use or consumption in the possessions. The distinction between
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing intangibles, which plays an important
role under a cost--sharing election, becomes blurred when items such as
computer programs, systems and technical data are concerned.32
Under a cost-sharing election, a possession corporation need only to make
appropriate cost-sharing payments with respect to product area research for
each taxable year beginning in 1983 and thereafter. This is to insure that
a full return on the related manufacturing intangibles previously
transferred to the possession corporation would qualify for the credit in
future years. This generous result would, of course, be obtained even if
the U.S. government prevails in the Eli Lilly and G.D. Searle cases.
Moreover, the statute appears to contemplate regulations that would define
"product area" in most cases with reference to the three-digit
classification of the Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC) (or
aggregations of two or more such classifications), which would result in
product areas such as "drugs" (Group No. 283), are very broad. Thus, if a
possession corporation producing pharmaceuticals makes appropriate
contributions under a cost-sharing election to future research and
development expenses related to drugs in general, income attributable in
future years to all drug-related, manufacturing intangibles, wherever
developed, would qualify for Section 936 credit.
The "profit-split" options under TEFRA, provides a credit to parent
corporations of 50 percent of the combined taxable income of the possession
corporations and all U.S. affiliates with respect to a product or service
produced, in whole or in part, in a possession. This means, 50 percent of
such profit would be allocated to a possession corporation, and the
remainder would be allocated to its affiliates.
Combined taxable income is computed separately for each product produced or
type of service rendered, in whole or in part, by the possession
corporation. Allowable expenses are deducted from the gross income realized
by the U.S. affiliated group (excluding foreign affiliates) on sales to
persons who are not members of the affiliated group and to foreign
affiliates. The expenses that are allowed to be deducted are: all
expenses, losses and other deductions properly apportioned or allocated to
gross income from such sales or services and a rateable portion of other
expenses, losses or other deductions, including marketing expenses, incurred
by the U.S. affiliated group.33 However, the research , development and
experimental expenses and related deductions apportioned or allocated to the
affiliated group cannot be less than the share of product area research that
would be payable by the possession corporation under a cost-sharing election
in the relevant product area.34
As a result of these rules (cost sharing and profit-split), the combined
taxable income is treated as income of the possession corporations and the
remainder allocated to the U.S. affiliates. As such,, the profit-split
contribution of the combined income from the product could exceed the
possession corporations' share. This might happen if the amount of the
proportionate product area research expenditures, payable by the possession
corporation under a cost-sharing election, is in excess of the amount that
would be apportioned or allocated to the combined taxable income in the
absence of the cost-sharing payment "floor."35 The purpose is to insure
that a U.S. affiliate will not be entitled to any deduction to which it
would not be entitled to under cost-sharing.
In order to qualify to elect either "cost-sharing" or the "50-50 profit-
split" options with respect to a product or type of service, a possession
corporation that was producing the product rendering the service on the date
of the enactment is required to maintain a significant business presence in
a possessions with respect to such product or type of service for the
taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1986.36 A transitional
business purpose test would be prescribed by regulations for future start-up
operations of new possession corporations and future products and services
of existing possession corporations. 37 The significant business presence
requirement is contained in the following four tests:
(a) More than 25 percent of the value added by the affiliated group to the
product is added by the possession corporation in a possessions,38 or
(b) At least 65 percent of the value added by the affiliated group to the
product is added by the possession corporation and is compensated for
services rendered in the possessions.39 These costs are for units of the
product produced or type of service rendered by the possession corporation
during the taxable year (or in connection with the purchase and sale of
goods not produced in whole or in part by the affiliated group.)
(c) Under value added tests, "total production costs" incurred by the
possession corporation is the possessions producing units must not be less
then 25 percent of the difference between: (1) gross receipts from sales of
the product to non-affiliates and (2) the direct materials costs of the
purchase of materials for such units by the affiliated group from persons
outside the group.40 These tests apply to products sold by the affiliated
group to persons outside the group.
(d) In addition to meeting the foregoing tests, the firm has to satisfy
other requirements in order to qualify for the profit-split election with
respect to products produced in whole or in part by the possession
corporation in the possessions. The possession corporation must be deemed
to produce or manufacture the product in the possessions under Section
954(d)(1)(A) of the controlled foreign corporation provisions. This Section
excludes from "foreign base commapny sales income" income for the sales of
products produced or manufactured by the controlled foreign corporation.
This will require activities in the possessions to meet either the
substantial transformation test or the purchased components rules of the
regulations issued under Section 954(d)(1).41,42
If a significant business presence is not maintained for a taxable year, the
election is revoked as of the beginning of the year, an no intangible
property income will be eligible for the credit; however, TEFRA provided a
"remedial distribution" provision to preserve eligibility.43
The second legislative change under TEFRA was remedial distribution to
preserve eligibility. Because intangible property income allocated to U.S.
shareholders under Section 936(h) is excluded from the possession
corporations income, such allocations may cause the corporation to-fail to
meet one or both of the possessions source income tests or the active
business income test. Under TEFRA, if such exclusion causes
disqualification for any taxable year, the corporation nonetheless may be
treated as satisfying the test or tests if, after the close of the taxable
year, it makes a remedial pro rata distribution to its U.S. and foreign
shareholders of disqualifying income either in the form of nonpossessions
source income or in the form of passive income that is not derived in the
conduct of an active trade or business or both.44
This Act raised from 50 to 65 percent the share of its gross income that a
corporation must derive from the active trade or business in order to
qualify for the Section 936 tax credit. This increase was phased in so that
the percentage rises to 55 percent for taxable year beginning in 1983, and
to 60 percent for taxable year beginning in 1984. Under the prior law, the
gross income test must have been met for the three-year period immediately
preceding the close of the taxable year).
The remedial distribution device, however, is much less likely to be of
significance under TEFRA because virtually all possession corporations
having income from intangibles can be expected to opt.out of the intangible
property income treatment by making a cost-sharing or 50-50 profit-split
election.
The third legislative change under TEFRA was the transfer of intangibles to
foreign corporations. TEFRA also contains a provision designed to deal with
the thread allegedly made by some U.S. corporations to remove investment
from Puerto Rico and transfer possessions-related intangibles to
corporations organized under the laws of foreign jurisdictions if the tax
treatment applicable to possession corporations were amended to their
substantial detriment.45 (Under existing law, transfer of manufacturing and
marketing intangibles by a U.S. corporation to a wholly-owned foreign
corporation will be tax-free under Section 351 only if a ruling is obtained
pursuant to Section 367 that they do not have as one of their principal
purposes the avoidance of federal income tax.)
D. 1984 Legislative Changes Under the President's Proposal to the Congress
for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity
The 1984 Tax Reform Proposal recommended the Section 936 possessions tax
credit and income-based tax credit to be replaced with a wage credit. 46 The
intent of this change is that under the proposed wage credit, qualified U.S.
corporations with manufacturing operations in Puerto Rico could take a
credit of 60 percent of wages up to the federal minimum wage plus 20 percent
of wages above the minimum, subject to an overall wage ceiling per employee
at four times the minimum wage. The credit, once adjusted by reducing the
tax deduction for wages paid by the amount of the credit, could be used to
offset the U.S. tax on any income earned by U.S. corporations. Also, this
proposal allowed grandfather protection for existing corporations in Puerto
Rico. During this grandfather period, existing corporation must elect to
use either the existing income-based tax credit or use the wage credit. If
the former is elected, protection is provided for the first five taxable
years commencing on or after January 1, 1986.
After a year-long political lobbying effort at the U.S. Congress (between
1984 and 1985), the Puerto Rican government and private entities, such as
the Chamber of Commerce of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rican Manufactures
Association, and the Puerto Rico-U.S.A. Foundation have managed to save
Section 936 without further significant changes detrimental to U.S.
possession corporations operating in Puerto Rico. 4 7 Among less significant
Section 936 changes introduced by the tax reform proposal passed on November
16, 1985, by the House Ways and Means Committee, were:
1. to increase by 10 percent the cost-sharing payments of the cost-
sharing option as defined by TEFRA,
2. to retain at 100 percent the possession corporations' tax credits.
3. to increase from 65 to 75 percent, over the next two years, the income
required to be derived from the conduct of active trade or business under
Section 936,
4. to develop regulations to tighten royalty payment for intangibles, and
5. to allow Puerto Rico to implement its "Twin-Plant" proposal. Under
this proposal a firm's "qualified" passive income can be invested in
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries.48
III. Conclusion
The Possessions Corporation System of Taxation, formerly Section 931, now
Section 936, has been the subject of increasing criticism, particularly
since the 1970s. The principal thrust of this criticism is that the tax
benefits to U.S. companies are excessive in the light of the number of jobs
and new investment created by the possession corporations. The 1982 TEFRA
significantly limited these tax benefits by imposing restrictions on the
amount of the income attributable to the use of manufacturing intangibles
which might be allocated for tax purposes to the possession corporations
instead of to the mainland U.S. parent company; it also introduced several
tests for qualification for Section 936 tax credit.
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Less significant changes in relation to intangible assets were introduced as
part of the Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth of
1984. Also, as part of the tax reform proposal of 1984, Section 936 was
amended to allow qualified possessions-source investment to be invested in
active business assets located in CBI countries. This would permit the
Puerto Rican government to implement its "Twin-Plant" proposal. Possession
corporations (taxpayers) would be required to certify that investment in CBI
countries were active business assets. Whether reinvestment of tax-exempt
profits in CBI projects occurred will be examined in the chapter on re-
investment.
The effectiveness of the Possessions Corporations System of Taxation,
however, lies with its ability to exploit the interaction of certain
sections of the U.S. IRC with Puerto Rican tax exemption laws. It is
through this integration that investors maximize the tax benefits available.
Moreover, these features of the industrial tax exemption acts have
established the legislation as the most comprehensive tax inducement ever
devised in an area politically and economically related to the United
States. The effective exemptions from U.S. and Puerto Rican income taxes
have encouraged U.S. corporations qualifying for Section 931 exemption and
Section 936 credit to transfer to qualifying corporations manufacturing and
marketing intangibles, tax free under Section 351, and thereafter to take a
position that all the income generated by these intangibles qualifies for
the exemption or credit. It has also encouraged them to invest earnings
excessively in portfolio investments that will generate tax-exempt qualified
possessions source investment income.
As a result of the flexibility inherent in the cost-sharing and profit-
splitting options, Section 936, as amended by TEFRA, appears to continue to
offer sufficient tax incentives to persuade U.S. corporations to retain
existing investments in Puerto Rico. Cost-sharing is likely to be
attractive to corporations that realize a relatively high return on
manufacturing intangibles resulting from research and development efforts
and that realize a relatively low return on marketing activities and non-
manufacturing intangibles. The profit-split election, on the other hand, is
likely to be made by corporations for which large profits are generated by
marketing activities and non-manufacturing intangibles.
U.S. corporations will be able to make a separate election with respect to
bona fide export sales. It seems probable that most major companies, for
example, the pharmaceutical companies, will make a 50-50 profit-split
election because this will enable 50 percent of the very substantial income
normally attributable to marketing intangibles and activities to qualify for
the credit. A separate cost-sharing election is likely to be made with
respect to export sales when, as is often the case, the marketing is carried-
out by sales companies established in countries in which export sales are
made. In this situation, the foreign country will normally insist that the
income attributable to marketing intangibles and activities be subject to
local tax and not shifted through inter-company prices to the affiliated
manufacturing companies. Accordingly, in such cases there will be
relatively little export marketing profit for the possession corporations
that could be sheltered from U.S. tax under a 50-50 profit-split option.
A challenging project for the regulations will be working out the mechanics
(omitted from the statute) for meshing a profit-split election with respect
to a product covering domestic sales with a cost-sharing election with
respect to export sales of that product. The broad policy issue that will
press for an answer in the years ahead is whether Section 936 will be a
sufficiently efficient, workable and fair approach to promote Puerto Rico's
economic development. Because Section 936 was created to encourage
additional jobs and investment, one question that should be evaluated is the
efficiency of Section 936's basic approach of exempting from U.S. tax
certain active business income and qualifying investment income through the
mechanism of a tax credit compared to the efficiency of other available
incentives.
The Conference Report seems to envisage a retention in any event of the
Section 936 tax credit and the basic approach to intangible property income
reflect in the new Section 936(h). The possible change it requests the
Treasury to evaluate seems to be a revision in the election-out provisions
(the cost-sharing and profit-split elections of TEFRA) that would identify
the portion of intangible property income which would continue to qualify
for the credit with reference to the costs of labor and capital located in
Puerto Rico. It is unclear how income that is to be treated as generated by
or as a function of the costs of labor and investment would be identified,
but the effort would probably involve an order of complexity at least as
great as is reflected in the new Section 936(h). If there are grounds for
concern over the efficiency and complexity of the new Section 936 as an
incentive to Puerto Rico's development, any evaluation of Section 936 should
not be restricted to a possible restructuring of the treatment of intangible
property income under Section 936(h) but should encompass consideration of
whether another more efficient and less complicated incentive would be
preferable.
The Section 936 tax credit does not appear to be effectively targeted toward
creating jobs and promoting new investment. Moreover, to the extent that
the Section 936 tax credit is applicable to income not generated by new jobs
or investment, it becomes a somewhat capricious windfall. Under the cost-
sharing and profit-split elections, substantial intangible property income
that does not result from new jobs or new investment will qualify for the
credit and be sheltered from U.S. taxes. If the United States desires to
encourage job creation and investment in Puerto Rico, it can perhaps do so
more simply and effectively by tying the incentive directly to job creation
and investment.
The retention of the Section 936 basic approach reflects the broad-based
political support for this approach as demonstrated by the success of the
Treasury-Puerto Rico compromise proposal incorporated in TEFRA. This
support appears to derive much of its strength from the fear that any
departure from the historic exemption credit system for possession
corporations would discourage new investment in Puerto Rico, if not a flight
of existing investment.
The next chapter will evaluate the economic outcome of the tax exemption
system in Puerto Rico. However, it does not seem premature to observe that
Section 936 is likely to prove relatively ineffective and an inordinately
complex incentive as compared with other alternatives for encouraging
creation of additional jobs and promotion of new investment in Puerto Rico.
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Section Two
The Role of Industrial Tax-Exemption
in Puerto Rico's Economy since 1948
Tax-exemption has played a significant role in the transformation of Puerto
Rico's economy since 1948. Exemption from Puerto Rico and the United States
taxes has been the main incentive to attract U.S. industries and the key
policy-instrument to promote industrial and economic development in Puerto
Rico. The single chapter of this Section analyzes the effect of industrial
tax-exemption on the structure of industrial employment and income in Puerto
Rico.
Chapter Three
The Effect of Industrial Tax-Exemption on the
Structure of Industrial Employment and Income
Puerto Rico's industrial incentives laws, as well as the industrial
promotion policies since 1948, have established profit tax-exemption as the
main subsidy provided to firms. Tax-exemption depends on the existence of
profits. As Puerto Rico operational costs rise, in particular labor costs,
the leverage of tax-exemption incentives has diminished. In general, the
tax-exemption laws lead to a bias towards subsidizing capital inputs, which
does not encourage labor-intensive industries; and the industrial promotion
program has been heavily oriented towards capital-intensive industries. Few
incentives have been offered to industries for whom profit tax-exemption
lacks significance. Supplementary tables for this chapter appear in
Appendix B.
Any assessment of Puerto Rico's industrial development strategy has to start
by desegregating the period of concern, from the early years of the
industrial tax-exemption to the present, into several distinct phases. What
follows is an effort to identify these phases and to analyze the effect of
profit tax-exemption on the transformation of industrial employment and
income in Puerto Rico since 1948.
I. Period 1948 to 1970
The beginning of Puerto Rico's industrialization effort generally is
associated with the approval of the 1947 Industrial Incentives Act (IIA)
that provided the tax-exemption framework for attracting external, mostly
U.S., manufacturing industry. This was, in effect, the beginning of what
subsequently has come to be known as the "operation bootstrap." Its
centerpiece was the offer of full tax-exemption from local, municipal, and
federal taxes to those who invested in manufacturing facilities in Puerto
Rico.
The rationale of the industrialization approach was that Puerto Rico needed
jobs and income that far outstripped the prospect of the agricultural
sector. Industrialization was seen as the only road towards progress and
development. Industrial promotion during the initial years was designed to
attract labor-intensive industries, many of them in the textile and garment
areas as well as in leather products. Furthermore, the industrial promotion
program offered to investors a combination of incentives that made tax-
exemption work. The most important incentives proposed to investors were
the combination of a low-wage environment with tax-free profits under the
U.S. flag and unrestricted access to the U.S. market. Simultaneously, a
massive out-migration, primarily of farm workers, to the United States was
sponsored by the United States and the Puerto Rican governments. Also,
incentives were drastically reduced to traditional industries and local
industries. As a result, a rapid erosion of agriculture and traditional
industrial activities as the main source of jobs and income took place.
A. Decline of Traditional Economic Activities
The period 1948 through 1970 experienced a sharp decline of Puerto Rico's
traditionally economic activities of agriculture, sugar and tobacco
manufacturing and home needlework. Agricultural employment dropped at an
average annual compound rate of 5.3 and 5.9 percent between 1950-1960 and
1960-1970, respectively. Total agricultural employment fell by 148,000 jobs
between 1950 and 1970, a loss of over 68 percent. Home needlework declined
at an average annual compound rate of 15 percent over the period, going from
51,000 workers in 1950 to 10,000 in 1960 (or a reduction of over 80
percent). Between 1960 and 1970, home needlework virtually disappeared as a
source of employment (the average annual rate of decline was 20.6 percent).
Sugar and tobacco manufacturing fluctuated around a combined average
employment of about 14,500 workers a year (a reduction of 1.5 percent
between 1960 and 1970). Overall, Puerto Rico's traditional employment
activities declined by 135,000 jobs between 1950 and 1960, and the
importance of these jobs decreased from 48 percent of total employment in
1950 to 27.4 percent in 1960. Between 1960 and 1970, Puerto Rico's
traditional economic activities fell by another 83,000 jobs. Between 1950-
1960 and 1960-1970, traditional employment's average annual compound rates
of reduction were 6.2 and 6.0 percent, respectively (Tables B.1 and B.4).
B. Growth of Labor-Intensive Manufacturing
Manufacturing employment grew from about 42,000 workers in 1950 to about
67,000 in 1960 (see Table B.1). The manufacturing firms attracted to Puerto
Rico were generally small, and labor-intensive, required modest capital
investment, paid low wages to unskilled workers, and produced consumer goods
(Madera, 1982). These indusries were scattered between both durable and
nondurable goods and showed virtually no interindustry linkages within
Puerto Rico (Table B.2). During 1950-1960, GDP increased at an average
annual compound rate of 4.3 percent. The average annual compound rate of
change in GDP per worker was 5.3 percent and in GDP per capita, 3.7 percent.
Total employment declined by 53,000 jobs in this period (see Table B.1).
Total employment in Puerto Rico during the 1960's grew at an average annual
compound rate of 2.4 percent and increased from 543,000 in 1960 to 686,000
in 1970 (see Table B.4-1). Investment in new plant and equipment generated
by manufacturing's growth was the primary force behind the increase of
almost 31,000 construction- jobs during the ten-year period. Investment in
industrial and commercial buildings averaged $270 million a year between
1960 and 1970, compared with $63 million a year between 1950 and 1960, both
expressed in current dollars. In constant 1954 dollars, this represented
about $61 million from 1950 to 1960 and $184 million from 1960 to 1970.
(Puerto Rico Planning Board, 1976, pp. A-5 and A-19).
In the aggregate, between 1960 and 1970, manufacturing jobs grew at an
annual average compound rate of 6.6 percent. In contrast to the trends in
mainland United States, total manufacturing growth in Puerto Rico during
this period, was more labor-intensive and used less advanced technology
(Table B.5). Over two-thirds of manufacturing's employment growth occurred
in four industries, non-sugar food products, apparel, leather goods, and
electrical machinery.' Manufacturing employment grew from 12.3 percent to
19.2 percent of total employment, while its share of Puerto Rico's GDP went
from 21.3 percent to over 25 percent. Compensation to industrial workers in
66
Puerto Rico averaged 62.1 percent of manufacturing's value added during the
period (Table 3.1 and B.6).
Table 3.1
Manufacturing as a Percentage of Total Employment,
GDP, and Income Indicators (1960 to 1970)
Years Mfg. as % Total Mfg. As A % Worker Compensation As A
Employment GDP % Mfg. Net Income
1960 12.3 21.3 62.5
1965 15.6 24.4 63.3
1970 19.2 25.4 63.4
Source: Table B.6, Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico,
Informe Economico Al Gobernador, 1960, 1969, and 1975.
In general, real GDP in Puerto Rico increased at an average annual compound
rate of 8.1 percent between 1960 and 1970, while GDP per worker rose at a
rate of 5.6 percent, and GDP per capita rose at 6.5 percent (Table B.3).
C. Structural Changes in Industrial Employment and Income
The period between 1960 and 1970 marked almost the end of labor-intensive
industries in terms of promotion and attraction. Employment growth was low
and unemployment remained high. Employment grew at an average annual
compound rate of only 2.4 percent (see Tables B.4-1 and B.4-2). During the
same period the unemployment rate was slightly reduced from 12.9 percent to
11.2 percent (Table B.7). It is interesting to note in Table B.7 that
between 1950 and 1965, the labor force did not grow despite a population
increase of 15 percent. This was primarily due to a falling labor force
participation rate and the massive out-migration (between 1954 and 1964,
out-migration was approximately 500,000) (Nieves Falcon,1975; Vazquez
Calzada, 1966; Villamil, 1983, pp. 99, 102-104).
Real economic growth rates during this period were attributed, mainly, to
the growth of labor-intensive manufacturing. However, several external and
internal factors developed and brought labor-intensive manufacturing growth
to an end during this period. Among the primary external factors were the
impact of the federal minimum wage in Puerto Rico and the structural changes
in the world economy. The most important internal factor has been the
nature of the industrial incentives program, primarily, profit tax-
exemption.
Low wages were traditionally an essential component of the industrial
incentives package offered to investors.2 Federally mandated increases in
Puerto Rico's minimum wage, however, had raised industrial wages
considerably by the mid-1960s, both in absolute terms and in relation to
those prevailing in other developing countries (Tables 3.2, B.8 and B.9).
Table 3.2
Average Annual Rate of Change of Manufacturing Wage Rates in
Selected Countries in Current U.S. Dollars per Hour: 1965 - 1983
Countries Hourl Manuf. Wage Rates Avg. Annual Rate
1965 1983 Rate of Change
Singapore 0.3 1.4 8.9
Hong Kong 0.2 1.4 11.0
Taiwan 0.2 1.5 13.5
South Korea 0.1 1.3 17.5
Puerto Rico 1.2 4.8 7.8
U.S.A. 2.6 8.8 7.0
Sources: Table B.9, International Labor Office, Yearly Report of Labor
Statistics, 1984, 1967; Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration,
"Puerto Rico and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC's) of Asia: An
Overview of Economic Development Performance and Policy" (Discussion Paper,
July, 1986).
Manufacturing wages nevertheless remained considerably below U.S. standards
(Figure 3.1). Whereas in 1950 the average hourly wage in manufacturing had
been $0.44 (31 percent of average U.S. wages), it had increased to $1.24 in
1965 (48 percent of U.S. average wage rate), as shown in Tables B.11 and
B.12.
Structural changes in the world economy also had weakened Puerto Rico's
position. The Kennedy Round had cut U.S. tariffs considerably, making it
easier for foreign competitors to break into the U.S. market. This, in
turn, led many U.S. companies to search for low-labor cost countries from
which to export to the United States. Despite the fact that the wage rate
differential between U.S. and Puerto Rico remained virtually unchanged
during this period--Puerto Rico clearly had ceased to belong to that
category--whatever other advantage it may have offered (U.S. Treasury, 1980,
pp.28-30).
Figure 3.1
Manufacturing Average Hourly Wages in Puerto Rico and
the United States: 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980
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The structure of Puerto Rico's industrial incentives program, primarily tax-
exemption, is considered to be one of the most important internal factor
affecting the economy (i.e., CEREP, 1984 and Tobin, 1975, p.17.) 3
Industrial promotion in Puerto Rico was based on the existence of "natural"
incentives affected by the so-called external factors (low-labor-costs and
access to the U.S. mainland markets) that made tax-exemption workable for
labor-intensive industries. Structural changes in the world economy
negatively affected the external factors (beneffiting Puerto Rico). As a
result, the attractiveness of Puerto Rico as a tax haven was reduced.
Consequently, tax-exemption became less effective in attracting labor-
intensive industries. This was mainly due to the increases in labor costs
that reduced their profit rates significantly.
As a response, in particular since the mid-1960s, Puerto Rico's industrial
promotion program as well as the industrial incentives program changed to
support mainly potentially profitable industries attracted because of the
tax-exemption incentives. 4 Little attention was given, however, to promote
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or to retain employment-producing industries or local firms for whom profit
tax-exemption lacked effectiveness due to the economic trends during the
period. Thus, firms were promoted based on the profit tax-exemption
potential regardless of their contribution to employment and to Puerto
Rico's economy in general.
Industrial promotion targeted high productivity industries, sufficiently
high, to permit them to pay high wages. Industrial processes in this type
of industry had to be of high quality in the sense that, they should be only
minimally affected by increases in operational costs and sale prices. The
industrial promotion program identified mainly "basic" and "high-technology"
industries. Growth of these types of industries began after 1969; thus,
their effect in terms of employment and income is analyzed in the next
period.
II. Period 1970 to Present
The most important changes in the structure of industrial employment and
income after 1970 have been intimately related to the industrial promotion
policies implemented in the mid-1960s. Among these changes have been: (1.)
the continuous decline of traditional and "low technology" industries, (2)
the failure of the attempt to promote petrochemical complexes, and (3) the
growth of "high technology" industrial segments.
A. "Traditional" and "Low-Technology" Economic Sectors
Puerto Rico's traditional economic activities of agriculture, sugar, and
tobacco production continued to decline. They dropped at an average annual
compound rate of 6.4 percent a year between 1970 and 1987 (Table B.13). The
construction industry followed a similar pattern. It registered an average
annual compound rate of decline over the whole period of 4.7 percent. Trade
and service employment grew slowly during 1970-1987, at a 0.7 percent
average annual compound rate. Government employment grew, 2.5 percent per
year compounded, with about half of its growth coming from the federally-
funded CETA job creation program. Overall, total employment grew at an
average annual compound rate of only 1.2 percent.
Low-technology manufacturing in Puerto Rican employment barely increased
between 1970-1980, growing at only 0.3 percent a year; and if the electrical
machinery industry (which in many respects behaves like Puerto Rico's high-
technology sector) is excluded, the rest of this industrial segment declined
at an average compound rate of 0.4 percent a year between 1970 and 1980
(Table B.14-1). The lowest-wage manufacturing industries in Puerto Rico
decreased in employment between 1969 and 1975. The apparel industry, for
example, fluctuated between 37,000 and 41,000 workers from 1970 to 1973 and
then began a slow secular decline (see Tables B.14-1 and B.14-2). The
national recession of 1974-1975 caused many of Puerto Rico's low-technology
manufacturers to cut back production. When the recession ended, they
expanded production in new third-world locations rather than in Puerto Rico.
The era of low-technology industrial growth in Puerto Rico appeared to have
come to an end in this period.
Manufacturing's average hourly earnings fluctuated between 54 and 55 percent
of their level on the mainland United States (see Figure B.10, and Tables
B.11 and B.12). With the exception of two industries, apparel and leather
products (which paid average hourly earnings of about 72 percent of U.S.
rates in 1980), differential average hourly earnings between Puerto Rico and
the United States manufacturing remained virtually unchanged between 1970
and 1981. It appears that the shift toward capital-intensive manufacturing
was not sufficient to narrow the earning differentials between the United
States and Puerto Rico.
The tendency for average industry wages to move toward the manufacturing
mean during 1960 and 1970 ended after 1970. Both the apparel and leather
products industries' average hourly wages were farther below the
manufacturing mean in 1980 than they had been in 1970. The chemical
industry had average hourly wages that were 25 percent to 40 percent above
Puerto Rico's manufacturing mean (Table B.15). Average wages in the
chemical industry were high mainly because payroll costs are a small part of
the industry's total cost structure. The total average payroll was 11.0
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percent of value added by the chemical industry in Puerto Rico, the smallest
percentage of any industry. The average for the rest of manufacturing was
31.0 percent (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1972, Table 2).
B. Petrochemical Industrial Complexes
Starting in the late 1960s, Puerto Rico's Economic Development
Administration (EDA) identified for promotion the so-called "basic"
industries. They.were promoted because of their tax-exemption benefit
potential. These industries were supposed to reduce the cost of raw
materials and of intermediate goods for existing firms. Also, it was
assumed that these firms would attract additional firms such as those
related to petrochemical complexes, aluminum industries, copper, and nickel
industries.
In particular, construction of large petrochemical complexes began between
1969 and 1972 and were financed with public funds. The strategy of
promoting petrochemical complexes involved getting the U.S. Department of
the Interior to increase significantly the quota of cheap foreign crude oil
allowed to enter Puerto Rico duty free. It was assumed that these complexes
would use imported petroleum to provide inputs for an extensive range of
industrial processes. This strategy was based on the belief that the
availability of industrial input would generate a series of forward linkages
leading to the establishment of more labor-intensive industries. This did
not occur in Puerto Rico; the products of the complexes were exported to be
processed near their markets in the United States (Villamil, 1983, pp. 99,
102-104). The development processes and/or problems of the petrochemical
industrial complex in Puerto Rico have been were documented in studies done
by Isard, Shooler, and Vietorisz (1959) and subsequent studies done by Isard
(1971, pp.378-409; 1975, pp. 434-474).
Total investment in the petrochemical industry in Puerto Rico between 1969
and 1976 exceeded $1,400 million, but direct jobs created numbered only
approximately 6,000 (Villamil, 1983, pp. 99, 102-104). The closing of two
large installations in the mid-1970s has reduced this figure. Between 1969
and 1975, the conditions generated by a light-manufacturing industry that
had reached its limit and by a heavy and capital-intensive industrial sector
that was not creating employment, had reached a critical level instead.
In order to increase employment, the government became the leading employer.
Between 1969 and 1975, total public employment grew more than 17 percent per
year. Government spending on infrastructure accounted for a substantial
proportion of employment in the construction sector. There were also a
massive increase in welfare payments. Approximately 28 percent of Puerto
Rico's total GNP is now made up of transfer payments (Table B.16). Close to
70 percent of all families receive government assistance in the form of food
stamps. (Gutierrez, 1983, pp. 117-134; and Weisskoff, 1983, pp. 135-182).
C. "High-Technology" Industries
In addition to the basic industries, firms of high-technological context
began to be distinguished for promotion in the 1960s.5 This type of
industry was encouraged because it could benefit from tax-exemption. This
means they were less sensitive to wage increases due to their high-
technology production processes and high-profit margin. Since 1970,
industrial growth in Puerto Rico has been in the high-technology segment.
This industrial segment is composed of chemicals, electrical machinery and
scientific instruments industries. Generally, these are capital-intensive
firms, and they have a low level of employment.
True high-technology activity has itself not been transferred from the
United States mainland to Puerto Rico. High-technology is defined by
analysts such as Riche, Hecker, and Burger (1983, pp.50-51), as those
activities in which the large proportion of scientific, technical, and
professional workers engage in research and development.6 By this
definition, Puerto Rico has not attracted high-technology activity; instead,
it attracted the capital-intensive production component of industries that
engage in high-technology activity in the mainland United States.
Puerto Rico's high-technology manufacturing employment between 1970 and 1975
displayed similar characteristics to those shown by the low-technology
manufacturing employment during the 1950-1970 period. They exhibited slow
or negative employment growth between 1970 and 1975 in the United States but
relatively high employment growth in Puerto Rico (Table B.17). Between 1970
and 1981, the high-technology segment increased its share of total
manufacturing employment in Puerto Rico from approximately 12 percent to 29
percent (see Tables B.14-1 and B.14-2.)
Puerto Rico has been an attractive location, moreover, for a very profitable
segment of the high-technology manufacturing sector of the United States.
This segment is composed of firms with large research and development
programs and with large intangible investments. Their production is in the
most part exported to the mainland United States. Exemption benefits of
both Puerto Rican and U.S. taxes seem to be one of the most important
location incentives. In addition, labor costs are relatively low compared
to the United States. Also, Puerto Rico's location provides easy access to
the parent company and to the new product development facilities in the
United States. These firms have produced low-levels of employment due to
their high capital components (see Tables B.14-1 and B.14-2), and, they have
invested in few real fixed assets.
The transition from low- to high-technology manufacturing growth, moreover,
has affected the structure of manufacturing employment and income and has
had consequences for the functioning of both Puerto Rico's labor markets and
its entire economy. After 1970, industrial employment growth in Puerto
Rico, as noted earlier in this chapter, has been in the high-technology
segment, which increased at an average annual compound rate of 8.2 percent.
Despite this growth in high technology employment between 1970 to 1987, the
total manufacturing share of total employment in Puerto Rico declined
slightly, from 19 to 18 percent (during the entire period, its share was
between 18 and 19 percent) (see Table B.13).
The increased returns to labor from working with more capital generated a
more rapid growth of manufacturing output than manufacturing employment
(Tables B.18 and B.19). The manufacturing share of Puerto Rican GOP rose
from 24 percent in 1970 to 48 percent in 1987. The share of manufacturing
value added paid as a compensation to Puerto Rico's workers fell from 63.5
percent in 1970 to 27.5 in 1987. By 1981, the Puerto Rico EDA estimated
that approximately two-thirds of manufacturing net income went to the mostly
non-Puerto Rican owners of manufacturing's real and financial assets.7
Puerto Rico's low-technology and traditional firms added value to their
products through labor-intensive production. While, high-technology firms
in Puerto Rico added value by using more capital in their products than
labor (Tables B.20 and B.21, Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Worker compensation as a
percentage of value added in high-technology firms averaged only about 18
percent compared with 39 percent in the rest of manufacturing (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1972, Table 2). Labor-intensive industries, such as
food products, apparel, and leather products, have maintained average
payrolls equal to over 60 percent of their total value added.8 Some high-
technology industries, such as electrical machinery products, electronics,
and professional and scientific instruments, have maintained average
payrolls equal to 30 percent of their total value added. The chemical
industry, on the other hand, has an average payroll equal to only 11 percent
of its value added (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1972, Table 2; and Table
B.22-1). High-technology firms in 1975 represented around 40 percent of
total manufacturing value added, while in 1981 they represented over 62.7
percent (Table B.22-2 and B.22-3).
High-technology industries, especially the chemical industry, attribute
substantial value to intangible assets, such as patents and licenses. In
general, almost all of the tangible and intangible assets used in Puerto
Rico's manufacturing are owned by individuals and companies residing outside
Puerto Rico (i.e., U.S. Treasury Reports on Possession Corporations, 1978;
1979; 1980; 1982; 1985; 1989.) Thus, the value added of these corporations
is repatriated tax-free to pay dividends, royalties, or any other form of
payment, to mainland U.S. investors. In other words, large manufacturing
value added has contributed little to the economic welfare of Puerto Rico's
residents.
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Other structural changes caused by the growth of high-technology
manufacturing were the increased investment required to produce a job, and
the increased worker output from each job created. Estimates from Puerto
Rico's Economic Development Administration (EDA) show that between 1960 and
1969, the average investment required to produce a job was about $55,000
(EDA, "The Effect of Institutional...", 1984, p. 39.) It was about $124,000
between 1970 and 1974 and rose to just over $148,000 for the period 1975
through 1980 (all expressed in constant 1980 dollars) (EDA, Directory of
Manufacturers, 1984.) The increased capital per worker, as noted above for
the high technology sector, has been reflected by the increase in annual
output per additional worker. It rose from about $32,000 between 1960 and
1969 to about $36,000 between 1970 and 1974, and $46,000 between 1975 and
1980 (EDA, "The Effect of Institutional...," 1984, Table 3, p. 10.) As
capital-production began to dominate manufacturing growth in Puerto Rico,
fewer jobs were needed to produce each $100,000 of additional real
manufacturing output (op. cit., p. 41.)
The growth of the high-technology industrial segment helps to explain the
behavior of the GDP and the GNP. The distinction between GDP and GNP is of
critical importance to Puerto Rico. GDP refers to the production that
occurs within Puerto Rico, GNP refers to the production that generates
income for residents of Puerto Rico. The difference is mainly the
remittance of tax-exempt profits and interest to the United States firms and
investors. The difference is not small and is growing steadily. Both
concepts, GDP and GNP, are useful to explain the growth of output and income
in Puerto Rico. GDP is the best single measure of the total productivity of
Puerto Rico. However, GNP is clearly the more relevant in discussions of
the production income of Puerto Rico's residents. From the point of view of
the welfare of Puerto Rico's residents, high level and rapid growth of GOP
are of little merit if not accompanied by a high and rising GNP.
Data from the Puerto Rico's Planning Board (PRPB) show that Puerto Rico's
GDP in current prices rose from barely $614 million in 1948 to nearly $24
billion in 1987, a growth rate over 1948-1987 of 9.8 percent per year. Even
after adjusting for price movements, the real GDP rose over 1948-1987 at a
growth rate of 5.5 percent per year. In contrast to GDP, by 1987 the GNP
had grown only to $17 billion. In 1960 there has been almost no gap between
GDP and GNP. The gap between the GDP and GNP is becoming bigger in recent
years. For the period of 1948 to 1974, the annual growth rate of GDP was
10.2 percent and that of GNP was 9.5 percent. However, during a recent
period, 1975-87, the annual growth rates of both, GDP and GNP, were 9.2 and
7.5, respectively. Both rates grew slower in the period of 1975 to 1987
than for the period of 1948-74. The annual growth rates of GDP and GNP,
during the period of 1948-1987, were 9.8 and 8.7, respectively. In per-
capita terms, the GNP has risen from $299 in 1948 to $5,196 in 1987, an
annual growth rate of 7.6 percent. For the first time since World War II,
however, real GNP per capita growth rate was negative in 1975. Previously,
growth had quickened and slowed, but never ceased. After 1975, real per
capita GNP has continued to grow slowly. It even registered negative growth
rates again in 1979, 1981, 1982, and 1983. (PRPB, Informe Economico al
Gobernador, 1976; 1987.)
The GDP and the GNP began to diverge significantly after 1970. GDP per
capita has grown faster than GNP per capita. The difference between per
capita GDP and per capita GNP in 1970 was about 6 percent, and it increased
to over 28 percent in 1987. Between 1970 to 1987, GDP per capita rose at an
average annual compound rate of 2.6 percent, while GNP per capita increased
at a rate of only 1.5 percent (see Table B.18).
The reason for the decline in the growth rates of both per capita and total
GNP over the last decade appears to result from the shift from labor-
intensive to capital-intensive manufacturing and to the transfers elsewhere
of much of the resulting value added. An increasing proportion of total
economic activity (GDP) was accounted for by capital-intensive manufacturing
and by mainly nonPuerto Rican ownership of industrial capital in Puerto
Rico. The interaction of these factors has resulted in increasing the
profitability of the high-technology industrial segment. At the same time,
however, the increased economic welfare of Puerto Rico's residents has been
far less than that of non-residents.
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The rapid growth of the high-technology manufacturing segment after 1976 in
Puerto Rico can be traced directly to the benefits of tax-exemption. In
particular, U.S. tax benefits with the introduction in 1976 of Section 936
have become the major incentive for locating United States manufacturing
facilities in Puerto Rico. Since 1976, the parent corporations' ability to
repatriate their earnings, tax free from U.S. and Puerto Rico taxes, is a
major factor that set Puerto Rico apart from alternative locations (Booz,
Allen, and Hamilton, 1985, pp. 111-13-15). As a result, U.S. manufacturers
with Puerto Rican subsidiaries (possession corporations) who benefit from
Section 936 typically make their high profit margin in Puerto Rico, because
tax-exemption shelters their profits. The general production strategy
applies not only to those that are usually characterized by higher than
average corporate-wide operating margins but also to labor-intensive
industries.
Since 1976, possession corporations operating in Puerto Rico have generated
more than half of their income from purely financial transactions (CEREP,
1984, p. 10). Section 936 created tax incentives for U.S. possession
corporations to invest in Puerto Rican financial markets rather than to
divert their Puerto Rican tax-exempt profits into Eurodollar markets. (See
Chapter Two of this research for an explanation.on the impact of Section 931
and Section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code). As a result, the
financial sector underwent a radical change. The deposits of the
manufacturing firms in financial institutions grew from $1.1 billion in 1976
and 1977 to $5.2 billion in 1983 and 1984 (Figure 3.4 and Table B.23).
During this time, these deposits accounted for more than half of the growth
in Puerto Rico's commercial bank deposit base, which grew from $5 billion to
over $12 billion. Although, bank loans, as a percentage of bank deposits,
declined from 1976 to 1984 (Figure 3.5).
In addition, Section 936 and Puerto Rico's laws exempted from taxes all
income generated through specified investments by possession corporations.
The purpose of the tax-exemption was to enlarge the pool of the assets
available for investment in Puerto Rico, with the idea being that a large
pool of funds would lower the local costs of capital. This, in turn, was
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supposed to stimulate physical investment in Puerto Rico. Whether the
"qualified possessions corporations source investment income (QPSII)" tax-
exemption has had this desirable effect will be the subject of the next
chapter. However, between 1973 and 1983 real fixed investment in Puerto
Rico experienced a dramatic reduction, from $849 million to $405 million in
constant 1954 dollars, respectively (Puerto Rico Planning Board, 1984, p. A-
3). Real fixed investment declined, even with the growth of funds of
possession corporations operating under Section 936.
III. Conclusion
The experience of Puerto Rico shows profit tax-exemption is self-limiting as
a main policy and key incentive for economic and industrial development.
Profit tax-exemptions do not create the profit incentives necessary to
locate employment-producing investment in Puerto Rico. Profits in Puerto
Rico of labor-intensive industries are determined by the relative cost of
labor, materials, land, transportation, and by the relative productivity of
the labor force. If these factors are unfavorable (as has been the case in
Puerto Rico), profit tax-exemptions cannot create incentives to locate in
Puerto Rico.
In 1948, Puerto Rico started with a very favorable position in terms of unit
labor costs, but this favorable position has gradually been eroded by
external and internal factors. Income tax-exemption, therefore, is having
less impact on location decisions for employment-producing investments,
because there will be smaller profits to exempt from taxes. The real
problem in Puerto Rico is, however, that if the present trends continue,
Puerto Rico's relative advantage will disappear long before Puerto Rico
reaches an adequate rate of employment and income.
Rapidly rising unit labor costs have led to the promotion of industrial
projects where labor costs are not important in determining total profits.
In such projects, tax-exemptions of profits become a major competitive
advantage. That was the case with the construction of capital-intensive
petrochemical projects in Puerto Rico. Although these projects were not
discouraged by increases in Puerto Rico of unit labor costs, they also did
not employ many people. They were invulnerable to wage increases but not
terribly useful in raising general living standards. They, in turn, led to
a construction industry that was too large for the long-run needs of Puerto
Rico. When the construction of these projects ceased, Puerto Rico was left
with substantial unemployment in the construction field.
In addition, Puerto Rico has promoted a capital-intensive high technology
segment, which is also not vulnerable to increases in the cost of labor.
For this segment, tax-exemption constitutes the location incentive to
establish operations in Puerto Rico. In particular the rapid growth of the
pharmaceutical and electronic industries in Puerto Rico can be traced
directly to the tax-exemption benefits. The current tax-exemption provides
incentives for these firms to put their highest profit margin products or
highest value added stages of production in Puerto Rico. These types of
production processes or investment decisions provide employment and income
opportunities for only a small percentage of the labor force.
Primarily, since the 1970s, the tax structure facing high technology firms
is the single greatest incentive for direct investment in Puerto Rico. The
tax structure is generally perceived to have three components: (1) tax-
exemption from Puerto Rico's income taxes, (2) tax-exemption from U.S.
income taxes, and (3) the virtual tax-free, except for a modest tollgate
tax, repatriation of earnings. Although the second and third components
overlap, tax-free repatriation as a separate component of the tax structure
merits special attention. The ability of parent companies to repatriate
earnings, including earnings on strictly financial transactions, virtually
tax-free is a major factor that sets Puerto Rico apart from alternative
production locations and/or investment sites (particularly other tax havens
worldwide). Tax-free repatriation is particularly important to industries
that have significant research and development requirements, such as
pharmaceutical, electronics, and scientific and professional instruments.
Between 1971 and 1984, total manufacturing income, in constant dollars, grew
by almost 200 percent. Industrial employment and workers earnings, however,
did not increase in concert with manufacturing income. The augmented
proportion of manufacturing income after the 1970s is attributable to
increases in capital inputs, and to intangible and financial assets.
Because this capital stock and these assets are mainly owned by U.S.
investors, a significant disparity between the growth of economic activity
in Puerto Rico (measured by GDP) and returns to Puerto Rico residents
(measured by GNP) emerged.
The primary reason for this situation was that a significant portion, as
mentioned previously, of the value-added of goods produced in Puerto Rico
was paid to the owners of capital and left Puerto Rico's economy virtually
tax free. Combined with the limited vertical integration of Puerto Rico's
manufacturing sector and the resulting small interindustry-linked impacts,
the creation of manufacturing jobs and income produced very small multiplier
effects. Few secondary jobs and income have been created. The result is
that industrial development in Puerto Rico is not generating a strong growth
of jobs and locally earned income.
In conclusion, there is little evidence to support the generally accepted
assumption that by exempting from taxes an industrial segment, output would
increase and would result in substantially increased employment, income,
real fixed investment or new investment opportunities in Puerto Rico. In
fact, tax-exemption appears to attract a profitable industrial segment, but
the composition and contribution by the attracted industries to Puerto -
Rico's economy have changed dramatically during the development process.
The industrial composition of the tax-exempt segment has been rapidly
changing from labor-intensive to capital-intensive industries. Moreover,
the new tax-exempt industries have been making a diminished contribution to
Puerto Rico's economic development.
During the first years, 1947-1960, the tax-exempt industrial segment that
was attracted to Puerto Rico contributed to rapid economic growth, created
new employment and income opportunities, and expanded real fixed investment.
Since early 1960, tax-exempt industries establishing operations in Puerto
Rico have been able to increase their share of Puerto Rico's gross domestic
product by reducing their labor inputs and by increasing their capital
inputs. Labor productivity has not been rising.
Increases in manufacturing income have resulted in tax-exempt profits being
repatriated outside Puerto Rico to pay dividends or royalties to U.S.
investors. These increases, however, have not been translated into economic
development activities in Puerto Rico. After more than 30 years under
Puerto Rico's industrial development program, tax-exemption has been
demonstrated to lack adequate incentives (1) to attract employment-producing
investments, (2) to stimulate local investment, and in general, (3) to
create new employment and income opportunities, or to expand real-fixed
investment.
Puerto Rico's industrial development program and the expansion of economic
development opportunities have been supported by expanding the share of
public investment financed, in most part, from external sources. In
addition, employment and income opportunities have been supported by
increasing Puerto Rico's participation in federal transfer payments.
Despite the need of incentives to stimulate local investment opportunities
or employment-producing investment and thus to alleviate the problems of
employment and unemployment in Puerto Rico, few effective incentives have
been offered to such industries. Tax-exemption is a profit incentive and as
such may contribute little to new employment and income opportunities and to
the expansion of real fixed investment.
Major changes to the current system of industrial incentives, primarily tax-
exemption, are needed to reach the desired objectives. Tax-exemption, as a
main incentive or as a key economic development policy-instrument for
economic and industrial development, appears not to be adequate for the task
ahead.
Endnotes to Chapter Three:
1. During the period 1960 to 1970, electrical machinery in the United States
contained a hi h technology component, namely communications equipment and
electronics with rapid employment growth of 6.2 percent. It had also a low
technology component (electrical wiring, lighting fixtures household
appliances, etc.) with slow growth, 2.9 percent. The low technology segment
was the growing.component in Puerto Rico.
2. There is a lack of studies analyzing the impact of the federal minimum
wage on Puerto Rico's industrial structure- however, there is no evidence
to support the enerally accepted statement that the impact of the minimum
wage in Puerto Rico resulted in a loss of jobs. The industrial employment
statistics show that apparel and leather products employment (main
industries in Puerto Rico) was declining at a faster rate during the five
years before minimum wages were imposed than during the five years after.
3. CEREP (a nonprofit research center in Puerto Rico) explains tax exemption
as the main internal factor affecting the economy since he 1950s based on
the distortion of the industrial policy and incentives program in Puerto
Rico. James Tobin refers to tax exemption as the main internal problem for
explaining disturbing trends of Puerto Rico's economic growth strategy.
4. The shift from labor-producing investment to capital-intensive was part
of Puerto Rico's industrial promotion policy since the mid-1960s. This,
policy is discussed in a confidential document repared by Puerto Rico s
Economic Development Administration "Analisis Economico del Programa de
Incentivos Industriales de Puerto Rico," February 1978, chapters 8 and 9.
5. Basic information about high-technology industrial segment in Puerto Rico
come from the Puerto Rico's Economic Deve lopment Administration.
6. There is not a widely accepted concept of high-technology. Generally,
high-technology industries are defined as those employing larger numbers of
scientific and technical workers, and spending a higher percentage of total
revenues on research and development, than the average for all
manufacturing. Within this broad concept,.high-technology firms include
chemicals (such as, pharmaceutical and medicinal industries), professional
and technical instruments, electrical and electronic machinery, among
others. The number of manufacturing industries classified as high-
technology varies with both the industry detail and strictness o the
definition. Under the strictest definition 6 industries qualify as high-
technology. Under the broader definition 16 industries qualify. For high-
technology definitions and a three digit SIC level industry detail, see
Richard W. Riche, Daniel E. Hecker and John U. Burgan, 'High Technology
Today and Tomorrow," MLR, Nov. 1983, pp. 50-51.
7. This estimate was made in 1984. It represents the percentage of
manufacturing net income going to property holders (61.1 percent) times the
percentage of GDP generated by manufacturing (47.5 percent) and equals the
estimate withdrawal of GDP from Puerto Rico (31.4 percent). In 1970, the
GDP loss from Puerto Rico's economy was 9.3 percent. In 1983 it was 34.9
percent. Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration, "The effects of
Institutional, Technological and Market Change on the Demand for Labor in
Puerto Rico," June 1984, p. 41 (Mimeo).
8. Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration, "Comments on Chapter 3,
Fourth Report," March 29, 1984, (Internal Memo).
THIRD SECTION
INDUSTRIAL TAX EXEMPTION AS A REINVESTMENT INCENTIVE
In 1976, a provision granting a reinvestment incentive was added to Puerto
Rico's Industrial Incentives Act (IIA) of 1963. This provision is
maintained under the 1978 IIA. This reinvestment incentive together with a
tollgate tax (that is a tax on repatriation of profits), constitute two of
the main tools to promote economic development in Puerto Rico. The
reinvestment incentive will be discussed in this section. The tollgate tax
will be the subject of the Fourth Section.
The reinvestment incentive offers tax exemption from federal and local taxes
to possession corporations who invest their profits in Puerto Rican public
sector obligations, in certain government development projects, and in other
designated economic development activities in Puerto Rico. The use of these
funds to finance these activities would increase the availability of credit,
it was believed, as well as reduce the cost of capital to the government and
to investors in Puerto Rico, thus leading to additional physical investment.
As will be shown in this section, the reinvestment incentive appears to be
effective in providing possession corporations significant amounts of tax-
free investments and interest income. Moreover, this incentive seems to
have contributed to increased bank profitability. Furthermore, tax
exemption as a reinvestment incentive appears to lack effectiveness in
increasing real investment and/or promoting economic development in Puerto
Rico.
In the absence of a financial or an economic model, this section examines
whether possession corporation funds have translated into economic activity
in Puerto Rico. It has been divided into four chapters (Chapters 4-7.)
Most of the time-series data presented in this section refer to data
available up to December 1988 (the last date of data collection for this
research). The information comes from sources such as Puerto Rico's
Planning Board, Government Development Bank (GDB), Department of the
Treasury, and Economic Development Administration (EDA), as well as the
United States (U.S.) Department of the Treasury, among others.
Chapter Four
Relationship between the Reinvestment Incentive
and the Financial Market of Possession Corporations
This chapter presents first, the basis of the reinvestment incentive, and
then, the financial market of the possession corporations operating in
Puerto Rico. This presentation is important given the complex relationship
between financial investment by possession corporations and real investment
in Puerto Rico. It is necessary to understand this relationship in order to
follow the analysis that comes afterwards. The chapter ends with the study
of whether or not the large inflows of possession corporation funds from
abroad since mid-1975, together with the introduction of the reinvestment
incentive, have been effective in expanding real investment. Tables and
figures appear throughout this chapter; others are found in Appendix C.
I. Basis of the Reinvestment Incentives
After 1976, with the introduction of Section 936 of the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code (IRC), the industrial tax exemption was limited to "qualified
possession source investment income" (QPSII) and to income effectively
connected with a possession trade or business. Section 936 created an
incentive for possession corporations operating in Puerto Rico to invest the
large pool of funds that had been invested in the Eurodollar market in the
Puerto Rico capital market instead.'
Shortly after Section 936 was passed, the government of Puerto Rico
initiated a tax reform, and the reinvestment incentive was introduced under
Puerto Rico's IIA of 1963 and again in the IIA of 1978. Under the IIAs of
1963 and 1978, the reinvestment incentive provision offers tax exemption to
income derived from the investment of Industrial Development Income (IDI) in
the so called eligible activities.2 The reinvestment incentive provides
federal and local tax-free dividends, rents and interest income to encourage
U.S. manufacturing firms operating under Section 936 of the U.S. IRC
(possession corporations), to invest a portion of their earnings in eligible
economic activities designated by the Puerto Rico Treasury (eligible
activities).3
The investment that generates exempt interest, rents, and dividends (so-
called "2j investments") includes: (1) Puerto Rican government loans
obligations and loans to the GDB or to other government agencies, (2)
Mortgage loans or loans guaranteed by an agency of the federal and Puerto
Rico governments, ~(3) Loans to other exempt businesses, (4) Loans to the
maritime industry, (5) Loans to businesses operating in Puerto Rico that are
guaranteed by the Puerto Rico or U.S. government, (6) Obligations issued by
the Conservation Trust of Puerto Rico, (7) Capital obligations issued by
Puerto Rico's banks as authorized by the Puerto Rican banking law, (8)
Investments in public buildings, including schools and-hospitals, (9)
Nonredeemable preferred stock of banking institutions organized under the
laws of Puerto Rico, and (10) Fixed-term deposits in qualifying banking
institutions. Section 936 provisions regarding QPSII and Puerto Rico's
rules on the investment of IDI together determine the financial investments
that are exempt from both Puerto Rico and U.S. taxes.
II. Financial Market Associated with Possession Corporations
The financial market developed with the accumulated earnings of possession
corporations in Puerto Rico serves primarily an allocation function.
Possession corporation funds, for the most part, are channelled through the
banks and other financial institutions that serve as intermediaries in the
allocation process.4 In this process, possession corporations look for ways
to maximize their tax advantage. Banks compete for tax-exempt funds and try
to lend them profitably. Borrowers seek loans at the lowest rates. The
intended outcome of this process is that a large amount of these funds are
reinvested in Puerto Rico's eligible activities. Interest rates for these
funds must be ultimately determined by the reinvestment incentive rules
together with the market forces of supply and demand.
In 1980, the estimated size of possession corporation funds in Puerto Rico
amounted to $7.4 billion, more than two-thirds the size of Puerto Rico's
1980 GNP of $11.1 billion. By 1986, possession corporation funds expanded
to $15.2 billion and the GNP only to $15.8 billion. Between 1980 to 1986
possession corporation funds grew faster than Puerto Rico's GNP,
representing an average annual change of $1.3 billion for possession
corporation funds and $783 million for the GNP. In other words, the
percentage rate of change of possession corporation funds during this period
was 105 percent while the GNP was 42 percent. The following table sets
forth the estimated size of the possession corporation funds in terms of
their financial investments in Puerto Rico by possession corporations (Table
4.1).
Table 4.1
Size and Growth of Financial Investments
of Possession Corporations after 1976
(Billion $)
Type of Asset 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983 1986
Total Investments 4.0 5.3 6.5 6.3 7.4 9.5 11.1 15.2
Deposits in Puerto 0.3 1.6 2.0 2.9 3.5 5.3 6.0 8.8
Rico's Banks*
Other Financial 3.7 3.7 4.5 3.4 3.9 4.2 5.1 6.4
Assets
ource: US Denartment of the Treasury: Puerto Rico GDB.
. ..
Notes: * In 1976, bank deposit data represent total investment in Puerto
Rico. See notes on Table C.1 in Appendix C.
Possession corporation deposits in Puerto Rico's banks increased by about
$5.3 billion between 1980 to 1986 (see Table 4.1). In 1980 and 1986, bank
deposits of possession corporations represented about 47 and 54 percent of
total possession corporation funds, respectively. The growth of possession
corporation funds in Puerto Rico, in short, has been very large. The
composition of financial portfolios of all possession corporations in Puerto
Rico is presented in Table C.1 (see Appendix C). Based on this table, in
1976 only a few hundred million dollars, out of a total portfolio of $4
billion, were invested in Puerto Rico. By 1986, investments in Puerto Rico
increased to $14.7 billion. Between 1976 and 1986, possession corporation
investments in Puerto Rico in relation to total investment increased from
7.5 to 96.7 percent. From the latter percentage, bank deposits represented
about 60 percent, and GNMA's and government obligations about 18 percent.
III. The Effect on Real Investment of Net Capital Inflows of Possession
Corporation Funds 5
The qualified possession source investment income (QPSII) provision was
intended to increase real investment in Puerto Rico by increasing capital
inflows from abroad.8 Any increase in this source of investment would be
reflected in a change in net capital inflows (in the capital account of the
balance of payments) into Puerto Rico. From 1972 through 1981 there were
moderate changes in the net annual inflow of capital into Puerto Rico (Table
C.2, Appendix C). There have been very large changes in individual
components, such as the big increase in foreign direct investment after 1975
(U.S. Treasury, 1980, pp. 95-99). Foreign direct investment was also very
high in 1980 and 1981 as possession corporations continued to invest their
retained earnings in Puerto Rico's financial assets.
However, the increase in Puerto Rico's investments by possession
corporations from 1975 to 1981 was offset by outflows through the banking
system, investments offshore by Puerto Rico's public enterprises, and shifts
in the ownership of Puerto Rico's public debt. (These problems will be
further discussed in Chapter Seven.) The changes in the local and federal
tax laws in 1976 regarding investment income, therefore, seemed to have a
relatively modest impact on net capital inflows to Puerto Rico through 1981.
In addition, there seems to have been little relationship between the large
swings in direct investment and the small changes in private real investment
(see Tables 4.2 and 4.3.)
In fiscal year 1982, net capital inflows almost disappeared compared to the
level that had been maintained in the previous decade. There was a
reduction of more than $2.5 billion in foreign direct investment. This
reduction seemed to reflect the large repatriation by possession
corporations in response to low financial returns in the first half of 1982.
This is consistent with the decline in possession corporations deposits in
the first half of 1982, as will be discussed later. There was no action in
the other components of the capital account to offset the change in direct
investment in order to leave net inflows unchanged. 7
Table 4.2
Components of the Puerto Rico Capital Account: 1971 to 1986(Million $)
Year Ending June 30 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1986
Direct Invetsment in Puerto Rico, Change 686 792 625 1698 878 2305 2636 -115 621 1011
Mainly in Assests of Possession
Corporations Controlled Offshore
Net Short-Term Banking Flows 32 114 306 -544 -440 -557 -1362 -655 -871 -36
Net Foreign Investment in Long-Term 307 404 896 352 637 344 186 349 719 320
Puerto Rico's Government Obligations
Puerto Rico's Investment in U.S. -20 9 13 -310 -191 -142 24 -96 5 -67
Government Securities
Net Foreign Investment in Short-Term 67 64 153 111 31 289 -11 169 -36 -198
Debts of Puerto Rico's Public Corp.
Short-Term Invetsment Abroad by Puerto -2 0 -88 -48 77 -631 -41 175 40 -52
Rico's Public Corporations
All Others 86 -131 -9 94 370 -25 161 301 210 359
TOTAL, NET 1156 1252 1896 1353 1362 1583 1593 128 688 1337
Source: Appendix C
Table 4,3
Gross Private Investment in Puerto Rico: 1971 to 1986(Million $)
Fica iey Change inFica 7otal Residential Ind, & Comm. Machinery &7 hagei
Year Construction Building Equipment Inventories*
1971 1234 312 391 417 114
1973 1227 392 208 435 192
1975 1183 385 261 398 139
1977 873 309 133 492 -61
1979 1317 394 136 611 176
1980 1569 343 162 657 407
1981 1312 305 210 671 126
1982 416 290 193 475 -542
1983 747 269 164 540 -226
1986 1176 310 253 1022 -409
Source: Appendix C
91
Several factors may have contributed to this decline in net capital inflows.
Table 4.3 indicates that there was a decline in private investment in Puerto
Rico in 1982. The demand for capital may not have been sufficient to
attract capital from offshore. In any case, whatever the independent
contribution of the changes in the demand for capital or in the trade
account, the fact that direct investment and possession corporations
financial assets declined in 1982 suggests that possession corporations
funds could have had little positive impact on Puerto Rico in that year.
In 1982, both, decline in gross private investment and in possession
corporations funds, were subject to different forces, and their parallel
behavior may have been largely coincidental. Gross private investment was
strongly affected by the 1982 recession, and change in inventory explains
much of the decline. Financial investments by possession corporations
dropped because more restrictive regulations were introduced that year.
Regulations introduced in February 1, 1982, drove down the interest rate on
possession corporation funds and caused large repatriations. The decline in
the interest rate was supposed to stimulate investment; however, it seems to
have discouraged it.
To the-extent that real investment and tax-exempt funds are related, it is
probably the level of real investment that influences the inflow of tax-
exempt funds rather than the reverse. The extent to which banks can acquire
possession corporation funds depends on the amount of loans available for
designated economic development activities. These are, in turn, related to
the amount of real investment taking place. The fact that fluctuations in
Puerto Rico's real investment are almost exclusively due to cyclical changes
in inventories suggests that the impact of tax-exempt funds on real
investment is weak.
Foreign direct investment, which reflects the assets of possession
corporations, did recover somewhat in fiscal 1983 and in 1986, suggesting
that the pace of repatriations diminished. Net inflows largely matched the
recovery in direct investment. However, net inflows in absolute terms
remained at the level of the early 1970s (that is at the level prior to the
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introduction of the "QPSII provision" in 1976). Moreover, recoupment of the
growth of possession corporation financial assets in 1983, as well as in
1986, was not associated with a comparable recovery of private investment
(see Table 4.3).
The balance-of-payments data, which are available to evaluate the impact of
possession corporation funds, cannot be interpreted properly Without
consulting data on real savings and investment in Puerto Rico. However, the
data on Puerto Rico's investments suggest that the additional capital
investment would not appear to have been financed by increased domestic
savings. In addition, the data do not support the argument that possession
corporation funds have reduced capital inflows by financing export
activities (to expand operations and/or increase an export surplus). In
other words, the data on capital inflows suggest that the QPSII provision
could have had little positive impact on increasing the amount of possession
corporation funds used to finance Puerto Rico's direct private investments.
This chapter introduced the relationships that exist between possession
corporation funds and reinvestment in designated economic development
activities. The next chapters of this section examine further the effect of
these funds on designated investment activities in Puerto Rico.
Endnotes to Chapter Four:
1. As explained in Chapter Two, there are three requirements for
investment income to qualify as QPSII: (1) the income must be
from sources within a possession in which a trade or business is conducted,
which basically means that the payor of the investment income must be a
resident of Puerto Rico; (2) the funds invested must be derived from the
active conduct of a trade or business in the possession; and (3) the funds
must be invested in the possession, for use therein.
2. As explained in Chapter One, IDI is the business income of a firm that
holds a tax-exemption grant, and also the passive income to which such
business income gives rise when it is reinvested in certain designated
assets.
3. The U.S. Congress's intention in limiting the tax exemption to QPSII is
to maintain a separation between Puerto Rico's capital market (where
possession corporations can earn tax-free returns) and world capital markets
y preventing arbitrage between them. The QPSII would reduce the cost of
capital in Puerto Rico relative to the cost of funds to investors in the
U.S. ~ (S. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 280: 1976).
4. The relationship between possession corporations and the reinvestment
incentive in Puerto Rico is not straightforward. A possession corporation
may, for example, deposit funds in a bank operating in Puerto Rico. In
turn, the receiving bank is supposed to invest these funds in designated
eligible activities. If the bank's investment in a designated economic
activity is, for example, an industry loan, the story does not end there.
A firm receiving a loan from a bank in Puerto Rico does not necessarily use
the loan for increasing real investment in Puerto Rico. The proceeds of a
loan can be used, for example, to increase its financial investments or to
finance investment outside of Puerto Rico. Further a firm receiving a loan
might otherwise have obtained the funds from the U.S. money market. If the
bank lends to Puerto Rico's government (which is another designated economic
development activity) this loan may have the effect of lowering the
interest rate costs of Puerto Rico's government and of encouraging public
investment. However, the real impact of this loan is also not immediately
clear. For example, the loan may simply replace purchases of tax-free
Puerto Rico debt by U.S. residents without much impact on the market for
overnment obligations. The principal categories supposed to be excluded
from the designated economic development activities list are consumer loans
and assets and loans outside of Puerto Rico; however, it is not very clear
to what extent these categories have in practice been excluded.
5. Some of the information of this part were obtained from the U.S. Treasury
Reports on Possession Corporations (1978, 1979 1980, 1983, 1985, and 1989).
These reports contain comprehensive analyses of the qualified source
investment income (QPSII) and the capital account of the balance of payment.
6. Since mid-1975 Section 936 caused U.S. possession corporations in Puerto
Rico to bring back to Puerto Rico the very large pool of funds that had been
invested outside of Puerto Rico, specially in the Eurodollar market. One
indication of whether the QPSII provision has been successful in increasing
investment in Puerto Rico can be found in the capital account component of
the Puerto Rico balance-of-payments.
7. In 1982, there was a great expansion in financial investments in Puerto
Rico by possession corporations and capital circulated out through the
banking system. Outflows through the banking system, while below the 1981
high, continue to be at a significant level (U.S. Treasury, 1985, p.70).
Chapter Five
The Effect of Tax-Exempt Funds Reinvested
by Commercial Banks on Puerto Rico's Economy
This chapter proceeds with an analysis of the economic effect of possession
corporation funds deposited in Puerto Rican banks. It studies the effect of
these bank deposits as a reinvestment incentive in Puerto Rico. Detailed
tables and figures appear throughout this chapter and in Appendix D.
The category of "bank deposits" is considered the most important eligible
activity under the reinvestment incentives. In other words, local and
federal. tax laws, under the. reinvestment incentives rules, have enabled
commercial banks to participate in the possession corporation financial
market. Possession corporation funds, deposited in Puerto Rican banks and
reinvested in eligible activities, both, principal and interest, are
exempted from taxes under Puerto Rican and U.S. tax laws.
Banks play a strategic role in the possession corporation financial market.
They are intermediaries for the investment of more than half of the
possession corporation funds in Puerto Rico. As a reinvestment incentive,
possession corporations' bank deposits have been supposed to produce a
significant effect in: (1) increasing the levels of real investment loans,
(2) distributing funds better among banks, (3) expanding the levels of long-
term maturity deposits, (4) producing interest rate differentials, and (5)
generally, increasing the availability of credit or reducing the costs of
loans to borrowers. However, the evidence suggests that possession
corporations' bank deposits have not produced a significant effect as a
reinvestment incentive.
I. Bank Investment in Designated Economic Development Activities
As of December 1976, possession corporation funds deposited in commercial
banks in Puerto Rico reached almost $1 billion, 18.8 percent of the banks'
total deposits. By December 1984, in contrast, direct possession
corporation deposits in commercial banks in Puerto Rico amounted to $5.6
billion, or 40.4 percent of total bank deposits. The compound rate of
growth during this period was 21.3 percent (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1
Total Deposits and Possession Corporation Deposits
All Commercial Banks (Million $)
Poss. Corp.
Total Percent Poss. Corp. Percent Deposits %
December Deposits Change Deposits Change Total Deposits
1976 5242 -- 986 -- 18.8
1977 6426 22.6 1745 77.0 27.2
1978 7209 12.2 1999 14.6 27.7
1979 8344 15.7 2862 43.2 34.3
1980 9663 15.8 3356 17.3 34.7
1981 11760 21.7 4601 37.1 39.1
1982 11476 (2.5) 4704 2.2 41.0
1983 12260 6.8 5093 8.3 41.5
1984- 13844 12.9 5593 9.8 40.4
Source: GDB of Puerto Rico, 1985.
However, possession corporation deposits in banks have not produced
significant levels of real investment loans. Based on GDB data in
particular, in March 1985, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and
possession corporations' working capital loans from banks represented 44.9
percent of all direct possession corporation funds. Besides commercial and
industrial loans, these funds were invested by banks in government
obligations and mortgage loans. These investments represent another 37.2
percent of total eligible activities as of March 1985. The remaining amount
of possession corporation investments by banks, 17.9 percent, was used to
finance consumer loans, such as car loans (Tables 5.2 and 5.3).
The GDB data, however, do not provide a breakdown of the distribution of
loans among categories, such as industrial and commercial loans. Data from
Citibank as of December 1984 provide a breakdown of bank loans financed with
possession corporation funds. Based on this information, banks used 37
percent of the possession corporation funds to finance commercial and
industrial loans. Manufacturing activities represented only 18 percent of
the commercial and industrial loans financed with these funds. Working
capital of the possession corporations represented the largest percentage of
manufacturing activities. Most of the commercial and industrial loans were
heavily concentrated in wholesale and retail trade (33 percent) and in
Table 5.2
Total Direct Possession Corporation Funds and
Commercial, Industrial, and Agricultural Loans,
All Puerto Rico Commercial Banks (March 1985)
Funds and Loans Outstandin Balance(Million $
Total Direct Poss. Corp. Funds 9659
Commercial, Industrial & Agric. Loans 2765
(excluding loans to the financial &
public sector, and foreign loans)
Other Loans 1571
Total Commercial & Industrial Loans 4337
Eligible Activities of Commercial, 3731
Indust., Agric. Loans & Working Capital
Percent of Eligible to Total Commercial 86
Indust., Agric. Loans, & Working Capitai
Source: GDB of Puerto Rico, 1985.
Table 5.3
Possession Corporation Deposits and Components of Eligible
Activities, All Puerto Rico Commercial Banks, (March 1985)
Monthly Average % Total
Eligible Activities Balance (Mil. $) Eligible Activities
Total adjusted Commercial,
Industrial, Agricultural
Loans & Working Capital
Total Adjusted Mortgage Loans
Investment in Government
Obligations
Other Eligible Activities
Total Eligible Activities
Source: GDB of Puerto Rico, 1985.
3731.3
1191.9
1889.0
44.9
14.4
22.8
1485.3 17.9
8297.5 100.0
finance, insurance and real estate (33 percent). Sixteen percent of the
commercial and industrial loans were classified as "Others," and it is not
clear what kind of eligible activities were involved (Figure 5.1).
Also in December 1984, 27 percent of possession corporation funds in banks
were used to finance mortgage loans, 20 percent were reserved to invest in
Puerto Rico's government obligations, 11 percent were used to finance
consumer loans, and 5 percent were classified as "other investments". As
already noted, it is not clear what "Other Investments" means. Also, it is
questionable whether consumers loans would be accepted as an eligible
activity.
II. Distribution of Possession Corporation Funds among Banks and Other
Financial Institutions
Banks operating in Puerto Rico are diverse in character. There are branches
of U.S. banks, such as Citibank, Chase Manhattan, and the Bank of Boston
among others. There are Puerto Rico's domestic banks, the largest of them
Banco Popular. There are also branches of Canadian banks, including the
Royal Bank of Canada and Bank of Nova Scotia. In addition, there are other
foreign-controlled banks, which are organized as Puerto Rican subsidiaries
and are classified as domestic Puerto Rican banks. This last group includes
Banco Central y Economias, Banco de Santander, and Scotiabank of Puerto
Rico.
The data suggest that there exist an unequal distribution of possession
corporation funds among banks in Puerto Rico. The possession corporation
fund market has always been characterized by the ability of the U.S. banks
operating in Puerto Rico to attract the largest share of the funds and by
the short-term maturities of the deposits. Local Puerto Rican banks, in
contrast, have been able to capture only a tiny portion of possession
corporation funds, primarily because possession corporations seem to prefer
the security that U.S. banks represent for their deposits.1 Foreign banks
also received only a small share of possession corporation funds.
Between 1976 and 1984, nondomestic banks, including U.S. banks, held an
average of 74.7 percent of total possession corporation deposits, while the
Figure 5.1
Distribution of Possession Corporations Deposits
in Eligible Activities as Designated under the
Puerto Rico's Reinvestment Incentive
Fiscal Year 1984, (Percentages)
RESERVES-20 Z
- MORTSAGES
27 Z
CONSUMERS-1l 1 OTHER-5 %
Source: Citibank of Puerto Rico, Department of Economics, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1985.
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ratio of possession corporation funds to their total deposits increased from
35.6 percent in 1976 to 60.2 percent in 1984. During the same period,
domestic banks held an average of 25.3 percent of total possession
corporation funds, whereas the ratio of possession corporation funds to the
total funds of these domestic banks increased from 7.8 to 21.3 percent, very
small percentages relative to nondomestic banks (Table D.14).
The possession corporation funds have filtered into the financial system,
primarily through redeposits in other institutions and repurchase agreements
(repos). The average daily balance as of April 1980 and as of April 1984
illustrate the distribution of possession corporation funds (Table D.16).
It is fairly evident from this information that local commercial banks.were
the prime beneficiaries of repurchase agreements and redeposits. In 1980,
about one-third of their total funds came through these channels. The
smaller local banks received $200 million of their $300 million in
possession corporation funds through redeposits and repurchase agreements.
By the end of March 1985, primarily small banks and savings and loan
associations, which represent most of the domestic-local institutions, had
received $2,033 million through redeposits, repurchase agreements, or other
mechanisms. This amount represented 36 percent of their total direct
deposits (Puerto Rico GDB, 1985, APP 1, p.5). However, these indirect
financial mechanisms, redeposits, and repurchase agreements are more costly
to banks than are direct deposits from possession corporations. Small and
local financial institutions (two categories which overlap), thus, have had
to pay higher premiums to obtain these funds than the large institutions
(Table D.17).
III. Maturities of Possession Corporation Deposits in Banks
The most notable characteristic of the possession corporation financial
market in Puerto Rico, since its creation in 1976, has been the short-term
maturities of the deposits in banks and other financial institutions. Based
on statistics from the Puerto Rico Treasury, the maturity schedule for funds
received by banks ,in selected dates is as follows:
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Table 5.4
Maturity Schedule for Funds Received by Banks
in Puerto Rico, Selected Dates (Percentages)
Maturity Percentage of Funds Deposited in Banks
Schedule in Relation to Their Maturity
December 1984 March 1985
1-90 days 73 % 70 %
91-360 days 24 20
1-5 years 3 10
5 years plus 0 0
Source: Puerto Rico GDB, 1985.
The largest percentage of possession corporation deposits in Puerto Rican
banks bear maturities ranging from one to ninety days. A very small
percentage displays maturities of one to five years. As of.March 1985,
maturity schedules of possession corporation funds deposited in nondomestic -
banks showed that 73.4 percent of the deposits exhibit maturities
fluctuating from one to ninety days. For domestic banks, the comparable
figure was 56.7 percent. Eighty percent of nondomestic banks possession
corporation deposits and sixty-nine percent of domestic possession
corporation deposits carry maturities varying from 1 to 180 days (Figure
5.2; Table D.18).
IV. Interest Rate Differentials
Possession corporation deposit rates are tax-exempt, and as such, they tend
to be lower than Eurodollar rates. Also, they tend to follow Eurodollar
movements. Generally, the Eurodollar market is a competitive alternative
for possession corporation funds. The Puerto Rico Treasury has designed
rules to determine which financial institutions need only to pay interest
equal to 65 percent of the Eurodollar rate.2 These rules have required
banks to move increasingly towards matching eligible loans (loans to
designated economic activities and therefore qualify for the reinvestment
incentive that offers tax free dividend and interest income). However, even
with these rules, the financial system often failed to show the full
interest rate differential compared to the Eurodollar market that would be
expected from the tax-exempt status of the securities and banks deposits.
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Figure 5.2
Possession Corporations Deposits Maturity Schedule
All Puerto Rico's Banks, Funds Received December 1984
1-30 Days--29 %
31-60 Days--31 I
365 Days +--3 Z
61-90 Days--13%
Source: Citibank of Puerto Rico, Department of Economics, San Juan, 1985.
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During the period from 1976 to 1980, the possession corporation certificates
of deposits rate fell in relation to the Eurodollar rate or regular
certificate of deposit rates whenever the amount of possession corporation
deposits rose more rapidly than "eligible" assets.3 There was a relatively
steady growth of eligible assets and possession corporation funds from early
1980 through January 1982. The amount of excess eligible assets in the
system was substantial and remained in the range of $700 million to $1.1
billion (Figure 5.3). This considerable level of eligible assets meant that
banks and brokers could actively bid for possession corporation funds. As a
result, the interest rates offered on these funds remained high from early
1980 through the end of 1981, generally in excess of 80 percent of the rate
on Eurodollars (Table 5.5).4
In 1982, the monthly average interest rate paid on possession corporation
deposits was about 64 percent of the Eurodollar rate. This rate is about as
far as it can fall without inducing a shift of funds to the Eurodollar
market. When the differential is at this level, the after-tax returns on
possession corporation deposits andEurodollars are approximately equal.
This dramatic impact was the result of the February 1982 regulations
implemented by the Puerto Rico Treasury. 5
Possession corporation interest rates after their abrupt decline in March
1982 continued to be low in relation to the rates on Eurodollars through
March 1983 (See Table 5.5). During this period, interest rates on
possession corporation funds were barely enough to make possession
corporations indifferent between investing in exempt possession corporation
deposits and investing in taxable Eurodollar deposits. This type of
equilibrium in the market implies that possession corporations had to
withdraw funds from the possession corporations market in order to balance
assets with investment requirements. In May 1983, however, the so-called
equilibrium in the market was disturbed.
In May 1983, possession corporation rates went up in relation to the
Eurodollar rates (to a 75% monthly average rate). The movement in the rate
was attributed to the reentry of the savings banks into the regulatory
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Figure 5.3
Possession Corporations Deposit Rates Vs. Eurodollar Rates
All Banks in Puerto Rico, (Percentages)
(M)
1984 1985
Jan.1983 - July 1985
Source: GDB of Puerto Rico, 1985.
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Table 5.5
Comparison of Possession Corporation
and Eurodollar Certificates of Deposit
Interest Rate in All Banks in Puerto Rico
(Every Three-Month Deposit Rate and Quarterly Average)
-------------------------------
RATIO POSSESSION CORPORATION TO EURODOLLAR RATES
Quarterly
March June September December Average
1976 69 69
1977 66 67 64 69 67
1978 63 68 73 86 73
1979 95 93 89 83 90
1980 64 80 82 81 77
1981 87 87 85 90 87
1982 57 64 71 64 64
1983 61 79 83 80 76
1984 87 70 76 73 77
1985 75 82 74 81 78
1986 84 81 87 88 85
1987 83 77 80
Source: GDB of Puerto Rico, "A Complementary View of
the 936 Issue " 1985 Report, Appendix 1, p.10. Manuel
Escobar, The 436 Market: An Introduction 1982, p.30,
U.S. Treasury, 1980, p.97; and 1985, p. 78.
Notes: 1. Data for the period 1976-1979 come from the
1980 U.S. Treasury Report.
2. Data for 1980 and 1981 come from M.Escobar's
article The 936 Market: An Introduction.
3. Data for 1982 come from the 1985 U.S.
Treasury Report.
4. Data for the period 1983-1985 come from the
GDB of Puerto Rico.
5. Data for the period 1985-1987 come from the
1987 U.S. Treasury Report.
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system. The increased ability of banks and brokers to compete for the
possession corporation funds drove-up the interest rates. Possession
corporation interest rates were generally 80 percent or more of the
Eurodollar rates between 1983 to 1984.
In 1984 and 1985, the possession corporation interest rates were relatively
lower than in 1983. In 1984, the possession corporation monthly average
rate was 78 percent, while in 1985, it was about 75 percent, of the
Eurodollar rates. This increase then decrease is frequently the pattern
after a new set of regulations goes into effect; however, in 1986 and 1987,
the rates went up again, the average monthly rates were 84% and 82%,
respectively.
The evidence suggests that the Puerto Rico Treasury regulations seem to have
had little success in further reducing the cost of possession corporation
funds relative to the Eurodollar interest rates. Moreover, the possibility
of repatriation of possession corporation funds to the mainland increases if
the interest rates range remains between 65 to 75 percent. The possibility
of repatriation suggests that it is most likely that possession corporation
funds interest rates will remain between 70 to 75 percent of Eurodollars in
the long run. Finally, this suggests that the 65 percent rate needed to
maintain the system in equilibrium is no longer likely to occur.
V. Possession Corporation Deposits and Lending Rates
Generally, possession corporation deposits in Puerto Rican banks are
supposed to increase the availability of capital and to reduce the cost of
capital in Puerto Rico. The effect of possession corporation funds is
primarily determined by: (A) the possession corporations' bank deposit rates
and (B) the borrowers' lending rates. Puerto Rico's public policy is to
keep the cost of possession corporation funds at the lowest level possible
so that banks and other financial institutions may pass on their savings to
the end users of those funds. The evidence suggests that availability of
possession corporation funds has produced a little reduction in the cost of
banks funds, although, there is little indication that banks savings are
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passed to the end users.
A. Possession Corporations' Deposit Rates
Data from Puerto Rico's Government Development Bank (GDB) reveal that the
flow of possession corporation funds to Puerto Rican banks have helped to
reduce the cost of their funds. The average interest rate paid by banks on
possession corporation funds was lower than the rate they would otherwise
have to pay for the same amount. For example, in the first three months of
1985, the cost of new possession corporation deposits averaged 6.3 percent
and the cost of commercial paper funding was 8.5 percent. These data show
that Puerto Rican banks pay 2.2 percent below market rates for much of their
funding (See Table D.26 in Appendix D). In 1983, 1984, and 1985, the lower
interest rates on possession corporation funds to banks, relative to the
cost of funds to commercial banks in Puerto Rico, have a value of $72, $98,
and $120 million, respectively (Table D.27).
Data from the Puerto Rico GDB also suggest that possession corporation funds
have enabled Puerto Rico's banking industry to consolidate its financial
position (Figure 5.4; Table D.29). Total bank resources almost tripled,
from $6,729 million in 1976 to $16,324 million in 1984 (Table D.30). Total
bank resources, in fact, grew at a substantially higher rate than Puerto
Rico's GNP from 1976 to 1984 (Figure 5.5). In addition, possession
corporation funds have contributed to increase bank profitability (Table
D.32); however, other factors during the period increased bank profitability
as well. In average terms, in 1984, 1985, and 1986, the cost of possession
corporation funds to the largest banks was 1.0 to 1.5 percentage points
cheaper than the other bank funds (U.S. Treasury, 1989, pp. 83-85).
B. Lending Rates
Unfortunately, little information is available on bank lending rates to end
users in Puerto Rico. Financial data focus almost exclusively on deposit
rates and little information is available on lending rates. The evidence
suggests that it is possible that the largest businesses and firms have paid
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Figure 5.4
Possession Corporations Deposits
Capital-Asset and Capital-Deposit Ratios
Domestic Banks of Puerto Rico
Percent (End of Dec.)
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Source:GDB of Puerto Rico, 1985.
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Figure 5.5
Puerto Rico: Banks Resources and Gross National Product
Millions
Gross National Product
In Current $(End of June)
Total Resources of
Commercial Banks
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lower interest rates than the prevailing rates. The evidence further
suggests that lower interest rates seem to have displaced other supplies of
funds rather than to increase private investment in Puerto Rico.
In 1985, the GDB compared March 1975 and March 1985 lending rates on all
commercial, industrial, and agricultural loans made by the four largest
commercial banks in Puerto Rico. These are Citibank, Chase Manhattan,
Banco Popular, and Banco de Ponce. The GDB found that in 1975 the average
interest rate charged on these loans was 3.5 percent higher than the U.S.
prime rate. By 1985, the average rate charged on the same type of loans had
fallen to 0.6 percent below the prime (Table D.33).
However, whether commercial banks passed through their lower cost of funds
to their clients seem questionable. The GDB data do not provide a break
down of the information to determine the specific factors that led to
reductions in borrowing rates relative to the prime rate. The evidence
suggests that in the earlier period, a greater proportion of the banks'
portfolios consisted of small loans (less than $250,000) made to small
business. By 1985 more loans were made to large corporations whose high
credit rating entitled them to lower interest rates (Robert R. Nathan
Associates, Inc., 1987, p.49).
Furthermore, the existence of low interest rate loans to large corporations
may not increase the incentives to invest in Puerto Rico. Possession
corporation deposits are short-term funds and generally do not finance plant
and equipment. A manufacturing firm, for example, uses short-term loans to
finance short-term working capital. A firm's plant and equipment requires
long-term capital. Commonly, the firm issues a bond to raise long-term
capital for plant and equipment. Thus, most probably, possession
corporation funds reduce the cost of working capital but not of longer-term
capital. The same is true for commercial loans, which represent the largest
percentage among the industrial, commercial, and agricultural category (See
Chart D.6). Usually, commercial loans financed with possession corporation
funds have been short-term loans to finance inventory.
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The U.S. Department of the Treasury interviewed experienced participants on
the possession corporations' financial market, including bankers, investment
bankers, attorneys, and accountants in the Puerto Rican capital market.6
These interviews were designed to obtain information about the interest
rates borrowers paid, because direct information on bank spreads is almost
impossible to obtain. The U.S. Treasury asked these participants how the
availability of the possession corporation deposits affects the interest
rates charged to borrowers.
The pattern that emerged from these interviews is that there is a wide range
of borrowers with different abilities to negotiate lower borrowing rates.7
At one extreme are large multinational companies, with known credit
standings, who are able to negotiate with several banks having possession
corporation funds. They apparently get substantial reductions in interest
costs. 8 At the other extreme are small Puerto Rican firms for whom the only
effective financing alternative may be through one of the smaller domestic
banks. These smaller domestic banks do not have many possession corporation
deposits, and they do not offer a "reasonable" cost of money because they
acquire most of their funds through repurchase agreements. This kind of
small local borrower, therefore, finds it difficult to negotiate better
terms.9
Moreover, a study done for the Puerto Rico Economic Development
Administration in 1984 suggests that the lower interest rate on corporate
tax-exempt funds, relative to the cost of other deposits, has provided
substantial savings for banks annually. These savings, however, can be
retained entirely by banks. In other words, they are not necessarily passed
on to borrowers (ICF Inc., August 1985, pp. 9-10).
There is little or no empirical evidence to demonstrate that private
investment in Puerto Rico increased as a result of possession corporation
funds. This could indicate that investment in Puerto Rico is not responsive
to interest rate reductions on very short-term funds, or that these funds in
lower interest rate accounts have displaced other supplies of funds, or
simply that there are too few data available with which to discern such an
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impact. The extent to which banks lower interest rates is important. It
would indicate how the benefits of possession corporation funds is
distributed among various economic groups in Puerto Rico.
Endnotes to Chapter Five:
1. Domestic banks have not been able to capture a-significant portion of
possession corporation funds. The main reason provided to explain why
Sossession corporations concentrate their funds mostly in branches of U.S.
anks is that their treasurers are unwilling to deposit funds in banks that
have deposits worth less than $100 million; or corporate treasurers are
willing to deposit their funds in branches of U.S. banks that have their
parents' capital behind them. This conservative financial policy is
reflected in the concentration of tax-exempt funds deposited in branches of
nondomestic banks, in particular, U.S. banks operating in Puerto Rico.
2 To be comparable on an after-tax basis, possession corporation rates have
to be at least 65 percent of Eurodollar rates. This rate was selected based
on the assumption that possession corporations are sub ect to approximately
a 35 percent effective income tax rate. Thus, for banks to attract funds,
they must offer an after-tax rate of return that is at least equal to 65
percent of the prevailing market rate on assets of comparable risks. This
is a way possession corporation deposits rates, in equilibrium, tend to be
about 65 percent of Eurodollar rates; however, at any given time, possession
corporation deposits rates may be higher than 65 percent of Eurodollar rates
due to other market factors.
3. This situation could be attributed to interest arbitrage. The cost of
arbitrage increased when the amount of "eligible" assets rises less rapidly
than the level of possession corporation deposits. Conversely, the costs of
arbitrage are very low when there is a substantial surplus of eligible
assets (U.S. Treasury, 1980, pp. 95-100). This topic will be discussed in
Chapter Six.
4. In particular the entrance into the market of the Continental Illinois
Bank, the Bank of Boston, and additional brokerage houses, contributed to
increased competition of possession corporation funds in 1981. Through the
brokerage houses, smaller commercial banks and saving banks enter into the
possession corporations financial market through the repurchase agreements.
The increased competition was in part due to the greater ability of the
savings banks and smaller commercial banks to increase the amount of
eligible assets in the system. In turn, these assets could be used to bid
for deposits. Some degree of competition among banks for possession
corporation funds remained between 1981 to 1984, mainly, due to
disproportionate growth of possession corporation funds in Puerto Rico's
commercial banks.
5. These 1982 regulations reduced the amount of excess eligible assets to
less than $200 million in 1982. In part this was due to moving up the
beginning date for computing incremental assets from April 1975 to July 1,1981. In addition, the Federal Savings banks did not choose to be declared
eligible institutions and their assets were not available for backing
possession corporation deposits. The amount of eligible activity declined
from $6,059.8 million in January 1982 to $5 155.6 million in February 1982.
This reduction was lower than the investment requirement of $5,480.5 million
in December 1981 (Tables D.22 and D.24).
6. Bankers and investment bankers were not entirely consistent in their
views. However, attorneys and accountants, who specialize in the possession
corporations financial market, seemed the most skeptical that possession
corporation funds were changing investment patterns. It was argued by them
that borrowers received better terms only if they had first linked up with
rospective possession corporation depositors and brought the deal to thebank (U.S. Treasury, 1980, pp. 30-38).
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7. Bankers pointed out that most banks match possession corporation deposits
with loans of the same maturity extended to multinational corporations. The
interest rates on these loans were based on the possession corporations
certificate of deposits rate. The low cost in Puerto Rico may not encourage
more investment in Puerto Rico because a multinational firm would be
reluctant to invest in projects with a low rate of return in Puerto Rico
when it has better opportunities elsewhere. These firms would attempt where
feasible to arrange financial investment where the return is highest.
8. Apparently, the multinationals are able to obtain lower cost loans
because of their willingness to accept short terms,.and, gonsequently, the
prospect of having to repay after 90 days if there is a withdrawal of
possession corporation deposits. They are in a position to repay the loans
if necessary because they can fall back on their ability to borrow from U.S.
banks. That is the have access to the U.S. capital market. However, this
increases the likelihood that the loan by a Puerto Rican bank replaces a
loan from a stateside bank. The multinational firms, also, have differing
abilities to negotiate lower borrowing costs. Based on several views, these
companies can threaten to take their loan elsewhere and deprive the bank of
an eligible asset.
9. The general view (based on the U.S. Treasury interviews) about small
domestic firms is that most of them have to develop a long-term relationship
with only one or two banks which can facilitate their obtaining loans. For
these firms to apply for a loan in a new bank would require an extensive
credit analysis before extending a loan.
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Chapter Six
The Outcome of Tax-Exempt Funds
Reinvested by the Commonwealth Government
The previous chapter discussed one of the eligible activities under the
reinvestment incentive, bank deposits. This chapter discusses the effect of
possession corporation funds on the availability of credit and/or reducing
the cost of capital to two other eligible activities: (1) Puerto Rico
government obligations and development projects, and (2) Puerto Rico's
source of U.S. Government Guaranteed Mortgage-Backed Securities (GNMA's).
These two reinvestment incentive activities, together with bank deposits,
are considered the most important possession corporation investments that
are exempted under Puerto Rico and U.S. tax laws. Tables and figures appear
throughout this chapter, otherwise they are shown in Appendix D.
I. Government Obligations and Development Projects
The reinvestment incentive regulations, designed by the Puerto Rico
Department of the Treasury, mandates that 30 percent of the daily average of
possession corporation deposits in the local financial system be invested in
Puerto Rico's public sector.' Of the 30 percent public investment
requirement, the Treasury regulations demand that 20 percent of all
possession corporation funds be deposited in qualifying private financial
institutions for investment in public projects. This requirement is
supposed to help increase the demand for and reduce financing costs of
public obligations. Further, the Treasury regulations mandate that 10
percent (from the 30 percent) of all possession corporation funds deposited
in eligible financial institutions be redeposited with the Puerto Rico
Government Development Bank (GDB). As of May 1985, there were $961.1
million in possession corporation redeposits plus $1,449.9 million invested
in government obligations (Table D.34). In addition, of the 30 percent
public sector investment requirement, funds to finance government
obligations or projects have been tapped directly from possession
corporations through specially designed bond issues.
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The use of possession corporation funds to finance public investments is
supposed to reduce net interest cost and to increase the marketability of
Puerto Rico's government obligations. Unfortunately, there is little
accurate or comparable information to determine the effect of possession
corporation funds on the cost of public financing in Puerto Rico. Pertinent
materials on this matter began to be formally reported in 1984, but they are
not easily available (most of the information about possession corporation
funds is considered confidential information). However, based on available
information, certain conclusions can be drawn.
A. Effect of the 20 Percent Requirement
As mentioned above, Puerto Rico's Treasury rules require that 20 percent
(i.e., two-thirds of the 30%) of all possession corporation funds received
by eligible institutions be invested in government obligations. This
requirement is supposed to help increase the demand for and to help reduce
financing costs of public obligations.
During the period from 1975 to 1985, there seems to have been a small
decline in the differential between net interest costs of Puerto Rico's
issues in relation to the Bond Buyers Index for Municipal issues (Chart
D.35). The GDB attributes the reduction of the interest costs of Puerto
Rico's public obligations to the possession corporation investment rules in
which 20 percent of their bank deposits are channeled into government
obligations. However, the U.S. Treasury suggests that the 20% investment
requirement (defined above) has contributed to increase the demand for
Puerto Rico's government obligations, but that it has not resulted in a
significant reduction in net interest costs of public obligations issues.
Both, the GDB and the U.S. Treasury analyses will be discussed in the
following paragraphs.
The GDB measures the cost of Puerto Rico's government obligations by
tracking the behavior of two bond issues from January 1983 to August 1984.
The offering rates of those issues were then compared to the Bond Buyers
Index. The GDB found that in January 1983 offering rates were 9 percent and
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16 percent, respectively, above the Bond Buyers Index. By August 1984, the
GDB verified that the cost of the offering rates of the two bonds issued had
improved. They were less than 1 percent and 5 percent above the Index.2
Unfortunately, the GDB provides the percentage interest rate differentials,
and it does not provide the interest rate statistic for those bond issues.
As a result, they cannot be compared with available data for previous years.
The U.S. Treasury findings support the GDB in relation to the increased
demand for government obligations. The Treasury data suggest that
availability of possession corporation funds in Puerto Rico since 1976 has
contributed to increased demand for public obligations. However, the U.S.
Treasury differs from the GDB analysis in relation to the effect of these
funds on interest costs. The Treasury analysis implies that the increased
demand for public obligation issues does not appear to have resulted in a
significant reduction in net interest costs of Puerto Rican public
obligation issues. Since 1976, there has been a moderate decline in the
differential between net interest costs of Puerto Rico's obligation issues
and the Bond Buyers Index. The average differential for nine issues between
1979 and 1981 was about 0.60 percentage points lower than in 1975 (Table
D.36).3
The U.S. Treasury argues that the reason for the small effect on interest
costs of Puerto Rico's bonds is that possession corporation funds have not
affected the relative desirability of Puerto Rico's publicly issued debt
because it was already exempt from U.S. tax. Puerto Rico's issues of
government obligations are a relatively small percentage of the total tax-
free U.S. market. As a result, interest costs in Puerto Rico depend
primarily on the perceived risk of default and will not be affected by a
small amount available to U.S. investors. 4
Generally, the effect of the 20 percent public sector investment rule, as
well as of possession corporations' direct investments in Puerto Rico's
Government obligations have led to a shift in the ownership of Puerto Rico's
government obligations. Banks in Puerto Rico have substantially increased
their holdings of these obligations, as well as of possession corporation
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funds from 1976 to 1985, as presented in the previous part. For example,
from June 30, 1975, to December 31, 1981, banks in Puerto Rico increased
their holdings of Puerto Rico government obligations from $275 million to
$1,614 million.5
B. The Effect of the 10 Percent Requirement
The 10 percent redeposit requirement (as defined previously) is supposed to
improve the GDB's ability to respond to the financing needs of Puerto Rico's
government. The influx of lower-cost possession corporation funds seems to
have contributed to the financial strength and stability of the GDB. As of
December 1984, the GOB held $3.8 billion in assets. Most of these assets,
$2.6 billion, were invested in certificates of deposit and in other short-
term investments (see Chart D.13). In other words, two-thirds of the assets
were not used to finance real investment or long-term investment in Puerto
Rico.
The GDB, however, has developed mechanisms to use its 10 percent (from the
30% mentioned above) share of possession corporation funds to finance
development projects. Among these mechanisms is a special program to give
low-cost loans for joint production projects involving Puerto Rico and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) nations. The complementary projects are
defined as operations in which exchange of goods and/or services occurs
between Puerto Rico and a CBI country. Under these projects, the labor-
intensive components of a production process are carried out in low-wage
countries, such as Haiti or the Dominican Republic while the capital-
intensive components of the production process are performed in Puerto Rico.
Concession loan terms under this special program are supposed to provide
firms with lower-interest financing as well as more liberal collateral
ratios than could be obtained in other Caribbean nations or through
conventional bank lending in the United States. The evidence suggests,
however, that most of the loans provided by the GDB under this special
program have been for refinancing projects of parent corporations.
Generally, refinancing is not considered an eligible activity. The evidence
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further suggests that the GDB program to finance complementary projects
between Puerto Rico and the Caribbean nations emerged as an effort by the
government of Puerto Rico to preserve Section 936.6 In other words, the
retention of possession corporation funds in Puerto Rico has been linked to
the successful implementation of the CBI.
New reinvestment incentive regulations introduced in 1987 (#3582) include
this GDB-CBI special program as an important activity for economic
development. The Puerto Rican government has pledged $100 million in loans
to CBI countries every year since 1985. This goal has not been met. The
Puerto Rican government has hopes that the new regulations will help to
accomplish this goal. Construction has been identified as an area of
significant interest to be promoted, because there is a general presumption
that construction of large-scale projects creates jobs and stimulates
economic development (U.S. Treasury, 1983, p.68). This GDB-CBI program
certainly lacks significant benefits for Puerto Rico in terms of investment
and employment opportunities. The benefits of this program to Puerto Rico
are supposed to be more political than economic.
C. Financing Government Obligations
Possession corporation funds, deposited under the 10 percent rule, appear to
enable the GDB to obtain better terms for public sector financing with other
banks and financial institutions. The GDB also began issuing obligations
geared to the possession corporations' market in 1976. The evidence
suggests, that there may have been larger interest savings on direct loans
by banks to government agencies than the interest savings on government
obligation issues. Deposits by other banks in the GDB have grown
substantially since 1975. The interest paid on these deposits is the after-
corporate tax Eurodollar rate, which is less than banks pay for possession
corporation certificates of deposit and on average may be less than the
market rate on Puerto Rico's public issues (U.S. Treasury, 1980, p.105; and
1983, p.98).
In some cases government obligations were financed through repurchase
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agreements, under which short-term maturities of long-term obligations were
sold, with a repurchase clause to be effective at a future date. However,
the U.S. Treasury presented evidence that arbitrage was one of the uses to
which the GDB has put the proceeds from its loans. These investments do
seem to have risen in recent years (U.S. Treasury, 1983, p.98). It is
difficult to tell whether the GDB's role as a fiscal agent justifies its
volume of money market investments. In 1976, the GDB began to sell
obligations directly to possession corporations.
In 1985, the GDB developed, perhaps, the most important financial mechanism,
the Mortgage Trust, to sell obligations to possession corporations for
financing low-cost private housing units in Puerto Rico. This Trust
provides a special fund guaranteed by the GDB, which accomodates longer-term
deposits from possession corporations (in contrast to their short-term
certificates of deposits). The Trust funds were used to finance housing
construction and the purchase of a zero coupon bond, which was issued to
repay the principal of the note. Also, these funds were used to help
finance the establishment of a new "development bank." 7 The GDB's Mortgage
Trust raised $220 million through the sale of notes to possession
corporations in 1985.
The Mortgage Trust is a socially productive program; however, there have not
been additional obligations issued since 1985 to finance this program. The
main reason given to explain why possession corporation funds have not been
used extensively to finance housing is that company treasurers, preoccupied
with the security of their principal, continue investing most of their funds
in short-term certificates of deposit in the larger banks. Banks are
reluctant to make long-term loans, such as mortgages, which are backed only
by short-term deposits. Large corporations that were able to purchase these
low-cost housing obligations were, in fact, the real beneficiaries of this
program.8 This program provided them tax-free interest income and a
reduction of the tollgate tax on repatriation, as well as ownership of part
of Puerto Rico's public debt.
Finally, the evidence suggests that the reinvestment incentive rules, which
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demand that 30 percent of the daily monthly average of total possession
corporation funds deposited in eligible institutions be invested in
government obligations, have not been satisfied. Between 1976 and 1987,
eligible institutions would comply with the 30 percent requirement through a
somewhat perverse practice. Eligible institutions in Puerto Rico
established affiliate entities in the United States. The affiliates
purchased bonds from the eligible institutions in Puerto Rico. Then, the
affiliates remitted the same bonds to the eligible institutions in Puerto
Rico.9 This practice diluted the relative effect of these rules. (The
practice will be explained further in Chapter Seven.)
II. Mortgage-Backed Securities Guaranteed- by the U.S. Government (GNMA's)
GNMA's are securities issued by mortgage lenders that are backed by a pool
of mortgages and whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the U.S.
government. The mortgages in the pool have to be government-insured. The
securities are issued at 50 basis points (0.5 percentage points) below the
FHA mortgage rate. The price of any GNMA at issue depends on market rates
and the special features of any particular pool of mortgages. For example,
some mortgage pools have a faster rate of principal repayments (U.S.
Treasury, 1980, p.105; and 1983, p.99).
GNMA's backed by Puerto Rico's mortgages are very desirable investments for
possession corporations. When the introduction of Section 936 ended the tax
exemption for possession corporation investments in the Eurodollar market,
GNMA's became one of the few high-yield investments that were still tax-
exempt. Not surprisingly, the possession corporations bought up virtually
all the available supply. Total outstanding GNMA issues originating in
Puerto Rico increased from 0.6 billion in mid-1977 to $1.4 billion as of
December 31, 1983, and to $2.2 billion in 1986 (see Chapter Four and Table
C.1). The supply of GNMA's in Puerto Rico is small compared to total
possession corporation funds. As a result of possession corporations'
demand and their limited supply, Puerto Rico sources of GNMA's sell at a
substantially higher price than U.S. GNMA's with the same coupon. For
example, in June 1981, Puerto Rico GNMA's sold at a four- to five-point
120
premium over recent U.S. GNMA's with the same coupon and maturity. This
implied a yield differential of about one percentage point (U.S. Treasury,
1983, p.99).
Probably, part of the savings provided by lower interest rates on Puerto
Rico GNMA's is passed on to Puerto Rico's homebuyers who qualify for
insurance. There are a large number of potential GNMA issuers, including
mortgage companies, commercial banks, and saving banks. It also appears
that a significant portion of Puerto Rico's home mortgages would fit under
the FHA size limits and could therefore qualify for insurance. However, the
interest rates on conventional mortgages do not seem significantly lower
than in the United States. The rate on conventional mortgages .in mid-June
1980 was 12.5 percent plus a one-time fee of 3 percent, which implies an
annual interest cost of only about one-quarter of one-percent lower than in
the U.S.(U.S. Treasury, 1980, p.106). In 1981, the interest rate on
conventional mortgages varied from 16 to 17 percent, which seemed to be
close to the range in the United States. In recent years, the interest
rates on conventional mortgages seem to be comparable to the U.S. rates.10
It is difficult to determine whether any reduction in mortgage costs that
may have taken place has had an impact on home building. The dollar level
of investment in private dwellings was very stable from 1972 through 1979.
From 1976 to 1978, GNMA issues were as high as $250 million per year. In
1979 they amounted to only about $100 million. After 1979, the amount has
been about $100 million per year mainly due to the depressed housing market
in Puerto Rico (U.S. Treasury, 1980, p. 106; and 1983, p. 100). Possession
corporation funds, invested in Puerto Rico GNMA's, appear to lack a
significant impact on Puerto Rico's economy. The high demand for these
securities by possession corporations in Puerto Rico led to a shift in the
ownership of these securities from foreign to local investors rather than to
increase Puerto Rico's investments.
In addition, between 1976 and 1987, possession corporations acquired GNMA's
and acted as financial intermediaries generating profits from the spread
between the original value and the resale price of their investments. This
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practice employed by possession corporations is known as "arbitrage."
Commonly, firms borrowed money at low possession corporation rates. Then,
with this money, these firms purchased GNMA's paying higher rates.11  Once
again, these practices by firms and other participants in the possession
corporations' market have diluted the relative effect of these funds as a
reinvestment incentive in Puerto Rico's economy.
The next chapter tries to offer a comprehensive view of the reinvestment
incentive regulations and their relative effect on the behavior and
operation of possession corporation funds and participants in promoting
economic development in Puerto Rico.
Endnotes to Chapter Six:
1. The daily monthly average refers to the sum of each day's outstanding
balance divided by the number of days in the month.
2. The mechanism used by the GDB to measure the demand for Puerto Rico's
government obligations was to track the number of offers and their prices on
the blue list, a daily list of all offerings of public obligations in the
United States.
3. The U.S. Treasury compared net interest costs of Puerto Rico's public
obligations offerings and of. tax-free U.S. municipal bonds, first, for 1975
to 1980 and then for 1975 to 1981 (U.S. Treasury, 1980, pp. 103-105; and
1983, pp. 96-99). They have similar findings in both reports and these
differ from the GDB of Puerto Rico findings.
4. Most of the Puerto Rico's government debt is held in the United States.
It, therefore, has to compete in yield with other tax-free obligations.
Possession corporation funds increased demand for Puerto Rico's government
debt by perhaps one billion dollars. This compares with a gross stock
outstanding on June 30 1979, of $6.4 billion. Based on Puerto Rico
Planning Board information, more than $5 billion on government debt that
year was held abroad, presumably in the United States. Because Puerto Rican
issues are a relatively small percentage of the total tax-free U.S. market,
interest costs will depend primarily on the perceived risk of default and
will not be much affected by a small shift in the amount available to U.S.
investors.
5. The statistic for 1975 did not include deposits with the GDB, which were
included that year in "balance due from banks." Total "balance due from
banks" that year amounted to $441 million (U.S. Treasury, 1980, p.88; and
1983, p.92).
6. Under the new #3582 regulations, eligible institutions must invest seven
percent of their daily monthly average basis in activities identified by the
Puerto Rican government as important for economic development. The special
complementary GDB-CBI program was listed as an area of significant
importance. In many forums the preservation of the possession corporation
funds in Puerto Rico has been linked to the successful implementation of CBI(U.S. Treasury, 1983, pp.61-71).
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7. Under previous reinvestment incentive regulations (#3087), there were not
specific requirements for investment in the Puerto Rico Economic Development
Bank (EDB). Beginning in mid-1987, the new reinvestment regulation (#3582)
demanded that eligible institutions invest and maintain an amount equal to 1
percent of its daily average of eligible funds received in direct deposits
with loans to or obligations of the EDB. It has the objective to generate a
capitalization of $50 million to promote loans to small and medium
businesses. There is insufficient information to evaluate its performance.
8. The possession corporations who purchased Mortgage Trust obligations up
to 1985 were: Pfizer, Heinz, Westinghouse, Warner-Lambert, Chanel, Insilco,
Sun Oil, Sterling Drugs, Upjohn, Johnson & Johnson, Revlon, Avon Loctite,
Scherin g, American Cyanamid, Pepsi Coal Bristol Myers, Squibb Abbot, Ell
Lilly, American Home, Bacardi, Intel, GfE, Playtex, Wang, and itway.
9. New regulations (#3582) were introduced in 1987 to try to correct this
loophole in the prior regulation. The new regulation demanded that an
eligible institution invest and maintain an amount; determined by adding the
ending balance each day during the month and dividing such sum by the number
of days of that month (daily month average), equal to 15 percent of its
daily monthly avera e of eligible funds received in any one or more of loans
to or obligations of the Puerto Rico's government or its instrumentalities
-or politi-cal subdivisions that satisfy certain criteria defined under the
regulations. In general, this new regulation was designed to oblige
institutions either to deposit the funds with the GDB so that entity can
channel the funds into the local economy or else invest the funds in taxable
obligations. Investment in taxable obligations helps those federal agencies
that cannot float tax-exempt instruments. These regulations provide
agencies an additional market for taxable obligations.
10. Currently, the interest rate on conventional mortgages is about 10.5
percent plus a comparable points-fee. This is almost similar to the U.S.
rate.
11. Under the new regulations (#3582), portfolio interest is not allowed.
The new regulations thus try to avoid arbitrage.
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Chapter Seven
Relative Effect of Tax Exemption
As a Reinvestment Incentive
Previous chapters, five and six, discussed specific effects of possession
corporation funds on institutions and activities designated under the
reinvestment incentive. This chapter provides a comprehensive approach for
explaining the relative effect of tax exemption as a reinvestment incentive.
The first part of this chapter discusses whether the Puerto Rico Treasury
reinvestment incentive rulings and regulations have contributed to making
possession corporation funds available to finance eligible activities,
including credits at long-term, low-cost interest rates, or to increase real
investment in Puerto Rico. The second part analyzes whether the large
volume of possession corporation funds could be absorbed by Puerto Rico's
economy in the form of designated economic development activities.
I. Tax Incentive Rules and Eligible Investment Activities
Since 1976, possession corporations have been increasing their
financial investments in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's Treasury has introduced
rulings and regulations, on the one hand, to limit the financial
institutions' discretion in investing these deposits. In addition, the
regulations try to assure that these financial investments lead to
availability of credit, accessible long-term loans at low-cost interest
rates, or to increase real investment in Puerto Rico.
Generally, reinvestment incentive rulings and regulations identify the
assets whose acquisition will constitute an eligible use of possession
corporation funds by financial institutions. These eligible activities
provide tax-free interest and dividends to possession corporations. These
rulings and regulations also specify the financial investments by possession
corporation that have to be matched with eligible assets by financial
institutions and how the matching is to be implemented. However, due to
technical reasons and controversial practices used by eligible financial
institutions, including the GDB, the effectiveness of these rulings and
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regulations appears to be diluted. Moreover, the magnitude of the
investments that have taken advantage of the technical defects or have been
made through dubious practices may have been very large. This investment
behavior by eligible institutions has made it extremely difficult to measure
the relative impact of possession corporation funds invested in designated
economic activities as defined under the reinvestment incentive.
This part of Chapter Seven analyzes the effect of reinvestment incentive
regulations since 1975. First, it discusses some of the most important
technical issues and doubtful practices, in particular: debt substitution,
warehousing, "repurchase agreements" transactions, conversion of long-term
funds into short-term funds, assets acquired from insolvent banks,
arbitrage, end-of-the-month reports, unequal access to funds, stateside
affiliate transactions, among others. Second, it presents some of the
findings (based on the analyses of chapters five and six) that describe the
relative effect of possession corporation fund, as a reinvestment incentive,
on the economy of Puerto Rico.
A. Reinvestment Incentive Rules Since 1975
This part discusses rules in effect from 1975-1980, 1980-1982, 1982-1984,
1984-1987, and 1987 to the present.
1. Reinvestment Incentive Rules 1975-1980 : In May 1, 1975, the Puerto Rico
the Treasury introduced regulations to ensure that possession corporation
funds were used for the benefit of Puerto Rico. In particular, the
regulations required that the banks invest 20 percent of the possession
corporation funds in obligations of Puerto Rico's government or its
agencies. Banks were permitted to use their existing investments to satisfy
this requirement. To prevent banks from using the remainder of these funds
to make consumer loans or investments outside of Puerto Rico, the
regulations provided that any increase in the banks' possession corporation
deposits had to be invested in eligible assets. The base period for this
requirement was April 30, 1975, the date that exempt certificates of deposit
(CDs) were introduced under the Industrial Incentive Act (IIA) of 1963.
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However, the reinvestment regulations were interpreted and operated before
April 1, 1980, in several ways that diluted the impact of the new rules.
During 1975 to 1980, the ineffectiveness of possession corporation funds on
investment in designated economic development activities was attributed
basically to: (a) warehousing, (b) "repurchase agreements," (c) assets
acquired from insolvent banks, (d) end-of-the-month reporting, (e) debt
substitution, and (f) conversion of long-term funds into short-term funds.
(a) Warehousing: Puerto Rico's government was aware that the sudden influx
of possession corporation funds in 1976 could not be absorbed immediately
within the economy. Technically, the regulations provide room for
"warehousing" opportunities. The rules granted banks 90 days to invest 25
percent of a new deposit in eligible assets and 180 days to invest the
remainder. As a result, possession corporation funds were "warehoused"
temporarily in U.S. investments such as U.S. Treasury securities.
(b) "Repurchase Agreements" (Repo): This practice refers to securities sold
under repurchase agreements. Loopholes in the regulations let banks engage
in a controversial practice that involves repurchase agreement transactions.
A bank could sell Puerto Rican government bonds in its portfolio to a
possession corporation, usually through an investment banker, under an
agreement to repurchase the bond on a specified later date.1  The funds
received by the banks were not considered possession corporation deposits.
To a possession corporation, however, a Puerto Rican obligation was an
eligible investment activity (or tax-free asset). Furthermore, the bond
that was sold under a repurchase agreement could still count as one of the
bank's eligible assets.2
(c) Assets Acquired From Insolvent Banks: Puerto Rico experienced a banking
crisis in the mid-1970s. The most significant liquidation was Banco
Credito, the second largest bank at the end of 1975 with almost $800 million
in assets. It was declared insolvent and its assets were taken over by
other banks in Puerto Rico. Banks that acquired "eligible" assets from a
liquidating bank could regard them as new assets under Puerto Rico's
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regulations.
That is, the bank did not bring an addition to the bank's base-period
eligible assets, nor did acquired assets from a liquidating bank result in a
corresponding increase of possession corporation deposits. The acquiring
banks could therefore report an increase in eligible assets, even though
eligible assets in the banking system as a whole had not increased.
(d) End-of-the-Month Reports: In compliance with the pre-1980 regulations,
banks were required to report on their possession corporation deposit
transactions in terms of end-of-the month levels. As a result, banks used
to offer a CD for 29 days yielding a month's tax-exempt interest, and let
the CD disappear on the last day of the month.
These technical reasons have contributed to the dilution of the impact of
Puerto Rico's reinvestment regulations on banks' use of possession
corporation funds.3 In addition, there have been several practices used by
banks that also have reinforced the dilution of the effect of these
regulations. Among the most common practices were debt substitution and
conversion of long-term into short-term funds (U.S. Treasury, 1978, 197.9,
1980, 1983, and 1985).
(e) Debt Substitutions: As documented in Chapters Four and Six, there has
been a substitution in the ownership of Puerto Rico's debt. Possession
corporations rather than other buyers have purchased Puerto Rico's
government bonds, GNMA's, and other assets. This substitution has not
affected the total funds available to finance investment. In the case of
corporations, Puerto Rican subsidiaries of large U.S. companies replace
parent debt with lower-cost possession corporations debt rather than by
adding significantly to their total debt capital.
(f) Conversion of Long-Term Funds Into Short-Term Funds: In addition, long-
term funds were converted into short-term funds. Many of Puerto Rico's
GNMA's and government bonds have been held under repurchase agreements with
brokers or banks, which effectively converted them into short-term
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investments. In addition, most deposits of possession corporations have
been in the form of short term certificates of deposit. Thus, because the
funds invested by tax-exempt corporations have been committed only for short
periods of time, banks and brokers could not risk making additional long-
term loans for investment in plant and equipment.
2. Reinvestment Incentive Rules 1980-1982 : In an attempt to solve the
problems created under the pre-1980 rules, described above, Puerto Rico's
Treasury issued new reinvestment regulations on April 1, 1980. According to
these regulations: 95 percent of all funds must be invested at all times in
designated eligible assets, average daily balances, of possession
corporation bank deposits, must be reported- rather than the end-of-the-month
levels; direct and indirect repurchase agreements with possession
corporation deposits must be classified as eligible activities for purposes
of the reinvestment incentive regulations, and banks must keep 10 percent of
the possession corporation funds deposited in the Puerto Rico Government
Development Bank (GDB). This rule is in addition to the investment
requirement that 20 percent of possession corporation banks deposits must be
invested in government obligations (i.e., two-thirds of the 30% was
explained in Chapter Six).
The 1980 bank regulations constrained the use of tax-exempt funds by banks
and other financial institutions. Generally, these rules also meant that
banks would take in possession corporation deposits only if they had
eligible assets in which to put them. As a result of these rules, practices
such as "warehousing" and end-of-the-month reports were reduced; however,
part of the technical problems and controversial practices under previous
regulations remained, and other disputable practices have surfaced since
1980. Among these new practices were: (a) arbitrage, (b) noncompetitive
interest rates, and (c) unequal access to funds.
(a) Arbitrage: The 1980 rule attempted to limit the previously available
opportunities for arbitrage; however, the attempt was unsuccessful.
Possession corporations, as well as financial institutions were able to
continue to engage in arbitrage practices, as will be discussed later in
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this chapter. As a result, these rules did not increase the contribution of
possession corporation funds to Puerto Rico's development. As presented in
Chapter Five, the fact that in 1980 the banking system as a whole continued
to have excess eligible assets meant that the new possession corporation
deposits could be received without additional investment in Puerto Rico.
Moreover, even if banks did expand their loans to eligible Puerto Rican
borrowers, these borrowers have the opportunity to invest the funds offshore
if yields in the Eurodollar market exceeded the cost of borrowing in Puerto
Rico.
The effect of the 1980 bank regulations on interest rates depends on the
rate of the growth of tax-exempt deposits relative to the growth rate of
eligible assets. If tax-exempt deposits grew faster than eligible assets,
the tax-exempt certificates of deposit rate would be expected to fall.
During 1981, however, tax-exempt fund rates, both in absolute and relative
terms, rose dramatically. In fact, tax-exempt rates rose to 12.16 percent
in December 1981, representing 90 percent of Eurodollar rates (see Chapter
Five).
This increase resulted partly from the rise in the general level of interest
rates, and partly from the demand for tax-exempt funds for arbitrage
purposes on the part of the banks, brokers, and other financial
institutions. Arbitrage refers to the practice by eligible institutions
receiving low-cost possession corporation funds to lend them out temporarily
at higher interest rates in financial markets outside of Puerto Rico.
(b) Noncompetitive Interest Rates: Puerto Rico's financial system often
failed to show the full interest rate differential between the possession
corporations market and the Eurodollar market that would be expected from
the tax-exempt status of the securities and bank deposits. Generally, the
system tended to operate with an excess of eligible investments over
available funds at any given time, and the cost of tax-exempt funds was
substantially below that of other sources of borrowed money. This tended to
make the larger banks compete vigorously for deposits and kept the rates on
deposits relatively high.
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(c) Unequal Access to Funds: Another problem, discussed thoroughly in
Chapter Five, is the tendency of possession corporation funds to be
concentrated in a reduced number of branches of very large U.S. banks.
Apparently, the treasurers of possession corporations prefer the security of
large banks and keep most of their funds at short-term in a handful of the
largest banks in Puerto Rico, such as the Chase Manhattan Bank and Citibank.
The locally owned banks received relatively few of these deposits and the
thrift institutions almost none. Yet, paradoxically, it is these smaller
institutions that, through their specialized knowledge and relationships
with local clients, are better suited than multinational banks to stimulate
the type of local economic development that the tax exemption on possession
corporation funds was intended to induce in Puerto Rico.
3. Reinvestment Incentive Rules 1982-1984 : The regulations issued on
December 17, 1981, which became effective February 1, 1982, were intended to
correct problems that remained under the April 1980 regulations. However,
in September 1, 1983, a new series of amendments to the February 1, 1982,
regulations were introduced to remedy what was perceived to be continuing
defects in the regulatory regime. The main concerns addressed under both
sets of regulations were to reduce practices such as: (a) arbitrage (b)
improper use of these funds, and (c) unequal access to funds among financial
institutions.
(a) Arbitrage: In order to reduce arbitrage, the rules further tightened the
procedures for banks' use of possession corporation funds. The main changes
in regulations to address this problem were: (1) the base period for the
calculation of incremental eligible assets in banks was moved from April 30,
1975 to July 1, 1981 and, (2) borrowers, or the ultimate recipients, must
report to banks the use of eligible funds. 4 For the first time, borrowers
or ultimate recipients were covered by the regulations. The intention of
this rule was to ensure that the proceeds of loans financed with possession
corporation funds were not used to purchase financial assets to take
advantage of any differential between these funds interest costs and regular
yields. Banks must be able to establish, to the satisfaction of Puerto
Rico's Secretary of the Treasury, that eligible funds had been used properly
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and not just to purchase financial assets.5
(b) Unequal Access to Funds: The 1982 regulations attempted to solve the
problem related to "unequal access to funds" by expanding the brokers'
ability to act as intermediaries for these funds while bringing them under a
regulatory regime similar to those applying to banks. The 1982 regulations
allowed brokers to become eligible to act as intermediaries for the use of
eligible possession corporation funds in a repurchase agreement (repo).
However, the proceeds of the repo had to be invested in the same range of
eligible assets that banks were restricted to in their use of these funds.
6
In addition, the regulations mandated that a certain portion of eligible
assets be invested in the form of mortgage loans for new housing. Banks
must now originate mortgage loans to finance the construction or acquisition
of new housing in an amount equivalent to six percent of their annual
average daily balance of possession corporation deposits. These two rules
attempted to broaden the distribution of possession corporations funds among
financial institutions in Puerto Rico.
These changes opened up a channel through which the smaller commercial banks
and thrift institutions could gain access to the tax exempt deposits of
large corporations; however, they could obtain these funds for a short-term
and at higher interest rates than the larger commercial banks. The
mechanism by which the brokers "spread out" the tax exempt funds into the
financial system was through repurchase agreements. Because brokers were
permitted to enter actively into the financial markets, repos have become a
popular way for the smaller financial institutions to gain additional funds
at a relatively low cost. 7 These repurchase agreements involve the sale of
a tax-exempt security to smaller institutions, with an agreement to buy it
back at a later time, in effect, a short-term loan. The purchase and
selling prices are arranged to provide a reasonable rate of interest to the
"lender." The transaction carries little risk, as the security itself can
serve as collateral.
(c) Improper Use of Funds: Most of the 1983 regulations dealt with "the
improper use of funds" by eligible institutions. Also, they attempted to
131
limit further practices such as arbitrage and the number of times possession
corporation funds, mainly through repos, can be transferred among banks and
brokers before being loaned to the final eligible recipient. Among the
basic 1983 rules were:
(i) Banks or brokers receiving direct possession corporation deposits may
transfer or redeposit them once. At that point, the bank or broker
receiving these funds becomes the "ultimate recipient" and must invest them
in eligible assets.
(ii) Banks or brokers must provide evidence that direct possession
corporation funds have been invested in eligible activities.8
(iii) banks and brokers may generate new areas of eligible activities. The
1983 regulations indicate which activities were not eligible (consumer loans
and offshore investments), instead of identifying the list of eligible
assets. Eligible activity is described in broad terms, apparently to give
flexibility to banks and brokers.
(iv) Banks must use possession corporation deposits even if they have excess
eligible assets when the funds are received. The attempt of this regulation
is to move a base period-incremental system to a transaction-by-transaction
basis for determining eligible activities. There is a presumption of
improper use of the funds. In other words, they appear to be used to
acquire ineligible financial assets (assets that are not qualified under the
reinvestment incentive), and,
(v) Banks or brokers receiving indirect possession corporation funds as the
"ultimate recipient" have to report to Puerto Rico's Secretary of the
Treasury how the funds were used.
Most of the 1982 and 1983 changes in regulations, however, appeared to
affect the timing of transactions without necessarily having a substantive
impact on the assets that were acquired. For example, the 45 days mentioned
above may merely mean that banks and brokers acquire their collateral
earlier. Little cost would have been added because they accrue interest
during that time. Similarly, the attempt to introduce "tracing" or a
"transaction-by-transaction" system was not significant because an excess of
eligible assets over possession corporation funds tended to be generated.
In that case, a bank or broker timed its acquisition of eligible assets to
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meet the tracing requirements, for example, by not booking eligible loans
until they had a possession corporation deposit in hand.
4. Reinvestment Incentive Rules 1984-1987 : Previous regulations, given the
technical reasons and disputable practices, did not seem to have a
significant effect on the market for possession corporation funds. In April
17, 1984, Puerto Rico's Treasury adopted new regulations (mostly known as
banking rules #3087) to deal, among other things, with the problem of
noncompetitive interest rates. The rules attempted to produce a
differential between the interest rate on possession corporation deposits
and Eurodollar rates.
The April 1984 regulations linked the interest rate paid on possession
corporation funds to the amount of eligible assets a bank or broker is
required to generate. In particular, if banks or brokers pay interest on
the possession corporation funds that is less than 65 percent of the
comparable Eurodollar rate, the amount of eligible activity required must
match the amount of possession corporation funds received. These rules
penalized banks or brokers for paying more than 65 percent of the Eurodollar
rate for the deposits of the possession corporations. If the interest rate
on possession corporation funds is 65 percent or higher, the eligible
activity has to exceed the amount of possession corporation funds received,
with the penalty increasing as the interest rate rises. In other words, the
penalty that banks would have to assume for paying higher rates of interest
on their possession corporation deposits was to make more than one dollar of
loans in activities eligible for local and federal tax exemption for each
dollar of deposits accepted at the higher rates. The higher the interest
rate, the greater the amount of lending that would have to be undertaken per
dollar deposited.
This regulation has been effective in lowering the rates that banks pay
possession corporations for their deposits. Consequently, the rules have
restricted the ability of banks and brokers to bid for funds when rates are
high. In doing so, it may also have increased the amount of funds that the
corporations have repatriated to the United States and kept the amount of
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deposits in line with the amount of lending activity that the banking system
can support at those interest rates.
The other major changes made by the April 17, 1984, regulations were: (a) an
eligible institution can consider one-twelth of its annual operating
expenses (excluding the cost of funds) as an eligible activity, (b) a full
100 percent of possession corporation funds is subject to the investment
requirements, instead of 95 percent, and (c) eligible assets can no longer
include cash on hand, cash items in the process of collection, demand
deposits with banks, interest and accounts receivable, prepaid expenses, or
(imputed) interest on bad loans.
In 1985, Puerto Rico's Treasury took note of the many unsolved problems of
current and previous regulations. It began working in a new set of
regulations, which became effective in February of 1987.
5. Reinvestment Incentive Rules Since 1987 : Puerto Rico's Treasury
introduced the 1987 reinvestment incentive regulations (#3582) to continue
dealing with most of the technical problems and practices that have diluted
the effectiveness of the reinvestment regulations. Among the main
objectives of these regulations are: to simplify the complexity of previous
regulations due to the increasing difficulties with examining or monitoring
their impact, to reduce the unequal distributions of possession corporation
funds among financial institutions, to minimize practices, such as arbitrage
and "affiliate stateside entity" transactions, which contributed to dilute
the purpose of the 1984 reinvestment regulations; and to increase the
regulations' effectiveness in challenging funds into productive development
activities by discouraging the generation of paper profits by financial
institutions and, by promoting the issuance of loans in the local market at
reduced rates and to guarantee the use of funds in a consistent manner with
the purpose of these regulations. The reinvestment incentive regulations of
1987 introduced significant changes to correct most of the technical
problems and controversial practices not fixed under previous regulations.
Among the changes proposed under the 1987 regulations were:
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(a) "Affiliate Stateside Entity" Transactions: Previous regulations required
that eligible institutions own and hold not less than 30 percent of the
daily monthly average of total assets transferred, assigned, or pledged in
obligations issued by the government of Puerto Rico. In particular, 20 and
10 percent of the daily monthly average must be invested, in obligations of
Puerto Rico's government, and in obligations of the GDB, respectively.
During 1984 to 1987, however, the use of another controversial practice by
financial institutions was uncovered, which was known as "affiliate
stateside entity" transactions. This entity's exclusive purpose was to
purchase these bonds from the main institution in Puerto Rico. Eventually,
this entity in the United States remitted the same bonds to Puerto Rico. In
other words, many financial institutions used to comply."artificially" with
the 30 percent requirement by establishing an affiliated entity in the
United States.
The 1987 regulations attempted to correct this loophole. The new regulation
demands that eligible institutions must deposit the 30 percent investment in
either government obligations with the GDB, in order that this entity can
channel the funds into the local economy, or they may invest the funds in
taxable obligations. There is a presumption that investment in taxable
obligations would help those federal government agencies that cannot float
tax-exempt instruments. Thus, these regulations provide the agencies with
an additional market for the taxable obligations.
(b) Arbitrage: Previous regulations allowed arbitrage in the GNMA's
transactions. The practice used by possession corporations was to acquire
GNMA's and generate a profit from their spread. Generally, corporations
borrowed money at low possession corporation rates. Then, these
corporations acted as intermediaries by purchasing GNMA's and earned the
difference between the original value and the resale price of their
investments. Under the new 1987 regulations, portfolio interest is not
qualified for tax-free treatment.
(c) Unequal Access to Funds: There were no specific guidelines in prior
regulations for solving the unequal access of possession corporation funds
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among financial institutions in Puerto Rico. The new 1987 regulations
intend to spread these funds among a greater number of financial
institutions by liberalizing the mechanism under which institutions may
transfer funds to other lending institutions. However, there is no
information available to determine if the local institutions are increasing
their market share of these funds.
(d) Improper Use of Funds: Large amounts of funds have been used to finance
activities which, in most part, do not increase real economic activities in
Puerto Rico. Among these activities are:
(i) Refinancing Loans: Previous regulations allowed working capital loans
for refinancing, as an eligible activity under commercial, industrial,
construction, agricultural, or service enterprises. Under the new 1987
regulations, working capital loans continue to be allowed. However, the
working capital definition has been modified in an attempt to avoid
refinancing activities. Nevertheless, the new 1987 regulations allow loans
for refinancing subject to limitations, although there is a general
understanding that this activity on its own does not generate new economic
activity.
(ii) Consumer Loans: Under previous regulations, as well as under the 1987
regulations, consumer loans were not allowed; however, in the past, account
receivables were acquired outside Puerto Rico and financed with possession
corporation funds, generating profits that in no way contributed to the
economic development of Puerto Rico. Also, monies were used to finance
consumer loans such as car loans. The 1987 regulation attempted to prevent
this type of loan.
(iii) Educational Loans: Previous regulations, as well as the 1987
regulations, allowed loans for education and for the purchase of school
supplies if the repayment period exceeded 12 months. However, little
information about these benefits has been furnished to a large segment of
Puerto Rico's potential beneficiaries. These rules have not provided
mechanisms to inform the general public of this type of low cost loans.
Also, there are questions as to what extent this type of loan is an eligible
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activity. There are no guidelines to regulate or to monitor educational
loans.
(iv) "Special Programs" Loans: Under previous regulations, seven percent of
the annual average daily balances was to be used to originate loans in the
areas of construction or acquisition of new residential, commercial or
industrial property in Puerto Rico. Fifty percent of these loans must be in
new residential property mortgages. The new 1987 regulations maintained
that eligible institutions must invest seven percent of the daily monthly
average balance on targeted economic development activities. The 1987
regulations proposed specific guidelines to promote those areas that Puerto
Rico's government has identified as important economic activities. This
seven percent investment requirement emphasizes as eligible activities those
involving the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). However, there is a lack of
studies indicating to what extent Puerto Rico could benefit from the CBI
projects. There is a presumption that possession corporation funds in
Puerto Rico can be preserved if they are used to finance CBI projects,
specially construction. In other words, the U.S. Treasury and Congress have
agreed to maintain Section 936 if possession corporation funds in Puerto
Rico are used to finance development projects in Caribbean countries
operating under the U.S.' CBI program.
(v) Economic Development Bank (EDB): Previous regulations did not provide
specific requirements for investment in an EDB that helps to finance local
development projects. The 1987 regulations demand that eligible
institutions must invest and maintain invested one percent of its daily
monthly average of eligible funds received in direct deposits with loans to
or obligations of the EDB.
The 1987 regulations are extremely complex and technical. Previous
regulations defined an eligible activity as those lending and investment
activities that constitute utilization within Puerto Rico of eligible funds
that directly tend to increase production, income, and employment. The 1987
regulations, however, redefine an eligible activity as those that stimulate
productive activities in Puerto Rico. This definition eliminates the
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economic development objectives of income and employment.
Generally, the 1987 regulations include significant changes that affect
almost any area in which problems have been confronted in the past. There
are.few economic data so far available with which to examine the
effectiveness of these regulations because of the short period since they
were enacted. However, there are reasons to believe that the impact of
these rules in channelling possession corporation funds into economic
activity in Puerto Rico will not be significant. These rules are applying
the same type of "prescription" implemented by previous regulations.
Preceding regulations, as discussed in this chapter, were ineffective among
other things, in avoiding financial institutions' discretion on the use of
these funds, in distributing these funds more widely among financial
institutions, and in increasing long-term, low-cost capital investment in
Puerto Rico. Most of the changes on these regulations follow the same
prescription as found in previous changes. Basically, changes in the
reinvestment incentive rules have only reduced the magnitude of some of the
problems. Other approaches, to solve the lack of economic impact of
possession corporation funds in Puerto Rico, have.not been considered.
B. Effectiveness of Tax Exemption as a Reinvestment Incentive
Unfortunately, as already mentioned, there is little reliable data with
which to document the effect of the technical problems and debatable
procedures discussed above. The existence and magnitude of the disputable
practices have been documented in this research along with the analysis of
the changes of the Puerto Rico Treasury reinvestment incentive rules. As
noted in the preceding sections, these changes have been used to correct
"loopholes" in the rules. Also, changes in the regulations have been
employed to reduce suspicious financial practices for investing possession
corporation funds. However, from the evidence presented in Chapters Four
through Six, the following conclusions can be drawn about the effect of the
reinvestment incentive regulations on channeling possession corporations
fund into eligible activities in Puerto Rico:
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1. Bank loans have grown slower than the rate of growth of possession
corporation deposits.
2. Possession corporations have brought to Puerto Rico funds they had
invested in Guam, Canada, and the Eurodollar market. However, the massive
inflow of funds has affected primarily the portfolio investments of tax-
exempt corporations and their dividend payout ratio, but the inflow has not
affected significantly their level of real investment or employment in
Puerto Rico.
3. There is some evidence showing that possession corporation funds
accumulated in Puerto Rico have helped to lower the interest rate on Puerto
Rico's government bonds (see Chapter Six). However, the impact of the
remaining percentage of these funds, not invested in government bonds or in
Puerto Rico's GOB, is less clear.
4. Since the change in regulations in 1977, aggregate investment by Puerto
Rico's banks abroad has approximately equaled the amount of tax-exempt firm
deposits. Most of these funds are deposited in 90-day bank certificates of
deposit, which are required to pay lower interest rates than the Eurodollar
rate. Evidence presented in Chapter Five suggests that these funds have
increased bank profitability. The lower interest rate on possession
corporation funds saved the banks about $72 million in 1983, $98 million in
1984, and $120 million in 1985, regardless of whether banks retained or
passed on those savings to borrowers.
5. There is little or no empirical evidence to show that private investment
in Puerto Rico increased as a result of possession corporation funds. This
could indicate that investment in Puerto Rico is not responsive to interest
rate reductions, or that these funds in lower interest rate accounts have
displaced other supplies of funds, or that there are too few data available
from which to discern such an impact.
6. The evidence also suggests that possession corporation funds have not
affected significantly the availability of credit or long-term interest
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rates and investment (eligible activities) in Puerto Rico and that it is
difficult to determine the effect of possession corporation funds on making
capital available to finance economic development activities, including
credit and long-term, low-cost interest rates.
7. The findings of these chapters also imply that possession corporation
funds have been invested through questionable financial practices.
Apparently, there have been large amounts of possession corporation funds
invested under these practices. The magnitude of the dubious financial
maneuvers has made it difficult to estimate the relative effect of these
funds and the effect of reinvestment incentive rules on the availability of
long-term capital to finance real investment in Puerto Rico.
II. Could Puerto Rico Effectively Use Possession Corporation Funds?
The last part of this chapter analyzes to what degree Puerto Rico's economy
can absorb possession corporation funds in the form of real investment in
Puerto Rico. The large amount of possession corporation funds that have
poured into Puerto Rico from 1976 to 1986 are an enormous burden for Puerto
Rico to assimilate under the current reinvestment incentive program. The
absorption of possession corporation funds in Puerto Rico since 1976 would
require an increase in gross investment of perhaps more than 50 percent per
year.
It is unlikely that investment in Puerto Rico could have increased by this
much. Assuming that it is conceivable, it would have required a sharp drop
in the cost of capital to bring it about. It is difficult to be specific
because the elasticity of investment with respect to the cost of capital is
one of the more controversial areas of economic analysis. However, the U.S.
Treasury report on possessions corporations (1980, pp.107-108) presents an
idea of the magnitude by using a study prepared for them by Chirinko and
Eisner (May 1980). This study simulated the effect on U.S. investment of
various tax changes using six leading econometric models.
With respect to Puerto Rico, the U.S. Treasury report suggests that a 50
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percent expansion in investment would require a fall in the cost of capital
by more than 30 percent (1980, p. 107). The rationale for this investment
behavior is the following:
The cost of capital is basically made of two components.
One is the interest paid on the investment. The other
is economic depreciation reflecting the decline value
over time of the capital. In order for the overall cost
of capital to fall by 30 percent, the interest component
has to fall by a larger percentage because the
depreciation component remains constant (1980, p.108).
That is, a fall in interest costs of 40 to 50 percent is required, under the
most optimistic assumptions, in order to increase investment by 50 percent.
A fall of interest cost of this magnitude would create large opportunities
for arbitrage between the low cost Puerto Rican market and the U.S. or
Eurodollar market, thus offsetting its potential economic development
effect. Borrowers from Puerto Rico (specially possession corporations) can
also arbitrage if they get low-cost funds. A drop of interest costs of 40
to 50 percent would certainly make arbitrage profitable, even after paying
the bank spread.
It is therefore apparent that interest rates would not fall enough to induce
full absorption of possession corporation funds in Puerto Rico either
because arbitrage would intervene or because the current reinvestment
incentive laws, rules and regulations would not be the most effective to
stimulate investment opportunities or economic development in Puerto Rico.
Endnotes to Chapter Seven:
1. Under the usual terms of the repo the seller (the bank) agrees to buy
the security back at a fixed date. It is in essence, a short-term secured
loan from the possession corporation to the bank. Under the reinvestment
incentive rules, the character of the repo interest is the same as the
coupon interest for purposes of exemption from taxes. The sale and
repurchase price are therefore set to reflect the accruing interest during
the life of the repo, and to make the interest equivalent to a short-term
yield. Because investment bankers in Puerto Rico are frequently
intermediaries there are in fact two back-to-back repos: first, between the
bank and investment banking house, and second, between the investment banker
and the possession corpora ions.
2. In April 1980, by the first month of the new reporting system, repos by
all banks including savings banks, amounted to $240 million, or about .5
percent of total funds in sanks.
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3. There was a possibility that the incremental rules, even if strictly
adhered to, would not have affected the banks' investments. The incremental
rules would have been effective only if the increase in possession
corporation deposits exceeded the increase in eligible investments that
banks would have wanted to make anyway.
5. All excess eligible assets in existence at that date are therefore no
longer available for matching with new possession corporation deposits.
There are some exceptions to these rules, including private placements with
the GDB, which preserved their character as eligible assets, although only
to the extent that the bank had excess eligible assets on July 1, 1981.
6. The 1983 regulations required that a bank or broker, in addition to
obtaining a representation letter from borrowers as to theproper use of
possession corporation funds, must exercise "due diligence to ascertain
that the funds are properly used. Following the close of the fiscal year,
the banks must also submit to the Puerto Rico Treasury an independent
certified public accountant's (CPA) report that will review any
noncompliance with the representations, records, requirements, and
.restrictions of the new rules. This rule attempted to avoid arbitrage
involving the borrower and the lender of possession corporation funds.
7. At-the same time that it announced the new regulations, the Puerto Rico
Treasury issued an administrative ruling that restricted the use of
possession corporation funds loaned by banks to brokers for the financing of
eligible Puerto Rican assets. Net proceeds of eligible funds obtained
through repurchase agreements must be invested in eligible activities. The
above rules were set forth in two regulations: #2847 covered the banks and
#2848 covered the brokers. In addition to these two regulations, Puerto
Rico's Treasury issued on December of 1981 two administrative determinations
(AD-81-1 and Ad-81-2) concerning banks and brokers, respectively. AD-81-1
limited the extent to which loans by a bank to a broker qualified an
eligible activity for forbidding certain uses and requirin reports covering
certain activities. AD-81-2 defined when an investment held under
repurchase agreement could be considered as an investment owned by a bank or
a broker for purpose of meeting its own investment requirements. This
determination was issued to ensure that two or more eligible institutions
did not each count the same investment as part of its reinvestment
requirements under the new regulations.
8. The amount of broker lending in designated economic development
activities for local and federal tax exemption increased from $0.9 billion
in February of 1982 to $2.0 billion in April of 1984. As of March 1985,
Puerto Rico's 12 thrift institutions alone held approximately $1.1 billion
in repurchase agreements, many of which undoubtedly came from brokers. In
1985, another initiative that helped somewhat to resolve the unequal access
of tax exempt funds into certain ocal financial institutions was that the
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) of New York agreed to guarantee the deposits
of possession corporations in Puerto Rican saving banks. About $125 million
in tax exempt funds were channelled into local thrift institutions. These
deposits in thrift institutions had a term of up to three years much longer
than is generally available to other financial institutions that accept tax
exempt deposits. The FHLB also guaranteed $635.8 million in term and
capital notes issued since 1982 by its member banks and purchased by U.S.
tax-exempt companies operating in Puerto Rico.
9. There is, on the one hand, a presumption that the funds have not been
properly applied if the collateral provide in support of the loan included
assets not related to eligible activities, such as CDs or other financial
assets owned by the ultimate recipient for less than 45 days. On the other
hand there is a presumption of proper use if the collateral is made up of
assets resulting from or related to the production and sale of goods and
services in Puerto Rico by the ultimate recipient.
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Fourth Section
The Role of the Tollgate Tax as a
Fiscal and Economic Incentive Mechanism
Possession corporations operating in Puerto Rico should pay a tollgate tax
on repatriated profits to the Puerto Rico Treasury. There exist rules to
determine the appropriate tollgate tax rates. These rates are based on the
dividend distribution limitations and the qualified reinvestment
requirements (explained in Chapter Eight). The tollgate tax rules are
defined under the Industrial Incentives Acts (IIA) of 1963 and 1978.
This section examines the application of the tollgate tax rules and analyzes
the effect of these rules as a fiscal and economic development mechanism.
As a fiscal mechanism, these rules are supposed to increase revenues through
tax collection. As an economic development mechanism, these rules are
supposed to increase reinvestment in qualified eligible activities. The
evidence suggests that the poor application of the tollgate tax rules has
diluted their expected fiscal and/or economic effect. Corporations in
practice can substantially reduce their tollgate tax regardless of their
rate of profits reinvested in Puerto Rico's economy or of their rate of
repatriation of profits. Moreover, there are no appropriate regulations nor
a standard system to monitor whether a closing agreement is satisfied.
In this Section, the closing agreements executed between possession
corporations and Puerto Rico's Treasury during the period of 1978 to 1985,
are analyzed. The period 1978 to 1985 was selected because of the
availability of files. The last data collection for this Section of the
research was undertaken in December 1986. An update of the information was
not possible since the authorization to review the new files was not granted
to the author (the files are confidential information). However, the period
of 1978 to 1985 constitutes what might be considered the most significant
period for the study of closing agreements for four reasons:
First, the closing agreements started to be executed in April of 1978, and
to this day a performance evaluation is missing.
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Second, the selected period contains the most complete files available. It
entailed most of the closing agreements enacted, including those covering
the repatriation of industrial profits accumulated prior to 1976,
repatriation of firms under conversion of their old grants of tax-exemption,
and firms operating under the 1978 IIA.
Third, many of the recent closing agreements-performed after 1985 are mainly
amendments of earlier ones, and
Fourth, current closing agreement rules and procedures have not been subject
to significant changes.
This Section contains three chapters. Chapter Eight discusses the basis of
the tollgate tax, including laws, regulations, and the closing agreement.
Chapter Nine analyzes general statistics of the tollgate tax rules. Chapter
Ten examines the closing agreements of three parent companies. These three
case studies have a combined total of 16 possession corporations operating
in Puerto Rico and represent 28 closing agreements executed between
possession corporations and Puerto Rico's Treasury. From the examination of
these case studies, some conclusions can be drawn on the application of the
tollgate tax.
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Chapter Eight
Application of the Tollgate Tax
This chapter presents the basis of the tollgate tax. First, it discusses
the tollgate tax rules, then, it explains the tollgate tax closing
agreements. Finally, it analyzes problems that appear to exist on the
application of the tollgate tax rules. This chapter establishes the
foundation for examining the effects of the tollgate tax rules in the next
two chapters.
The tollgate tax is considered to be one of the main tools for promoting
economic development in Puerto Rico. This withholding tax is supposed to
help increase real investment or revenues in Puerto Rico. The tax rate is
used as a mechanism to encourage reinvestment of possession corporations
profits in Puerto Rico. The withholding tax rate applied on the
repatriation of industrial profits is based on the rate of reinvestment in
qualified eligible activities (these activities were defined in Chapter
Four).1 The tollgate tax on repatriation of industrial profits is also used
as a mechanism for increasing local revenues. The tollgate tax would
increase local revenues if firms decided to increase repatriation of profits
without significant reinvestment in Puerto Rico.
However, the tollgate tax rules appear to be poorly applied. The tollgate
tax actually paid on repatriation of profits appears to be low. Closing
agreements may be based on questionable alternative tollgate tax rules,
created by lawyers on the basis of their own interpretation of income tax
laws, rules, and regulations.
I. Basis of the Tollgate Tax Rules
The application of a tollgate tax on repatriation of corporate tax-exempt
profits was formally introduced in 1973. The Industrial Incentives Acts
(IIA) of 1954 and 1963 were amended in 1973 to impose a withholding tax on
repatriation of tax-exempt corporate earnings accumulated in Puerto Rico.
The tollgate tax dictated was 15 percent on dividends paid out of Puerto
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Rico's income from hotels, manufacturing, and shipping. This tax applied to
any corporation without significant business of its own in Puerto Rico
(which meant that at least 50 percent of its corporate income had to come
from the business carried out in Puerto Rico).
However, the tollgate tax prior to 1976 was rarely applicable. During the
period of 1973 to 1976, this tax only applied if that nonresident parent
corporation could claim a foreign credit for the tollgate tax. In addition,
prior to 1976, most firms liquidated their operations in Puerto Rico when
their tax exemption grant period ended. The liquidating distribution of a
possession corporation was free of both U.S. and Puerto Rico taxes. Prior
to 1976, firms did not ordinarily pay dividends. Instead, these
corporations accumulated profits in Puerto Rico and invested them anywhere
in the world for future tax-free returns to the United States. The tollgate
tax did not apply to the distribution of dividends upon liquidation, and the
interest or other investment income seems to have brought no economic
benefits to Puerto Rico.
Shortly, after Section 936 was passed in 1976, the government of Puerto Rico
introduced a tax reform. In particular, the tollgate tax provisions were
amended in 1976. The tollgate tax applied to industrial income repatriated
prior to liquidation was reduced from 15 percent to 10 percent. This
withholding tax applied to all ordinary dividend repatriations that had
previously been completely tax-free. In addition, it applied to earnings
generated prior to the effective date of the amendment. The 1963 IIA and
1978 IIA define the basic rules used to calculate the tollgate tax,
including dividend distribution limitations and reinvestment requirements.
Based on these rules:
A. 1963 IIA Exemption Grant 2
The tollgate tax on repatriation of dividends under a 1963 IIA grant
established that dividends paid from Puerto Rico's source industrial
development income (IDI) to on-residence corporateshareholders are subject
to a 10 percent "tollgate" tax. IDI is the net income earned by an exempt
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business and the interest earned by the investment of IDI in certain Puerto
Rican assets. The tollgate tax, however, could be reduced to seven percent
if certain earnings, payout, reinvestment, and holding period conditions are
met by the exempt corporations as shown in Table 8.1. If the corporate
shareholder is itself engaged in a trade or business in Puerto Rico,
dividends from IDI are taxable at an effective maximum rate of 6.75 percent,
and the possession corporation has no reinvestment requirement.
Table 8.1
Tollgate Tax Rules under a 1963 IIA Exemption Grant
Tollgate Income Period Maximum Reinves-tment Investment
Tax Rate Source Earnings Annual Requirement Period
Payout in 2(j) Assets Required
10 % IDI -- 100 % 0 0
7 % IDI Pre-1976 25 % 25 % 12 months
7 % IDI Post-1976 75 % 25 % 8 years
0 % Interest on -- -- -- 8 years
Government
Securities
0 % Liquidation -- 100 % -- --
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
B. Dividends for Firms Under Conversion: 3
There were particular tollgate tax rules that applied to firms who decided
in 1978 to convert their tax-exempt grants obtained under the 1963 IIA to
the 1978 IIA. With respect to pre-1978 earnings, the primary incentive
offered to a 1963 IIA grantee to convert to the 1978 IIA is a reduced
tollgate tax credit mechanism. This mechanism was designed to eliminate
effectively Puerto Rico's tollgate tax on accumulated IDI attributable to
periods prior to January 1, 1978.
If the converted company invests or has invested certain amounts of its pre-
1978 IDI for a period of five years and does not annually distribute more
than a certain percentage thereof as dividends, the dividends will be
subject to a reduced tollgate tax of four percent upon distribution.
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Moreover, the four percent tollgate tax payments may be used as credits
against the converted company's income tax liability on IDI. The credit may
be carried over indefinitely until fully used with the only limitation that
a firm not reduce the income tax liability in any one year by more than 50
percent. Table 8.2 summarizes the opportunities available to a converted
company to reduce the tollgate tax.
Table 8.2
Tollgate Tax Rules on Dividends for Firms under Conversion
of Their Grants from the 1963 IIA to the 1978 IIA
Tollgate Income Period Maximum Reinvestment Investment
Tax Source Earnings Annual Requirement Period
Rate Payout in 2(j) Assets Required
10 % IDI -- 100 % 0 0
4 % IDI Pre-1973 50 % -- --
4 % IDI 1973-1977 0-50 % 50 % 5 years
5 % IDI Post-1977 10-50 % 50 % 5 years
0 % Liqui- Pre-1978 100 % -- --
dation
Source: Manuel Escobar, The 936 MarKet, An Introduction, 1982.
C. 1978 IIA Grant 4
Under the 1978 IIA (as under the 1963 IIA), if a tax-exempt firm reinvests
all or part of its earnings in eligible activities (as defined in Chapter
Four, Section Three), the dividends, rent, and interest derived from those
investments will be 100 percent income tax exempt to the firm. The payment
of the 10 percent tollgate rate is applied when firms decide to repatriate
their earnings, including interest income, without satisfying Puerto Rico's
reinvestment rules. Apart from this modest tollgate tax, these profits are
free of U.S. and Puerto Rican income taxes.
Also, the 1978 IIA provides that dividends paid out of income earned by an
exempted business are subject to a tollgate tax of 5 percent provided that
50 percent of such income is invested for five years in eligible economic
activities in Puerto Rico. And, unless otherwise decreed by the Special
Exemption Distribution Regulatory Board, no more than 10 percent of the IDI
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is distributed annually in each of the first five years. The 50 percent of
income reinvested during this period can be repatriated after the fifth
year.
On liquidation, undistributed earnings are subject to a tollgate tax of 4
percent rather than 10 percent, provided that 50 percent of such earnings
have been invested for five years in designated economic development
activities. The new investment requirements are summarized in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3
Tollgate Tax Rules under a 1978 IIA Grant
Tollgate income Period Maximum Reinvestment Investment
Tax Source Earnings Annual Requirement Period
Rate Payout in 2(j) Assets Required
10 % IDI - -- 100 % 0 0
5 % IDI -- 50 % 50 % 5 years
4 % Liqui-
dation -- 100 % 50 % 5 years
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 3rd Annual Report, 1980.
II. Contract Agreements
The tollgate tax rate, as well as the dividend distribution limitations and
the reinvestment requirements applied to a firm on the repatriation of their
earnings and profits, is determined by a legal contract known as a closing
agreement. A closing agreement can only be executed by a qualified
possession corporation doing business in Puerto Rico. For the execution of
this contract, the possession corporation appoints an authorized
representative to act on its behalf and to represent it before Puerto Rico's
Treasury. The parent company also designates a representative to act and to
represent it before Puerto Rico's Treasury. Usually both the parent and
possession corporation are represented by the same authorized agent in the
closing agreement.
Generally, this closing agreement should be made in accordance with the
rules mentioned above, under certain provisions of the 1963 IIA and 1978
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IIA. Under a closing agreement, a corporation must provide a clear
explanation of the tollgate tax rules applied, including the income data and
rates to calculate the tollgate taxes.
A. Closing Agreement Provisions
In particular, under a closing agreement, a corporation must include a
breakdown and a proper explanation of: (1) total earnings and profits
available for distribution, (2) taxable and nontaxable income sources
available for distribution, (3) nontaxable and taxable IDI sources, (4)
rates of the income sources to be repatriated, reinvested, the tollgate
tax, and the set of rules applied, (5) rate of reinvestment of industrial
profits by eligible activities, the investment time-period, and rules
applied, (6) tax and investment credits used to reduce the tollgate tax; and
carry-over credits, including the rules applied, and (7) particular
provisions that many corporations are able to include in their closing
agreements and that entitle them to certain privileges.
B. Calculation of the Tollgate Tax Rules
The following seven conditions apply to the calculation of the tollgate tax
rules:
(1) Total industrial income is equal to total repatriation plus reinvestment
or is equal to the sum of IDI and non-IDI sources.
(2) IDI is equal to total taxable IDI and nontaxable IDI sources repatriated
plus reinvestment.
(3) Repatriation of industrial income is equal to 100 percent of tax-free
income repatriated (non-IDI and IDI sources), plus the portion of taxable
IDI repatriated.
(4) Reinvestment is equal to the portion of taxable IDI reinvested. The
tollgate tax rules determine the rate, the assets, and the time-period of
reinvestment of these dividends.
(5) The tollgate tax rate is equal to the tax rate applied in relation to
the taxable-IDI repatriated. This rate is based on the tollgate tax rules
applied in the closing agreement.
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(6) Tax and investment tax credits and credit carry-overs are determined by
closing agreements. These credits can reduce or eliminate the actual and/or
future tollgate taxes, and
(7) Particular provisions negotiated in these closing agreements can alter
the computation of the tollgate tax, dividend distribution limitations, and
reinvestment requirements.
III. General Problems in the Application of Tollgate Tax Rules
There appear, as will be seen later in Chapter Ten, to be many problems with
the application of the tollgate tax rules in the closing agreements. Among
these problems are:
A. A closing agreement is not a standard contract. As such, a closing
agreement can be executed for one particular or for many possession
corporations within a company. Also, a closing agreement might cover an
individual tax exemption grant of one or many possession corporations within
a company; or a closing agreement might cover several tax exemption grants
of one or many possession corporations within a company. In addition, a
closing agreement might cover a decree of tax exemption sheltering an
individual production of one or many possession corporations within a
company. A closing agreement might also cover tax adjustments and income
reallocation imposed by tax audits of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).
Having so many different ways to file the tollgate tax contract represents
an accountability problem. For example, a company can use the strategy
either to execute a single or multiple closing agreements for its possession
corporations. A common problem that appears to exist, when the company uses
the strategy of executing a single closing agreement for multiple
possessions corporations, is that the information provided is too little
and/or too aggregated.
In the case when the company strategy is to execute multiple closing
agreements for multiple possession corporations, grants, or products, then
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the information is split in multiple closing agreements. As a result, many
provisions in some closing agreements refer to particular provisions in
other closing agreements so that the data and rules are not provided in one
place. This means that several closing agreements may have to be examined
in order to have a single estimate of any calculation (i.e., IDI, tollgate
tax, reinvestment and repatriation rates, etc.). Moreover, under this
company strategy, the information provided is so fragmented that it is
almost impossible to do the calculation. The most common example is the
calculation of reinvestment requirements. In general, the main problem is
that standard procedures and regulations interpreting the various laws are
absent. It may be extremely burdensome to audit or monitor whether the
company satisfies the tollgate tax rules.
B. Most closing agreements lack a breakdown of the amount and a proper
explanation of the information required to calculate the tollgate tax, the
rate of repatriation, and the reinvestment of profits and earnings. For
example, the data provided by several companies, under many closing
agreements, are estimated ranges. Dividends to be distributed could vary,
for example, from a minimum of $10 million to a maximum of $100 million in a
given year. Moreover, many closing agreements do not provide information
about the rate of repatriation or reinvestment, about total income and IDI,
and about reinvestment periods. All this information, as mentioned
previously, should, in fact, be contained in these closing agreements.
C. A closing agreement is not a straight-forward document, specifying
dividend distribution limitations, reinvestment requirements, and investment
and tax credits used to reduce the tollgate tax. The tollgate tax rules
appear not to have been enforced. The lack of enforcement of the 1963 IIA
and 1978 IIA tollgate tax rules seems to have had the following four
consequences:
(1) The dividend distribution amounts and time-periods can vary
significantly from one closing agreement to another.
(2) The tollgate tax rates have ranged for most cases from 0 to 5 percent,
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regardless of the rates of reinvestment or repatriation of earnings and
profits.
(3) In many closing agreements, corporations have been able to increase the
rate of repatriation of profits and earnings and to reduce the rates of
tollgate tax and reinvestment beyond those defined in the tollgate tax rules
presented above. Depending on the ability of individual tax attorneys, the
tollgate tax rules have been satisfied under many closing agreements by
using provisions of Puerto Rico Income Tax Act of 1954 (PRITA) rather than
by the provisions of Puerto Rico's 1963 IIA and 1978 IIA.
Section 231 of the PRITA of 1954 provides certain investment credits to
corporations who meet certain criteria.. Under the closing. agreements, most
firms have been able to satisfy the reinvestment requirements by using
several investment activities that qualify for the investment tax credit
under Section 231. These activities include: investment in machinery and
equipment, cash, securities, accounts receivable, inventory, prepaid assets,
leasehold improvements, intangible assets, including patents, trademarks,
trade names, technology, among others. However, the eligible economic
development activities qualified to satisfy the tollgate tax rules are
defined under Section 2(j) of the 1963 IIA and of the 1978 IIA (they were
defined in Section Three, Chapter Four). These activities are supposed to
be the only qualified reinvestment assets under the tollgate tax rules
applied in the closing agreements. Instead, most companies under the
closing agreements list Section 2 (j) activities as "a single activity"
added to the list of activities of Section 231 of PRITA of 1954.
(4) In addition, some investments can be transferred from one agreement to
another by only adding a provision under the new closing agreement. This
provides the only authorization required. Furthermore, any of these
investments provided under the PRITA of 1954 can be used not only to satisfy
the tollgate tax rules but also to satisfy the income tax requirements with
respect to subsequent distributions.
D. A closing agreement can also be executed to alter one or more previous
closing agreements. A provision in most closing agreements authorizes a
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corporation to amend the dividend distribution limitations and investment
requirement applicable to its dividend distributions and income tax returns
at any time in the future. This provision generally establishes that:
(1) earnings and profits of such corporation shall be reduced by the amount
of such adjustment and allocation and such amount should be repatriated free
of taxes,
(2) income taxes overpaid by such corporations as a result of such
adjustment or allocation shall be credited without interest until exhausted
at such corporation's option against such corporation's future liability for
Puerto Rican taxes,
(3) the corporation shall be entitled to amend the dividend distribution
limitations and investment requirements applicable to its dividend
distributions. As a result of such reallocation or adjustment, the
corporation shall not be deemed to have violated said limitations and
requirements, and
(4) if the corporation chooses to repatriate such funds from the adjustment
or allocation, it will be authorized without the imposition of any tax, and
it will not be deemed to have violated said limitations and requirements.
Further, it will be authorized to pay interest to the parent corporation at
the prevailing rate, and a tax and investments carry-over will be provided
to the corporation to be used at any time in the future in any of the
possession corporations of the parent company.
E. Through a closing agreement, corporations are able to use several tax and
investment credits including credit carry-over. These credits appear not to
conform with the 1963 IIA and 1978 IIA, as explained previously in this
chapter.
F. Through a closing agreement, corporations indicate the break down of
their income as between nontaxable (refers to income classified by the
corporation as a non-IDI source) and taxable sources. As a result, most
non-IDI sources which represent large amount of corporate profits, earnings,
and interest income can be repatriated free of taxes and without
reinvestment requirements. In most cases, under the closing agreements, the
corporation is able to satisfy the terms of their dividend distribution by
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referring to Subsection 4 (h) of the 1978 IIA. This Subsection states that
"The Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare such regulations as may be
necessary to make the provisions of this subsection (h) effective". (1978
IIA, Section (4)(h)).
Endnotes to Chapter Eight:
1. Firms operating under Puerto Rico's 1963 and 1978 IIAs, and under Section
936 of the U.S. IRC have to pay a tollgate tax at the time of repatriation
of tax-exempt profits (or at the time of distribution of dividends from
retained earnings accumulated in Puerto Rico). The tollgate tax is reduced
if the firm satisfies certain investment requirements established under
Section 213 (Puerto Rico's Tax Law of 1974), and Sections 2(j) and 4 (h) of
the 1963 IIA and 1978 IIA.
2. Puerto Rico's Law Number 95 of June 1, 1976 contains the modifications
to the tollgate tax provisions introduced in 1973. Under this law, the
tollgate tax was reduced from 15 to 10 percent, and it became applicable to
U.S. shareholders, even though they were denied a foreign tax credit. The
tollgate tax rate instituted in 1976 remains, but the effective rate has
been subsequently reduced by a series of amendments and rulings. These
amendments are known as the tollgate rules under the 1963 -IIA exemption grant.
3. Rules for the distribution of accumulated earnings are defined in Section
3 (i) (7) of 1978 IIA. Subsection 3(i)(7)(A) defines the distribution of
earnings accumulated prior to January 1, 1978. Subsection 3(i)(7)(B)
defines the distribution of earnings earned or accumulated after January 1,
1978, in accordance with the provisions of subsection 4(h) of this Act.
Subsection 3(i)(8) defines the carry-over credit and Sub-section 3(i)(9)
defines special exemption for the tax on liquidation.
4. Section 4 of the 1978 IIA defines the rules that apply and qualify for
tax-exempt distribution of dividends or profits by a corporation or
partnership that is an exempted business, or by a corporation or partnership
that is a member of an exempted business. In particular, Subsection 4 (h)
defines the provisions that the exempted business has to meet to qualify for
a credit equal to 50 percent of the tollgate tax and the corresponding
withholding at the source. Section 6 of the 1978 IIA defines the dividend
distribution of liquidation of an exempted business.
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Chapter Nine
Statistics of the Tollgate Tax:
Analysis of Closing Agreements
This chapter presents general statistics of the tollgate tax. First, it
discusses the revenue effect of the tollgate tax. Second, it introduces an
industry-by-industry analysis of the relationship between rates of
repatriation, tollgate tax, and reinvestment of profits. This analysis is
based on extensive research of primary data sources, including selected
closing agreements and other related information from Puerto Rico's
Treasury. These industrial data might represent the only available
information of this kind. Tables related to this chapter appear in Appendix
E.
I. Revenue Statistics of the Tollgate Tax
The relative significance of the tollgate tax in relation to total income
taxes is discussed first in this section, then the amount of industrial
development income repatriated as a percentage of profits is presented.
A. Tollgate Tax as a Percentage of Total Income Taxes
Appendix E.1 shows the contribution of the tollgate tax relative to other
Puerto Rico's government revenues for 1978 to 1987. During this period,
tollgate taxes on industrial income fluctuated between $49 million to $162
million. The tollgate taxes were supposed to represent about five percent
of the total taxable industrial development income (IDI) repatriated (as
explained later). During the same period, the tollgate tax on repatriation
of taxable industrial profits, as a percentage of total income taxes,
represented between 5.1 to 13.0 percent. Annual collection of tollgate
taxes, as a percentage of total income taxes in Puerto Rico, was as shown in
Table 9.1.
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Table 9.1
Annual Tollgate Taxes 1978 - 1987
(Million $ and as a Percentage of Total Income Taxes)
Years
Unit 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Mil $ 49 65 81 55 85 121 162 108 88 120
(%) 7.6 8.8 9.4 5.8 7.8 10.2 13.0 8.1 5.1 6.5
Source: Appendix E, Table E.1.
B. Repatriation as a Percentage of Industrial Profits
Estimates of Puerto Rico's Treasury suggest that repatriation of industrial
profits as a percentage of the total fluctuated between 34.6 to 56.2 percent
during 1978 to 1985. These estimates suggest that the average annual
proportion of industrial profits repatriated during the period was about 47
percent. The other 53 percent of these profits were supposed to have stayed
in Puerto Rico. The annual percentage rates are shown in Table 9.2.
Table 9.2
Repatriation as a Percentage of Industrial Profits (Million $)
Fiscal Tollgate Repatriated Taxable Repatriation
Year Tax IDI IDI As a % of IDI
1978 $ 49.1 $ 982 $ 1,746 56.2%
1979 65.0 1,300 2,644 49.2
1980 81.3 1,626 3,185 51.1
1981 55.8 1,116 3,221 34.6
1982 85.4 1,838 3,653 50.3
1983 121.1 2,002 4,683 42.8
1984 161.6 3,256 6,075 53.6
1985 107.8 2,158 6,193 34.8
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury, 1985.
However, no information is provided about the uses of these profits. Also,
the Treasury estimates were based, mainly, on two inter-related assumptions:
(1) that the tollgate tax paid represents five percent of all industrial
profits repatriated, and (2) that the tollgate tax was applied to all
industrial profits repatriated.
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The first assumption presupposes that most firms paid only a five percent
tollgate tax on repatriation of profits. Little is known about whether or
when a reduced tollgate tax rate may have been applied based on the rate of
reinvestment of industrial profits in eligible activities in Puerto Rico.
The second assumption suggests that all industrial profits repatriated were
taxable. This assumption is wrong because the tollgate tax is applied only
to certain kinds of IDI. In other words, the five percent tollgate tax
should only be applied to the taxable IDI portion of the industrial income
to be repatriated. Based on this information, however, little can be said
about the actual application of the tollgate tax rules.
II. Industry-By-Industry Analysi-s
Selected closing agreements which had been filed at the Puerto Rico Treasury
between 1978 and 1985 will first be discussed in this section. These
agreements will also be discussed on an industry-by industry basis with
regards to their rate of repatriation, reinvestment and tollgate tax.
A. Closing Agreements Executed Between 1978 to 1985
A list of all closing agreements between 1978 and 1985 appears in Table E.2
(Appendix E). This list contains all the closing agreements executed by
possession corporations and filed at Puerto Rico's Treasury. In addition,
the list was broken down by parent company, possession corporations, and
their respective standard industrial classification (SIC) numbers. Based on
this list, there were 133 parent companies and 286 possession corporations
who filed closing agreements during this period.
The list was used to determine the distribution of closing agreements by
industry. The list was first broken down based on the two-digit SICs, and
then, based on the four-digit SICs. The industrial distribution of the
closing agreements based on two-digit SICs is presented in Table 9.3. This
distribution reveals that industries under SICs 28, 35, 36, and 38 have the
highest concentration (71.9%) of possession corporations that have executed
closing agreements during 1978 to 1985.
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A distribution of closing agreements based on the four-digit SICs reveals
that the SICs 2834, 3613, and 3841 are the industries with the highest
number of closing agreements executed. They represent 20.9%, 7.7%, and
6.6%, of the total closing agreements, respectively. The distribution for
these industries is shown in Table 9.4.
Table 9.3
Two-Digit SIC Distribution of Closing Agreements: 1978-1985
SIC INDUSTRY CLOSING AGREEMENTS
Two-digit As % of Total Number
20 Food & Kindred Products 4.2
21 Tobacco Manufacturers 0.4
22 Textile Mill Products 0.4
23 Apparel & Other Finished Products 6.6
25 Furniture & Fixtures 0.4
26 Paper & Allied Products 2.1
27 Printing and Publishing 0.7
28 Chemical & Allied Products 29.0
29 Petroleum Refining & Related Ind. 2.1
30 Rubber & Misc. Plastic Products 1.7
31 Leather & Leather Products 1.4
32 Stone, Clay, Glass & Concrete Products 0.7
33 Primary Metal Products 0.7
34 Fabricated Metal Products 1.0
35 Machinery except Electrical 8.0
36 Electrical Machinery Eauip. & Supplies 20.6
38 Prof., Scient. & Contro1. Instruments 14.3
39 Misc. MFG. Industries 4.5
40 Services Industry 0.4
Others (non-classified) 0.7
TOTAL 100.0
Source: Appendix E, Table E.2.
B. Repatriation, Reinvestment, and the Tollgate Tax
Table E.3 (Appendix E) presents industry-by-industry statistics from closing
agreements filed at the Puerto Rico Treasury between 1978 through 1985. The
table contains information about repatriation of profits, rate of tollgate
tax, and rate of reinvestment of profits in Puerto Rico. In most cases, the
tollgate tax rules, as defined in Chapter Eight, were applied to obtain the
reinvestment estimates.
The information presented in Table E.3 is limited to the data available at
the Puerto Rico Treasury. It represents a significant sample of parent
TABLE 9.4
DISTRIBUTION OF THE CLOSING AGREEMENTS BY THE FOUR-DIGIT SICs
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SIC INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION INDUSTRY AS SIC INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION INDUSTRY AS
A PERCENTAGE A PERCENTAGE
CLOSING AGMTS. CLOSING AGMTS.
20
2065
2067
2079
2085
2091
2111
2253
23
2311
2321
2328
2342
2361
2521
2621
2643
2653
27
2752
28
2819
2831
2833
2834
2844
2891
29
2911
2992
3021
3069
3079
3143
3144
3149
3231
3291
33
3412
3451
3499
FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS
CONFECTIONARY PRODUCTS
CHEWING GUM
SHORTENING & COOKING OILS
DISTILLED LIQUOR EXCEPT BRANDY
CANNED & CURE SENFOOD
CIGARATTES
KNIT OUTERWEAR MILLS
APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS
MEN'S & BOYS' SUITS & COATS
MEN'S & BOYS' SHIRTS & NIGHTWEARS
MEN'S & BOYS' WORK CLOTHING
BRASSIERES & ALLIED GARMENTS
CHILDREN'S DRESSES & BLOUSES
WOOD OFFICE FURNITURE
PAPER MILLS EXCEPT BUILDING PAPER
BAGS EXCEP TEXTILE BAGS
CORR6GATED & SOLID FIBER BOXES
PRINTING & PUBLISHING
COMMERCIAL PRINTING LITHOGRAPHIC
CHEMICALS & ALLIED PRODUCTS OTHER
INDUSTRIAL INORGANIC CHEMICALS
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS
MEDICALS & BOTANICALS
PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS
TOILET PREPARATIONS
ADHESIVES & SEALANTS
PETROLEUM & COAL PRODUCTS
PETROLEUM REFINING
LUBRICATING OILS & GREASES
RUBBER & PLASTIC FOOTWEAR
FABRICATED RUBBER PRODUCTS
MISC. PLASTIC PRODUCTS
MEN'S FOOTWEAR EXCEPT ATHLETIC
WOMEN'S FOOTWEIR, EXCEPT ATHLETIC
FOOTWEAR, EXCEPT RUBBER
PRODUCTS OF PURCHASED GLASS
ABRASIVE PRODUCTS
PRIMARY METAL PRODUCTS
METAL BARRELS, DRUMS & PAILS
SCREW MACHINE PRODUCTS
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
0.7
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
2.1
0.4
0.4
1.0
0.4
1.0
0.7
3.1
0.4
0.4
1.7
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
1.0
0.7
4.5
20.9
1.0
0.4
0.4
1.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
1.0
0.4
0.3
0.7
0.4
0.4
0.7
0.4
0.4
0.4
35 MACHINERY EXCEPT ELECTRICAL
3534 ELEVATORS & MOVING STAIRWAYS
3546 POWER DRIVENS HAND TOOLS
3562 BALL & ROLLER BEARINGS
3569 GENERAL INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY
3573 ELECTRONIC COMPUTING EQUIPMENT
3585 REFRIGERATION & HEATING EQUIPMENT
3599 MACHINERY EXCEPT ELECTRICAL
36 ELECTRIC IND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
3612 TRANSFORMERS
3613 SWITCHGEAR & SWICHBOARD APPARATUS
3621 MOTORS & GENERATORS
3622 INDUSTRIAL CONTROLS
3629 ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIAL APPARATUS
3641 ELECTRIC LAMPS
3643 CURRENT-CARRYING WIRING DEVICES
3648 LIGHTING EQUIPMENT, NEC
3651 RADIO.& TV RECEIVING SETS
3662 RADIO & TV COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
3671 ELECTRON TUBES RECEIVING TYPES
3672 CATHODE RAY (TO PICTURE TUBES)
3674 SEMICONDUCTORS & RELATED DEVICES
3676 ELECTRONIC RESISTORS
3678 ELECTRONIC CONNECTORS
3679 ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS
3693 X-RAYS APPARATUS & TUBES
38 SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL INSTRUMENT
3811 ENGINEERING & SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS
3822 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
3823 PROCESS CONTROL INSTRUMENTS
3825 INSTRUMENTS TO MEASURE ELECTRICITY
3832 OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS & LENSES
3841 SURGICAL & MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS
3842 SURGICAL APPLIANCES & SUPPLIES
3843 DENTAL & EQUIPMENT & SUPPLIES
3851 OPHTHALMIC GOODS
3873 WATCHES, CLOCKS & WATCHCASES
3911 JEWELRY PRECIOUS METAL
3951 PENS & MECHANICAL PENCILS
3999 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
4001 INT'L COMMERCIAL DIST. FACILITIES
OTHERS
1.0
0.4
0.4
0.4
1.4
3.5
0.7
0.4
1.0
1.7
7.7
0.4
0.4
0.7
0.4
1.4
0.4
1.0
1.4
0.4
0.7
0.7
0.4
0.4
1.4
0.4
1.0
0.4
0.4
1.4
0.7
0.4
6.6
1.4
1.4
0.4
0.4
1.0
0.4
0.7
0.4
0.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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companies by industrial sector in relation to total parent corporations who
have executed closing agreements during 1978 through 1985. In fact, this
table represents 54 percent of all the parent companies who executed closing
agreements during the period of study.
Table E.3 includes data on two-digit SIC, as shown in Table 9.5. The table
presents a distribution of industrial sectors in relation with total
industries represented in the sample. Also, this table demonstrates the
relative importance of each industrial sector in relation to total IDI,
repatriation of profits, rate of tollgate tax, and rate of reinvestment of
profits in Puerto Rico (based on the sample of Table E.3). The distribution
by industrial sector of this sample compares with the grouping by industrial
sectors in Table 9.3. The evidence from Table 9.5 suggests that the largest
representation corresponded to industries under two-digit SICs 28, 35, 36,
and 38. The evidence further suggests that industries under SIC 28 were the
most important in terms of the total IDI (61 percent), followed by
industries under SIC 38 (15 percent), SIC 36 (14 percent), and SIC 35 (5
percent).
However, as shown in Table 9.5, these industries paid a lower percentage of
tollgate taxes than other industries, which have lower levels of IDI and
which are within the same range of the rates of income reinvested and
repatriated. The rates of tollgate tax paid by the industries with the
highest percentage of IDI were: SIC 28, 4.1 percent; SIC 38, 4.7 percent;
SIC 36, 4.5 percent; and SIC 35, 6.8 percent. Industries under SICs 21, 22,
23, 31, and 32, which have low levels of IDI and a similar range of rates of
income reinvested and repatriated, paid the highest rates of tollgate tax,
between 6.1 to 7.0 percent. Based on this information, the total IDI of
these closing agreements, was estimated to be $5,638.6 million.
Repatriation of profits represented about $4,080.2 million, while
reinvestment of IDI in Puerto Rico was about $1,693.1 million. The average
rate of tollgate tax paid by these industries, during 1978 to 1985, was 4.47
percent. The average rates of income reinvested and repatriated were 30 and
70 percent, respectively.
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TABLE 9.5
SELECTED PARENT CORPORATIONS INDUSTRY-BY-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
TWO-DIGIT SIC DISTRIBUTION OF CLOSING AGREEMENTS, 1978 TO 1985
SIC INDUSTRIAL INDUSTRY INDUSTRY RATE TOLLGATE REINVESTMENT
TWO-DIGIT CLASSIFICATION AS A % OF AS A % TOTAL TAX BY INDUSTRY RATE
TOTAL IDI REPATRIATED BY INDUSTRY
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES OF TABLE E.3 100 100 4.5 29.7
20 FOOD & KINDRED PRODUCTS 2.0 1.8 6.1 34.9
21 TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS 0.4 0.4 3.5 25.0
22 TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 0.0 0.0 7.0 25.0
23 APPAREL & OTHER FINISHED PPRODUCTS 0.2 0.2 6.2 26.0
26 PAPER & ALLIED PRODUCTS 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
27 PRINTING AND PUBISHING 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
28 CHEMICALS & ALLIED PRODUCTS 61.1 58.0 4.1 34.4
30 RUBBER & MISC. PLASTIC PRODUCTS 0.1 0.1 6.3 22.4
31 LEATHER & LEATHER PRODUCTS 0.0 0.0 7.0 24.9
32 STONE CLAY GLASS & CONCRETE PRODUCTS 0.6 0.6 7.0 25.0
33 PRIMARY METAL PRODUCTS 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0
35 MACHINERY EXCEPT ELECTRICAL 5.0 4.7 6.8 31.8
36 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, EQUIP. & SUPPLIES 13.7 14.4 4.5 24.7
38 PROF., SCIENT & CONTROL. INSTRUMENTS 15.0 17.6 4.7 16.1
39 MISC. MFG. INDUSTRIES 1.8 2.1 4.5 15.2
Source: Appendix E -- Table E.3
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The information reveals that industries with the highest amount of
industrial income in Puerto Rico have paid the lowest tollgate tax rates.
The most important industries with the highest manufacturing output in
Puerto Rico since the early 1970s have been chemicals and allied products,
surgical and medical instruments, electronics equipment, and electrical
machinery. Based on the characteristics of these industries, as presented
in Chapter Three, they are the growing industrial segment in Puerto Rico.
However, they have invested relatively little in real, fixed assets, and
they have produced a low level of employment in Puerto Rico. Moreover,
based on Section Three (Chapters Four through Seven), these industries have
reinvested mainly in working capital and certificates of deposits.
The information presented above shows that the average rate of tollgate tax
paid for all industries is modest. In addition, the data reveal that
industries under SICs 28, 35, 36, and 38 controlled about 95 percent of
total IDI and paid a small amount of tollgate taxes. In conclusion, the
information suggests that most firms were able to reduce the rates of
tollgate taxes, and there is little indication that the reduction of the
tollgate tax rates was related to the rate of reinvestment in eligible
activities.
The industry-by-industry statistics in Table E.3 are the first to be
published establishing the relationship between rates of reinvestment,
repatriation, and tollgate tax as applied on industrial profits of
possession corporations operating in Puerto Rico. This information,
however, is too general to draw specific conclusions about the application
of the tollgate tax rules.
There are some problems associated with the application of the tollgate tax
rules in the closing agreements that have made it difficult to examine the
application of the tollgate tax rules industry-by-industry. For example,
under the closing agreements, the corporations have been able to reduce the
tollgate tax and reinvestment rates and/or to increase the rate of
repatriation. Also, they have been able to use many tax and investment
credits to reduce the rate of the tollgate tax. Moreover, these
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corporations have been able to break down their industrial income into
taxable and nontaxable sources. This means that the tollgate tax, as well
as the rate of reinvestment, is only applied to a portion of total income
and of total repatriations. In general, the closing agreements are not
standard documents, and as such, the level of reliability, if some
conclusions are drawn from the aggregated data of Appendix E.3, is reduced.
To pursue this aspect of the research into the application of the tollgate
tax rules and the closing agreements, three case studies were conducted.
The case studies facilitated the study of the application of the tollgate
tax rules because every closing agreement and related information of each
case study was examined. The next chapter presents the findings from these
case studies. Some conclusions are then drawn about the impact and
application of the tollgate tax rules.
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Chapter Ten
Analysis of Contract Agreements : Case Studies
of Selected Industries, 1978 to 1985
This chapter examines, through three case studies, the relative impact of
the tollgate tax, repatriation, and reinvestment of income of possession
corporations in Puerto Rico's economy. The analysis of this chapter covers
a missing piece in previous sections of this research, namely to what extent
have the tollgate tax rules been satisfied under the closing agreements
executed between possession corporations and Puerto Rico's Treasury.
The evidence suggests that the application of the tollgate tax rules is
poor. Most of the time, firms have been able to pay below 5 percent
tollgate tax rates, close to the lowest rates of the 4 to 10 percent rates
of tollgate taxes that should be applied to firms (as explained in Chapter
Eight). Reduced rates of tollgate tax should be based on the proportion of
income repatriated and reinvested in a determined time-period; however, in
most cases, firms have been able to reduce the rates of tollgate tax
regardless of the rates of repatriation and reinvestment of profits.
Moreover, only a small percentage of industrial profits is actually
reinvested in Puerto Rico (that i.e. relative to total industrial profits
repatriated). In most cases, the portion of industrial profits reinvested
was used to finance company activities, such as cash (time deposits or
certificate of deposits), working capital, securities, accounts receivable,
inventory, prepaid assets, leasehold improvements, or intangible assets,
including patents, trademarks, trade names, and technology, among others.
However, these assets did not necessarily comply with investment
requirements in eligible activities, as defined in Section 2(j) of the 1978
Industrial Incentive Act (IIA). (See definition in Chapters Four and/or
Eight.) The supposed reinvestment activities, as defined in most of the
closing agreements, contribute very little to increased real investment in
Puerto Rico. Thus, the tollgate tax and the reinvestment incentive appears
to lack significant or real effect on Puerto Rico's economy.
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I. Case Studies: Background and Methodology
The closing agreements of three selected parent corporations are examined in
this chapter. They had a combined total of 16 subsidiaries operating in
Puerto Rico. These subsidiaries generated a total of 28 closing agreements
between 1978 and 1985. However, seven of these 28 closing agreements
represented six to 12 subsidiaries in each agreement. If each subsidiary
would have executed an agreement the total number of agreements would have
increased to 62.
These case studies were chosen because they represented three of the more
important industrial groups, based on their Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC): Chemical & Allied Products Industry (SIC 28),
Machinery, except Electrical Industry (SIC 35), and Professional &
Scientific Instruments Industry (SIC 38). These industrial groups have a
combined total of more than 50 percent of all the closing agreements under
the period of study (see Table 9.3 in Chapter Nine). Moreover, these
industrial groups represent the most profitable firms operating in Puerto
Rico. All the case study closing agreements were filed at the Puerto Rico
Treasury between 1978 to 1985. Each closing agreement was examined to learn
about the application of the tollgate tax rules, explained in Chapter Eight.
The qualified reinvestment activities, as defined in Chapter Four, were used
in the examination of the investment requirements.
The particular industries were selected because they represent the most
important industrial sectors in terms of: (1) number of closing agreements
executed, (2) magnitude of the manufacturing income, (3) time-period
operating in Puerto Rico (more than 20 years in each case), (4) different
aspects covered under the tollgate tax rules (i.e., income rules under the
1963 IIA, firms under conversion and new grants under the 1978 IIA), and (5)
different closing agreement styles (as they were drafted by four different
law firms).
The distribution of these case studies and closing agreements, by parent
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industry and by subsidiaries with their respective industrial
classification, is shown in Table 10.1. The real names of the parent
companies and subsidiaries are not provided in this research, instead,
fictitious names have been used to protect the firms identity. The analysis
of the contract agreements emphasizes on the applicability of the tollgate
tax and the institutional problems related with the tollgate tax as a fiscal
and economic development instrument; as such the case studies are not
intended to single out any corporation.
Table 10.1
CASE STUDIES AND CLOSING AGREEMENT DISTRIBUTION BY SIC
Parent Company & Subsidiaries SIC # Closing
Agreements
1. LA Company
a LAC 2833 5
b LAH 3842 1
c LAP 2834 6
d Other (the above subsidiaries combined) 3
2. SHEA Company
a SHEA ADD 2831 7
b SHEA BAS 2831 7
c SHEA CAS 2831 5
d SHEA DEL 3841 7
e SHEA EHS 3841 7
f SHEA FPI 3841 7
g SHEA GPC 3841 3
SHEA HPL 3841 5
i SHEA IML 3841 7j SHEA JVM 3841 5
SHEA KBP 3841 1
1 SHEA LAC 3851 1
3. MAC Company
a) MACCA 3573 6
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
As explained in Chapter Eight, a closing agreement is a legal document and
the primary source of data about the tollgate tax applied under repatriation
of industrial profits, including a breakdown of the eligible activities and
rates of reinvestment. The reinvestment rate, relative to the rate of
repatriation, is suppose to determine the rate of the tollgate tax paid on
the repatriation of industrial profits.
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For each case study, the following estimates were obtained: (1)Industrial
Income: Total, Taxable, Non-Taxable, Repatriated, Reinvested; (2) Industrial
Development Income (IDI): Total, Taxable, Non-Taxable, Repatriated,
Reinvested; (3) Tollgate Tax Applied.on Repatriation of Taxable IDI; (4) Tax
Credits, Investment Tax Credits, and Credit Carry-Over; and (5)
Reinvestment: Total, Time-Period and Type of Investment. Furthermore, from
the interpretation of the terms of the closing agreements for each selected
company, problems, inaccuracies, and practices are analyzed. This analysis
was needed to determine how the tollgate tax rules were applied in each
case. Finally, this chapter discusses the findings of the three case
studies. However, given the technicalities of the subject matter,
information in this chapter is also supported by the detailed data on the
closing agreements for each company as presented in Appendix F.
II. Findings of the Case Studies
A. First Case Study: LA COMPANY
Fifteen closing agreements were studied for the LA Company case study. Five
of the agreements were related to one of the subsidiaries, LAC Corporation;
one agreement was for another subsidiary, LAH Corporation; and six
agreements were for a third subsidiary, LAP Corporation. The other three
closing agreements included all three possession corporations. One was
related to the installation of an earth station, and two resulted from tax
audits by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). (The IRS tax audits were
related with the use of intangibles which were discussed in Chapter Two. In
other words, the IRS was not interested in LA Company's compliance with
Puerto Rico tax laws).
LAC Corporation (SIC 2833) manufactures medicinal and botanical products,
specifically antibiotic bulk powders. LAH Corporation (SIC 3842) engages in
the production of surgical appliances and supplies, which covers the
production of hospital parenteral equipment. LAP Corporation (SIC 2834)
produces pharmaceutical tablets, capsules, and liquid preparations.
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Findings of this case study are discussed below. Information of this case
study per closing agreement, including a set of tables, appears in Appendix
F.I. Table 10.2 analyzes the data of the closing agreements executed by the
parent company, LA Company from 1978 to 1985. Industrial income (column 1),
includes total income repatriated (column 3) plus total reinvestment (column
8). Total repatriation of industrial income (column 3) was about 72.9
percent, while reinvestment (column 8) was about 27.1 percent (of which LAC
and LAP corporations represented 10 and 17 percent, respectively).
Taxable and tax-free industrial income sources were about 71 percent and 29
percent, respectively, as a percentage of total industrial income
repatriated. Industrial income by possession corporations was as follows:
LAC Corporation, 25 percent (4% tax-free non-IDI, 2% non-taxable IDI, 19%
taxable IDI); LAH Corporation, 33 percent (5% non-taxable IDI, 28% taxable
IDI); and LAP Corporation, 41 percent (5% tax-free non-IDI, 13% non-taxable
IDI, 23% taxable IDI).
IDI (column 10) is composed of taxable-IDI repatriated (column 6), tax-free
IDI repatriated (column 5), and reinvested income (column 8). These line
items represent about 55.7 percent, 29.0 percent, and 15.3 percent,
respectively, as a percentage of total IDI. Total taxable-IDI repatriated,
as a percentage of total taxable IDI (the sum of column 6 and 8), was 65.7
percent (column 7), while reinvested income (as a percentage of taxable IDI)
represented about 34 percent (column 9), of which 12.7 percent corresponded
to LAC Corporation and 21.5 percent corresponded to LAP Corporation.
A gross tollgate tax (column 10) was applied to LA Company on the
repatriation of taxable IDI. The gross rate (column 11) is equal to the
gross tollgate tax as a percentage of total taxable IDI repatriated.
However, the gross tollgate tax was reduced through tax credits (column 12)
and investment credits (column 13). When a portion of these credits is used
to reduce the gross tollgate tax, the real amount of the withholding tax
paid by LA Company is called the net tollgate tax (column 14). The net rate
is equal to the net tollgate tax as a percentage of total taxable IDI
repatriated (column 15).
TABLE 10.2 FIRST CASE STUDY: LACOMPANY$ - CLOSING AGREEMENTS: 1978TO 1985
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------
TOLLGATE TAXON REPATRIATION OF NDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INCOME (101):
ADJUSTMENTS TO REDUCE TAX CREDIT
PARENT COMPANY TOTAL INDUSTRIAL REPATRIATION OF PROFITS (IDI & ON-101 SOURCES) REINVESTMENT 101 GROSS THE TOLLGATE TAX NET OLLGATE TAX 10 CARRY
AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT NON-1DI IDI REPATRIATION TAXABLE TOLLGATE TAX FORWARD
POSSESSION INCOME INCOME (101) TOTAL SOURCE SOURCE 101 SOURCE TAX INVESTMENT
CORPORATIONS TOTAL REPATRIATION (TAX-FREE) (TAX-FREE) AMOUNT RATE AMOUNT RATE AOUN1 RATE CREDIT CREDIT AMOUNT RATE ANOUNT
Coluan I Coluan 2 Column 3 Coluan 4 Coluan 5 Coluan 6 Coluen 7 Column 8 Column 9 Coluan 10Coluan ilColuan 12 Coluan 13 Coluan 14 Column 15 Coluan 16
(S) (1) ($) () (S) () (8 () () () () (S) ($) ($) () ()
----------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
I-------------------------------------------------
LA COMPANY
TOTAL 1,42t,262,000 1,333,188,000 1,039,253,000 93,074,000 2 4,110,000 742,009,000 65.7 387,009,000 34.3 31,850,058 4.3 20,117,151 795,040 30,163,942 4.1 19,886,075
---- -- --- -- --- -- -------- ---   ---- -- 
- ----- ---- -- -- -- --- -- --- -- -- --- -- --- -- 
--- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- -- --- -- - ----- ---- -- 
--- -- --- -- --- -- --
LAC ORPORATION
SUB-TOIAL 401,450,000 364,523,000
CLOSING AGREEMENTS:
1979 51,033,000
1980 89,680,000
1981 18,607,000
1983 64,413,000
1984 55,000,000
50,000,000
ADJUSTMENT (19Q3) 10,657,000
LAP CORPORATION
SUB-TOTAL
33,533,000
79,680,000
61,805,000
59,848,000
55,000,000
50,000,000
18,651,000
263,206,000
35,000,000
50,000,000
45,000,000
34,549,000
55,000,000
25,000,000
18,657,000
42,927,000 21,035,000 199,244,000 58.
11,500,000
10,000,000
10,802,000
4,625,000
1,467,000
320,000
591,000
18,657,000
16,033,000 5 .0
39,680,000 5 .0
33,601,000 5 .0
29,924,000 5 .0
55,000,000 1 .0
25,000,000 5 .0
100.0
670,873,000 620,126,000 428,108,000 5 ,147,000 135,196,000 242,765,000 50.0
CLOSING AGREEMENTS:
1919 37,351,000
19,218,000
1980 43,171,000
87,518,000
1981 67,538,000
148,278,000
1983 70,744,000
1984 8,311,236
6,450,764
ADJUSTnENT (1984) 11,091,000
ADJUSIMENT (1983) 111,136,000
17,351,000
19,218,000
20,408,000
81,578,000
63,354,000
148,218,000
67,544,000
8,317,236
6,450,764
11,091,000
111,136,000
30,391,000
39,609,000
36,211,000
43,189,000
35,861,000
74,139,000
36,972,000
5,683,618
3,225,382
11,091,000
111,136,000
20,080,000
22,763,000
4,184,000
3,200,000
0
3,431,000 6,960,000
39,609,000
6,488,008 6,960,000
43,189,000
31,611,000
14,139,000
33,772,000
3,050,000 2,633,618
3,225,382
144,244,000 42.0
16,033,000
39,680, 000
33,601,000
29,924,000
25,000,000
0
242,165,000 5 .0
6,960,000
39,609,000
6,960,000
43,189,000
31,677,000
14,139,000
33,772,000
2,633,618
3,225,382
7,695,140 3.9 6,690,914 500,040
641,320
1,581,200
1,344,280
1,041,340
2,200,000
815,000
0
641,320
1,58,200
1,344,280
181,960
2,200,000
0
736,154
9,154,918 3.8 13,486,231
'218,400
1,584,360
218,400
1,751,560
1,267,080
2,594,865
1,182,020
105,345
112,888
0 11,091,000
0 111,136,000
278,400
1,584,360
0
0
1,267,080
0
1,478,880
105,345
881,810
1,478,880
3,564,555
2,840,861
0
0
295,000
0
0
0
7,013,140 3.5
641,320
1,587,200
1,344,280
365,340
2,200,000
815,000
0
6,508,954
641,320
1,581,200
1,344,280
2,200,000
736,154
8,150,802 3.6 13,317,121
278,4
1,584,s
278,4
1,751,s
1,267,0
2,299,8
1,182,0
109,1
00
60
00
60
80
65
218,400
1,584,360
1,267,080
20 1,418,880
0 4.1 105,345
11 0.0 118,154
0 0.0 1,418,080
3,564,555
0 0.0 2,840,867
LAN CORPORATION
SUB-TOTAL
CLOSING AGREEMENTS:
1979
ADJUSTMENT (1983)
341,939,008 341,939,000 341,939,000
300,000,000 300,000,000 300,000,000
47,939,000 41,939,000 47,939,000
0 41,939,000 300,000,000 1 .0
O 0 300,000,000 1 .0
0 41,939,000
0 0.0 15,000,000 5.0
0 0.0 15,000,000 5.0
15,000,000 5.0
0 U 15,000,000
- - - - - - --- - - -- - - - - -- --- ----- --- -- ------ 
-- --- --- -------  ----- 
----- --- ----- -- ------ ----- --- -- ------ ----- ----- 
--- --- -------
6 and 8as a % of taxable 101 (Column 2 sinus Column 5), respectively.
Coluans 11 and 15 refer toColuans 10 and 14 as a % of Coluen 6,respectively. Co uan 14is the difference of Column 10minus thefull amount ora portion of the credits in Coluans 12 and/or 13. Column 16refers to the full amount
or a portion of columns 12 and/or 13. The credits (Coluans 12 and/or 13) can be used (in full or a portion of one or both): to reduce Coluan 10 (as shown i Coluan 14) or as a tax credit carry-over (as shown i  Column 16).
Source: Puerto Rico Departsent of the Treasury.
NOTES: I A set of tables, which provides a breakdown f the information presented in this table, ispart of the first case study in Appendix F.I.
roluin I is the sum of Columns 3 and 8. Coluan 2 is the sus of Columns 5, 6and B. Coluan 3 is the sum of Columns 4, 5 and 6. Coluans 1 and 9refer to Coluans
0
5.0
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Most of the time, the full amount or portion of the tax and/or investment
credits not used to reduce the gross tollgate tax was converted into what is
called a tax credit carry-over (or carry-forward). The tax credit carry-
over can be used to reduce future income or tollgate taxes (column 16).
These credits have been applied in multiple ways. Table 10.2, for example,
lists all the credits in columns 12 and/or 13. The net tollgate tax (column
14) reveals the portion of the credits used to reduce the gross tollgate tax
(the difference between columns 10 and 14). The credit carry-forward
(column 16) shows the portion of the credits (columns 12 and/or 13) granted
to reduce future income or tollgate taxes.
The gross tollgate tax applied to taxable -IDI repatriated by LA Company was
about $31.9 million. This tax represented about 4.3 percent of the taxable
IDI repatriated. The average gross tollgate tax rate, as a percentage of
taxable IDI applied to LAC Corporation was about 3.9 percent, LAP
Corporation, 3.8 percent, and LAH Corporation, 5.0 percent.
The net tollgate tax (the amount paid by LA Company), however, was $30.8
million. The net tollgate tax did not include the amount listed under tax
credit carry-forward. If this tax credit carry-over of $19.9 million is
considered, the net tollgate tax could have been reduced to $10.9 million.
The latter amount represented about 1.5% as a percentage of taxable IDI
repatriated. The $10.9 million only represented about 1.2 percent of total
IDI repatriated and about 1 percent of total industrial income repatriated.
In fact, this tax credit carry-over ($19.9 million) represented about 65
percent of the amount of the tollgate tax paid ($30.8).
Table 10.2 also provides a breakdown by closing agreement and by possession
corporation of the relationship that exists among the rates of the tollgate
tax, repatriation, reinvestment and credits applied to the company's
industrial income. In the cases of LAC and LAP corporations, the rates of
taxable IDI reinvested and repatriated were about 50 percent each. For
these corporations, the net tollgate tax rates applied ranged between 1 to 4
percent. If the rate of the withholding tax is applied, it should have been
10 percent. Based on the 1978 IIA tollgate tax rules (Table 8.3, Chapter
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Eight) the 10 percent rule could be reduced to 5 percent only if (a) the
dividends distributed equals to 50 percent of IDI to be repatriated at a
rate of 10 percent per year for a five year period, and (b) the other 50
percent of the taxable IDI should be reinvested in eligible activities for a
period of five years. In the case of LAH, industrial income repatriated was
100 percent, no reinvestment was required, and the tollgate tax rate paid
was 5 percent.
Most of the IDI reinvested by LAC and LAP corporations was used to finance
inventory, accounts receivable, intangible assets, and investments in 2(j)
activities (plant and equipment, Puerto Rico GNMA's, loans to an LA Company
affiliate, and certificates of deposit). Based on the closing agreements,
these investments also qualify for additional tax and investment credits and
for credit carry-over.
B. Second Case Study: SHEA COMPANY
The second case study is that of the SHEA Company. This corporation
manufactures chemicals and allied products (SIC 28) and scientific and
professional instruments (SIC 38). The parent corporation had 12 possession
corporations working in Puerto Rico during the period of this study.
The corporations were engaged in three primary areas of production. Three
of these corporations, SHEA ADD, SHEA BAS, and SHEA CAS, developed
biological products (SIC 2831). Eight of the corporations, SHEA DEL, SHEA
EHS, SHEA FPI, SHEA GPC, SHEA HPL, SHEA IML, SHEA JVM, and SHEA KBP,
manufactured surgical and medical instruments (SIC 3841). One corporation,
SHEA LAC, produced ophthalmic goods (SIC 3851). Seven closing agreements
were executed between SHEA Company, its subsidiaries and the Puerto Rico
Treasury from 1978 to 1985. SHEA Company liquidated one of these
corporations, SHEA BAS, in 1984.
This case study considers each one of the seven closing agreements executed
by SHEA Company. According to the information on these closing agreements,
there were three other agreements (dated 5/17/78, 6/28/78, and 3/24/79) that
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were executed by the corporations; however, copies of these three closing
agreements were not found in the Puerto Rico Treasury central files.
Basic findings and data estimates for this case study are presented in the
following paragraphs. Information on each closing agreement, including a
full set of tables, appears in Appendix F.II.
The evidence presented in Table 10.3 suggests that from 1978 to 1985, total
industrial income repatriated (column 3) of this corporation was about
$374.3 million. Tax-free industrial income repatriated, as a percentage of
total industrial income repatriated, was about 4.4 percent, while tax-free
IDI repatriated was about 4.2 percent in relation to total IDI repatriated.
As a percentage of total industrial income, industrial income repatriated
and reinvestment represented 71.5 percent and 28.5 percent, respectively.
About 5 percent of total IDI was reinvested for only a one-year period.
The gross tollgate tax was about 6.9 percent (column 11) in relation to
taxable IDI repatriated, and it was equal to 6.7 percent of total income
repatriated. The net tollgate tax paid by this corporation was reduced
(through tax and investment credits) by almost $1.7 million. The net
tollgate tax rate was thus lower than the gross tollgate tax rate, going
from 6.9 percent to 6.4 percent (column 15). Moreover, this company
obtained $498,719 in tax credit carry-forwards. If the tax credit carry-
over were used to reduce the net tollgate tax, it would have lowered the tax
by 2.2 percent. The "adjusted" net tollgate tax (column 14 minus column 16)
would thus have been reduced to 6.2 percent as a percentage of taxable IDI
repatriated.
Table 10.3 reveals that the rate of reinvestment per closing agreement, as a
percentage of total taxable IDI, ranged between 0 to 33 percent. The
reinvestments of this corporation, as in the case of the LA Company, were
used to finance inventory, accounts receivable, and intangible assets.
Based on the closing agreements, these assets also qualify for additional
tax and investment credits, and credit carry-overs. The extent to which
these activities and credits have been used appear not to comply with the
rules and regulations of the tollgate tax as defined under the 1963 IIA and
TABLE 10.3 SECOND CASE STUDY: SAEA COMPANYS - CLOSING AGREEMENTS: 197810 1985
TOLLGATE TAX08 REPATRIATION OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INCOME (101):
ADJUSINENTS TO REDUCE TAX CREDIT
PARENT COMPANY TOTAL INDUSTRIAL REPATRIATION OF PROFITS (IDI I NON-101 SOURCES) REINVESTMENT 101 GROSS THE TOLLGATE TAX NET OLLGATE TAX TO CARRY
AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT NON-101 11 REPATRIATION TAXABLE TOLLGATE TAX FORVARD
POSSESSION INCONE INCOME (101) TOTAL SOURCE SOURCE 101 SOURCE TAX INVESTMENI
CORPORATIONS TOTAL REPATRIATION (TAX-FREE) (TAX-FREE) AMOUNT RATE A6OUNT RATE AMOUNT RATE CREDIT CREDIT AMOUNT RATE ANOUNT
Column I Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column 9 Column 10Column 1lColumn 12 Column 13 Column 14 Column 15 Column 16
(S) (S) (8) ($) () (8) (t) () (8) (8) (1) ($) (8) () (t) ()
SHEA COMPANY
TOTAL S23,601,646 522,936,459 374,314,521 671,187 15,708,546 357,934,788 68.4 149,293,125 29.4 24,525,167 .9 1,229,899 59,804 23,210,042 6.5 873,978
CLOSING AGREEMENTS:
1979 58,151,602 58,151,602
SIC 82831 16,984,512
4,157,216
SIC 83841 23,214,454
13,195,420
1980 82,191,043
SIC 82831 22,260,836
7,135,824
SIC 83841 33,001,253
19,793,130
1981 19,113,555
SIC 12831 1,189,310
29,525,143
SIC 83841 3,298,810
45,754,287
1982 89,311,395
SIC 82831 37,963,269
SIC 83841 51,348,126
1983 95,090,183
SIC 82831 18,800,774
2,466,359
6,217,198
SIC 83841 63,424,312
4,182,080
1984 119,689,268
SIC 82831 23,077,525
1,392
9,832,218
161,632
SIC 83841 829,531
15,462,414
13,574,865
514,843
SIC 83851 1,234,848
16,984,512
4,151,216
23,214,454
13,195,420
82,191,043
22,260,836
1,135,824
33,001,253
19,193,130
78,881,880
1,189,310
29,430,991
3,298,81
45,557,364
89,191,156
31,916,871
51,280,879
94,861,308
18,740,352
2,456,560
6,198,645
63,326,771
4,138,980
119,652,870
20,054,440
696
9,832,218
159,160
826,924
13,462,414
13,574,688
507,482
1,234,848
39,123,292
12,738,384
2,378,608
17,408,590
6,597,110
59,399,203
16,695,621
4,757,216
24,150,940
13:195,420
58,111,031
594,655
22,167,995
1,649,435
34,364,946
8,695,013
30,161,107
38,521,906
65,017,587
14,115,686
1,238,019
18,553
47,592,619
2,112,590
83,242,395
15,063,915
1,392
4,916,109
82,052
416,069
55,096,811
6,787,521
261,102
617,424
8 8 39,123,292 61.3
12,138,384 75.0
2,318,608 25.0
11,408,590 15.0
6,597,110 25.0
0 8,976,318 50,422,885 6 .9
16,695,621 15.0
2,378,608 2,318,608 25.0
24,750,940 15.0
6,597,110 6,597,710 25.0
291,615 0 58,485,356 14.1
594,655 2 .0
94,152 22,073,243 75.0
1,649,435 25.0
196,923 34,168,023 75.8
113,639 6,732,228 61,849,146 5.0
46,392 6,132,228 3,388,487 75.0
67,247 38,460,659 7 .0
229,475 0 64,848,112 68.4
60,422
9,799
18,553
97,601
43,100
36,398 0
23,085
696
0
2,412
2,607
0
1771
1,361
O
19,028,310 32.1 2,138,633 7.0
4,246,128 5.0 891,681
2,318,608 25.0 166,503
5,805,864 25.8 1,218,602
6,597,110 25.0 461,841
22,191,840 31.1 3,561,103
5,565,209 25.0 1,168,694
2,378,608 25.0 166,503
8,250,313 25.0 1,132,566
6,591,710 25.0 493,340
20,396,524 25.9 4,093,975
594,655 25.0 41,626
1,357,748 25.0 1,545,127
1,649,435 2 .0 115,460
11,389,341 25.0 2,391,162
20,616,382 25.0 4,329,440
1,196,162 25.0 1,631,194
12,820,220 5.0 2,692,246
30,013,196 31.6 4,423,941
14,055,264 75.0 4,685,088
1,228,280 50.0 1,228,280
6,198,645
47,495,018 15.0 15,831,693
2,069,498 50.0 2,069,490
83,205,997 69.5 36,446,873
15,040,830 75.0
696 100.0
4,916,109 5 .0
79,580 50.0
413,462 50.0
55,096,811 15.0
6,187,344 50.0
253,141 50.0
617,424 50.0
5,013,610
4,916,189
19,5080
413,462
18,365,603
6,787,344
253,141
611,424
25.0
5 .0
100.0
25.0
50.0
30.5
25,.8
0.0
50.0
5 .0
50.0
25.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
983,869
42,990
3,324,656
12,432
5,318,669
1,052,858
0
172,064
5,571
14,471
3,856,176
231,557
11,162
21,610
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.1
7.0
1.0
1.87.0
7.8
7.0
7.0
1.0
7.0
1.0
1.01.8
6.8
7.0
3.5
1.0
3.5
6.5
1.0
0.0
3.5
1.0
3.5
1.0
3.5
7.0
3.5
U
138,4]
38,0]
188,42
114,13
80,74
93,38
353,12
141,46
211,66
564,20
236,91
327,28
2,738,633 1.0
8 I 891,681
166,583
8 8 1,218,602
461,841
0 0 3,561,103
0 0 1,168,694
0 0 166,503
0 0 1,732,566
8 8 493,340
35 0 3,955,540
 0 11,616
1,545,127
5 8 7,035
2,391,762
3 548,965 3,606,342
7 139,103 1,411,344
6 409,862 2,188,998
8 243,505 3,969,155
7 16,999 825,403
42,990
8 223,294 3,101,362
1 3,212 8
3 161,334 5,378,669
9 11,050 1,052,858
112,064
5,511
4 150,284 14,471
3,856,716
231,557
11,162
21,610
Source: Puerto Rico Department of he Treasury.
NOTES: s A set of tables, mhich provides a breakdown of the information presented in this table, is part of the second case study in Appendix F.11.
Column 1 is the sum of Columns 3 and 8. Column 2 is the sum of Columns 5, 6 and 8. Column 3 is the sum of Columns 4, 5 and 6. Columns 1 and 9 refer to Columns 6and 8as a of taxable 101
Columns 11 and 15 refer to Columns 10 and 14 as a % of Column 6,respectively. Co umn 14is the difference of Column 10sinus thefull amount ora portion of the credits in Columns 12and/or
(Column 2 sinus Column 5), respectively.
13. Column 16refers tothe full amount
or a portion of columns 12 and/or 13. The credits (Columns 12and/or 13) can be used (in full or a portion of one or both): to reduce Column 10(as shown i Column 14) or as a tax credit carry-over (as shown i Column 16).
0
142,441
142,441
131,537
253,969
477,568
0
174
1978 IIA. Several examples are presented later on in this chapter (III.
Final Observations on the Case Studies).
C. Third Case Study: MAC COMPANY
The third case study presented is that of the MAC Company. This company
manufactures in the area of machinery except electrical products (SIC 35).
The parent corporation had one possession corporation, MACCA Corporation,
working in Puerto Rico during the period of this study. The possession
corporation was engaged in the production of electronic computing equipment
(SIC 3573). Six closing agreements were executed between MAC Company, MACCA
Corporation and the Puerto Rico Treasury from 1978 to 1985. This case study
considered each one of these closing agreements. There were two closing
agreements (dated 6/20/78 and 11/28/78) that were executed by the
corporation, but copies of them were not found in the Puerto Rico Treasury
central files. However, the third closing agreement of 4/15/80 makes
substantial reference to the first two agreements, enabling one to
understand what was agreed upon. The significant findings of this case
study are presented in Table 10.4. Information of each closing agreement,
including a full set of tables, appears in Appendix F.III.
Table 10.4 suggests that during 1978 to 1985, total industrial income
repatriated represented about 69.5 percent of total industrial income, while
reinvestment was about 30.5 percent. The gross tollgate tax was about 6.8
percent in relation to total taxable IDI repatriated. The credits (columns
12 and 13) reduced the gross tollgate tax by 2.8 percent. The net tollgate
tax was thus equal to about 6.6 percent (column 15) of total taxable IDI
repatriated. Moreover, if the tax credits carry-over would be used to
"adjust" the net tollgate tax, it could be reduced by 79.6 percent (from
$935,509 to $191,241). This "adjusted" net tollgate tax would equal only
1.3 percent of total taxable IDI repatriated.
Table 10.4 also presents a breakdown of similar information for each closing
agreement. The rate of reinvestment, as a percentage of taxable IDI,
fluctuated between 25 to 50 percent per closing agreement. The rates of net
TABLE 10.4 THIRD CASE STUDY: NAC ONPANYS - CLOSING AGREENENTS: 1978TO 1985
TOLLGATE TAXON REPATRIATION Of NDUSTRIAL DEVELOPhENT INCONE (101):
ADJUSINENTS TO REDUCE TAX CREDIT
PARENT CONPANY TOTAL INDUSTRIAL REPAIRTATTON OF PROFITS (101 LNON-101 SOURCES) REINVESTNENI 101 GROSS THE TOLLGATE TAX NET OLLGATE TAX TO CARRY
AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPHENT NON-101 101 REPATRIATION TAXABLE TOLLGATE TAX FORWARD
POSSESSION INCOME INCOME (101) TOTAL SOURCE SOURCE 101 SOURCE TAX INVESTHENT
CORPORATIONS TOTAL REPATRIATION (TAX-FREE) (TAX-FREE) ANOUNT RATE ANOUNT RATE AMOUNT RATE CREDIT CREDIT ANOUNT RATE ANOUNT
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column B Column 9 Column 10 Column lIlColuan 12 Column 13 Column 14 Column 15 Column 16
Wg (1) (S) (1) (1) (W (W ($) (W ($) (W ($ (W ($) (W WI
NAC ONPANY
TOTAL 20,893,376 20,855,569 14,520,180 31,801 310,249 14,172,124 69.0 6,323,196 31.0 962,933 6.19 184,513 581,119 935,509 6.60 744,268
---- ------ - --- - ----- ---- -   
- - ----- ----   ---- -- --- -- --- -- --- 
-- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- -- - ----- -- 
-- --- -- --- -- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- --
CLOSING AGREENENIS:
April 1980
(6/20/1978)
2,375,714 2,315,714 1,398,698
1,532,350
843,364
April 1980 2,760,664
(11/28/1978) -
1,149,264
1,611,400
April 1980 2,350,373
(12131/1978) -----
1,919,299
431,074
April 1980 2,451,103
(12/31/1981)
2,451,703
June 1982 2,782,82i
2,182,821
July 1983 4,338,351
4,338,351
June 1985 3,833,750
3,833,150
1,532,350
843,364
2,160,664
1,149,264
1,611,400
2,312,566
1,881,492
431,014
2,451,703
2,451,703
2,182,821
2,782,821
4,338,351
4,338,351
3,833,750
3,833,150
166,175
632,523
1,783,182
514,632
1,208,550
1,233,199
1,017,662
215,537
1,841,026
1,847,026
2,101,681
2,101,687
3,262,013
3,262,013
2,894,375
2,894,315
O 1,398,698 58.9
166,175 50.0
632,523 15.0
0 1,783,182 64.6
31,807 78,218
31,807 78,218
0 65,031
65,031
0 57,158
57,150
O 33,000
33,000
0
O
574,632
1,208,550
1,117,174
901,631
215,531
1,781,995
1,781,995
2,043,937
2,043,931
3,229,013
3,229,013
16,250 2,818,125
16,250 2,818,125
917,016 41.1 97,909 1.00 14,759
166,115 50.0
210,841 25.0
971,482 35.4
574,632 50.0
402,850 25.0
1,117,114 50.0
901,637 50.0
215,537 50.0
604,617 25.0
53,632 1.00
44,277 1.00
124,823 7.00
40,224 1.00
84,599 1.00
46,842 4.19
36,065 4.00
10,777 5.00
126,983 7.13-
14,159
3,476
0
3,416
12,130
12,130
U- 0
950
----- -
604,677 25.0 126,983 7.13 8 9,560
601,134 25.0 143,076 1.00 0 19,168
681,134 25.0 143,076 1.00 0 19,168
,076,338 25.0 226,031 1.00 0 552,451
,016,338 25.0 226,031 7.00 0 25,818
100.0 526,639
939,375 25.0 197,269 7.00 94,208 5,934
939,315 25.0 197,269 1.0 94,208 5,934
and 8 as a I of taxable101 (Column 2 sinus Column 5), respectively.
Columns 11and 15 refer toColumns 10 and 14 as a % of Column 6,respectively. Co umn 14is the difference of Column 10 sinus the full amount ora portion of the credits inColumns 12 and/or 13. Column 16refers tothe full amount
or a portion of columns 12 and/or 13. The credits (Columns 12and/or 13) can be used (in full or a portion of one or both): to reduce Column 10 (as shown i Coluen 14) or as a tax credit carry-over (as shown i Column 16).
97,909
53,632
44,211
121,341
40,224
81,123
46,842
36,065
18,771
122,203
122,203
123,908
123,908
226,031
226,031
197,269
197,269
7.00
7.00
6.81
1.00
6.71
4.19
4.00
5.00
6.86
6.86
6.06
6.06
7.00
1.00
7.00
7.80
14,759
14,1590
0
0
12,130
12,130
4,780
4,180
552,451
25,818
526,639
100,142
100,142
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury.
NOTES: n A set of tables, which provides a breakdown of the information presented in this table, ispart of the third case study in Appendix F.11T.
Cnluan I is the sum of Columns and 8 Column 2 is the sum of Columns 5 6and . Column 3 is the sum of Columns 4, 5and 6. Columns I and 9 refer to Columns 6
- --- --------- 
- ----------- - --------- --
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tollgate tax paid on repatriation of taxable IDI ranged between 4 and 7
percent. However, the tax credit carryover has the effect of reducing the
net tollgate tax. If the net tollgate tax is adjusted, then the tax would
be reduced in all closing agreements. (It would range below one percent as
a percentage of taxable IDI repatriated.)
Table 10.5 -summarizes the official tollgate tax schedules presented in
Chapter Eight, which were supposed to be used by MAC Company. Table 10.6
presents the actual tollgate tax schedule used by MAC Company. A comparison
of these two tables reveals the -difference between the official rules and
the alternative schedule employed by MAC Company. Many corporations, as in
this case, have implemented alternative tollgate tax schedules, instead of
following the official rules.
Table 10.5 --
Tollgate Tax Schedules
Tollgate Income Period Maximum Reinvestment Investment
Tax Rate Source Earnings Annual Requirement Period
Payout in 2(j) Assets Required
1963 IIA Grants Converted to 1978 IIA:
10 % IDI -- 100% -- --
4 % IDI Pre-1973 50 % -- --
4 % IDI 1973-1977 0-50 % 50 % 5 years
5 % IDI Post-1977 10-50 % 50 % 5 years
0 % Liquidation Pre-1978 100 % -- --
1978 IIA Grants:
10 % IDI -- 100% -- --
5 % IDI -- 50 % 50 % 5 years
4 % Liquidation -- 100 % 50 % 5 years
Source: Chapter Eight
MAC Company, like the other two case studies, satisfied the reinvestment
requirements, in most part, with activities such as accounts receivable and
inventory. Other investments listed were leasehold improvements (such as an
electrical substation, an acoustical ceiling and lavatories, an air
conditioning system and air compressor system; and clean room, lighting
system, electrical distribution installations, vacuum system, fence,
building partitions and miscellaneous), government obligations, Puerto Rico
Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO) Bonds, and Puerto Rico GNMA's (see
Table 10.6). Also, these activities provided MAC Company certain investment
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Table 10.6
Tollgate Tax Rules of NAC OMPANY
Gross Net
closing Tollgate Tollgate Income Period Maximum Reinvestment I vestment Type of Investment
Agreement Tax Rate Tax Rate Source Earnings Annual Requirement Period
() () Payout in 2(j) Assets Required
7 3.5 101
7 3.5 101
7 3.5 101
7 6.8 101
101
101
PRIMC0 Bond Int.
Rental Income
Prior 10/1/76 50 50 12 months GNMAs, Inventory & Acct. Receivable
9/30/76 to 1/1/78 75 25 8 years Ann. Avg. Inventory & Acct. Receivable Ba .
Prior 10/1/76 50 50 12 months Working Capital
After 9/30/76 75 25 8 years Anifual Average Working Capital
4 years
4 years
0
Prior 1/1/78
1/1/78-1/12/78
at 12/78
at 12/78
GNMA's & Govt. Bonds (PRIDCO)
GMA's & Govt. Bonds (PRIDCO)
4/15/80 Griit I 7 7.0 - 101
4/15/80 Interest 0 0.0 PRIOCO Bond Int.
4/15/80 Interest 7 -8.0** GNMA's Dividends
4/15/80 Interest 0 0.0 GNHA's Interest
1/179-12/31/19 15 25 8 years Leasehold Improvements & PRICO bonds
12/31/79 100 0 0
12/31/79 100 0 0
100 0 0
PRIOCO Bond Int.
PRIDC Bond Int.
IDI
IDI
101
101
1/80-9/80
10/80-10/81
10/79-9/80
10/80-10/81
4/80-9/80
10/80-10/81
0 0.0 PRICO Bond Int. 1982
7 -6.9*3 101 1982
101 1982
101 1982
PRIDCO Bond Int. 1982
101 1983
101 1983
101 1983
PRI0CO Bond Int. 1983
Public Oblig. Int.1983
8 years
8 years
8 years
8 years
100 0 0
15 25 8 years
8 years
8 years
8 years
B years
8 years
Ann. Avg. Inventory Balance
Ann. Avg. Inventory Balance
Ann. Avg. Inventory Balance
Ann. Avg. Inventory Balance
Purchase PRIOC0 Bldg. & GNMA's
GNHA's, Govt. Bonds & Ann. Avg. Akg. Cap.
GNMA's, Govt. Bonds & Ann. Avg. Vkg. Cap.
GHMA's, Govt. Bonds & Ann. Avg. Vkg. Cap.
GNMA's, Govt. Bonds & Ann. Avg. Wkg. Cap.
GNHA's, Govt. Bonds & Ann. Avg. Wkg. Cap.
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
Note: Date of Conversion of Grants: Grant 1, 10/1/1978; Grant 11, 10/1/1979; Grant 111, 4/16/1980.
Net Tollgate Tax Rate was calculated to demonstrate the effect of investment credits, tax credits, and tax credit carry-over.
In other words, the credits were used to reduce the gross tollgate tax.
** The negative symbol means that the net tollgate tax was reduced to zero and an amount equal to the negative % could be taken
6/20/78 Grant 1
6/20/78 Grant I
11/28/78 Grant I
11/28/78 Grant 1
12/31/79 Grant I
12/31/79 Grant I
12/31/79 Interest
12/31/79 Interest
Grant I
Grant I
Grant 11
Grant 11
Grant III
Grant III
Interest
Grant III
Grant I
Grant 11
Interest
Grant I
Grant 11
Grant III
Interest
Interest
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and tax credits to reduce the tollgate tax or to carry over to reduce
future taxes.
D. Findings Summary
Table 10.7 presents aggregated data for all the case studies. Total
industrial income repatriated was about 72.5 percent in relation to total
industrial income, while reinvestment was about 27.5 percent. Tax-free
industrial income repatriated was about 22 percent of total industrial
income repatriated. Taxable IDI repatriated was about 67.2 percent (column
7), while reinvestment was about 32.8 percent (column 9), both as a
percentage of taxable IDI (column 6 plus column 8).
Gross tollgate tax was about 5.1 percent (column 11) in relation to taxable
IDI repatriated, however, it was only about 4 percent of total industrial
income repatriated. Most corporations were able to reduce their gross
tollgate tax through the use of tax and investment credits (the reduction is
reflected in the net tollgate tax column). The gross tollgate tax was cut
down from $57.3 million to $54.5 million (net tollgate tax). The net
tollgate tax paid was about 4.9 percent (column 15) in relation to taxable
IDI repatriated and it was only about 3.8 percent as a percentage of total
industrial income repatriated.
In addition, there were $21.1 millions provided as a tax credit carry-over.
This tax credit carry-over can be applied to reduce future income and/or
tollgate taxes. If this tax credit carry-over would have been applied to
adjust the net tollgate tax, the "adjusted" rates would have been reduced to
3.0 percent in relation to taxable IDI and 2.5 percent in relation to total
industrial income repatriated. In fact, these credits would have a real
effect of reducing the net tollgate tax by about 39 percent.
The three case studies suggest that there are particular ways to reduce the
tollgate tax rates or to reduce the overall effect of the tollgate tax
rules. LA Company, for example, paid an average tollgate tax rate of 3
percent, while SHEA Company and MAC Company paid about 6 percent. SHEA
TABLE 10.1 SUMMARY: ALLCASE STUDIES$ - CLOSING AGREEMENTS: 1978 TO 1985
TOLLGATE TAXON REPATRIATION OF NOUSIRIAL DEVELOPMENT INCOME (10T):
AOJUSTMENTS TO REDUCE TAX CREDIT
PARENT TOTAL INDUSTRIAL REPATRIATION OF PROFITS (101 &NON-1O SOURCES) REINVESINENT 101 GROSS THE TOLLGATE TAX NET TOLLGATE TAX 10 CARRY
COMPANIES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT NON-1DT 101 REPATRIATION TAXABLE TOLLGATE TAX FORNARD
AND INCONE INCOME (101) TOTAL SOURCE SOURCE 11 SOURCE TAX INVESIMENT
POSSESSION TOTAL REPATRIATION (TAX-FREE) (TAX-FREE) ANOUNT RATE AMOUNT RATE ANOUNT RATE CREDT CREDIT ANOUNT RATE
CORPORATIONS Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column I Column 8 Column 9 Column 10Column lIColuan 12 Column 13 Column 14 Column 15 Column 16
() (1) (1) (S) ($) (8) () ($) () ($) ( ($) (8) () () ()
ALL CASE STUDIES
TOTAL 1,910,763,022 1,876,980,028 1,428,081,701 93,182,994 220,188,795 1,114,115,912 61.2 542,615,321 .8 51,338,158 .1 21,591,623 2, 41,963 54,909,493 4.9 21,504,321
7------ ---- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- --- --- ---:!7--- -- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- -- --- ------ -----  - -- --- -- --- -- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- - -- -- --- -- --
1,426,262,000 1,333,188,000 1, 39,253,000 93,014,000 2 4,170,000 142,009,000 65.1
407,450,800
670,813,000
347,939,000
364,523,000
620,126,000
341,939,000
263,206,000
428,108,000
347,939,000
523,601,646 522,936,459 374,314,521
58,151,602 58,151,602 39,123,292
82,191,043 82,191,043 59,399,203
79,173,555 78,881,880 58,777,031
89,311,395 89,197,756 68,695,013
95,090,783 94,861,308 65,017,587
119,689,268 119,652,870 83,242,395
20,893,376
2,315,114
2,760,664
2,350,313
2,451,703
2,182,821
4,338,351
3,833,750
42,927,000 21,035,000 199,244,000
5 ,141,000 135,196,000 242,765,000
0 47,939,000 300,000,000
671,187 15,708,546 357,934,788
8 0 39,123,292
0 8,916,318 58,422,885
291,675 0 58,485,356
113,639 6,732,228 61,849,146
229,415 0 64,848,112
36,398 0 83,205,991
18.6
67.3
6 .9
74.1
75.0
68.4
6 .5
20,855,569 14,520,180 37,801 310,249 14,172,124 69.0
2,375,114 1,398,698 8 0 1,398,698 58.9
2,760,664 1,783,182 8 0 1,783,182 64.6
2,312,566 1,233,199 37,807 18,218 1,117,174 50.0
2,451,703 1,841,826 0 65,031 1,181,995 74.7
2,782,821 2,101,681 0 57,750 2,043,931 75.0
4,338,351 3,262,013 0 33,000 3,229,013 75.0
3,833,150 2,894,315 U 76,250 2,818,125 75.0
381,009,000
144,244,000
242,165,088
34.3
42.8
5 .6
8.0
149,293,125 29.4
19,028,310 32.1
22,191,840 31.1
20,396,524 25.9
20,616,382 25.0
30,013,196 31.6
36,446,813 30.5
6,313,196 31.0
977,016 41.1
971,482 35.4
1,117,174 50.0
684,611 25.3
681,134 25.0
1,076,338 25.0
939,315 25.0
31,850,058
7,695,140
9,154,918
15,000,860
3.1 20,171,151 195,040
6,690,914
13,486,231
0
500,040
295,00
0
24,525,767 .6 1,229,899 59,804
2,138,633
3,561,103
4,093,975
4,329,440
4,423,947
5,318,669
130,435
114,133
353,128
564,203
0
548,965
243,505
161,334
30,763,942
7,013,140
8,150,802
15,000,000
3.0
2.7
2.8
4.3
19,886,075
6,508,954
13,377,121
23,210,042 6.2 873,978
2,738,633
3,561,103
3,955,540
3,606,342
3,969,155
5,318,669
0
0
0
142,441
131,531
962,933 6.6 184,513 587,119 935,509 6.4 744,268
97,909 7:0 14,159 0 97,909 1.0 14,159
124,823 7.0 3,476 0 121,347 6.8 0
46,842 3.8 72,130 0 46,842 3.8 72,130
126,983 6.9 0 9,560 122,203 6.6 4,780
143,016 .8 0 19,168 123,908 5.9 0
226,031 6.9 0 552,457 226,031 6.9 552,457
191,269 6.8 94,208 5,934 197,269 6.8 100,142
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury.
NOTES: * Aset of tables, which provides a breakdown of the information presented in this table, ispart of ,he threecase studies in Appendix F.I, F.IT, and F.111.
Column I is the sum of Columns 3 and 8. Column 2 is the sum of Columns 5, 6 and 8. Column 3 is the sum of Columns 4, 5and 6. Columns 1 and 9 refer to Columns 6 and 8 as a % of taxable TOT (Column 2 sinus Column 5), respectively.
Columns 11and 15 refer to Columns 10 and 14 as a I of Column 6,respectively. Co umn 14is the difference of Column 10minus the full amount ora portion of the credits in Columns 12and/or 13. Column 16refers tothe full amount
or a portion of columns 12 and/or 13. The credits (Columns 12and/or 13) can be used (in full or a portion of one or both): to reduce Column 10 (as shown i Column 14) or as a tax credit carry-over (as shown i Column 16).
LA COMPANY
TOTAL
LAC ORPORATION
LAP CORPORATION
LAN CORPORATION
SNEA COMPANY
TOTAL
1919
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
MAC OMPANY
TOTAL
11 April 1980
12 April 1980
13 April 1980
14 April 1980
15 June 1982
16 July 1983
17 June 1985
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Company, however, was able to reinvest part of its IDI only for a one-year
period, and after that period it was able to repatriate the reinvested IDI
free of taxes. MAC Company was able to almost match the amount of tollgate
tax paid with investment and tax credits. Part of the credits was used to
reduce the tollgate tax, and part was used as a tax credit carry-over to
reduced future tollgate or income taxes. MAC Company also was able to
satisfy the reinvestment requirements (as mentioned previously) with
existing investment, projected working capital, inventories, account
receivables, and leasehold improvements.
Generally, the evidence of the three case studies suggests that these
companies have been able to design particular provisions to reduce- the rate
of tollgate tax and to establish the repatriation of income limitation and
the qualifying investment requirements. The terms of the closing
agreements, suggest that there exist many problems related to the
implementation of these rules. An analysis of some of these problems is
presented in the remaining pages of this chapter.
III. Final Observations on the Case Studies
The formal tollgate tax rules do not seem to have been satisfied in the
closing agreements of the case studies. Many of the provisions of the
closing agreements do not necessarily conform with the applicable laws and
regulations. The evidence suggests that the lack of a proper application of
the tollgate tax rules is the result of several interrelated problems and
practices. Several examples are listed below.
1. Lack of Consistent Information: One of the most important findings, as
documented by these case studies, is the deficiency of consistent
information with regard to the tollgate tax rates, repatriation of profits,
reinvestment requirements, and tax and investment credits. The Puerto Rico
Treasury lacks regulations, which are required by law. These regulations
and their enforcement are needed to ensure compliance with these rules in
order to reach the desired fiscal and/or economic development objectives.
SHEA Company, for example, did not specify the tollgate tax amount or the
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rate to be applied on repatriation of profits. Instead, the closing
agreements made reference to a section of the Puerto Rico Income Tax Act
(PRITA) of 1954.
2. Lack of Appropriate Fiscal Mechanism: This problem is related to the
first one. For example, the tollgate tax has been used as a mechanism to
balance the central government budget. As such, corporations were allowed
to reduce the tollgate tax rates substantially if they were prepaid. In
most cases, the closing agreements were executed during the last month of
the fiscal year. Moreover, corporations who agreed to prepay their tollgate
tax, were able to obtain lower amounts of tollgate tax than what usually
would have been allowed; or were given tax credits carry-over for the same
amount of the taxes paid. The credit carry-over could be used to reduce
future tollgate and/or income taxes. Under this practice, Puerto Rico's
Treasury seems to have given little attention to the fiscal and reinvestment
objectives underlying this mechanism.
3. Lack of a Standard Closing Agreement Format: The Puerto Rico Treasury
needs a standard closing agreement document (a boiler plate), which could be
used by all possession corporations. In its absence, the provisions
contained in each agreement appear to have been tailored to particular
corporate needs. Most of the provisions are interpretations of income tax
laws and seem to have resulted in lost revenues for Puerto Rico. The design
of regulations and of a standard format could serve as an appropriate
management mechanism that might prevent the improvisation of closing
agreements by the corporations. This mechanism could contribute to the
formulation of better fiscal and real investment policies that would help to
have a greater impact in the economic development strategy for Puerto Rico.
Moreover, it could provide an adequate accounting system that would allow to
monitor these funds better and increase revenues.
4. Inaccuracies in the Closing Agreements: The magnitude of the
inaccuracies contained in the closing agreements is contributing to make the
tollgate tax a nonreliable fiscal and economic development mechanism. These
inaccuracies seem to be the result of several interrelated problems and
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practices. Among them are:
(a) Lack of a standardized system for itemizing deductions. This has led to
tollgate tax underpayments by most corporations. Viewed in another light it
could lead to overestimation of tollgate activities.
(b) It is practically impossible to verify the information, such as the IDI
and foreign sources provided by the corporations under the closing
agreements. In the case of LAC Corporation the information of qualifying
investments was not clear. For example, total IDI in 1977 was completely
different in the closing agreement of 1979 ($30,629,000) to the one reported
in the closing agreement of 1981 ($26,272,000), or to the ones reported in
the closing agreement of 1983 ($23,983,000). There were no reasons given or
that seem adequate to accept these discrepancies. Moreover, the information
was imprecise to make inferences. (See Appendix F Tables F.I.15, F.I.18 and
F.I.20). A typical example with "foreign-source" income earned was the case
of SHEA Company. There was a "lump sum" amount that represented foreign-
income source, although, there were no explanations about where this income
came from.
(c) It is almost impossible to reconcile the total amount claimed of the
five-year investment in eligible activities with the amount of IDI reported
to be reinvested at the time of executing the closing agreement. In the
case of LAC Corporation, for example, the closing agreement of 10/21/81
indicated that the amount of reinvestment will be $33,607,000. An
investigation of the qualifying investment information suggests that the
real amount reinvested was about $11.7 millions. This amount was even lower
than the minimum range presented in the respective closing agreements, which
was about $20 million (See Appendix F Tables F.I.17 and F.I.20).
(d) In many instances closing agreements were signed without providing a
precise amount for tollgate taxes, sometimes giving a range or a ceiling of
dividends to be distributed. LA Company engaged in this practice in almost
every closing agreement. In the case of LAP Corporation, for example, the
total amount of dividends to be repatriated in the closing agreement of 1980
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was given in a range of $40 million and in the closing agreement of 1981 was
given in a $50 million range. In addition, the amount of income to be
reinvested and the tollgate tax rate were provided in ranges that varied
proportionately to dividends to be repatriated.
(e) Most closing agreements did not use precise language. For example, some
closing agreements state the amount of the dividends to be distributed, but
include no reference about the taxes to be paid nor what was actually agreed
upon. SHEA Company, for example, in several closing agreements, referenced
the tollgate tax to be paid in accordance with particular provisions of the
PRITA of 1954 or the 1978 IIA, instead of providing the exact amount or rate
of tollgate tax to be paid.
(f) A lump sum amount for Section 2(j) investments is identified in most
closing agreements. This makes it difficult to monitor how these
investments are actually made and what activities are more attractive for
the investors. SHEA Company, for example, filed a statement as part of
their Puerto Rico income tax records but only give a total amount for
qualifying investments.
(g) The repatriation amount that is stated as having been paid is not the
same as the amount referenced in the closing agreement. In the agreement of
SHEA Company dated 6/24/80, for example, the repatriation amount was
supposed to be $59,399,203, while in the PRITA statement dated 1/27/81 the
actual amount of industrial income repatriated for 1980 was only
$20,013,921, a difference of almost $40 millions.
(h) An amount equal *to the tollgate tax paid by a corporation has been
granted also as a tax credit carry-over. However, there have not been
regulations to apply this credit. MAC Company, for example, used the tax
credit carry-over provision in three different situations in their closing
agreement of 4/15/80.
Situation One (Closing Agreement of 6/20/78): MAC Company agreed to
reinvest 25 percent of the IDI accumulated during the period of 9/30/76 to
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1/1/78 for eight years. At the end of the eight-year period, the company
could distribute the reinvested IDI ($210,841) subject to a seven percent
tollgate tax ($14,759). A tax credit was granted equal to the same amount
of tollgate paid ($14,759), which could be credited against future income or
tollgate taxes.
Situation Two (Closing Agreement of 11/28/78): The company agreed to pay a
seven percent tollgate tax on repatriation of certain IDI reinvested for an
eight year period. The company was able to obtain a tax credit carry-over
for the same amount of tollgate tax (seven percent) paid for a certain
amount of IDI ($49,664 x 7% = $3,476). This credit could be used against
future tollgate taxes.
Situation Three (Distribution of 12/31/79 Closing Agreement of 4/15/80):
The company reported it already had distributed 50 percent of the pre-1/1/78
IDI and applied a reduced tollgate tax of 4 percent ($36,065). MAC Company
was able to obtain a tax credit carry-over equal to four percent of the
tollgate tax paid that could be credited to future payments of income and/or
tollgate taxes. Moreover, the remaining 50 percent of IDI was reinvested.
At the end of the four year reinvestment period, the company agreed to pay a
four percent tollgate tax upon repatriation (of the 50 percent IDI
reinvested). The company was able to obtain an additional tax credit
($36,065) equal to the four percent of tollgate tax paid.
MAC Company supported their use of the credits, as explained in the above
situations, by referring to Section 3(1)(8) of the 1978 IIA. In these three
situations, however, the company appears to have interpreted Section of the
1978 IIA for their own benefit. MAC Company seems to have been unqualified
to use the tax credit in the three situations, based on the dividend
distribution limitation, reinvestment requirements, and the reinvestment
period.
5. Legal Basis of the Closing Agreements and the Tollgate Tax Rules: The
lack of a standard closing agreement and of a proper set of regulations has
resulted in imaginative corporate practices. These practices have reduced
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the effect of the tollgate tax rules as a fiscal and economic development
mechanism. Among these practices are:
(a) Frequent Use of Safety-Margin Provisions Under the Closing Agreements:
Most corporations have been able to execute new closing agreements, which
allowed them to adjust investment requirements, tollgate taxes, and
repatriation of income of previous agreements. Moreover, some of the
provisions were designed to clear the corporation of any fiscal
responsibility as a result of such changes. These provisions, thus, enable
the corporations to reduce the effect of the tollgate tax and income tax
rules.
MAC Company, for example, appears to have been allowed to make correlative
adjustments to its earnings and profits and to amend its Puerto Rico income
tax return and/or tollgate tax returns for each year it might be affected by
an income reallocation, assignment or adjustment. Also, some provisions
entitled MAC Company to a credit for any excess income and tollgate taxes in
any future year, not withstanding that the statute of limitations to claim a
credit had expired.
(b) Regular Use of the Plan of Complete Liquidation Under the Closing
Agreements: Corporations seem to have reduced the tollgate tax and freed
themselves from the reinvestment requirements by liquidating a subsidiary.
This was the case of LA Company in relation to LAH and LAC corporations.
The production of LAH Corporation might continue either by creating a new
subsidiary or by consolidating the production into another subsidiary. In
the case of LAC Corporation, the closing agreements provided that this
corporation may distribute and the parent company may receive free from
Puerto Rico taxes all IDI accumulated pursuant to a plan of complete
liquidation.
(c) Use of Mergers by Possession Corporations Under the Closing Agreements:
Corporations appear to have used mergers as a practice to reduce their
tollgate taxes. In the case of SHEA Company, for example, several
corporations merged into one of the existing company subsidiaries, SHEA GPC
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Corporation. As a result of this merger, all of the assets of the other
possession corporations were transferred to SHEA GPC Corporation subject to
all of their liabilities. SHEA GPC Corporation was to carry out the
manufacturing operations of the merged corporations at their existing
locations as divisions of SHEA GPC whose corporate name was changed to SHEA
Caribe, Inc. The merger of these possession corporations was not subject to
Puerto Rico taxes, because it was considered a reorganization under Section
112(g)(1)(A) of the PRITA.
(d) Flexible Use of Qualified Reinvestment Requirements Under the Closing
Agreements: Most corporations have complied with their reinvestment
requirements by using what seems to be flexible interpretations of some
income tax laws provisions. In addition, certain practices have been used
to produce the same effect. Among these laws and practices are:
(1) A corporation, sometimes documented the qualifying investment data by
providing what is known as a "Statement Under the Penalties of Perjury",
that is required by Article 231-3(c) of the Regulations under the PRITA of
1954. For example, in the case of SHEA Company this type of statement was
provided as a qualifying investments reference. This statement confirmed
the amount of dividends that each corporation had distributed, and the
amount of dividends which were declared but not yet distributed. Also, the
investment amounts of each possession corporation were given for the
beginning of the taxable year and at the end of the taxable year.
Unfortunately these investments were given in lump sums, which does not help
to analyze how much capital was invested in each one of the 2(j) eligible
activities or if they had more. Moreover, there is no form to verify the
validity of the information provided.
(2) Many closing agreements allowed reinvestment requirements to be
satisfied by acquiring qualifying investment from another possession
corporation. In the case of SHEA Company, for example, some of its
possession corporations could have acquired a qualifying investment from
another possession corporation.
(3) There seems to be an indiscriminate use of Section 231 of PRITA of 1954
to satisfy 1978 IIA reinvestment requirements. Among the activities most
frequently used were cash, accounts receivable, notes receivable, inventory,
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and leasehold improvements. These do not necessarily conform with the 2(j)
activities as defined under the 1978 IIA. Also, following the expiration
date of the reinvestment period, the above assets may be utilized again to
meet the requirements of Section 231 (a)(2)(C)(ii) with respect to
subsequent distributions.
(4) A possession corporation's acquisition of intangible assets, such as
patents, trademarks, trade names and technology, have been allowed as
investments meeting the requirements. However, such assets might not
necessarily satisfy the tollgate tax rules as defined under the 1978 IIA.
(5) Most closing agreements satisfied the reinvestment requirements by
investing in working capital. Working capital, for the purposes of the
closing agreements, was defined as the amount by which assets exceeded
liabilities (see MAC Company case). This definition might not necessarily
comply with the rules and regulations of Section 2(j) of 1978 IIA.
(e) Flexible Use of Rules for Dividend Distribution Under the Closing
Agreements: Many possession corporations seem to have interpreted several
tax laws to reduce the effect of the tollgate tax rules. SHEA Company, for
example, was able to obtain tax credits carry-over in most of their closing
agreements, although it seems they were unqualified to claim these credits.
The credit carryover provisions of Section 3(i)(8) of the 1978 Act applied
if the corporation converted their grant(s) of industrial tax exemption to
the 1978 IIA. SHEA Company did not give any indication of a possession
corporation having chosen to convert their grant to obtain tax credits.
(f) Flexible Use of Rules for Tollgate Taxes Under the Closing Agreements:
Corporations give the impression of having reduced the tollgate tax by
applying alternative rules based on their interpretations of several tax
laws. SHEA Company, for example, lowered the tollgate taxes of several
possession corporations by using what seems to be alternative tollgate tax
rules. The alternative rule established that: (1) this corporation could
reduce the tollgate tax from 7.0 to 3.5 percent (as a percentage of taxable
IDI repatriated) if the combined total tollgate tax rates of possession
corporations would be at least 5 percent; (2) the corporation was allowed to
use accumulated tax and/or investment credits to reduce the tollgate tax up
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to 50 percent in any given year, if the corporation maintained at least 5
percent of the combined overall gross tollgate tax rate of possession
corporations. Under the alternative rules, the company seems to have
reduced their tollgate tax by over half a million dollars or about 2.2
percent in relation to the tollgate tax amount that was supposed to be
applied. As a result of the tax credits the company was able to reduce the
tollgate tax by $1.7 million, or to 6.9 percent (as a percentage of taxable
IDI repatriated).
(g) Frequent Use of Tollgate Tax Credits Under the Closing Agreements: Most
corporations, apparently, do not pay full tollgate taxes, because they were
able to obtain a reduced rate of tollgate tax. In addition, many possession
corporations seem to have been able to obtain a tax credit for a certain or
a full amount of the tollgate taxes paid. For example, for all the case
studies at the end of their investment period, they would be able to
distribute dividends earned by qualifying investments subject to agreed
tollgate tax rates without any further investment requirements. This tax
payment, in many cases, would then be available to the corporation as a
credit against any future income taxes imposed on the taxable portion of the
IDI. The income tax credit could be used to offset up to 50% of the taxes
due on any given year. The unused portion of the credit could be carried
forward to future years until fully utilized, without any time limits.
Further, certain investments in Puerto Rico might be released so that they
could be used for other investments requirements.
(h) Regular Use of Tax-Free Industrial Income Sources Under the Closing
Agreements: The use of many activities as tax-free industrial income
sources by possession corporations might appear to be questionable. As
shown in the tables of these case studies, a significant portion of the
total industrial income repatriated was free of taxes, although there were
no clear explanations of the criteria for excluding these income sources
from taxes.
(i) Frequent Use of Investment Tax Credits Under the Closing Agreements:
Corporations appear to have used investment credits in an indiscriminate
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manner. SHEA and MAC companies, for example, have used a three percent
investment credit allowed under Section 231 of PRITA of 1954. In the case
of MAC Company, the three percent investment credit was taken based on
certain leasehold improvements. This credit was to be used to reduce its
tollgate taxes. In the case of SHEA Company, as another example, the three
percent investment credits was allowed, at their option, to lower their
tollgate taxes. Further, in both cases, any unused portion of the
investment credit could be carried over indefinitely to future years.
IV. Conclusion
Three major conclusions can be drawn from the above examination:
First, the tollgate tax rules offer significant reductions of taxes to
firms. The tollgate tax rates range between 4 to 10 percent. The rules
provide ample opportunities for corporations to apply the lower end of the
tax rates in this range. In fact, the average gross tollgate tax applied to
firms was about 5 percent.
Second, there is a lack of regulations to implement the dividend
distribution limitations, qualified reinvestment requirements, and the rates
of tollgate tax. As a result, most companies have applied their own
interpretation of income tax laws to reduce their tollgate taxes, to obtain
tax and investment credits, and to use many firms activities and operational
expenses to satisfy reinvestment requirements.
Third, the combination of the flexible tollgate tax rules and the lack of
regulations appear to have enabled the corporations to reduce the tollgate
tax by using excessive credits, by exempting from taxes large amounts of
industrial income, and by lowering the gross tollgate rate applied
(regardless of the dividend distribution limitations and reinvestment
requirements). Also, industrial income reinvested in real economic
development assets, has been nonexistent. Otherwise, reinvestment
requirements have been satisfied in most part with firms assets, such as
working capital, inventories, cash, and accounts receivables. Most of these
assets are part of the corporations day-to-day operational capital. The
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regular use of these practices seems to have diminished the effectiveness of
the tollgate tax as a fiscal and economic development mechanism in Puerto
Ri co.
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Chapter Eleven
Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter presents the main conclusions and recommendations of the
thesis. The first part of this chapter presents principal findings. The
second part deals with a question that presses for an answer, namely, why
profit tax exemption continues to be supported by both the U.S. and Puerto
Rico governments. Finally, the study provides some recommendations for
further research.
I. Findings From The Evidence Presented in this Research
Throughout this research several economic and administrative aspects of
development problems were evaluated. These problems are related to profit
tax-exemption as the main policy-instrument and key incentive for promoting
industrial and economic development in Puerto Rico. Of principal concern
are the initial perceptions that (1) some features of the tax exemption laws
appear to distort investment incentives, (2) employment and income remain
low, (3) reinvestment of tax-exempt profits seems to be a weak incentive to
finance economic development projects, (4) the tollgate tax appears to be
poorly applied, and (5) tax-exemption seems to be managed on a discretionary
basis.
Puerto Rico's industrial incentives laws, as well as the industrial
promotion policies since 1948, have established profit tax exemption as the
main subsidy provided to firms. Tax-exemption appears to attract a
profitable industrial segment, but the composition and contribution by the
attracted industries to Puerto Rico's economy have changed dramatically
during the development process. Profit tax exemption depends on the
existence of profits. As Puerto Rico operational costs rise, in particular
labor costs, the leverage of tax exemption has diminished. In general, the
tax exemption laws lead to a bias towards subsidizing capital inputs, and
the industrial promotion program has been heavily oriented towards capital-
intensive industries. Few incentives have been offered to industries for
whom profit tax exemption lacks significance. Moreover, neither the
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reinvestment incentive nor the tollgate tax seem to have produced the best
results. A combination of technical and administrative problems and the use
of questionable practices by legal and financial institutions appear to have
made the reinvestment incentive and the tollgate tax ineffective mechanisms.
Puerto Rico's industrial incentives program started in 1948. During the
initial years, it offered to industrial investors a combination of
incentives that made tax exemption work. This was, in effect, the beginning
of what subsequently became known as "Operation Bootstrap." Its centerpiece
was the offer of full tax exemption from local, municipal, and federal taxes
to those who invested in manufacturing facilities in Puerto Rico. In
addition, other incentives proposed to investors were the combination of a
low-wage environment with tax-free profits under the U.S. flag and
unrestricted access to the U.S. market. Simultaneously, a massive out-
migration, primarily of farm workers, to the United States was sponsored by
the United States and the Puerto Rican governments.
Puerto Rico's economy grew between 1948 and 1970. Real economic growth
rates were attributed, mainly, to the growth of labor-intensive
manufacturing. The gross national product (GNP) and the gross domestic
product (GDP) (total, per worker, and per-capita) increased significantly.
Productivity per worker and per dollar of investment rose. Investment in
new plant and equipment generated by manufacturing growth was the primary
force behind the increase of construction jobs. Investment in industrial
and commercial buildings also increased substantially during the period. In
the aggregate, manufacturing jobs grew, significantly. Manufacturing share
of Puerto Rico's GDP increased; and the compensation to industrial workers
represent close to two-thirds of manufacturing value added. Over two-thirds
of manufacturing employment growth occurred in four industries, non-sugar
food products, apparel, leather goods, and electrical machinery. These
industries were labor-intensive, low-wage, and manufactured consumer-goods.
Since the 1970s, Puerto Rico's economy has shown a poor performance. Real
fixed investment is lower now than in previous years. Gross internal
savings became negative in 1973, and have remained negative since.
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Employment growth has been and continues to be low and unemployment has been
and continues to be extremely high. In contrast, between 1970 and 1987,
real manufacturing net income has grown substantially. Industrial
employment and workers' earnings, however, did not increase in concert with
manufacturing income. The augmented proportion of manufacturing income
after the 1970s is attributable to increases in capital inputs, intangible
assets and financial assets. Furthermore, the lack of availability and/or
reasonable cost of capital to finance new investment in Puerto Rico has been
and continues to be a development problem.
The structure of Puerto Rico's industrial incentives program, primarily tax
exemption, has been the most important internal factor affecting the
economy. Generally, industrial tax-exemption in Puerto Rico is designed to
subsidize those factors of production which combine to increase
manufacturing output. The assumption is that such increases will contribute
to physical fixed investment, employment, income, and revenues in Puerto
Rico. The tax-exemptions constitute a profit incentive. As a firm becomes
more profitable, the more subsidy it obtains. Industrial promotion in
Puerto Rico was based on the existence of "natural" incentives affected by
the so-called external factors (low-labor-costs and access to the U.S.
mainland markets) that made tax exemption workable for labor-intensive
industries, mainly, from 1948 to 1970. Structural changes in the world
economy negatively affected those external factors benefiting Puerto Rico.
As a result, the attractiveness of Puerto Rico as a tax haven was reduced.
Consequently, tax exemption became less effective in attracting labor-
intensive industries. This was mainly due to the increases in labor costs
that reduced their profit rates significantly.
As a response, in particular since the mid-1960s, Puerto Rico's industrial
promotion program as well as the industrial incentives program changed to
support mainly potentially profitable industries attracted because of the
tax exemption incentives. Little attention was given, however, to promote
or to retain employment-producing industries or local firms for whom profit-
tax exemption lacked effectiveness due to the economic trends during the
period. Thus, firms were promoted based on the profit-tax exemption
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potential regardless of their contribution to employment and to Puerto
Rico's economy in general. Industrial promotion targeted high productivity
industries, sufficiently high to permit them to pay high wages. Industrial
processes in this type of industry had to be of high quality in the sense
that they should be only minimally affected by increases in operational
costs and sale prices.
Since 1970, industrial growth in Puerto Rico has been in the high-technology
segment. High-technology manufacturing growth, however, has affected the
structure of manufacturing employment and income and has had consequences
for the functioning of both Puerto Rico's labor markets and its entire
economy. Between 1970 and 1987, the manufacturing share of total employment
in Puerto Rico declined slightly. After 1970, industrial employment growth
in Puerto Rico has been in a high-technology segment that is composed
primarily of chemicals, electrical machinery and scientific instruments
industries. Generally, these are capital-intensive firms and they have
produced a low level of employment. Worker compensation as a percentage of
value added in high-technology firms represent a small percent compared with
the rest of manufacturing. Other structural changes caused by the growth of
high-technology manufacturing is the increased investment required to
produce a job and the increased worker output from each job created. As
capital-production began to dominate manufacturing growth in Puerto Rico,
fewer jobs are needed to produce additional real manufacturing output.
Also, the growth of the high-technology industrial segment helps to explain
the behavior of the GDP and the GNP. The GDP and the GNP began to diverge
significantly after 1970. Puerto Rico has experienced a rapid growth of
economic activity (measured by the GDP) but low or even negative growth of
economic welfare (measured by per capita GNP). The reason for the decline
in the growth rates of both per capita and total GNP over the last decade
appears to result from the shift from labor-intensive to capital-intensive
manufacturing and to the transfers elsewhere of much of the resulting value
added. The difference between the GDP and the GNP is mainly the remittance
of tax-exempt profits and interest income to U.S. firms and investors. An
increasing proportion of total economic activity (GDP) was accounted for by
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capital-intensive manufacturing and by mainly nonPuerto Rican ownership of
industrial capital in Puerto Rico. The interaction of these factors has
resulted in increasing the profitability of the high-technology industrial
segment. At the same time, however, the increased economic welfare of
Puerto Rico's residents has been far less than that of non-residents.
-After 1976, the structural changes of Puerto Rico's economy, in particular,
industrial employment and income and the financial sector, can be traced
directly to the changes of tax exemption laws. In particular, U.S. tax
benefits with the introduction in 1976 of Section 936 and tax-free interest
income offer to possession corporations under the reinvestment incentive
introduced by Puerto Rico's Industrial Incentives Acts (IIAs) have become -
the major incentive for locating United States manufacturing facilities in
Puerto Rico. The changes in the tax-exemption laws were supposed to
encourage U.S. possession corporations to invest in Puerto Rican financial
markets rather than to divert their Puerto Rican tax-exempt profits into
Eurodollar markets. Bank deposits, investments in Puerto Rico government
obligations and Puerto Rico sources of mortgages-backed guaranteed by the
U.S. government (GNMA's), were designated the main eligible activities that
qualified under the reinvestment incentive. As a result, the financial
sector underwent a radical change.
Since 1976, possession corporation deposits have accounted for more than
half of the growth in Puerto Rico's commercial bank deposit base. Also,
since 1976, these corporations have generated more than half of their income
for pure financial transactions. Moreover, possession corporations have
bought most of Puerto Rico's public debt bond issued and the GNMA's sources.
However, the reinvestment incentive appears to be more effective in
providing possession corporations significant amounts of tax-free investment
and interest income than in reducing the cost capital or increasing
investment opportunities or physical fixed investment in Puerto Rico. The
reinvestment incentive rulings and regulations seem to have been deficient
both substantively and in technical drafting, and also to be inordinately
difficult and burdensome to administer and enforce. Financial institutions
and tax lawyers appear to have taken advantage of the defects of these
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rules. Finally, the tollgate tax seems to be poorly applied. In practice,
possession corporations seem to be able to reduce their tollgate tax
regardless of their rate of profits reinvested in eligible activities or
their rate of repatriation of profits.
U.S. and Puerto Rico's tax exemption laws for possession corporations do not
appear to be effectively targeted toward creating jobs and promoting new
investment. Profit tax exemption provides no direct incentive to achieve
the desired economic development objectives. The effectiveness of the
federal and local tax incentive laws has been dependent on earnings being
produced by additional jobs and investment. To the extent that earnings are
not achieved or delayed, the impact of the incentive is reduced and, to the
extent that initial losses are expected, the effectiveness of the credit as
an incentive to investment is also reduced. Moreover, to the extent that
Puerto Rico exempts all income from U.S. corporations, including income
attributable to intangibles and income from financial investments, the
incentive to create jobs, local income, and new investment in Puerto Rico is
attenuated. These tax exemption laws appear to be more effective in
providing U.S. manufacturing firms enough incentives to generate profits.
Under this approach manufacturing output and income have increased but not
employment, income, and investment opportunities. Instead, manufacturing
income appears to be leaving Puerto Rico to pay royalties, dividends, and
profits to U.S. investors.
In summary, from this research, the following findings were made:
1. As discussed in Section One (Chapters One and Two), the combination of
Puerto Rico and U.S. tax incentives laws has demonstrated to be a highly
complex and less than adequate approach for promoting the economic
development of Puerto Rico. The revision of these laws has demonstrated
that some feature of the tax exemption laws appear to distort investment
incentives. The structure of the tax-exemption laws has become the main
incentives to attract and promote high-technology firms' direct investment
in Puerto Rico. The structure is generally perceived to have three
components: (a) tax-exemption from Puerto Rico's income taxes, (b) tax-
exemption from U.S. income taxes, and (c) virtually tax-free, except for a
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modest tollgate tax on repatriation of earnings. In particular, the ability
of parent companies to repatriate earnings almost tax-free is a major factor
that sets Puerto Rico apart from alternative production locations. Tax-free
is important to industries that have significant research and development
requirements, such as pharmaceutical, electronics, and scientific and
professional instruments. In general, the various amendments appear to be
restricted to restructuring primary provisions of the laws, and little
attention seems to be paid to whether another more effective and less
complicated incentive would be preferable to create jobs, promote new
investment, and increase-income and revenues. Changes are needed in the
present industrial incentive laws, concerning primarily profit tax
exemption, in order to increase employment, income, revenues, and real
investment in Puerto Rico.
2. As analyzed in Section Two (Chapter Three), tax exemption has played a
significant role in shaping the structure of Puerto Rico's economy. Puerto
Rico's experience has revealed that under the current tax exemption
framework, growth of manufacturing output and income would not result in
significant increases in the levels of employment and investment. Profit
tax exemption by itself is unlikely ever to satisfy Puerto Rico's industrial
and economic development needs. Tax exemption is having a low impact on
location decisions for employment-producing investments. The real problem
in Puerto Rico is, however, that if the present trends continue, Puerto
Rico's relative advantage will disappear long before Puerto Rico reaches an
adequate rate of employment and income. Puerto Rico should consider the
fact that profit tax exemption has not been helpful in improving the
employment conditions in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's labor force
participation rates have been low and declining since 1950 (1950, 53.0%;
1960, 45.2%; 1970, 44.5%; and 1987, 43.9%). The unemployment rates have
been and continue to be extremely high (1950, 12.9%; 1960, 13.1%; 1970,
10.3%; and 1987, 17.7%). The percentage of discouraged workers in Puerto
Rico also has been high and is higher now than in previous decades (1950,
47.0%; 1960, 54.8%; 1970, 55.5%; and 1987, 56.1%). (The employment
statistics are presented in Table B.7 in Appendix B.) As Tobin in 1975
said:
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Puerto Rico is pricing itself out of the market for industries
which provide jobs and require little capital. What can be
done? In the longer run, Puerto Rico can "bring the labor up
to the price" by upgrading skills through training programs...
However, there is much evidence that skills and work practices
learned on the job form a large part of the labor training.
These forms of human capital simply will not be developed in
an unskilled worker if he can never find his first job.
... We doubt that the answer lies in extending the period of,
or renewing, the tax exemption status... Innovation in
incentive policy is necessary and welcome. (pp. 24-25).
Moreover, the growth of capital-intensive manufacturing (high-technology)
after 1970 has been intimately related to the industrial program designed to
promote firms based on their profit tax-exemption potential. Despite the
growth in capital-intensive industrial employment between 1970 and 1987, the
total manufacturing share of total employment in Puerto Rico declined.
Also, the growth of high-technology manufacturing has contributed to the
increased investment required to produce a job, and the increased worker
output from each job created. Based on Puerto Rico EDA information (1984),
between 1960 and 1969, the average investment required to produce a job was
about $55,000 and rose to over $148,000 for the period 1975 through 1980
(all expressed in constant 1980 dollars). The increased capital per worker
for the high-technology sector has been reflected by the increase in annual
output per additional worker. It rose from about $32,000 between 1960 and
1969 to about $46,000 between 1975 and 1980. As capital-production began to
dominate manufacturing growth in Puerto Rico, fewer jobs were needed to
produce each $100,000 of additional real manufacturing output.
Industrial employment and workers' earnings, however, have not increased in
concert with manufacturing income. Between 1970 and 1987, total
manufacturing net income, in constant 1954 dollars, grew by almost 143
percent (Puerto Rico Planning Board, 1983; and 1987). The augmented
proportion of manufacturing income after the 1970s is attributable to
increases in capital inputs, intangible assets, and financial assets.
Because capital stock and these assets are mainly owned by U.S. investors, a
significant disparity between the growth of economic activity in Puerto Rico
(measured by GDP) and economic welfare (measured by GNP) emerged.
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The primary reason for this situation is that a significant portion, as
mentioned previously, of the value-added of goods produced in Puerto Rico
was and is paid to the owners of capital and left Puerto Rico's economy.
Combined with the limited vertical integration of Puerto Rico's
manufacturing sector and the resulting small interindustry-linked impacts,
the creation of manufacturing jobs and income produce small multiplier
effects. Few secondary jobs and income have been created. The result is
that industrial development in Puerto Rico is not generating a strong growth
of jobs and locally earned income.
In conclusion, there is.little evidence to support the generally accepted
assumption that by exempting from taxes an industrial segment, output would
increase and would result in employment, income, real fixed investment or
new investment opportunities in Puerto Rico. In fact, tax exemption appears
to attract a profitable industrial segment, but its composition and
contribution to Puerto Rico's economy has changed dramatically during the
development process. The industrial composition of the tax-exempt segment
has been rapidly changing from labor- to capital-intensive industries.
However, new tax-exempt industrial segments have been diminishing their
contribution to Puerto Rico's economic development.
3. The Third Section (Chapters Four to Seven) evaluated the relative impact
of tax-exemption as a reinvestment incentive. This evaluation has shown
that tax exemption as a reinvestment incentive has not resulted in
substantial investment opportunities for new industries in Puerto Rico. The
tax incentive represents an attempt by the Puerto Rico government to use the
financial assets retained in Puerto Rico by possession corporations to
promote local development. The financial investments of possession
corporations ($14.7 billion as of 1986) are enormous for an economy the size
of Puerto Rico (GNP was $15.8 as of 1986).
The series of rulings and regulations that have been designed since 1976 to
channel possession corporation funds into designated reinvestment activities
in Puerto Rico have not accomplished significant positive results. In 1976,
possession corporation funds began to be accumulated in Puerto Rico.
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However, a significantly higher level of real private investment was
financed prior to 1976 than between 1976 to 1986. From 1981 to 1986,
private investment in Puerto Rico was only slightly above the level of 1970.
Moreover, since 1976, most of the fluctuations of total private investment
have been attributed to cyclical changes in inventories. The evidence
suggests that the availability of possession corporation funds has not had a
major impact on Puerto Rico's growth.
Moreover, the reinvestment incentive rules and regulations have not been
able to drive the interest rate down relative to the Eurodollar rate. The
adequate rate of possession corporations to Eurodollar rates is 65 percent
(based on the determination of Puerto Rico Treasury rulings). However, the
rate has been higher than the 65 percent ruling for most years. For
example, the average annual percentage rate between January 1984 to January
1987 was 82.9 percent. Generally, new rules and regulations have an
immediate impact in driving down the interest rate on possession corporation
funds, but their effect is only temporary.
In addition, the annual growth of eligible assets relative to the growth of
possession corporation funds suggests that the rules and regulations have
not been very effective in restricting the use of possession corporation
funds. Commonly, the growth of eligible assets has been equal or almost
equal to the level of total aggregate public and private investment in
Puerto Rico, excluding nonbank financial investments and other sources of
funds also available to finance new gross investment.
The cost of possession corporation funds relative to non-possession
corporation funds in Puerto Rico has been slightly reduced to the largest
banks. The cost of these funds to the largest banks was estimated by the
U.S. Treasury to be about 1 to 1.5 percentage points lower than other funds,
as of 1986. However, it is not clear whether this reduction is passed on to
the end users in the form of lower interest rates. Possession corporations'
bank deposits have not produced, as they are supposed to, a significant
effect in increasing the levels of real investment loans, distributing funds
among banks, and increasing the levels of long-term maturity deposits.
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Also, there is little indication of higher available credit or lower loan
rates as a result of these funds.
Finally, the evidence suggests that the reinvestment incentive rules and
regulations have failed to correct many technical problems and controversial
practices used by possession corporations and eligible financial
institutions, which have lessened their contribution to Puerto Rico's
economic development. Among these practices are: warehousing (investments
in U.S. securities), repurchase agreement transactions (double-counting
eligible activities by banks and possession corporations), conversion of
long-term loans into short-term loans, assets acquired from insolvent banks
(used by the acquiring banks to increase eligible assets even though
eligible assets have not increased in the banking system). Also, arbitrage
(possession corporation funds lent offshore at higher interest rates), end-
of-the-month report (29 days CD yielding a month's tax-exempt interest),
unequal access to funds among financial institutions, and state affiliate
transactions (an artificial entity created in the U.S. to purchase Puerto
Rico government bonds).
4. The last Section, Fourth (Chapters Eight to Ten), evaluated the role of
the tollgate tax. The application of a tollgate tax on repatriation of
industrial development income (IDI) is supposed to act as a fiscal and
economic development mechanism in Puerto Rico. The so-called tollgate tax
rate ranges from zero to ten percent based on the dividend distribution
limitations and the reinvestment incentive requirements. The dividend
distribution limitations and the qualified reinvestment requirements are
defined under the provisions of the IIAs of 1963 and 1978 and by Puerto Rico
Treasury rulings. The-application of the tollgate tax was examined in this
thesis through three case studies, a chemical & pharmaceutical industry, a
scientific & professional instrument industry, and an electronic industry.
The evidence of these case studies suggests that the tollgate tax rules have
been poorly applied. As a result, the rates of tollgate collections,
repatriation of profits, or reinvestment of possession corporations funds
are not necessarily related, as they should be. The poor application of the
202
tollgate tax rules has diluted their expected fiscal and economic result.
Corporations can substantially reduce their tollgate tax regardless of their
rate of profits reinvested in Puerto Rico's economy or of their rate of
repatriation of profits. Moreover, there is a lack of appropriate
regulations and a standard system to monitor a closing agreement. The
corporations have been able to negotiate through the closing agreement all
kinds of adjustments to reduce the payment of t-he tollgate tax or to modify
the dividend distribution limitations and the qualified reinvestment
requirements.
Furthermore, the corporations have been able to satisfy the reinvestment
requirements with activities that are not necessarily eligible activities or
that do not increase real investment in Puerto Rico. In most cases the
portion of industrial profits reinvested is used to finance company
activities, such as cash (time deposits or certificate of deposits), working
capital, securities, accounts receivable, inventory, prepaid assets,
leasehold improvements, or intangible assets. The latter include patents,
trademarks, trade names, and technology, among others; however, these assets
do not necessarily comply with investment requirements in eligible
activities, as defined in Section 2(j) of the 1978 IIA. The tollgate tax
and the reinvestment incentive relative to industrial profits, in short,
clearly do not significantly affect Puerto Rico's economy.
5. As discussed by Taylor in 1957 and reports by the Puerto Rico Economic
Development Administration (EDA) (1985), the institutional framework of tax
exemption in Puerto Rico has a conflict with both the development program
and public policy. Tax-exemption seems to have become a "state of mind" to
a considerable number of public administrators in Puerto Rico. The beliefs
that appear to be prevalent are: on the one hand, the whole development
program would improve the economic conditions by enhancing the location tax
incentives provided to firms. On the other hand, the development program
would collapse without the subsidy or even if changes in the tax incentives
are made (on jobs and/or investment incentives among others). Another
belief is that tax incentives offer real benefits to Puerto Rico because it
is primarily an incentive offered to industries by the U.S. government.
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This belief has contributed to limit the effort to structure an industrial
incentives program more realistic to Puerto Rico's needs. This emphasis in
tax-exemption is a threat if it deflects attention away from the real
problem of developing the necessary foundation for development. The next
part, instead of outlining a set of recommendations to improve the current
laws, policies, and/or program of industrial development and incentives,
will present reasons for profit tax-exemption support.
II. Reasons for Profit Tax Exemption Support
Historically, Puerto Rico's government has preferred profit tax exemption
over other incentives. Its support appears to-be based mainly on three
interrelated policy-issues:
The first, is the belief that the major tax incentive to possession
corporations operating in Puerto Rico is provided by the United States. Tax
exemption is seen as almost costless to Puerto Rico, or it is seen as a
subsidy offered by the U.S. Consequently, the government of Puerto Rico has
been indifferent to the fact that a large percentage of net income in heavy
industry goes to the owner of capital rather than to labor, to finance new
investment, or to increase revenues and income in Puerto Rico. It firmly
believes that income and tax revenues would probably be lost to Puerto Rico,
along with the jobs that are generated, in the absence of tax exemption.
However, the Puerto Rico government should not be indifferent to the
capital-labor ratio of new industries or to the contribution of industries
to revenues, new investment and income. Moreover, it should pay closer
attention to the direct budgetary cost for each job attracted. Also, a
major effort should be made to structure the incentives in order to gain the
maximum number of jobs for each dollar of income sheltered from U.S. taxes.
The second issue is the fear that the U.S. Congress would eliminate or
substitute current Section 936 provisions for an incentive that could be
less beneficial to Puerto Rico than the current incentive. Section 931 and
its successor, Section 936, have been periodically evaluated by the U.S.
Treasury since 1974. The U.S. Treasury has considered that tax incentives
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for possession corporations is U.S. foregone revenue, because it has not
produced significant economic benefits for Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's
government has maintained a defensive position against the U.S. Treasury
evaluation. Its political position has been not to compromise in order to
obtain alternatives or combined approaches to the current tax-credit. They
considered that it is safer to lobby in the U.S. Treasury and Congress for
the unconditional support to the current approach of Section 936 than to
bargain for the unknown.
Finally, there appears to be little appreciation in Puerto Rico that tax
exemption is a perverse, inequitable, and even at times an unethical device.
More than 30 years ago, Taylor (1957) examined whether industrial tax
exemption, in the case of Puerto Rico, was a saint or a sinner, as he called
it. He interviewed top private and government officials in Puerto Rico
about this subject. Taylor found these officials were reluctant to accept
any proposal to improve the program of industrial tax exemption, because
they feared losing the psychological appeal to attract U.S. investments.
This position prevails today.
The support the U.S. government has given to the tax credit for possession
corporations reflects the effective lobbying campaigns promoted by broad-
political groups in Puerto Rico, including the government, the Puerto Rico-
U.S.A. Foundation (representing principal possession corporations operating
in Puerto Rico), the Chamber of Commerce, the Manufacturers' Association,
and the Bankers' Association, among others. Whether the political realities
would permit abandoning the Section 936 basic approach, with respect to
future investments and employment in Puerto Rico in favor of more effective
and less complex incentives, remains to be seen.
The extent to which Puerto Rico's authorities are wedded to the Section 936
approach has been highlighted in the official view in many reports, hearings
and public appearances sponsored by the government. This support derives
much of its strength from the fear that any departure from the historic
exemption-credit system for possession corporations would discourage new
investment in Puerto Rico, if not actually encourage a flight of existing
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investment.
It is important to point-out that the fears of Puerto Rico public and
private officials about the elimination or substitution of Section 936 tax
credits for a less advantageous incentives to a certain degree seem to be
well-founded. The resulting U.S. Treasury recommendations do not deal
adequately with Puerto Rico's economic development problems. The U.S.
Congress should include adequate representation from Puerto Rico if they are
seriously looking for better economic development incentives or if they are
really concerned about finding better solutions to Puerto Rico's needs.
III. Recommendations for Further Research
The U.S. Treasury evaluations of the tax credit for possession corporations
since the mid-1970s have placed Puerto Rico's government on the defensive in
supporting the current Section 936 approach. As a consequence, the Puerto
Rican government has organized almost all financial institutions and
business and industrial organizations in Puerto Rico in support of Section
936 "as is." As a result, a large amount of research has been sponsored by
these interest groups, trying to demonstrate the positive effect of Section
936 on Puerto Rico's economy.
Among the most important studies have been those sponsored by: Puerto Rico
Manufacturing Association (Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, 1985), Puerto Rico
Planning Board (1985), Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration
(EDA) (1985), Citibank of Puerto Rico (1985), Puerto Rico-USA Foundation
(Robert R. Nathan Associates, 1987), and Puerto Rico Bankers' Association
(Estudios Tecnicos, 1988). Despite these studies, one of the most important
research projects needed at this time is to determine by employing industry-
by-industry analysis the economic development effect of possession
corporations in Puerto Rico.
Several of these studies, using an input-output table, have attempted to
estimate the direct and indirect economic effects of possession corporations
operating in Puerto Rico. However, the results of these studies are
unreliable for four reasons:
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(1) Information to determine which industries were operating under Section
936, is not the most accurate. Puerto Rico EDA has organized the industry
list as continental, foreign, and local (see, for example, the analysis
presented by Woodward, 1972, Appendix F). The only official and/or complete
list of possession corporations is controlled exclusively by the U.S.
Treasury (EDA Memorandum of April 1, 1985).
(2) Puerto Rico EDA employment statistics are based on the promises
corporations made when they applied for a tax exemption grant. EDA's most
recent effort to improve the employment data was a survey asking
corporations if they were possession corporations and about their actual
employment level. About 50 percent of the questionnaires were answered.
This information, however, was not helpful in providing a clearer picture of
possession corporations' status and employment by industrial sector (EDA
Memorandum of April 1, 1985).
(3) The multipliers estimated on the basis of these studies are inflated.
Errors of double-counting are found in almost every study. The input-output
tables used by these studies were based on transactions between
establishments, not corporations. Therefore, a shipment from a possession
corporation's bulk chemical plant to its final processing plant would be
recorded as an indirect effect when, in fact, the enterprise's entire
employment is already included in the direct employment levels. Also,
possession corporations in Puerto Rico most likely use other possession
corporations of the same parent company as suppliers (goods and services are
seldom provided by other industries) (U.S. Treasury, 1989, pp. 54-55).
(4) The study sponsored by the Puerto Rico-USA Foundation (Robert R. Nathan
Associates, 1987) recognized the difficulties inherent in using the
multipliers of most of the studies done. This study calculated new
employment multipliers that allegedly do not double count employment.
However, the assertion by Nathan Associates that this study has avoided
double-counting is not properly substantiated. In fact, the U.S. Treasury
(1989) had the following concern about this study:
.Although no suoporting data are provided in this report,
the statement bac ing their findings seems unusual. The
report claims that 936 firms generate employment in non-936
industries by purchasing non-labor inputs locally. The
locally purchased inputs ... are chemicals... However, the
chemical industry in Puerto Rico is composed almost
exclusively of 936 firms, and workers in the chemical
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industry are already counted under direct employment... The
numbers generated by the Nathan report do not seem realistic
in light of these facts.
The methodology used to compute the employment multipliers in
the Nathan report is also seriously flawed leading the
report to overstate multipliers substantially...
The error in their reasoning lies in their failure to
recognize that the input industry is also part-936, part-non-
936... Nathan Associates completely disregarded this
necessary adjustment. Nathan Associates also apparently
adjusted for indirect employment effect resulting from
consumption but did not explain how this was done.
A further memorandum from Fernando Zalacain has not entirely
clarified matters... He claims that if the whole
manufacturing sector were assumed to be 936, the
manufacturing multiplier would only be reduced by 18 percent.
First this is not entirely the plnt ... The 18 percent
reduction also seems modest... It is hoped that Treasury and
Puerto Rican Government staffs will reso]ve these problems
before the next possession report. (pp. 55-56) (Fernando
Zalacain has worked in several Puerto Rico input-output
studies).
Moreover, there are few independent studies about the impact of Section 936,
on an industry-by-industry basis. Independent studies are confronted by
many problems, such as how to get access to reliable information. Most of
Puerto Rico's public and private institutions have classified these data as
highly sensitive. The public and private sectors cannot afford to continue
maintaining this position. Puerto Rico needs accurate data to guide
properly the decision-making process about the future of the industrial
incentives program and to improve the current economic conditions. The
qualified professionals in Puerto Rico who have worked in this field of
inquiry can and should improve their previous studies with adequate support
from public and private institutions.
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APPENDIX A
Puerto Rico System of Industrial
Tax Incentives Since 1948
I. OVERVIEW
Since 1948, Puerto Rico's industrial development program has offered
exemption from federal, local and municipal taxes to attract U.S. capital
and investors.1 The Industrial Incentives Act (IIA) introduced in 1948
played a key role in Puerto Rico's large-scale industrialization program,
which was launched that same year. Afterwards, tax incentives acts have
continued to play a significant role in promoting industrial development in
Puerto Rico.
After the 1948 IIA, there have been three other Acts, in 1954, 1963, and
1978. The main objectives of these IIAs have been to increase employment,
income, and revenues in Puerto Rico by means of providing industrial tax
exemption. There are minor differences among these laws. The most
significant legislative change introduced by these IIAs was to increase the
period of tax exemption as a measure to retain existing corporations and to
attract new firms. In particular, the 1978 IIA added a tollgate or
withholding tax on repatriation of dividend income outside of Puerto Rico.
Tax exemption on dividend income was provided if firms reinvested part of
their retained earnings in Puerto Rico designated eligible activities.
This appendix examines the Puerto Rico IIAs of 1948, 1954, 1963, 1978 and
their respective legislative changes. The tax exemption statute has been
contained under these Acts since 1948. This statute serves as a logical
basis for examining whether legislative changes have been effective in
attracting manufacturing industries and in increasing employment, income,
and revenues in Puerto Rico.
II. Impact of Industrial Incentives Acts Since 1948
Here, the four acts from 1948, 1954, 1963, and 1978 will be reviewed.
A. Puerto Rico Industrial Incentives Act of 1948
The stated objective of the 1948 IIA was to promote industrial development
by providing tax exemption to certain industrial sectors. 2 Provisions of
this IIA also exempted commercial and tourist hotels, but these were of
minor importance when compared to the emphasis given in the statute to
industrial development.3
Eligibility for manufacturing was exclusive in the sense that only two broad
segments of this industry may qualify for tax exemption, (1) producers of
any article that was not being manufactured on January, 1947, and for which
facilities were not available on this same date for commercial production,
such as wearing apparel and processed food products,4 and, (2) as a
supplement to this primary area 42 industries that were in existence on May
12, 1947, were singled-out for special treatment.5
In other words, tax exemption was restricted to items not produced on a
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commercial scale in Puerto Rico prior to 1948 and to certain other specified
items, such as wearing apparel and processed food products. The rationale
of exempting from taxes a select group of existing industries was to
stimulate particular areas of manufacturing that were embryonic in their
development but were considered to have a potential for expansion. Thus,
the production of artificial flowers was included, but the rum industry was
excluded from the selected list.
Through either statutory directive or administrative policy, existing firms
in the list of designated industries may receive tax exemption as soon as
the first new eligible firm begins to operate.6 The IIA exempts only a part
of manufacturing and, therefore, its favorite part. Exemption is granted to
producers of new articles, as well as to both new and old producers of
certain articles previously manufactured in Puerto Rico. Broadly speaking,
it appears that the basic objective is to exempt all U.S. firms that would
be interested in starting a business in Puerto Rico, but at the same time to
maintain all well-established manufacturing industries on a taxable basis. 7
Tax exemption in Puerto Rico is virtually complete for the exempt firms (at
least insofar as residents of Puerto Rico were concerned) through a
combination of the basic exemption act and other supplementary legislation.
The 1948 IIA provided exemption from three major tax levies:
(1) an income-tax exemption, which included, (a) individual, corporate, or
partnership income;8 (b) dividend or profit distribution made by residents
of Puerto Rico, and to those nonresidents that were not taxable elsewhere on
the same income;9 and (c) income received from the lease of real property
that is used by an exempt firm.10
(2) a property-tax exemption that covered both the municipal and the central
government levies and includes: (a) property employed in the development,
organization, construction, establishment, and operation of an exempt
business; 1  and (b) real property leased to an exempt firm.'12
(3) an exemption that applied to all municipal levies, such as licenses,
fees, and excises.13
These three exemption fields were then supplemented by several relief
measures provided by separate legislation. Excise taxes levies by the
central government were removed from: (1) machinery, apparatus, and
equipment essential to the establishment and operation of industrial
plants;1 4 (2) raw materials;1 5 (3) goods transferred from one manufacturer
to another or to an agent for shipment outside of Puerto Rico;1 6 and (4)
industrial safety equipment.17 Property tax exemption was also supplemented
by exempting three further categories: (1) personal property brought to
Puerto Rico to be processed or assembled and then shipped outside of Puerto
Rico;1 8 (2) products improved through aging or storing;1 9 and (3) raw
materials in the hands of either the producer or distributor.20
The statute provided a 12-year period of full exemption form July 1, 1947,
to June 30, 1959, with an additional three years of partial exemption until
the expiration of the act on June 30, 1962.21 During the final three years,
the amount of exemption was graduated downward as follows: fiscal years,
1959-60, 75 percent; 1960-61, 50 percent; and 1961-62, 25 percent. 22 There
was an important effect stemming from having this fixed expiration date,
variable periods of exemption were provided for each grantee, depending on
the date of each particular petition for a grant.
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In the early 1950s, many manufacturing firms established plants in Puerto
Rico to benefit from the tax holiday. Apparel was the fastest growing
industry, but shoes and other leather goods and assembly of mechanical,
electrical, and electronic devices were also important. However, by 1954,
the provisions for 1959-61 phase-out had reduced the incentive for new
industries to establish operations in Puerto Rico. Also, it was becoming
less attractive for existing industries to expand or to continue operation
after the tax-exemption period expired. In other words, the act was not
effective in attracting industries as the expiration date approached. These
factors helped to create the conditions for introducing the 1954 IIA.
B. Puerto Rico Industrial Incentives Act of 1954
The 1954 IIA (Act No. 6 of December 15, 1953) modified the dispositions of
expiration of the previous IIA No. 184 of May 13, 1948. This law provided
income tax exemptions to promote industries, as well as exemptions on
patents, excise taxes, and municipal taxes for a period of 10 years from the
date of beginning operations. Also, this law permitted under its
dispositions, the conversion of businesses already covered by the previous
IIA. Under conversion, firms that began operations between 1948-59, were
provided 10 years of tax exemption regardless of the date of each particular
petition for a grant.
This IIA was introduced to increase the attractiveness of tax exemption by
offering a 10-year tax exemption period for new applicants. Because some of
the established firms in Puerto Rico were approaching the end of their tax
holidays, the 1954 IIA sought to limit the ability of an old firm to obtain
a new grant.. If a firm received a new grant of tax exemption for a product
produced under an old grant, the new grant would be terminated if the level
of output in the predecessor operation was reduced. In addition, plant,
equipment, and other property that had been used in the production of an
exempted product could not be used by another enterprise to produce a
similar product. However, both prohibitions were weakened in 1959, and the
Governor had the power to waive them if he deemed it to be in the public
interest.
This law also provided 5 to 10 years of tax exemption on real and personal
property, depending of the total amount of the industrial investment (five
years of tax exemption for investment of less than $1 million, an extra year
of tax exemption for every $2 million of additional investment, up to a
maximum of 10 years of tax exemption), plus a tax exemption period of 7
years for dividends.
Furthermore, in 1961, an amendment to this law was introduced to give the
government the opportunity of designating a special zone of scarce
industrial development. Firms operating in this special zone could opt to
have three additional years of tax exemption, for a total of 13 years of tax
exemption. In fact, designated periods of tax exemption by development
zones has been considered the most important change in the legislation that
was introduced under the 1963 IIA.
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C. Puerto Rico Industrial Incentives Act of 1963
On June 13, 1963, Law No. 57, known as "the Puerto Rico Tax Incentives Act
of 1963" was approved. This law continued, in general terms, under the
provisions of the previous IIA (Law No. 6 of 1954.). This law was created
not only to increase the level of industrial employment, income, and
revenues, but also to promote decentralization of firms; to promote firms
with local capital; to attract firms who pay high salaries; and to establish
industries that help integrate the economic activity in Puerto Rico. 2 3
The most important changes introduced under this IIA were : (1) To provide
tax exemption based on the level of development of the zone where firms were
located. This law defined three periods of tax exemption; they correspond
to three designated development zones:
TABLE A.1
1963 DESIGNATED DEVELOPMENT ZONES AND PERIODS OF TAX EXEMPTION
Designated Development Zone Period of Tax Exemption
High Development Zone 10 - Year Period
Outside Development Zone 12 - Year Period
Scarce Development Zone 17 - Year Period
Source: Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration
(2) To apply full tax exemption to income, dividends, and to real property
(the previous law allowed tax exemption on dividends up to 7 years, and 5 to
10 years for real property): and (3) Under this IIA, firms could opt to
postpone the beginning date of their tax-exemption period up to two years
later after the fixed day of starting operations, or within such a period.
The only requirement was formally to notify the responsible agency.
D. Amendments to the Industrial Incentives Act of 1963
There were about 44 amendments under this IIA between 1963-78. Most of the
legislative changes were related to previous amendments on this Law. Among
these changes were:
First, firms were provided a more flexible period of tax exemption as part
of the program of decentralizing industries. Among the provisions were, (1)
Two extensions of the expiration date of the 17-year tax exemption period
for firms operating in the scarce development zone. The expiration date was
first extended until 1971.24 Then, it was amended to expire in 1983.25 (2)
Creation of an additional development zone which provided a 15-year period
of industrial tax exemption.26 (3) Revisions of the period of tax exemption
to 10, 15, 25, and 30 years for the designated development zones are
illustrated in Table A.2.
Also, existing firms operating under regulations of previous provisions were
granted the remaining tax-exempt years, which corresponded to the tax
exemption period assigned to the development zone where these corporations
were located. In addition, firms located in the "high industrial
development zone" were permitted to transfer their operations to other less
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or scarce development zones in exchange for more years of tax exemption. 27
TABLE A.2
1963-1978 REVISED DESIGNATED DEVELOPMENT ZONES AND PERIOD OF TAX EXEMPTION
---------------------------------------------------------------
Designated Development Zone Period of Tax Exemption
High Development Zone 10 - Year Period
Outside High Development Zone 15 - Year Period
Less Development Zone 25 - Year Period
Scarce Development Zone 30 - Year Period
----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration
Second, tax exemption or additional years of tax exemption were provided to
several industries, among these provisions were: (1) Tax exemption was
provided for export and transport of distilled spirits to the United
States.28 ' (2) Tax exemption was given to "joint ventures or partnerships"
as eligible entities with equal conditions and benefits to those offered to
corporations or individuals. 29 (3) Extension of 5 years of tax exemption
was given to the textile and apparel industries until 1978.30 (4) Existing
firms were offered the option of having a double period of partial tax
exemption, or to continue with their fixed tax-exemption period.31
Third, several provisions were introduced, where (1) firms could postpone
their tax exemption period up to four years from the date of starting
operations (two years were granted by the law, plus a two year option was
added), and (2) firms were provided the option to begin their period of
property tax exemption before the beginning date of their income-tax-
exemption period.32
Fourth, under this law, new positions were created to authorize management
discretion in the administration of the tax-exemption statute. Among these
new provisions were, (1) To provide the Administration of the tax-exemption
program the power to design "flexible management criteria" to help firms to
qualify for tax exemption.33 (2) To give the Governor the discretion to
approve "participation criteria" to be applied to tax-exempt firms'
interest income. 34 (3) In 1973, a provision was created forbidding the
Governor from providing industrial tax exemption on a discretionary basis, 35
however, in 1975 it was amended to allow the Governor's discretion again. 36
Fifth, in 1973 and 1974, Puerto Rico's economy entered a recession, and the
government experienced difficulties financing a large deficit. In 1973,
Section 2(j) was added to the 1954 and 1963 IIA to encourage U.S. tax-exempt
manufacturing corporations to reinvest a portion of their earnings in Puerto
Rico.3 7 This section extended the benefits of tax exemption to interest,
rent and dividends earned on funds derived from tax-exempt corporations that
were reinvested in specified eligible assets. Principal among these assets
were certificates of deposit in qualifying banking institutions. Banks
receiving these exempt deposits were in turn required to reinvest such funds
in Puerto Rican government obligations and loans to Puerto Rican businesses.
This provision imposed a 15 percent tollgate tax (or withholding tax) on
dividends paid out of Puerto Rican income from hotels, manufacturing, and
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shipping to any corporation without significant business of its own in
Puerto Rico, but only if that nonresident parent corporation could claim a
foreign tax credit for the tollgate tax.38 Because such dividends were
fully taxable to the parent company under U.S. tax law in effect until 1967,
whereas a liquidating distribution was free of both U.S. and Puerto Rican
tax, firms did not ordinarily pay dividends, the existence of the Puerto
Rican tollgate tax was rarely applicable, and the-foreign tax credit was
little used.
E. Pre-1978 Puerto Rican Industrial Incentives Act
In 1976, the creation of a new IIA, to simplify the structure of the 1963
and 1954 IIA, was suggested. The proposed legislation kept the general
concepts of the previous IIA. However, the legislative proposal was not
considered by the Puerto Rican legislature. Although additional changes to
the 1963 and 1954 IIA occurred.
In the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1967, congress allowed O.S. parent companies a
dividends-received deduction from their possession corporations, but denied
a foreign tax credit for Puerto Rico or other taxes imposed on the
dividends. This provision was supposed to stimulate the repatriation of
possession corporations accumulated profits in Puerto Rico to the U.S.3 9
Under pre-1976 laws, the denial of the foreign tax credit would have
exempted the dividend from the tollgate tax.
In 1976, anticipating the passage of Section 936 and the other federal
provisions related to possession corporations, Puerto Rico modified the so-
called tollgate tax in two important ways:40 (1) The rate was reduced from
15 to 10 percent, and (2), the tax became applicable to U.S. shareholders,
even though they were denied a foreign tax credit.41 The two changes taken
together had the effect of subjecting dividends paid to nonresident U.S.
parent corporations to a 10 percent Puerto Rican tax. Although the tax rate
seemed low, the potential source of dividends included not only new income
earned under section 936, but also earnings accumulated under previous
Sections (Section 931). However, the 10 percent tollgate rate instituted in
1976 remains, and the effective rate has been subsequently reduced by a
series of five amendments and rulings. Among them are:
(1) Dividends paid out of accumulated possession corporations industrial
development income (IDI) earned in tax years beginning prior to September
30, 1976, are subject to a tollgate tax of seven percent rather than 10
percent, if not more than 25 percent of the balance at the beginning of any
year is paid out and a matching 25 percent is reinvested for 12 months in
Puerto Rico.
(2) Dividends paid out of possession corporations' IDI earned in tax years
subsequent to October 1, 1976 are subject to a tollgate tax of seven percent
if not more than 75 percent of a given years income is paid out and if at
least 25 percent of such income is reinvested in Puerto Rico for a period of
more than eight years.
(3) Dividends paid out of interest on investment in government obligations
are exempt from tollgate tax. If the government obligation is held for at
least eight years, the principal may also be distributed exempt from
tollgate tax.
231
(4) A credit (made not later than March 31, 1977) equal to three percent of
a new investment in buildings and other structures used in manufacturing is
allowed against the tollgate tax.
(5) On liquidation, a firm with an old tax-exemption grant may distribute
all accumulated earnings free of the tollgate tax.
In December of 1977, the Puerto Rican Treasury Department issued guidelines
regarding the tax treatment on dividends paid out of income earned outside
of Puerto Rico (e.g. Eurodollar investments of possession corporations).
Under these regulations, a dividend may be paid out of the foreign source
portion without imposition of a tollgate tax if: (1) a firm has both
undistributed earnings from Puerto Rico and earnings from foreign sources,
and (2) an equal amount is distributed out of the Puerto Rican source
portion. This means that the tollgate tax in these instances will be
imposed on only 50 percent of the total distribution, thereby, reducing the
effective tax rate.
These provisions introduced between 1973-77 formally became significant
parts of the 1978 IIA. Additional changes to these provisions have occurred
under this new Act since 1978.
F. Puerto Rico Industrial Incentives Act of 1978
In 1977, the Governor of Puerto Rico appointed a commission to study the
industrial tax exemption program. Out of that commission's work came the
1978 IIA. Under this new legislation, the rate of tollgate tax on dividends
paid by exempt-firms is reduced if firms reinvest specified portions of
their earnings in designated assets. Also, this new IIA replaced 100
percent tax exemption for new firms and permitted established tax-exempt
corporations to elect to move to a partial tax-exempt status. This law
affects both the terms of new grants and of old grants. In order to
simplify the criteria for taxation of firms operating under old and new
grants, the 1978 IIA presented four definitions: (1) New Exemption Grants,
(2) Conversion of Old Exemption Grants, (3) Old Exemption Grants, and (4)
Nonexempt Corporations.
(1) New Exemption Grants issued under the 1978 IIA: These grants provided
90 percent exemption from income and property tax in the first five years of
a firm's operation, and a gradually decreasing rate of exemption during each
subsequent five-year period until the expiration of the grant (see Table
A.1). The duration of a firm's grant will vary from 10 to 25 years,
depending upon the location of its plant.
The actual effective rates will be somewhat lower than those shown because
of two additional incentives provided by the 1978 IIA to encourage labor-
intensive operations and assist small firms. All grants issued under the
new IIA allow the firm to deduct five percent of production worker payroll
from its manufacturing income, up to 50 percent of such income. As an
alternative to the payroll deduction, a firm whose profits are less than
$500,000 in any given year is allowed a 100 percent tax exemption on the
first $100,000.
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TABLE A.3
TAX EXEMPTION PERIODS, PERCENTAGE OF EXEMPTION, AND EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
Years of : Percentage of Exemption : Effective Tax Rate on
Exemption : From Income and Property : Income Derived From
Tax : Manufacturing
Minimum : Maximum
1-5 90% 2.20% 4.50%
6-10 75 5.50 11.25
11-15 65 8.75 15.75
16-20 55 8.90 20.25
21-25 50 11.00 22.50
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
If a tax-exempt firm reinvests all or part of its earnings in Puerto Rico
2(j) assets, then dividends, interest, and rents derived from those assets
will be 100 percent exempt from income tax. The intent of the tax exemption
under 2(j) is to induce possession corporations to reinvest their business
earnings in Puerto Rico. However, the main incentive for a firm to retain
its earnings in Puerto Rico arises from the tollgate tax provisions of the
new 1978 IIA, as follows:
(a) Dividends paid out of income earned by a tax-exempt business are subject
to a tollgate tax of five percent, provided that 50 percent of such income
is invested for five years in Section 2(j) assets (designated eligible
activities) or in the firms own capital assets, and not more than 10 percent
of the net income is distributed in each of the succeeding five years. The
50 percent of income reinvested during this period can be repatriated after
the fifth year.
(b) On liquidation, undistributed earnings are subject to a tollgate tax of
four percent, rather than 10 percent, provided that 50 percent of such
earnings have been invested in the firm's own capital assets or in Section
2(j) designated assets for a period of at least five years.
(2) Old Exemption Grant converted to the 1978 IIA: The election to convert
old tax exemption grants to partial tax exemption under the new IIA had to
be made by December 31, 1979, and two optional conversion plans were
available:
Option One: During the years remaining until the end of the existing grant,
the exempted business will pay a minimum effective rate tax from three
percent to 12 percent of income, with the higher rate applicable to a firm
which has fewer years left on its original grant (see Table A.2). After the
period of original exemption has expired, the firm electing this option will
be automatically entitled to operate partially exempt from taxation for 10
or more years. During the first five of those 10 years, 50 percent of
income will be exempt. During the second five years, between 35 and 50
percent will be exempt, depending on the location of the plant.
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TABLE A.4
OLD EXEMPTION GRANTS CONVERTED TO 1978 IIA - OPTION ONE
Years Left On Exemption Maximum Effective
Original Grant Percentages Tax Rate
0-4 Years 73.3 % 12.0 %
5-8 Years 77.7 % 10.0 %
9-12 Years 85.5 % 6.5 %
13-16 Years 90.0 % 4.5 %
17-20 Years 91.0 % 4.0 %
More than 20 years 93.3 % 3.0 %
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
Option Two: A company with six or more years remaining on its current tax
exemption may make an alternative election. It may exclude 90 percent of
its income from taxation, and credit two thirds of the corporate income
taxes actually paid against the tollgate tax on dividends paid from current
earnings. A company that elects that second option may apply for the 10
year extension when the current grant expires, but the extension will not be
automatic.
As a further inducement for firms to convert to partial tax exemption, the
1978 IIA provides that under either conversion option, a firm may credit
tollgate taxes paid on distribution from pre-1978 earnings against the
income taxes due in future years, up to 50 percent of such liability in any
given year. In addition, dividend payments by "converted" firms may benefit
from a reduced tollgate tax rate, as follows:
(a) Pre-1973 earnings may be distributed subject to a four percent tollgate
tax, provided that only 50 percent of such amounts are distributed in a
given year, and not more than 10 percent of such earnings are distributed in
each of the succeeding five years. Dividends paid out of income earned
after 1972, but before 1980, are subject to a tollgate tax of four percent
(depending upon the year in which the income was earned) provided that 50
percent of such income is invested for five years in the firm's own capital
assets or in assets designated in Section 2(j) of Puerto Rico IIA,42 and
not more than 10 percent of such earnings are distributed in each of the
succeeding five years.
(b) On liquidation, pre-1978 earnings of "converted" firms are exempted from
tollgate tax.
(3) Taxation under an Old exemption Grant: In general, a firm which has a
tax exemption grant under the 1963 IIA is 100 percent exempt from tax on
business income and investment income (or IDI) from certain designated
assets.43
The assets which give rise to tax-exempt investment income, generally known
as Section 2(j) assets, include Puerto Rico bonds, loans for construction of
buildings or acquisition of equipment used by a tax- exempt business,
mortgages insured by the Puerto Rico Housing Bank and Finance Agency, and
certificates of deposits in certain banks doing business in Puerto Rico.
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Banks receiving these tax-exempt deposits are required to reinvest the funds
in Puerto Rico, although this requirement was not strictly enforced until
1980.44
The firm is also 100 percent exempt from property and gross receipt taxes.
The duration of the tax-exemption grant, which depends on the municipality
of Puerto Rico in which the firm locates its plant, ranges from 10 to 30
years.
(4) Taxation of Nonexempt Corporations: Although possession corporations
operating in Puerto Rico normally hold an exemption contract, others,
including nonmanufacturing corporations generally do not qualify for an
exemption. -
In the absence of a tax-exemption grant, Puerto Rico taxes all Puerto Rico
source income earned by U.S. and foreign persons (including corporations),
and taxes the worldwide income of all Puerto Rico residents and firms.
Corporate income tax rates are graduated, ranging from 22 percent for
taxable income under $25,000, to 45 percent for taxable income in excess of
$300,000. Gross income and allowable deductions are defined in much the
same way as under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (IRC); however, the Puerto
Rican tax code contains "flexible depreciation" provisions which permit tax
payers to cover the cost of "qualifying property" in any taxable year of
years chosen by the taxpayer, up to a limit of 50 percent of net income,
without regard to the useful life of the property. Generally, property
acquired for use in agriculture, shipping, construction, manufacturing, or
hotels qualifies for flexible depreciation.
These conditions and rules apply not only to firms with pre-1978 exemption
grants, but also to firms with grants issued under the 1978 IIA.
G. Amendments to the Puerto Rico Industrial Incentives Act of 1978
In 1986 the 1978 IIA was modified, six legislative changes were introduced:
(1) To provide a 100 percent tax break to qualified companies, instead of a
partial tax exemption as provided by the 1978 IIA. Full tax exemption was
eliminated with the introduction of this IIA in 1978.
(2) Under the 1978 provisions of this law, the industrial tax-exemption rate
gradually declined. Although these provisions were amended in 1986 to offer
a uniform 90 percent tax-exemption rate that would remain constant during
the 10, 15, or 20 year lifespan of the exemption.
(3) Additional tax-exemption benefits to firms were provided. Companies
could also receive additional tax benefits if they qualify for a special
wage deduction based on the size of the company payroll. Firms received a
15 percent deduction which would exceed by 10 percent this type of benefit
offered under the provisions of 1978.
(4) In special cases the Governor could declare a zone or town as highly
underdeveloped areas for the period of one year through an executive order.
In that case, the 90 percent exemption could be offered for 25 years to the
companies that establish plants in those areas. Under the 1978 provisions,
only those firms establishing operations on the island municipalities of
Culebra and Vieques qualify for a 25-year tax exemption.
(5) In designated special cases, corporations could enjoy a full tax
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exemption (100 percent) or the wage credit would also increase to 40
percent.
(6) Since 1986 a special benefit for companies that purchase local machinery
and raw material is provided by means of offering a tax credit against the
tollgate taxes firms have to pay when they repatriate profits to the
mainland.
Conclusions
The basic objective of the tax incentive laws since 1948 has been to provide
a temporary period of tax exemption to new firms that would continue
operating after the fixed-period ended. The intention underlying this
objective was to attract a large and diverse industrial base. Consequently,
the development of this industrial base is supposed to increase employment
opportunities and contribute to generate revenue (through the industrial
income tax) in Puerto Rico. However, Puerto Rico IIA since 1948 appeared to
be more effective in attracting U.S. tax exempt investors than to retain
them on a taxable basis. Also, there is little evidence of whether longer
periods or the extension of the tax-exemption period have continued to
increase employment and income in Puerto Rico.
Changes in tax-exemption regulations since 1948 have primarily extended the
periods of income-tax exemption to new and existing corporations.
Generally, tax legislation changes have provided longer periods of tax
exemption to new firms and, also, have facilitated the established and most
profitable firms to extend indefinitely their period of tax exemption.
The law of 1948 offered a 10 year fixed-period of industrial tax exemption,
from 1948 to 1959. The 1954 IIA provided a 10-year industrial tax-exemption
period starting from the day when a firm began operations. Under the laws
of 1963 and 1978, corporations' tax-exemption periods ranged from 10-30
years, depending on the location of the firm. Moreover, Puerto Rico IIAs
since 1948 have contained a provision of limited existence, although, tax
exemption has been extended and it has become permanent. The tax-exemption
law of 1948 was supposed to end in 1959. The original tax exemption of the
1963 IIA was supposed to terminate in 1973. Then it was amended in 1971 to
end in 1983. The 1978 IIA did not include this provision.
Puerto Rico's IIA since 1948 have primarily emphasized on maximizing profits
for U.S. firms operating under Section 931/936 of the U.S. IRC. The IIA
have provided almost complete tax exemption for most mainland firms that
undertake manufacturing in Puerto Rico. This breadth of the coverage is a
distinguishing characteristic of the tax subsidy as compared to the usual
type of tax exemption in the U.S., for it not only covers all major taxes on
the operation of a business, but also the distribution of earnings.
The full significance of these exemptions may be appreciated when it is
realized that the Puerto Rican income tax for the most part, is a full
substitute for the United States tax. Thus, freedom from Puerto Rico means
virtual relief from taxation. The tax incentive has applied not only to
business organizations, whether operated as an individual ownership,
partnership, or corporation, but also to profit distributions under the
individual income tax for residents of Puerto Rico.
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Thus, the effectiveness of industrial tax-exemption principally stems from
the combination of the United States and Puerto Rico's statutory provisions.
Generally, the structure of Puerto Rico's IIA since 1948 has been designed,
in most part, to provide U.S. investors, operating under Sections 931/936,
the highest degree of tax minimization. As a result, income-tax exemption
predominates as a single most important incentive to attract United States
industrial investors to Puerto Rico; however, the degree to which these tax-
exemption incentives may be exploited by U.S. investors, in most cases,
appear to vary with the skills of tax attorneys, the specific cases, and the
duration of the present statutory and administrative rulings.
Since 1948, the tax-exemption legislation in Puerto Rico has provided that
the gross income of a U.S corporation derived from operations in Puerto Rico
is excluded from federal taxation by satisfying the "foreign source income
tests" required for U.S. corporations under Section 931/936 of the IRC.
Puerto Rican laws have established that tax exempt corporations are excluded
from federal taxes if income payments are not actually received in the
United States and that there is compliance with two operating conditions.
The first condition requires that 80 percent of the gross income of the
United States corporation for the three year period immediately preceding he
close of the taxable year (or for such part of the period during which
business was actively conducted) be derived from sources within a possession
of the United States. The second requirement is that 50 percent or more of
a corporations gross income must be derived from the active conduct of a
trade or business within a possession of the United States.
Essentially, the use of Section 931/936, by a corporate subsidiary operating
-under Puerto Rican tax-incentive laws, have provided that the U.S. parent
corporation can realize profits free of both U.S. and Puerto Rico taxes
through either: (1) liquidation of the subsidiary or (2) by accumulating tax
exempt profits.
Until 1976, the IIA of 1948, 1954, and 1963, stated that in the realization
of current earnings through dividends, the profit distribution of any tax-
exempt firm was exempt to the recipient only if paid to residents of Puerto
Rico. This provision also applied to nonresidents who were not obligated to
pay in any jurisdiction outside Puerto Rico, any tax on income derived by
them from any source in Puerto Rico.
This provision helped U.S. investors operating under Section 931 to reduce
their federal income tax payments. U.S. residents and corporations were
obligated to pay a federal tax on income derived from Puerto Rico. They
were subject to a withholding tax of 29 percent on profit distributions of
tax-exempt firms. When the parent corporations on the Mainland received
dividends from corporations operating in Puerto Rico, there were no
provisions for the usual 85 percent dividend credit.
U.S. corporate shareholders of a Section 931 corporation subsidiary were
able to claim a credit for the 29 percent tollgate tax against their United
States tax. As a net result,.the total federal tax rate imposed on
dividends was approximately 20 percent less than in the case of earnings
derived from an ordinary subsidiary.
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United States citizens who established residence in Puerto Rico have been
excluded from federal taxation of income from sources within Puerto Rico.
Individuals who were bona fide residents of Puerto Rico throughout an entire
taxable year could realize fully tax-free dividends from their exempt
businesses. They might then, under federal law, exclude all income from
sources within Puerto Rico from their gross taxable income.
The IIAs have provided U.S. investors exclusion from local taxes; moreover,
profits of a tax exempt firm may also be retained and paid out at the
convenience of residents stockholders because under the federal law, taxes
apply only to earnings from United States sources. Puerto Rico IIAs have
allowed, however, the tax free distributions of accumulated earnings. Bona
fide residents of Puerto Rico would also not be subject to the United States
tax on the liquidation of a Puerto Rican corporation.
For corporations under Section 931, in the absence of Puerto Rico residence
status, the potential of the tax-exemption program may be maximized by
retaining profits rather than distributing dividends, and either by
liquidating the tax-exempt firm or by selling stocks after the accumulation
of surplus. Puerto Rico IIAs have provided for the full exemption of
proceeds resulting from the sale or exchange of shares on or before the
termination of the exemption period for either individual or corporate
shareholders.
Also, nonresident individual stockholders had the advantage of retaining
earnings tax-free for the duration of the tax-exemption period, and they
could repatriate profits at the lower rate on capital gains. Under federal
tax legislation, corporations, may repatriate accumulated profits free of
United States taxes through liquidation. Thus, the profits from Puerto Rico
corporations may be transferred to U.S. free of federal tax. The transfers
are accepted if the approval of the Puerto Rican Tax Commissioner is
obtained certifying that the liquidation does not constitute part of a plan
to avoid taxes.
In 1976, Section 936 substituted Section 931 of the IRC. This new Section
permitted dividend distribution of a U.S. firm subsidiary free from federal
taxes. In other words, tax-exempt corporations may repatriate their
accumulated earnings if desired. They did not have to wait for the tax-free
distribution of dividends until the liquidation of their operations in
Puerto Rico. However, in 1976, a tollgate tax on the repatriation of
profits was introduced which imposed a Puerto Rico tax of 10 percent to U.S.
corporations.
After 1976, a reduction of the tollgate tax-rate has taken place. In 1978,
a new IIA in Puerto Rico was introduced. This law modified several prior
provisions. Under the 1978 IIA, the tollgate tax could range between zero
to 10 percent on repatriation to U.S. of tax-exempt profits. On
liquidation, firms have to pay a tax rate on their accumulated profits of
less than four percent. The percentage of tollgate taxes depend on the rate
of reinvestment of half of the firms accumulated profits on designated
assets.
Designated assets include a firm's working capital, deposits in Puerto Rican
238
banks, Puerto Rican government bonds, mortgages insured by the Puerto Rican
Housing and Finance Agency, and loans or other guaranteed mortgage bonds
executed by any government pension or retirement plan.
The list of designated assets was expanded to include investment of earnings
in the company's own business or in paying off its own debt. In addition,
dividends paid out of income from interest on designated Puerto Rican assets
are exempt from the tollgate tax. Also, a credit equal to three percent of
new investment (made later than March 31, 1977 or the second year of tax
exemption) in buildings and other structures used in manufacturing is
allowed against the tollgate tax.
However, under the 1978 IIA, firms operating under tax-exemption grants
prior to 1976, could pay a substantially reduced tollgate tax for immediate
repatriation of accumulated profits. This law did not change former tax
exemption commitments, but it provided incentives to firms operating under
"old" full tax exemption commitments to "convert" to partial tax-exemption
under the 1978 IIA. New grants will exempt from tax only a declining
fraction of income; however, when the original grants expires, the company
may apply for a 10-year extension. If the extension is granted, and it most
probably will be, the period of tax exemption and the exact percentage of
tax exemption depends on the location of the firm in Puerto Rico.
In 1986, partial income tax-exemption periods for manufacturing operations
were replaced from the 1978 IIA. Instead, a fixed period of tax exemption
was established. Also, 100 percent industrial tax-exemption was reinstated
in 1986.
Even, under the least favorable circumstances, Puerto Rico IIAs have 
been
designed to assure eligible mainland investors tax savings which appear to
be financially appealing; while under the most advantageous circumstances,
virtually complete tax avoidance is possible both during the process of
earning income and when profits are realized. These features of the IIA
establish the legislation as the most comprehensive tax inducement ever
devised in an area intimately related politically and economically to the
United States.
Basically, tax-exemption laws in Puerto Rico have been designed to take
maximum advantage of the U.S. tax exemption legislation. The tax incentives
laws have changed when the federal tax-exemption provisions have changed,
and any change of the federal tax-exemption rules could alter the whole tax
exemption legislation of Puerto Rico. Thus, the Puerto Rican structure of
industry, would be different without the existence of federal tax-exemption
for possession corporations.
Endnotes to Appendix A.1:
1. Federal tax exemption will be examined in Chapter Two of this thesis.
2. The IIA of 1948 is known as Law No. 184 of May 13, 1948. This Act was a
technical revision of the Act No. 347 of May 13, 1947.
3. (Sections 1[e][f] and 2[d]), No. 184 Act, May 13, 1948.
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4. Section 2[a), Act No. 184, May 13, 1948.
5. These firms constituted about one-half of the manufacturing industries
operating on that date, Sections 2[b] and 2[c], Act No. 184, May 13, 1948.
6. New firms eligible as designated industries were exempt under Section
2(b) and existing firms under Section 2(c) of Act No. 184 of May 13, 1948.
7. Milton C. Taylor, Industrial Tax-Exemption in Puerto Rico: A Case Study
in the Use of Tax Subsidies for Industrializing Underdeveloped Areas, The
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1957, p. 22.
8. Section 4[a], Act No. 184, May 13, 1948.
9. Section 6[a] [11 [21, Act No. 184, May 13, 1948.
10. Section 12, Act No. 184, May 13, 1948.
11. Section 4(a] [1], Act No. 184, May 13, 1948.
12. Section 12, Act No. 184, May 13, 1948.
13. Section 4(a] (3], Act No. 184, May 13, 1948.
14. Act No. 77 of 1944, as amended by Act No. 436 of 1947 and Act No. 195 of
May 7, 1949.
15. Act No. 61 of May 5, 1945.
16. Act No. 84 of May 8, 1945.
17. Act No. 139 of May 9, 1945.
18. Act No. 45 of May 2, 1945.
19. Act No. 53 of May 5, 1945.
20. Act No. 61 of May 5, 1945.
21. Section 5, Act 184 of May 13, 1948.
22. The IIA was not clear as to whether the reduced percentages of exemption
in the years 1959-60 to 1961-62 were to be applied to the tax base or to the
tax itself.
23. Statement of Motives, Act No. 57 of 1963.
24. Law # 127 of June 28, 1966.
25. Law # 123 of June 30, 1971. Originally, the Tax Incentives Act # 57
expired in June 30, 1973. The Act # 123 of June 30, 1971 extended the
expiration date until June 30, 1983.
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25. Law # 100 of June 27, 1969, Section 1(r).
27. Law # 147 of June 23, 1974.
28. Law # 18 of May 16, 1975.
29. Law # 155 of June 28, 1968.
30. Law # 178 of June 24, 1974.
31. Law # 99 of June 27, 1969, Section 1(q).
32. Law # 210 of July 24, 1974, Section 1 (1).
33. Law # 19 of 1972, 2(e)(35) and 2(e)(36)
34. Law # 3 of March 26, 1970, Section 8.
3s. Law # 106 of June 5, 1973 created Section 8A without Chapter 2.
36. Law # 104 of June 30, 1975.
37. Law # 3 of October 3, 1973. This law was amended by laws: #5 of
November 14, 1974; #91 of June 30, 1975; #57 of May 27, 1976; #107 of June
24, 1977; and #120 of June 27, 1977.
38. Puerto Rican tax laws make a distinction between resident" and
"nonresident" firms. Firms that are organized outside of Puerto Rico but
conduct a business in Puerto Rico are classified as resident; those that
have no such business are nonresidents. The tollgate tax does not apply to
dividends paid to a resident parent corporation (e.g., a U.S. manufacturer
which wholesales and retails its products in Puerto Rico). Instead,
dividend payments to such a corporation would be subject to the regular
Puerto Rican income tax. The 85 percent dividends received deduction would,
however, reduce the effective rate on dividends from a possession
corporation to a resident parent corporation to no more than 6.75 percent
(45 percent of 15 percent).
39. The possession corporations system of tax exemption was contained under
Section 931 before 1976 and it is contained under Section 936 after 1976.
These sections are part of the U.S. IRC and they are designed to provide tax
exemption to U.S. corporations doing business in the U.S. possessions.
Puerto Rico represents almost 99 percent of all U.S. possession
corporations. The impact of the U.S. system of tax exemption in Puerto Rico
is discussed in Chapter Two.
40. Law # 95 of June 1, 1976
41. Thus, a U.S. parent corporation resident in Puerto Rico is taxable in
Puerto Rico on its dividend income from a possession corporation, but the
effective rate of taxation is less than the 10 percent tollgate tax
applicable to dividends paid to nonresident U.S. parent corporations.
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Table B.1
Labor Intensive Industries
Traditional and Manufacturing Employment
Selected Years: 1950-1960
(Thousands)
Total
Years Employment
Traditional Agriculture
Agri- Sugar Home
cul- Tobacco Needle-
Total ture Mfg. work
Low Technology Manufacturing
Non-
Sugar Other
Total Food Apparel Mfg.
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1950-1960 Average Annual Compound Rate:
-0.9 -6.2 -5.3 -1.9 -15 4.8 -2.3 6.2 .
Source: Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and Market
Change on the Demand for Labor in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June
1984; Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico, informe Economico al Gobernador,
1954, 1960, 1965, 1970 and 1976; Departamento de Trabajo de Puerto Rico,
"Employment and Average Earnings in Manufacturing Industries: 1953-82", 1983.
Note: Manufacturing employment data come from Departaiento
del Trabajo, except the 1950-1952 statistics that come from the Junta de Planificacion.
The data from the Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico refer to fiscal years while
the estimates from "Departamento de Trabajo" are in calendar years. The
mean absolute difference between fiscal and calendar years' estimates
of manufacturing employment for the period 1950-60 was very small in every year.
Average annual compound rate figures fot non-sugar food and other manufacturing
are from 1953 to 1960.
NA means data were not available.
-- ----------- - ---------- -- -- ----- ----------------
Table 8.2
Changes in Manufacturing Esploysent,
1953 to 1958 (Thousands)
Employment Employment
Change
1953 1958 1953-58Industry
Percentage
Change in
Mfg. Esploysent
Total Hfg.
Total Hon-Durables
Food Products
Tobacco Products
Textile Products
Apparel Products
Paper Products &
Printing
Chemical Products
Petro., Rubber &
Plastic Products
Leather Products
Total Durables
Lusber &
Furniture Products
Stone, Clay, &
Glass Products
Metal Products
Hon-Electrical Mac
& Transp. Products
Electrical Machine
Prof. & Scientific
Instruments
Misc. Mfg.
62.5 69.5
48.1 51.3
16.5
7.3
3.4
16.4
1.7
1.2
0.1
16.1
5.0
4.5
17.4
2.1
1.4
2.1
2.1 2.7
13.8 18.2
3.0 3.2
3. 3.9
3.9 3.9
7.0 100
2.6 37.1
-0.4
-2.3
1.1
1.0
0.4
0.2
2.0
-5.7
-32.9
15.7
14.3
5.7
2.9
28.6
8.6
4.4 62.9
0.8 11.4
17.1
1.4
21.4
7.1
0
Source : Departamento del Trabajo de Puerto
Hourly Earnings in Manufacturing Industries
Rico, "Esploysent and Average
in Puerto Rico, 1953-1982," 1983;
Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and Market
Change on the Demand for Labor in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research,
June 1984.
242
243
Table 8.3
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
(1980:100), (Selected Years 1950-1970)
Annual
Years Real GOP Rate of
$ Million Change
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
2771
2799
2938
3069
3157
3356
3480
3503
3632
3923
4238
4603
5005
5434
5936
6387
6840
7234
7800
8502
9250
Real GOP
Per
Worker
4649
4634
5145
5580
5846
6226
6237
6346
6544
7185
7805
8161
8556
9241
10027
10575
10789
11250
11927
12596
13484
Annual
Rate of
Change
-0.3
11
8.5
4.83
6.5
0.2
1.7
3.1
9.8
8.6
4.6
4.8
8
8.5
5.5
4.3
6
5.6
.7
Real GDP
Per
Capita
1256
1257
1309
1356
1383
1458
1499
1496
1538
1686
1811
1938
2077
2222
2392
2537
2677
2790
2964
3183
3413
Annual
Rate of
Change
0.1
4.1
3.6
5.4
2.8
-0.2
2.8
9.6
7.4
7
7
7.7
6.1
5.5
4.2
6.2
7.4
'7
Average Annual Compound Rates:
1950-1960 4.3
1950-1965 5.7
1950-1970 6.2
1960-1965 8.5
1960-1970 3.1
1965-1970 7.7
Source: Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and
Market Change on the Demand for Labor in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic
Research, June 1984; Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico, Inforse
Economico al Gobernador, 1954, 1956, 1960, 1962, and 1976.
Note: The GOP data in the various "Informe Economico Al Gobernador"
were not reconciled, The reported series is a 3 year ioving average
of the reported data for the years 1949-59, include; adjusted to
1980 dollars by the Puerto Rico Dol's CPI for Puerto Rico.
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Table B.4-1
Traditional and Manufacturing Employment
Selected Years: 1960-1970
(Thousands)
Traditional Agriculture Low Technology Manufacturing
Total
Years Employment
Agri- Sugar Home
cul- Tobacco Needle-
Total ture Mfg. work
Non-
Sugar Apparel Leather Elec. Other
Total Food Goods Mach. Mfg.
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1960-1970 Average Annual Compound Rate:
-6 -5.9 -1.5 -20.6 6.6 6.6 5.3 7.2 2.3 T.
Source: Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and Market
Change on the Demand for Labor in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June
1984; Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico, Informe Economico al Gobernador,
1960, 1965, 1970, 1971 and 1976; Departamento de Trabajo de Puerto Rico,
"Employment and Avearge Earnings in Manufacturing Industries: 1953-82", 1983.
Note: Manufacturing esployment data come from Departamento del Trabajo,
except the 1950-1952 statistics that come the Junta de Planificacion. The data
from "Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico" refer to fiscal years while
the estimates from "Departamento de Trabajo" are in calendar years. The
mean absolute difference between fiscal and calendar years' estimates
of manufacturing employment for the period 1950-60 was very small in every year.
--- -- -- - - -- -- -- ----- - -- ------------------- - ------------------- -
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Table 8.4-2
I3portance of Traditional and Manufacturing Eiployment
Relative to Total Employment : 1950-1960 and 1960-1970
(Thousands)
Total Employsent Traditional Low-Technology
Years Absolute Percent Absolute Percent Absolute Percent
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
47.7
45.2
42
40.9
41.1
39
36.4
33.7
31.5
29.9
27.4
28
27.7
26.2
25
21.7
19.2
16.6
15.4
13.6
11.7
42
42
43
46
49
50
56
56
58
62
67
70
79
83
88
94
102
110
121
125
127
7
7
7.5
8.4
9.1
9.3
10
10.1
10.5
11.4
12.3
12.4
13.5
14.1
14.9
15.6
16.1
17.1
18.5
18.5
18.5
Source: Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and market
Change on the Oemand for Labor in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June
1984; Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico, Inforse Economico al Gobernador,
1960, 1965, 1970, 1971 and 1976; Departasento de Trabajo de Puerto Rico,
"Employment and Average Earnings in Manufacturing Industries: 1953-82", 1983.
Table 8.5
Low and High Technology Manufacturing
Production Workers As a Percentage of Total Workers
United States (US) and Puerto Rico (PR): Periods 246
1958-1969, 1969-1975, and 1975-1981
Production Workers As a Percentage of Total Employment
1958-1969 1975-1981
PR US PR US
Low Technology Industries:
Total Manufacturing 84.8 74.4 85.4 78
Non-Sugar Food Products 69.6 67 67.6 69
Apparel Products 94.9 88.8 93.7 82.9
Leather Goods 93.3 87.8 93.9 85.8
Electrical Machinery 87.7 67.6 86.5 74.2
Production Workers As a Percentage of Total Employment
1969-1975 1975-1981
PR US PR US
High Technology Industries:
Total Manufacturing 83.1 63.5 79.8 54.4
Chemicals 68 58.3 66.8 57
Non-Electrical Machinery 81.7 51.8 77.9 43.2
Electrical Machinery 84.5 56.3 88.1 56.9
Prof. and Tech. Instruments 88.8 61 86.3 60.4
Source: Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and Market
Change on the Demand for Labor in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June
1984; Departamento del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, Annual Census of Manufacturers,
1969-81, inclusive; "Employment and Average Hourly Earnings in Manufacturing
Industries: 1953-1982", 1983; United States Department of Labor, "Employment
and Earnings, United States, 1909-1978," (8LS Bulletin 1312-11), 1979.
Notes:
1. Low Technology Manufacturing: Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including household appliances, electrical lighting & wiring equipment,
electrical apparatus, electrical transmission and distribution equipment, and
miscellaneous electrical machinery.
2. High Technology Manufacturing: Hon-Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including office, computing, accounting, and miscellaneous industrial
and service industry machinery.
3. High Technology Manufacturing: Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including radio, phonograph, and communications equipment; electronic
components and accesories.
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Table B.6
Manufacturing As A Percentage of Total
Employment, GOP and Income Indicators
Period 1960 to 1970
Mfg. as %
Years Total
Employst.
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
12.3
12.4
13.5
14.1
14.9
15.6
16.1
17.1
18.5
18.5
19.2
Mfg. as
% Total
GOP
21.3
NA
NA
23.8
24.3
24.4
24.7
24.9
25.5
25.8
25.4
Worker
Compensation
as % Mfg.
Net Income
62.5
NA
NA
61.5
60.4
63.3
59.8
61.8
62.1
63.5
63.4
Source: Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects of Institutional,
Technological, and Market Change on the Demand for Labor
in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June 1984;
Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico, Informe Economico
al Governador, 1960, 1969, and 1975.
Note: HA means data were not available.
----- - -----
Table B.7
Puerto Rico Employment Statistics : 1940 to 1987
(In Thousands of Persons and the Percentages)
Population
16 years
or older
Labor Force
(1) Total Employed Unemployed
1154
1289
1299
1383
1526
1718
1767
1856
1396
1914
1962
2019
1922
1986
2039
2093
2139
2192
2235
2261
2283
2300
2305
602
684
635
625
6 80
7165
787
838
844
847
324
839
864
889
891
907
925
918
918
951
964
977
1013
Labor Force Discourage
Participation Unemployment Discourage Workers
Rate Rate Workers Rate
52.2
53
49
45.2
44.8
44.5
44.5
45.1
44.5
43.3
42.3
41.6
44.9
44.7
43.7
43.3
43.2
41.8
41.1
42.1
42.2
42.5
43.9
15
12.9
15.4
13.1
11,2
10.3
11.2
11.9
11.7
15.3
19.2
20
18.7
17.5
17
17.9
21.7
23.5
22
21.4
20.5
17.7
. 552
605
664
758
46
953
980
1018
1052
1067
11383
1180
1058
1097
1148
1186
1214
1274
13171
1310
1319
1323
1292
47.8
47
51
54.8
55.2
54.9
56.7
5 7
58.4
55.1
56.3
56.7
56.3
5.2.
58.9
57.9
56.1
Source : Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico, Inforse Economico al Gobernador,
1976, 1984 and 1987; Departasento del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, "Household Sample,"
except 1940 statistic that was obtained from 1940 Census of Population.
Note : Employment statistics since 1978 refers to population 16 years old and over.
All other employment statistics refer to population 14 years old and over.
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1940
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
------- - - -- - --------- - ----- - -- --------- - ------ - - --- - -----------------
Table 8.8
hanufacturing Employment Statistics
Selected Countries in 1983
Table B.9
Average Annual Rate of Change of
Manufacturing Wage Rates in Selected Countries
In Nominal U.S. Dollars : 1965 and 1983
Total
Hourly
Compensation
Mfg.
($ 1982)
hfg .
As a % of
Total
Employment
Manufacturing Wage Rates
1965 1983Percentage
Unemployment
Rate
Average Annual
Rate of Change
1.42 2.24 48.9 28.8
1.36 1.92 45.5 37.9
1.46
South Korea 1.25
48.8 32.1
54.4 22.6
Puerto Rico 4.8 6.17 38.9 18.6
U.S.A. 8.83 11.68 40.1 19.8
23.4
9.5
Sources : World Bank, World Development Report, 1985; U.S. Department of Commerce,
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984; International Labor Office,
Yearly of Labor Statistics, 1984; Puerto Rico Economic Development
Administration, "Puerto Rico and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC'S)
of Asia: An Overview of Economic Development Performance and Policy,"
Discussion Paper (revised and expanded July 1986).
Source : International Labor Office, Yearly of Labor Statistics
1984, 1967; Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration,
Puerto Rico and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC'S)
of Asia: An Overview of Economic Development Performance
and Policy" Discussion Paper (revised and expanded July 1986).
Average
Hourly
Earning
Mfg. ($)
($ 1983)
Average
Hourly
Worked
Per Week
Mfg.
Singapore
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Singapore
Hong Kong
Tawain
South Korea
Puerto Rico
0.3 1.4
0.2 1.4
0.2 1.5
0.1 1.3
1.2 4.8
2.6 8.8
8.9
11.0
13.5
17. 5
7.8
U.S.A.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------
------------------- -----------------------------------------
Table 8.10
Manufacturing Average Hourly Wages
in Puerto Rico and the United States
Years : 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1980
Difference
Manufacturing Average Hourly Wages Puerto Rico
U.S. Average
Puerto Rico United States Hourly Wages
$0.43
0.92
1.76
4.02
$1.44
2.26
3.35
7.27
1.01
1.34
1.59
3.25
250
1950
1960
1970
1980
Puerto Rico
as a % of U.S.
Average Hourly
Mfg. Wages
29.90
40.70
52.50
55.30
Source : Comite Para el Desarrollo de Puerto Rico, Inc., La Crisis Economica
de Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Enero de 1984.
--- - ----- - ------
Table B.11
Relative Average Hourly Earnings : 1960-1970
Total and Selected Manufacturing Industries
And Puerto Rico As a Percentage Of the U.S.
Total Mfg.
Avg.Hr.Earnings
Food Products Apparel Products
Avg.Hr.Earnings Avg.Hr.Earnings
Leather Products
Avg.Hr.Earnings
Electrical Machinery
Avg.Hr.Earnings
PR U.S. % PR
of PR (I)
U.S. % - PR
of PR (%)
U.S. %
of PR
U.S. %
of PR
U.3. 
of PR
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Source : Departatento del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, "Employment and Average Hourly Earnings in
Manufacturing Industries, 1952-82," 1983; U.S. Department of Labor, " Employment and Earnings,
United States, 1909-1978," Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin, 1979, pp. 1311-12; Puerto Rico
EDA, "The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and Market Change on the Demand for Labor
in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June 1984.
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Table B.12
Average Hourly Earnings of Production Workers in Puerto Rico
and the United Stat es, Selected Industries 1955-1980
(dollars per hour)
--11------ TIP ---IS--- -- 1171--- TPS --- 98-
Puerto Rico Earnings 0.69 0.99 1.40 1.94 2.60 4.08
United States Earnings 1.77 2.18 2.52 3.38 4.65 6.95
P.R. Earnings as a
Percentage of U.S. 38 45 56 57 55 59
Tobacco
Puerto Rico Earnings
United States Earnings
P.R. Earnings as a
Percentage of U.S.
Textile Mill Products
Puerto Rico Earnings
United States Earnings
P.R. Earnings as a
Percentage of U.S.
Apparel
Puerto Rico Earninus
United States Earnings
P.R. Earnings as a
Percentage of U.S.
Chemicals
Puerto Rico Earnings
United States Earnings
P.R. Earnings as a
Percentage of U.S.
Leather
Puerto Rico Earnings
United States Earnings
P.R. Earnings as a
Percentage of U.S.
Metal Products
Puerto Rico Earnings
United States Earnings
P.R. Earnings as a
Percentaqe of U.S.
Elec. & Electron. Equip.
Puerto Rico Earnings
United States Earnings
P.R. Earninqs as a
Percentage of U.S.
Stone, Clay & Glass
Puerto Rico Earnings
United States Earnings
P.R. Earnings as a
Percentage of U.S.
0.37
1 .25
30
0.55
1.41
39
0.63
1.62
39
0.97
1.62
60
1.05
2.08
50
1.23
2.00
62
1.56
3.00
52
1.71
2.59
66
2 .21
4.27
52
2.15
3.53
61
252
3.69
7.69
48
3.59
5.27
68
0.47 0.86 1.18 1.70 2.14 3.40
1.36 1.59 1.93 2.51 3.24 4.73
35 54 61 68 66 72
0.73
2.01
36
0.48
1.42
34
0.66
2.02
33
0.64
1.90
1.19 1.64
2.53 3.03
47 54
0.75
1.66
45
1.15
2.47
47
1.20
2.32
1.08
1.96
55
1.60
2.92
55
1.47
2.67
2.36
4.00
59
1.59
2.64
60
2.17
3.77
58
2.01
3.50
3.64
5.50
66
2.02
3.25
62
2.95
5.19
57
2.82
4.66
5.43
8.53
64
3.35
4.65
4.56
7.69
59
4.27
7.18
34 52 55 57 61 59
0.69 1.13 1.69 2.27 2.93 4.30
1.88 2.30 2.76 3.75 5.02 7.74
37 49 61 61 58 56
955~iiii-P5iFf5~_ R iE~-Dipi ffminf~T1ous
Xears; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics and Em ployment
Standards Administration, Employment and Earnings, various yearsi U.S. Treasury
Department, The Operation and Effect of the Possessions Corporation System of Taxation,
Fourth Report, February 1983.
Notes:
1. Earnings are the actual returns to the worker including premium pay for overtime
and late-shift work and changes in output of workers paid on an incentive plan.
2. Production workers include all nonsu ervisory employees and working supervisors
enga ed in production or services closely associated with production--recordkeeping,
maintenance, sales, etc.
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Table B.13
Total Employment : 1970 to 1987
(In Thousands)
Years Total Traditional
Esoloy % Emgloy %
Manufacturing Government Construction Trade & Service
Employ % Employ % Employ % EmIloy Y
--------------------------- 
-----------------------------
686
699
738
745
744
699
678
691
722
735
753
759
719
703
743
758
777
834
12.4
10.4
9.8
8.2
3.7
8.6
7.7
7.1
6.1
5.9
6.1
5.7
5.3
5.7
5.3
5.1
4
17.8
18
17.6
18.8
18.7
17.7
1713
18.2
19
18.9
18.2
19.1
18.1
18.3
18.8
17.9
17.8
1E.2
1-5.5
15.9
17.6.
19
18.83
20.5
2 2
A.
23.1
23.5
24 .4
24.4
23.8
23.3
23.6
Average Annual Rate of Change for Selected Periods:
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
-5.4
-10.5
-7 .7
-6.4
-5.3
-4.5
-3.6
-6.4
-12.9
-7.1
-6.8
-6.6
-5.7
1.3
4.7
-0.3
1.1
2.2
1.7
0.1
1.8
-0.1
0.6
1.3
0.2
-0.8
-.5
7
5.8
4.2
2.9
1.2
-0.6
-3.6
0.9
-3.1
-4.8
-6.3
-3,8
Source: Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and
Market Change on the Demand for Labor in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic
Research, June 1984; Junta de Planificacion ce Puerto Rico, Inforie
Economico al Gobernador, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1983, 1984, and 1987.
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
11. 1
11 .6
12.83
10.5
10.3
9.7
7,4
5.8
6
5.83
5.83
4.3
4.6
4.9
44.1
44
43.4
;3-9
45. 6
46.2
46.1
45.
47.6
47-7
49
1970-1987
1970-1973
1970-1975
1970-1981
1975-1981
1975-1987
1981-1987
-4.7
-1-8
-7.6
-5.2
-..
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 8.14-1
Traditional and Manufacturing Employment in Puerto Rico
Selected Years: 1970-1981
Employment in Labor-Intensive Industries
Traditional Low Technology Manufacturing
Employment in Capital-Intensive Industries
High-Technology Manufacturing
Sugar
Total Tobacco
Years Mfg. Mfg.
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
136773
138126
147245
152867
148557
136617
144789
148553
155934
157375
154643
151687
9819
9212
9818
9635
9392
8765
8345
6629
5154
4846
5364
4178
Non-
Sugar Ap- Leather Elec.
Total Food parel Goods Mach.
67345
67596
72769
75231
70756
66421
69611
70807
72374
70290
69504
69807
16881
18099
19289
18656
19635
19165
20357
20461
22519
21810
20108
19275
36819
36218
39200
40721
38027
36075
37054
37197
36241
34155
33575
33630
8309
6571
6100
6655
6148
5161
4990
5663
6171
5877
6642
5201
4719
6708
8180
9199
7368
6020
7210
7486
7443
8448
9179
11701
Non- Prof.
Chem- Elec. Elec. Tech. Other
Total icals Mach. Mach. Instr hfg.
16621
17145
21772
26316
29056
27548
32772
37664
41687
45221
44669
44124
4890
6924
9384
11042
11914
10615
12520
15388
15942
16690
15606
15834
484
620
552
583
2428
2205
3514
4123
4498
5989
6611
8093
6001
5849
4110
5622
3899
6127
6583
8776
8887
8845
7083
5246
3752
7726
906
9534
10829
10611
11570
12471
13655
13607
13114
42988
44173
42886
41685
40353
33883
34061
33453
'619
37018
35106
33033
Average Annual Compound Rate of Change:
1970-1973
1970-1975
1970-1981
1975-1981
-0.6
-2.2
-7.5
-11.6
3.8
-0.3
0.3
0.8
3.4
-0.4
-0.8
-1.2
-7.1
-9.1
-4.2
0.1
24.9
5
8.6
11.7
16.6
10.6
9.3
8.2
31.2
16.8
11.3
6.9
6.4
35.4
29.2
24.2
-2.2
1.5
10.5
20
15.6
8.7
3.2
-2.4
-0.4
Source: Departamento del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, Annual Census of Manufacturers, inclusive; Puerto Rico EDA, "The
Effects of Institutional, Technological, and Market Change on the Demand for Labor in Puerto Rico,' Office of Economic
Research, June 1984.
Notes:
1. Traditional Manufacturing includes sugar and tobacco products.
2. Low Technology Manufacturing : Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including household appliances, electrical lightining & wiring equipment,
electrical apparatus, electrical tramsmission and distribution equipment, and
miscellaneous electrical machinery.
3. High Technology Manufacturing : Non-Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including office, computing, accounting, and miscellaneous industrial
and service industry machinery.
4. High Technology Manufacturing : Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including radio, phonograph, and communication equipment; electronic
components and accesories,
5. High Technology Manufacturing : Electrical Machinery was adjusted to account
for an SIC industry reclassification for the years 1977-1981.
----------------------------------------- --
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Table B.14-2
Traditional and Manufacturing Employment in Puerto Rico
Selected Years: 1970-1981
Total Manufacturing Traditional Low-Technology High-Technology Other Manufacturing
Years Employ Percent Employ Percent Employ Percent Employ Percent Employ Percent
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
136773
138126
147245
152867
149557
136617
144789
148553
155934
157375
154643
151142
9819
9212
9818
9635
9392
8765
8345
6629
5154
4846
5364
4178
67345
67596
72769
75231
70756
66421
69611
70807
72374
70290
69504
69807
49.2
48.9
49.4
49.2
47.3
48.6
48.1
47.7
46.4
44.7
44.9
46.2
16621
17145
21772
26316
29056
27548
32772
37664
41687
45221
44669
44124
12.2
12.4
14.8
17.2
19.4
20.2
22.6
25.4
26.7
28.7
28.9
29.2
42988
44173
42886
41685
40353
33883
34061
33453
36719
37018
35106
33033
31.4
32
29.1
27.3
2 7
24.8
23.5
22.5
23.5
23.5
22.7
21.9
Source: Departamento del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, Annual Census of Manufacturers, inclusive; Puerto
Rico EDA, "The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and Market Change on the Demand for Labor in
Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June 1984.
Notes:
1. Traditional Manufacturing includes sugar and tobacco products.
2. Low Technology Manufacturing : Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including household appliances, electrical lightining & wiring equipment,
electrical apparatus, electrical traissission and distribution equipment, and
miscellaneous electrical machinery.
3. High Technology Manufacturing : Non-Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including office, computing, accounting, and miscellaneous industrial
and service industry machinery.
4. High Technology Manufacturing : Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including radio, phonograph, and communication equipment; electronic
components and accesories.
5. High Technology Manufacturing : Electrical Machinery was adjusted to account
for an SIC industry reclassification for the years 1977-1981.
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Table B.15-1
Percentage of Workers in Various Industry Classifications in Puerto Rico Earning Exactly the FLSA
Minimum and Certain Specified Rates Above It, 1975-77
-------------------------------------------- --------- ecnte at --- --  earning-
Industries
:Survey
:date
:FLSA
:minimum
:rate
:Average
:hourly
:earnings
FL
:Exactly
:the FLSA
:minimum
: Not more than
: above : above : above
: minimum : minimum : minimum
Fooi Kidred Products: pre-1966 coverage:
Milk Processing & distribution
Candy & gum products, 1961 coverage
Other products and activities
Tobacco pre-1961 coverage:
Filler Tobacco Processing
Wrapper tobacco processing
Machine threshing other products
Other products and activities
Textile mills products, pre-1961 coverage:
Hooked rugs
Other products and activities
Gloves and Mittens, pre-1961 coverage:
Other products and activities
Hosiery, pre-1966 coverage:
Woman hosiery
Other hosiery
Sweater and knit swimwear
Hnadkerchiefs, scarves, and art linens,
pre-1961 coverage:
Other products
Women's outerwear, needlework and fabricated
textile products, 1966 coverage
Children's dress and related products,
pre-1966 coverage:
Other operations
Women's and children's underwear,
pre-1961 coverage
Corsets and brassieres, pre-1961 coverage
Men's and boy's clothing, pre-1961 coverage:
Work clothing and separate trousers
Other products and Activities
1961 coverage
1966 coverage (trousers and
other products)
Furniture and fixtures and lumber
Leather goods pre-1961 coverage
Belts
Other Products and activities
Non-rubber footwear, pre-1966 coverage
Rubber and plastic footwear
Stone, clay and glass, pre-1961 coverage:
Art pottery
Vitreous and semi-vitreous china
Jewelry and miscellaneous industries,
pre-1961 coverage:
Straw and hair products
Other products and activities
May 1976
May 1976
May 1976
Aug 1976
Aug 1976
Aug 1976
Aug 1976
2.05 2.37 37.70
2.00 2.23 0.00
2.15 2.47 32.70
1.56 1.56 97.60
1.82 1.93 72.80
2.04 2.37 25.00
2.11 2.25 40.40
Nov 1975 1.57
Nov 1975 1.75
47.80
60.60
39.40
99.00
78.00
39.30
57.50
2.25 0.00 0.00
2.18 20.60 26.20
May 1977 2.21 2.37 48.50 65.10 .i/
55.00
60.60
51.20
99.00
78.70
39.30
68.90
61.70
60.60
58.60
99.00
78.70
46.40
78.70
0.00 0.60
28.90 38.70
n.a 78.40 _
May 1977 2.18 2.42 30.00 50.00 55.00 63.00
May 1977 1.97 2.30 8.50 27.10 34.00 38.30
May 1977 2.28 2.49 50.70 64.80 70.00 72.00
May 1977 1.70 1.79 70.50 74.80 79.90 82.30
May 1977 2.29 2.48 43.80 72.90 77.00 78.00
May 1975 1.90 2.08 30.60 47.00 74.90 78.60
May 1977 2.20 2.42 39.70 47.80 67.80 70 90
May 1977 2.28 2.57 17.90 1850.3/ 57.40 4/ 66:10J
May 1977
May 1977
May 1977
May 1977
Aug 1976
May 1977
May 1977
Nov 1975
Nov 1975
2.22 2.46 43.30
2.15 2.39 42.30
2.15 2.27 74.40
50.10 /
48.40
78.60
55.007/
58.30
80.90
63.40.8
65.00
83.90
2.22 2.33 38.30 86.70 88.40 90.10
2.10 2.39 39.00 48.90 49.30 56.10
2.28 2.43 2.30
2.10 2.36 38.10
1.75 2.02 35.30
1.75 2.25 9.50
68.90
55.20
42.30
19.90
79.00
62.00
50.60
28.10
80.60
66.40
62.00
36.50
Aug 1976 1.67 2.16 0.00 40.00 45.00 45.00
Aug 1976 2.13 2.39 0.40 0.80 57.60 68.90
Aug 1976 1.85 1.98 0.00 67.90 79.80 88.10
Aug 1976 2.05 2.28 39.10 43.00 64.80 68.40
s ~ ~Depar im~nt L immeri~~Econoic~ l--Po-Ri ~ 7~~~~---~~~~~~~~~~ ~-
nine cents of minimum.
19 cents of minimum.
two cents of minimum.
12 cents of minimum.
22 cents of minimum.
8 cents of minimum.
7. Within 13 cents of minimum.
8. Within 18 cents of minimum.
9. Within 23 cents of minimum.
10. As much as seven and a half cents
11. As much as 12 1/2 cents above the
12. Estimated.
above the minimum.
minimum.
Notes:
1. Within
2. Within
3. Within
4. Within
5. Within
6. Within
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table B.15-2
Relative Average Hourly Earnings : 1970-1980
Total and Selected Manufacturing Industries
And Puerto Rico As a Percentage Of the U.S.
Leather Products Hon-Elec. Ma
Avg.Hr.Earnings Avg.Hr.Earni
Elect. & Electr Chemicals
Avg.Hr.Earnings Avg.Hr.Earning
Prof. & Tech. Inst.
Avg.Hr.Earnings
PR U.S. % PR
(%) of PR (%)
U.S. %
of PR
PR U.S. t PR
(%) of PR ()
1970 100 53 102 57 91 67 88 62 131 61 107 57 124 59 106 56
1971 100 52 101 56 90 68 85 61 132 61 106 57 124 59 108 57
1972 100 52 102 57 87 67 81 60 135 62 108 58 128 60 108 59
1973 100 53 102 56 85 69 79 60 130 59 106 57 130 61 108 60
1974 100 54 103 57 83 65 76 59 125 59 106 58 133 63 108 61
1975 100 53 104 58 82 66 77 61 118 56 107 59 140 66 108 61
1976 100 53 100 56 82 67 77 63 119 57 108 61 139 66 107 60
1977 100 55 100 56 82 69 76 63 112 54 106 60 137 64 107 61
1978 100 55 98 57 83 71 77 67 110 55 106 61 134 64 105 62
1979 100 55 98 57 84 73 80 70 109 55 106 62 131 63 101 61
1980 100 55 99 58 84 74 82 72 106 53 102 59 133 64 101 60
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source : Departamento del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, "Esployient and Average Hourly Earnings in Manufactuing Industries, 19852-82," 1983;
Total Mfg.
Avg.Hr.Earnings
Food Products
Avg.Hr.Earning
Apparel
Avg.Hr.Earning
U.S. %
of PR
U.S. %
of PR
U.S. %
of PR
U.S. %
of PR
U.S. %
of PR
U.S. Departsent of Labor, "Employment and Earnings, United States, 1909-1978," Bureu of Labor Statistics Bulletin, 1979, pp.1311-12,
Supplement to Employment and Earnings, July, 1983; Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and harket Change on
the Desand for Labor in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June 1984,
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
iable B.16
Net Federal Funds Received by Puerto Rico as a
Percent of the Gross National Product 1948-1987
Years GNP Met Federal Transfers as a
Transfers % of GNP
1948 651.2 73.9 11.3
1950 754.5 78.1 10.4
1955 1141.8 125.7 11.0
1960 1676.4 177.1 10.6
1965 2763.9 302.0 10.9
1970 4621.9 575.5 12.5
1975 7183.6 1578.6 22.0
1980 11073.8 3288.3 29.7
1985 14805.4 4273.2 28.9
1986 15829.4 4597.3 29.0
1987 17068.3 4692.7 27.5
Source Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico,
Inforse Economico Al Gobernador, 1976, 1987.
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Table 8.17
Low and High Technology Manufacturing 259
Average Annual Compound Rates of Change : All and Production Employment
United States (US) and Puerto Rico (PR) :1958-69 and 1969-75
Average Annual Compound Rates of Change
All Jobs Production Jobs
PR US PR US
Period 1958-1969
Low Technology Industries:
Total Manufacturing 7.2 2.2 6.4 1.9
Non-Sugar Food Products 8.7 0.1 NA -0.2
Apparel Products 7.8 1.7 7.8 1.5
Leather Goods 12.8 -2.2 13.3 -2.5
Electrical Machinery 12 4.3 11.8 4.1
Period 1969- 1975
High Technology Industries:
Total Manufacturing -0.2 -1.6 -0.7 -2
Chemicals 13.6 -0.7 12.4 -1.2
Non-Electrical Machinery 29.3 0.6 27.1 -2.7
Electrical Machinery -3.2 -2.8. -3.4 -3.7
Prof. and Tech. Instruments 17.4 0.1 16.8 -0.2
Source: Departamento del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, Annual Census of Manufacturers,
1969-75, inclusive; "Employment and Average Hourly Earnings in Manufacturing
Industries: 1953-1982", 1983- United States Department of Labor, "Employment and
Earnings, United States, 1909-1978," (BLS Bulletin 1312-11), 1979; Puerto Rico EDA,
The Effects of Institutional, Technological, and Market Change on the Demand for
Labor in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June 1984.
Notes:
1. Low Technology Manufacturing : Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including household appliances, electrical lighting & wiring equipment,
electrical apparatus, electrical transmission and distribution equipment, and
miscellaneous electrical machinery.
2. High Technology Manufacturing : Non-Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including office, computing, accounting, and miscellaneous industrial
and service industry machinery.
3. High Technology Manufacturing : Electrical Machinery is composed of certain
parts, including radio, phonograph, and communications equipment; electronic
components and accesories.
Table 8.18
Real Gross Domestic Product (GOP) and Real
Gross National Product (GNP) er Capita
(1954:100), (Selected Years)
Annual
Real GOP Rate of
$ Million Change
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
3067.8
3268.3
3510.8
3722.9
3724.5
3634.1
3829.9
4110.9
4408.3
4677.2
4750.9
4779.4
4550
4626.6
4933.8
5044.4
5391.4
5778.6
0.5
7.4
6
0
-2.4
5.4
7.3
7.2
6.1
1.6
0.6
-4.8
1.7
6.6
2.2
6.9
7.2
Real GOP
Per
Worker
4472
4675.7
4757.2
4997.2
5006
5199
5648.8
5949.2
6105.7
6363.5
6309.3
6297
6328.2
6581.2
6640.4
6649.6
6938.7
6928.8
Annual
Rate of
Change
4.6
1.7
5
0.2
3.9
8.7
5.3
2.6
4.2
-0.9
-0.2
0.5
4
0.9
0.1
4.3
-0.1
Real GDP
Per
Capita
1136.1
1188
1244.1
1297.6
1292.8
1247.1
1285.6
1349.6
1423
1489.1
1492.1
1481.1
1397.8
1417.5
1509.7
1538.6
1644.2
1759.1
Average Annual Compound Rate of Change:
1970-1975
1970-1981
1970-1987
1975-1981
1975-1987
Source: J
Gobernador, 1979 and 1983; Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects
Technological, and Market Change on the Demand for Labor
Office of Economic Research, June 1984.
of Institutional,
in Puerto Rico
Notes: The GOP data in the various "Inforve Economico Al Gobernador'
were not reconciled. The reported series is a 3 year ioving average
of the reported data for the years 1949-59, include; adjusted to
1980 dolars by the Puerto Rico Dol's CPI for Puerto Rico.
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Annual
Rate of
Change
4.6
4.7
4.3
-0.4
-3.5
3.1
5.4
4.6
0.2
-0.7
-5.6
1.4
6.5
~1.9
6.9
Real GNP
Per
Capita
1070
1117
1145
1183
1192
1158
1161
1189
1232
1281
1281
1279
1193
1239
1274
1306
1370
Annual
Rate of
Change
4.4
2.5
3.3
0.8
-2.9
3.3
2.4
3.6
4
0
-0.2
-4.5
-2.4
3.9
2.8
2.5
4.9
261
Table 8.19
Real Gross Domestic Product (GOP) and Real
Gross National Product (GNP) Per Capita
(1980:100), (Selected Years)
Annual
Real GOP Rate of
$ Million Change
8502
9250
9900
10600
10749
9644
9430
9830
10162
10665
11085
11108
10936
8.8
7
7.1
1.4
-10.3
-2.2
4.2
3.4
4.9
3.9
0.2
-1.5
Real GDP
Per
Worker
12596
13484
14163
14363
14428
12962
13491
14499
14706
14771
15082
14752
14408
Annual
Rate of
Change
7
5
1.4
0.5
-10.2
4.1
7.5
1.4
0.4
2.1
-2.2
-2.3
Real GOP
Per
Capita
3183
3413
3595
3787
3780
3337
3211
3293
3349
3459
3538
3489
3384
Annual
Rate of
Change
7.2
5.3
5.3
-0.2
-11.7
2.6
1.7
7 7
2.3
-1.4
-3
Real GNP
Per
Capita
2963
3161
3315
3412
3350
2897
2745
2672
2636
2629
2578
2419
2356
Annual
Rate of
Change
6.7
4.9
2.9
-1.3
-13.5
-5.2
-2.7
-1.3
-0.3
-1.9
-6.2
-2.6
Average Annual Compound Rate of Change:
4.4
0.1
0.5
-1.4
0.9
3.1
-1.3
-1.9
-4.3
-2.5
Source: Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico, Informe Economico al
Gobernador, 1979 and 1983; Puerto Rico EDA, " The Effects of Institutional,
Technological, and Market Change on the Demand for Labor in Puerto Rico,"
Office of Economic Research, June 1984.
Notes: The GOP data in the various "Informe Economico Al Gobernador"
were not reconciled. The reported series is a 3 year moving average
of the reported data for the years 1949-59, include; adjusted to
1980 dolars by the Puerto Rico Dol's CPI for Puerto Rico.
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1969-1973
1969-1975
1969-1981
1973-1981
1975-1981
- -- - -- - ---- --------
Table 8.20
Total Net Income and Manufacturing Net Income in Puerto Rico
Manufacturing Net Income As A Percentage of Total Net Income
(Including Government and excluding the Rest of the World;
and excluding Government and the Rest of the World
Total Net Adjusted Manufacturing Mfg. Net Income
Income (1) Net Income(2) Net Income As a % of Total
Net Income (1)
225
614
960
1349
2230
3749
6094
9213-
12149
13956
206
544
352
1174
1923
3138
4920
7317
9804
11327
Mfg. Net Income
As % of Adjusted
Net Income(2)
27
89
169
289
553
975
1987
4809
6984
8661
Source :
1976, 198
Notes :
Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico, Informe Economico Al Gobernador,
7.
1. Including Government and Excluding Rest of the World.
2. Excluding Government and Rest of the world.
Table 8.21
Distribution of Manufacturing Net Income Between
Capital and Worker Compensation : 1970 to 1987
(Percentages)
Worker Payment to
Compensation Capital
1970 63.6 36.4
1975 48.2 51.8
1980 34.0 66.0
1983 32.1 68.8
1985 30.9 69.1
1987 27.5 72.5
Source : Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico,
Informe Economico Al Gobernador, 1976 and 1987.
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1940
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1987
-- ---------------- - --- -
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Table 8.22-1
Employment, Payroll and Value Added of Puerto Rico Manufacturing Industries, 1972 and 1977
1972 1977 Percentage Chang
Payroll As Payroll As Percent of
Employment Payroll Value-Added Percent of Eicloyment Payroll Value-Added Percent of Value-Added
(000) $ Mi) $ Mil) Value-Added (000) $ Mi l V;aue-Aded 1972-1977
All Manufacturing Industries
Food & Kindred Products
Tobacco Products
Textile ills Products
Apparel and Other Textile
Products
Lumber and Woods Products
Furniture and Fixtures
Paper and Allied Products
Printing and Publishing
Chemical and Allied Products
Petroleum and Coal Products
Rubber and Miscellaneous
Plastics Products
Leather and leather Products
Stone, Clay and Glass Products
Primary Metal Industries
Fabricated Metal Products
Machinery, except electrical
Electric and Electronic
Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Instruments and Related
Products
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Industries
Industries with Expanding
Employment [11
Industries with Declining
Employment [21
Industries with Constant
Employment [3]
149.7
4.5
7.3
39.6
1.2
3.0
9.0
2.2
3.5
6.6
6.3
1.0
14.7
0.7
616.8 1915.4
121.2 343. 4
16.0 46.4
27.9 67.1
124.1
4.5
13.0
8.2
16.7
58.8
20.7
14.0
20.4
29.0
5.3
27.6
12.8
50.4
3.1
LX7
0 7
29. ,
17.9
41.3
451.2
91.7
27.4
39.3
73.1
14.3
73.2
37.6
169.6
6.8
32.2%
35.3
34.5
41.6
49.1
34.2
44.4
45.8
40.0
13.0
22.6
51.1
51.9
39.7
37.1
34.0
29.7
45.6
146.9
21.x
7 7
0.0
2.4
4.0
15.7
2.5
6.0
6.2
5.0
~1.6
4.7
4.1
14.3
1.1
~. .0 4007.4
1;~ .3 5.:~
.,.~ i~4
29.5 153.9
151.3
3.9
11 1
11.1
23.3
162.5
36.9
43,4
29.3
39.3
12.7
33.7
32.8
734
91/
21.7
63.9
1476.5
143.4
147.
55.7
102.7
34.2
161.2
106.9 403.1
3.2 28.1
6.1 29.0 84.2 34.4 6.8 52.1 257.3
3.7 14.1 35.3 39.9
27.7 160.4 755.0
105.3 397.8 972.9
16.3 58.6 187.5
21.2
40.9
31.3
;4 .4
42.9
34. 0
41.3
11. 1
40A
29.4
52.6
26.1
40.3
20.3
26.5
29.2
7 1
- .7
4.5
-15.4
13.7
-42.5
1.3
13.3
-40.3
-10.3
-36.0
20.2 -41.3
3.5 27.3 67.3 40.3 1.0
41.3 377. 2331.6
39.0 500.9 1341.0
16.3 113.7 424.3
-71
51.4
.7' 0 ~
-. 4
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1977 Economic Censuses of Outlying Areas, Manufactures, Puerto Rico,
Areas, Manufactures, Puerto Rico; and U.S.
Fourth Report, February 1983.
and 1972 Economic Censuses of Outlying
Treasury Department, The Operation and Effect of the Possessions Corporation System of Taxation,
Notes:
1. Includes printing and publishing, chemicals, petroleum, rubber products, primary metal industries, machinery, tranportation equipment, and
instruments and related products.
2. Includes food products, tobacco products, textiles, apparel, lumber, furniture, leather products, stone, clay, and glass products, fabricated
metal products, and miscellaneous manufacturing industries.
3. Includes paper and allied products and electric and electronic equipment. Includes industries where employment change was 100 employees or less
-- -- - -- - - -- - - -- - -- - - -- - - - - -- - -- -- -- - - - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - -- - - -- -
- - - - - - -
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Table 8.22-2
Manufacturing Growth:
Employment and Income Indicators
1969-1975 and 1975-1981
1969-1975
Mfg. as %
Years Total
Esployst.
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
18.5
19.2
18.9
19.1
18.8
19
18.6
Mfg. as
Total
GOP
25.8
25.4
25.4
27.9
30
32.4
32.4
Worker
Comp.
as % Mfg.
Net Income
63.5
63.4
61.4
58.6
54.6
49.5
49.7
High-Tech
as % Mfg.
Employlt.
10.5
12.2
12.4
14.8
17 .2
19.2
20.2
1975-1981
Mfg. as %
Years Total
Employmt.
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
18.6
-18.6
19.5
20.1
19.9
19
18.6
Mfg. as
Total
GOP
33.3
39.4
40.4
43.6
44.4
48.1
47.5
Worker
Comp.
as % Mfg.
Net Income
48.2
41.4
40.8
37.8
36.9
34
33.9
High-Tech
as %Mfg.
Employlt
20.2
22.6
25.4
26.7
28.7
28.9
29.7
High-Tech
As % Mfg.
Value Added
39.5
42.6
46.1
49.8
53.8
58.1
62.7
Source: Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico, Informe Economico al
Gobernador, 1979 and 1983; Departamento del Trabajo de Puerto Rico,
Annual Census of Manufactures, 1975-1981; and United States Department
of Labor, Census of Manufacturers, 1967,1972, and 1977 (logarithmic
expolations for intercensal years); Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effects of
Institutional, Technological, and Market Change on the Desand for Labor
in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June 1984.
Table B.22-3
Met Income in Puerto Rican Manufacturing
Fiscal Years 1960, 1970, and 1981
(dollars in millions)
: 1960 : 1970 : 1981
:Amount Percent :Amount Percent :Amount Percent
:of net of :of net of :of net of
:income total :income total :income total
All Manufacturing Industries 288.8 100.0% 957.6 100.0% 4453.7 100.0%
Food and Kindred Products 66.7 23.1 161.3 16.8 457.0 10.1
Tobacco Products 10.4 3.6 36.4 3.3 56.0 1.3
Textile hill Products 13.9 4.8 41.1 4.3 47.9
Apparel 50.7 17.6 172.0 18.0 356.2 3.3
Furniture and Wood Products 8.8 3.0 26.2 2.7 33.5 0.1
Printing and Publishing 11.2 3.9 22.6 2.4 67.5 1.5
Chemicals 9.8 3.4 109.3 11.4 16633
Stone, Clay and
Glass Products 18.8 6.5 49.1 5.1 97.6 2.2
Machinery ans Metal
Products 54.7 18.9 191.5 19.4 1261.6 28.3
Other Manufacturing 43.7 15.1 148.0 15.5 413.1 9.3
Source: Puerto Rico Planning Board, Economic Report to the Governor, 1980-1981,
Table 7.
TaDle 8.23
Bank Deposits of Corporations
Operating Under Section 936
(Billions of Dollars)
7able L.24
Loans As A Percentage of Comercial
1976-1977
1977-1978
1978-1979
1979-1980
1980-1981
1981-1982
1982-1983
1983-1984
1986-1987
Source: Puerto Rico Treasury Department
Note: Deposit data represent 12-sonth averages
starting in July of every year and ending in
June of next year, except in 1983-84 which
includes all infomation as of 1/31/84.
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
90.4
86.8
75.4
71.0
63.3
53.3
56.7
- - ---------------------
Source: Puerto Rico Treasury 0epartment
Note: Data correspond to November of every year.
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Table 8.25
Distribution of Employment in Puerto Rican Manufacturing, 1968-1981
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Absolute Percentage
Industry Group __--_C------------------------------------------------------------------- Change Change
(in thousands) 1968-1981 1968-1981
All Manufacturing 137.1 138.5 136.7 138.1 147.2 152.9 149.6 136.6 144.8 148.6 155.9 157.7 154.6 151.7 $14,600 11.0%
Nondurable Goods 101
Food and Kindred Products 20
Tobacco Products
Textile mill products 8
Apparel 40
Paper and Allied Products, and
Printing and Publishing 3
Chemicals 4
Pharmaceuticals I
Petroleum Refining, Rubber
Products, and Plastics 6
Leather and Leather Products 11
Durable Goods 35
Lumber and Wood Products and
Furniture and Fixtures 4
Stone, Clay and Glass
Products 6
Primary Metal Industries and
Fabricated Metal Products
Machinery, Except Electrical; and
Transportation Equipment
Electrical and Electronic
Equipment 9
Scientific Instruments 3
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Industries 3
.7
.5
7
.2
.2
.8
.5
.4
.2
.4
.4
100.8
20.9
6
8.7
40.5
3.8
5
1.8
6.8
9.1
37.7
96.5
20.6
6.1
8.9
36.8
4
4.9
1.7
7
8.3
40.2
94.6
21.7
5.6
6.8
36.2
4.1
7
3
102.5
23.5
5.6
7.7
39.2
4.1
9.4
3.5
105.1
22.7
5.6
7.6
40.7
4.5
11
5
6.8 7 6.5
6.4 6.1 6.7
43.6 44.7 47.8
102.9
23.7
5.3
7.2
38
4.2
11.9
5.4
6.5
6.1
46.6
93.9
23
5
4.9
36.1
3.8
10.6
6
5.4
5.2
42.8
98.3
24.2
4.5
4.31
37.1
4.4
12.5
7.3
6.4
5
46.4
100.6
23.9
3.2
4.9
37.2
4.4
15.4
8.4
7
5.7
47.9
102.2
24.8
2.8
5.1
36.2
4.5
15.9
9.8
6.7
6.2
53.7
100.4
24.3
2.2
4.3
35.4
4.8
16.3
10
7.1
6
57.3
97.4
23.4
2.1
3.4
33.6
5.1
15.6
11
7.7
6.6
57.2
93.2
21.8
1.7
3.2
33.6
4.9
15.8
11.7
7
5.2
58.4
($8,500)
$1,300
($5,300)
($5,000)
($6,600)
$1,100
$11,300
$10,300
$800
($6,300)
$23,000
-8.0
6.0
-76.0
-61.0
-16.0
29.0
251.0
736.0
13.0
-55.0
65.0
.9 4.9 5.1 5.1 5 4.9 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.1 3.6 3.4 ($1,500) -31.0
.7 6.5 6.8 7.3 7.5 7.2 7.3 6.2 5.3 5.1 5.5 5.5 4.8 4.3 ($2,400) -36.0
5 5.6 6.1 6.5 6.9 6.7 6.7 5.6 5.7 5.5 6 6 5.3 4.8 ($200) -4.0
2 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 3.8 3.5 4.7 5.3 5.9 6.6 7.9 9.4 $7,400 370.0
11.8
7.2
12.3
7.7
12.5
9.5
9.9
10.8
13.3. 14.1
10.6 11.6
16.2
12.5
17.3
13.6
18
13.6
19.8
13.1
$10,700
$9,300
118.0
24S.0
.9 4.3 4,3 3.8 3.4 3.2 2.6 2.9 3 2.8 3.8 4.2 3.9 3.6 ($300) -8.0
Note: Data as of October of each year.
Source: Puerto Rico Department of Labor, Census of Manufacturing Industries of Puerto Rico, Table 4, Various years.
Table 8.26
Eiployment By Manufacturing Industry
(Thousands)
1952 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984
59.9 82.3 114.2 166.1 138.8 154.1 148.7
Food & Kindred Products
Tobacco Manufacturers
Textile Mill Products
Appapel & Related Products
Paper & Allied Products
Printing & Publishing
Chemicals & Allied Products
Petroleum Refining Rubber
and Plastics
Leather & Leather Products
Lumber & Wood Furniture
and Fixtures
Stone, Clay and Glass
Metal Products
Non-Electrical Machinery
& Transp. Equipment
Electrical Machinery,
Equipment & Supplies
Professional & Scientific
Instruments
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Equipment
17.5
5.7
3.2
15.4
1.6
NA
0.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
0.4
1.3
18.2
5.5
4.8
21.6
2.6
2.0
2.2
3.9
3.4
4.4
2.6
1.0
21.6
8.6
30.8
3.3
3.3
4.1
8.1
4.6
5.3
4.1
1.8
21.6
5.7
8.4
36.9
4.0
4.0
6.9
7.7
4.9
6.1
6.2
1.9
23.6
5.0
4.7
36.5
4.1
4.1
5.7
5.0
3.9
6.0
5.6
3.3
23.8
2.0
3.3
33.2
5.0
5.0
7.9
6.4
3.6
4.7
8.3
23.3
0.8
2.9
30.5
4.5
4.5
6.1
5.2
7 7
3.9
4.2
12.4
0.9 4.2 6.7 10.3 10.5 13.4 19.2
0.6 1.3 2.4 5.2 10.7 13.0 11.9
NA 4.1 3.7 4.1 3.0 3.7 3.2
Source : Junta de Planificacion de Puerto Rico; Depatamento del Trabajo y Recursos Humanos
de Puerto Rico; Puerto Rico EDA, "The Effect of Institutional, Technological, and Market
Change on the Demand for Labor in Puerto Rico," Office of Economic Research, June 1984.
Note: NA means data were not available.
Total
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Appendix C
268iable 01Estimated Comoosition of Financial Investments by Possession Corporations
(1976 to 1986 - Billion $)
ASSETS 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983 1986
TOTAL POSSESSION CORPORATION FUNDS 4.0 5.3 6.5 6.3 7.4 9.5 11.1 16.2
Investments in Puerto Rico 0.3 2.9 4.0 5.9 6.9 9.0 10.6 14.7
Deposits in Puerto Rican Banks -- 1.6 2.0 2.9 3.5 5.3 6.0 8.3
Puerto Rican Source GNMA Mortgages -- 0.6 0.8 1.0 1,1 1.2 1.4 2.2
Possession Coroorations Loans -- 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5
Puerto Rican Government Bonds -- 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Repurchase-Resale Agreements -- 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.8
Mortgage and Real Estate Loans -- 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4
Other Investments -- 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6
Investment in U.S. 3.7 1.3 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5
U.S. Municioals - 0.6 0.2 0.0 -- -- 0.0 -
U.S. Project Notes -- 0.3 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0. 0.0 --
Preferred Stock -- 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 --
Other Investments -- 1.1 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
Source: U.S. Deoartment of the Treasury Office of Tax Analysis 1978, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985,
and 1989; GOB of Puerto Rico, 1984, 1987.
Notes:
1. The tables offers a breakdown of the information available at December 1988. The information
on this table presents some discrepancies, in particular, bank deposits for the years 1281 and
1983. The reason is that the data may include deposits on savings and loan institutions. The
information on this tables was selected based on comparable data available. Thus, in some
cases, the aggregation of this table differs with the breakdown of some statatistics that will
be presented in this section.
2. In 1976 and in 1977, data is up-to-mid, 1976 and 1977.
3. Yearend 1978 U.S. Municipals figure includes U.S. Project Notes investments.
4. Yearend 1979 U.S. Municipals figure also includes preferred stock of U.S. corporatlons.
5. Yearend 1979 Puerto Rican Source GNMA Mortgages includes about $75 milion insavings oanks.
5. Yearend 1981 Deposits in Puerto Rican Banks includes S400 million in savings "an.s. gome or
the funds reffered to as oosession corporations deposits may inclue deposits oj exempt-rirms
which have not made a Section 936 election, e.g., local-exempt firms. These, however, are
likely to be small part of the total.
7. Yearend 1983, possession corporations funds may incluce deposits -y exemot-firms which hae
not made a Section 936 election, e.g., local exempt-firms. These, however, are likelY; to oe a
small part of the total. The financial assets listed do not include accounts receivaule or
other working capital.
8. Yearend 1983, Deposits in Puerto Rican banks includes about $800 milllon in saving banks.
9. Except, 1977 and 1978, it is not clear whether total investment out of Puerto Rico is 1nly
U.S. investment or investment outside the U.S.
10, Yearend 1986 Estimates are preliminary data from the Puerto Rico GDB.
Table 0.2
Components of the Puerto Rico Capital Account, 1970 to 1983
(Millions of 0olarz1
Year Ending
June 30 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19381 1982 1983
Direct investment in
Puerto Rico - change
in assets of mainly
possessions corporations
controlled offshore
Net short-term banking
flows
330 686 626 792 735 625 1483 1698 1682 378 2305 2636 -115 621
182 32 -25 114 39 306 59 -544 -211 -440 -551 -1362 -655 -371
Foreign holdings
of bank debts
Investment by
Puerto Rico's
banks abroad
45 20 102 248 227 453 48 -91 -72 197
-110 79 -4 -174 -25 -168 0 -457 -197 -763
-13 -384 114 -357
-490 -1001 -327 -533
External deposits
in Puerto Rico's
banks
Net foreign investment
in long-term Puerto
Rico's Government
obligations
Puerto Rico's investment
in U.S. Government
securities
Net foreign investment
in short-term debts of
Puerto Rico's public
corporations
Short-term investment
abroad by Puerto Rico's
public corporations
All other
TOTAL, NET
247 -57 -123 40 -163 21 -59 4 58 133 -95 29 58 19
131 307 448 404 590 896 175 352 -139 631 344 186 349 719
-15 -20 66 9 113 13 -29 -310 124 -191 -142
25 67 42 64 15 153 -37 111 -13 31 289
-7 -2 -15 0 -21 -88 -25 -48 -204 77 -631
195 86 184 -131 -59 -9 18 94 321 370 -25
891 1156 1327 1252 1412 1896 1644 1353 1560 1362 1583
24 -96 5
-11 169 -36
-41 175 40
161 301 210
1593 128 683
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Source: Puerto Rico Planning Board, Bureau of Economic Accounts and Cilsuses.
Notes:
(+) reflects increased investment in Puerto Rico by nonresidents and liquidation of foreign assets by
Table C.3
Gross Private Investment in Puerto Rico
(Millions of Current Oollars)
Fiscal Total Residential Ind. & Comm. Machinery & Change in
Year Construction Building Equipment Inventories*
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1065
1234
1268
1227
1138
1183
1197
873
1255
1317
1569
1312
416
747
761
1360
1994
382
417
426
435
375-
398
482
492
569
611
657
671
475
540
651
849
1022
50
114
136
192
104
139
138
-61
125
176
407
126
-542
-226
417
37
-409
Source: Puerto
Tables,
Rico Planning Board, "Informe Economico Al Governador",
A.2and Tables A.12: 1976; 1984; 1986; and 1987.
Note:
* Part of the net change in inventories may include inventories held
by public agencies.
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Appendix D
Table D.1
Total Deposits and Possession Corporation 2.71
Deposits in All Commercial Banks
(Million $)
Poss.Corp.
Total Percent Poss.Corp. Percent Deposits 7.
December Deposit Change Deposits Change Total Dep.
1976 5242 -- 986 -- 18.8
1977 6426 22.6 1745 77.0 27.2
1978 7209 12.2 1999 14.6 27.7
1979 8344 15.7 2862 43.2 34.3
1980 9663 15.8 3356 17.3 34.7
1981 11760 21.7 4601 37.1 39.1
1982 11476 (2.5) 4704 2.2 41.0
1983 12260 6.8 5093 8.3 41.5
1984 13844 12.9 5593 9.8 40.4
----- 7~GWf T~Pii-- ~Ri --~~iM 5~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
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Table D.2
Possession Corporations Deposits in
Puerto Rico.'s Banks and Savings & Loans Institutions
(Billion $)
Bi 1 lion
7-
7-
1983: 2 1983: 3 1983: 4 1984:
S & L's
1 1984: 2 1984: 3 1984: 4
Banks
iurce: Citibank of Puerto Rico, Economics Department, San Juan, March, 1985.
-m
Table D.3
Possesion Corporations Deposits
Structure of Puerto Rico's Commercial Banks Assets
June 30, 1960 to 1984 - (Billion $)
273
Billion
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1934
DUE FROM BANKS BOND & OTHERS
a a .
Citibank of
Puerto Rico,
Puerto Rico, Economics Department, San Juan,
March 1985.
/
ASSETS
a..* a
LOANS
Source:
Table D.4
Total Direct Possession Corporation Funds and 274
Commercial, Industrial and Agricultural Loans
All Puerto Rico Commercial Banks - March 1985
---------------------------------
ujiii
Balance
(Million $)
Total Direct Possession Corporation Funds 9659
Commercial Industrial and Agricultural
Loans (excluding loans to the financial and
public sector, and foreign loans). 2765
Other Loans 1571
Total Commercial and Industrial Loans 4337
Eligible Activities of Commercial, Industrial,
Agricultural Loans and Working Capital 3731
Percent of Eligible to Total Commercial,
Industrial and Agricultural Loans 86
Table D.5
Possession Corp oration Deposits
Components of Eligible Activities
All Puerto Rico Commercial Banks - March 1985
Monthly 7. Total
Average Eliqible
Eligible Activities Balance Activities
(Mil. $
Total Adjusted Commercial,
Industrial Agricultural
Loans and Wor king Capital 3731.3 44.9
Total Adjusted Mortgage Loans 1191.9 14.4
Investment in Government
Obligations 1889.0 22.8
Other Eligible Activities 1485.3 17.9
Total Eligible Activities 8297.5 100.0
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Figure 0.6
Distribution of Po$ssssion Corporations Depositsin Eligible Actiy1ties as Desi nated under the
Puerto Rico s Reinvestment Incentives
Fiscal Year 1984, (Percentages)
RESERVES-20 Z
MORTGAGES
27 %
CONSUMERS-11 % OTHER-5 %
TOTAL C& I
Source: Citibank of Puerto Rico, Department of Economics, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1985.
Table D.7
Puerto Rico's Savings and Loans Institutions 276
Annual Growth Rates: 1979-1983
-----------------------------------------
Puerto Rico United States
(7.) ()
-----------------------------------------
Total Assets 21.0 9.2
Total Loans 9.9 6.8
Mortgage Loans 8.9 6.5
Other 25.0 17.5
Total Liabilities 21.0 9.7
Total Deposits & Savings 12.0 8.7
Savings at Regular Rate 7.4 12.3
Savings above~Regular Rate 14.3 7.0
San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 1985.
Note: These data represent.annual growth rates within each
category.
Table D.8
Possession Corporation Deposits
Components of Eligible Activities
Puerto Rico's Federal Savings Banks
March 1985
--~---- - ~~~~~~~-------------------------~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~ To
Average Eligible
Amount Activities
(Mil. $) (Q)
Total Adjusted Commercial,
Industrial Aqricultural
Loans and Working Capital 170.9 7.2
Total Adjusted Mortgage
Loans 1765.9 74.9
Investment in Government
Obligations 201.2 8.5
Other Eligible Activities 221.1 9.4
Total Eligible Activities 2359.1 100.0
555 Eii DB 57~lif B~R i5; I98 -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Table D.9
Capital Notes Issued by Puerto Rico's
Savings & Loans Associations 277
(Million $)
1985 1984 1983 1982
First Federal Saving 50.0 65.8 100.0 100.0
Ponce Federal Saving 100.0 50.0
Caguas Federal 55.0 55.0
Western Federal 35.0
Oriental Federal 25.0
Total 265.0 170.8 100.0 100.0
965Hi.~GDP~T~Pii6~RI~~1-1985~~~~~~~~~~~~-------------------------
Table D.10
Puerto Rico's Federally Insured Savings & Loans - Federal Mutual Savings Banks
FHLBB Monthly Report - December 1983 - Selected Balance Sheets Items at End of Month(Million $)
ASSETS
Mortgage Loans: Construction
Other
Less: Loans in process
TOTAL (001+002-010)
Repossessed Real Estate:
Sold on Contr & Lns to Fac
Unsold or in Judgment
Guar.Mtges.Part.Mt e-Bck Secr
Non-Mtge Consumer Loans
Cash & Investments:
Eligible for Liquidity
Ineligible for liquidity
Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
Short-Tern Adv & Borr Money
Inc Capital & Net Worth Cert
Appraised Equity Capital
MORTGAGE ACTIVITY DURING MONTH:
Construction Loans Closed:
Condomi ni ums
1-4 Family Homes
5 or more Dwelling Units
Non-residential
Loans Closed for Purchasing:
Single-Family -- newly built
prev.occpd
2-3 Dwelling UNits
5 or more Dwelling Units
Non-residential
Land Loans Closed
Refinancing Loans Closed
Loans Closed all other purp
TOTAL LOANS CLO SED
Loans & Parts Purchased
Loans & Parts Sold
Cash Repayments of Principal
Debits less Credits exc Repmts
Net Change in Mtge Loan Port
Prev rptd Constr/Prem Loans
completed this month
Refinancing Loans (noncash port)
Delinquent Mtge Loans & Contr
New Mortgage Loans Commitments:
To Originate Loans
To Purchase Loans from others
(1) 108.1(2) 1523.0(10) 35.2
1595.8
(3) 12.1(4) 23.2(5) 501.0(6) 129.6
(7) 464.6
(8) 644.3(9) 270.6
it (50) 3641.1
(161) 821.9(162) 42.0(163) 5.9
(201)(214)(204)(205)
(206)(207)(208)(209)(210)(211)(212)(213)(220)(221)(222)(223)
(224)(250)
2.0
2.0
5.0
0.2
2.2
1.7
0.0
0.0
1.6
0.006
4.3
1.2
20.2
2.4
3.4
12.4
-1.1
5.8
LIABILITIES AND REGULATORY NET WORTH
Deposits in Accounts Earning:
Greater than Reg PassBk Rate
In Cert
Other
Reg PassBk Rate or Less
FHLB Advances
Other Borrowed Money
Other Liabilities
Regulatory Net Worth
TOTAL LIAB & REG NET WORTH
(101)(102)(103)(104)(105)
. (107)(108)
* (150)
MORTGAGE LOAN COMMITMENTS OUTSTANDING:
To Originate Loans (303)
To Purchase Loans from others (304)
To Sell Loans to other (305)
Net Disbursement (303+304+305)
within 3 months t (306)
4-5 months (307)
over 6 months (308)
OTHER COMMIT. FUTURES & OPENING POSITIONS:
Short-put Options & Other
Commit. to Purchase %**(402)
Short-call Options & Other
Commit. to Sell (403)
Long-put & Long-call Options (404)
Short-put & Long-put Options (405)
Unreg Gains/Losses (put & opt) (406)
SAVINGS ACTIVITY DURING MONTH:
Int/Dividends Credited
New Savings Received
Savings Withdrawn
Net Ch ange (501+502+503)
SELECTED INCOME/EXPENSE ITEMS (F
Interest on Mtge Loans & Contr
Interest on Investments
Other Operating Income
Other Non-operating Income
TOTAL INCOME
Operating Expense
(261) 0.9 Interest/Dividends on Savings
(262) 0.03 Interest on Adv & Borrowed Money
(263) 83.6 Non-operating Expense
Federal & State ncome Taxes
TOTAL EXPENSE
(301) 7.7 NET INCOME
(302) 2.2 No. Months Included Fiscal YTD
Assets Acquired this month = 1
953.1
697.3
719.8
113.7
950.6
65.2
141.4
3641.1
130.1
15.7
0.0
28.9
30.6
86.2
9.9
15.0
0.0
6.2
11.5
(506) 13.1(502) 901.8(503) 854.9(550) 59.9
ISCAL YTD)
(601)
(602)
(603)
(604)(620)
(621)
(622)
(623)
(624)
(625)
(640)
(650)
(661)
(701)
STATUS:
20.1
9.9
3.2
0.4
33.5
6.6
15.8
8.4
0.2
0.2
31.2
N/A
0.0
Notes:
* Beg 9/82 these flds are net of def liab items reclass as contra-assets items (exc Sep rptd L-I-P), see
Ins Reg 565.13 (B) (2).
** Beg 9/82 fld 050=sum of 001 thru 009 less 010 and fld 150=sum of 101 thru 106 plus 107 thru 108.
*t Prior to 1/83 data is old fld 401 (other commit to purch loans/securities).
N/C not collected this month.
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Table D.11
Puerto Rico, Federally Insured Savings & Loans - Federal Mutual Savings Banks
FHLB Monthly Report - December 1984 - Selected Balance Sheets Items at End of Month(Million $)
ASSETS
Mortgage Loans: Construction *
Other
Less: Loans in process
TOTAL (001+002-010)
Repossessed Real Estate:
Sold on Contr & Lns to Fac
Unsold or in Judgment
Guar.Mtges.Part.Mtge-Bck Secr
Non-Mg t Consumer Loans
Cash & Investments:
Eligible for Liquidity
Ineligible for liquidity
Other Assets
TOTAL ASSETS
Short-Term Adv & Borr Money
Inc Capital & Net Worth Cert
Appraised Equity Capital
MORTGAGE ACTIVITY DURING MONTH:
Construction Loans Closed:
Condominiums
1-4 Family Homes
5 or more Dwelling Units
Non-residential
Loans Closed for Purchasing:
Single-Family -- newly built
prev.occpd
2-4 Dwelling Units
5 or more Dwelling Units
Non-residential
Land Loans Closed
Refinancing Loans Closed
Loans Closed all other purp
TOTAL LOANS CLOSED
Loans & Parts Purchased
Loans & Parts Sold
Cash Repayments of Principal
Debits less Credits exc Reprts
Net Change in Mtge Loan Port
Prev rptd Constr/Prem Loans
completed this month
Refinancing Loans (noncash port)
Delinquent Mtge Loans & Contr
New Mortgage Loans Commitments:
to originate loans
to purchase loans from others
LIABILITIES AND REGULATORY NET WORTH
(1)(2)(10)
(3)
(4)(5)(6)
(7)(8)(9)
it (50)
(161)(162)(163)
(201)
(214)(204)(205)
(206)(207)(208)(209)(210)(211)
(212)(213)(220)(221)(222)(223)(224)(250)
(261)(262)(263)
116.8
1466.3
53.4
1529.7
12.1
23.0
731.4
233.5
700.2
935.6
332.2
4497.7
1230.9
67.0
6.0
0.0
3.0
0.6
6.0
1.7
0.8
0.1
0.0
0.9
0.1
1.5
0.9
15.5
6.3
4.4
14.6
0.1
1.9
0.3
0.1
82.1
(301) 17.1(302) 4.2
Deposits in Accounts Earning:
Greater than Reg PassBk Rate
In Cert
Other
Reg PassBk Rate or Less
FHLB Advances
Other Borrowed Money
Other Liabilities
Regulatory Net Worth
TOTAL LIAB & REG NET WORTH
(101)(102)
(103)(104)(105)(107)(108)(150)
MORTGAGE LOAN COMMITMENTS OUTSTANDING:
To Originate Loans (303)
To Purchase Loans from others (304)
To Sell Loans to other (305)
Net Disbursement (303+304+305)
within 3 months : (306)
4-5 months - (307)
over 6 months (308)
OTHER COMMIT. FUTURES & OPENING POSITIONS:
Short-put Options & Other
Commit. to Purchase t:(402)
Short-call Options & Other
Commit. to Sell (403)
Long-put & Long-call Options (404)
Short-put & Long-put Options (405)
Unreg Gains/Losses (put & opt) (406)
SAVINGS ACTIVITY DURING MONTH:
Int/Dividends Credited (506)
New Savings Received (502)
Savings Withdrawn (503)
Net Change (501+502+503) (550)
SELECTED INCOME/EXPENSE ITEMS (FISCAL YTD)
Interest on Mtge Loans & Contr (601)
Interest on Investments (602)
Other Operating Income (603)
Other Non-operating Income (604)
TOTAL INCOME (620)
Operating Expense (621)
Interest/Dividends on Savings (622)
Interest on Adv & Borrowed Money
Non-operating Expense
Federal & State Income Taxes
TOTAL EXPENSE
NET INCOME
No. Months Included Fiscal YTD
Assets Acquired this month = 1
(623)(624)(625)(640)(650)(661)(701)
7 iiPif Ri5DiiiiT iT y 985 , F95 eiTl Hi Loan Bank Board 1983.
Notes:
* Beg 9/82 these flds are net of def liab items reclass as contra-assets items (exc Sep rptd L-I-P
Ins Reg 565.13 (B) (2).
Beg 9/82 fld 050=sum of 001 thru 009 less 010 and fld 150=sum of 101 thru 106 plus 107 thru 108.
it: Prior to 1/83 data is old fld 401 (other commit to purch loans/securities).
N/C not collected this month.
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1085.5
862.2
688.1
109.2
1464.3
77.3
211.1
4497.7
87.3
0.9
0.0
23.1
16.2
48.9
41.2
0.0
0.0
6.2
0.0
16.2
741.9
731.3
26.9
STATUS:
21.3
13.8
5.6
2.3
43.0
8.7
18.0
12.9
1.5
-0.3
40.8
A. .
N/A
0.0
Table D.12
Puerto Rico Federally Insured Savings & Loans - Federal Mutual Savings Banks
FHLB Monthly Report - March 1983 - Selected Balance Sheets Items at End of Month
(Million $)
ASSETS
Mortgage Loans: Construction
Other
Less: Loans in process
TOTAL (001+002-010)
Repossessed Real Estate:
Sold on Contr & Lns to Fac
Unsold or in Judgment
Guar.Mtges.Part.Mtge-Bck Secr
Non-Mtge Consumer oans
Cash & Investments:
Eligible for Liquidity
Ineligible for liquidity
Other Assets *
TOTAL ASSETS t
Short-Tern Adv & Borr Money
Inc Capital & Net Worth Cert
Appraised Equit.y Capital
MORTGAGE ACTIVITY DURING MONTH:
Construction Loans Closed:
Condominiums
1-4 Family Homes
5 or more Dwelling Units
Non-residential
Loans Closed for Purchasing:
Single-Family -- newly built
prev.occpd
2-3 Dwelling UNits
5 or more Dwelling Units
Non-residential
Land Loans Closed
Refinancing Loans Closed
Loans Closed all other purp
TOTAL LOANS CLOSED
Loans & Parts Purchased
Loans & Parts Sold
Cash Repayments of Principal
Debits less Credits exc Repats
Net Change in Mtge Loan Port
Prev rptd Constr/Prem Loans
completed this month
Refinancing Loans (noncash port)
Delinquent Mtge Loans & Contr
New Mortgage Loans Commitments:
to originate loans
to purchase loans from others
LIABILITIES AND REGULATORY NET WORTH
(1) 114.0(2) 1457.4(10) 51.0
1520.5
(3) 11.3(4) 22.6(5) 755.3(6) 274.3
(7) 756.2(8) 978.9(9) 354.5
: (50) 4673.5
(161) 1220.7(162) 56.2(163) 6.0
(201)(214)(204)(205)
(206)(207)(208)(209)(210)(211)(212)(213)
(220)
(221)(222)(223)(224)(250)
(261)(262)(263)
0.0
1.5
0.0
1.3
2.0
1.4
0.0
0.0
0.2
4.3
0.8
0.5
11.9
5.0
5.1
13.8
2.4
0.4
0.2
0.4
110.7
(301) 15.6(302) 3.7
De osits in Accounts Earning:
breater than Reg PassBk Rate
In Cert
Other
Reg PassBk Rate or Less
FHLB Advances
Other Borrowed Money
Other Liabilities
Regulatory Net Worth
TOTAL LIAB & REG NET WORTH
(101)(102)
(103)(104)(105)(107)(108)(150)
MORTGAGE LOAN COMMITMENTS OUTSTANDING:
To Originate Loans (303)
To Purchase Loans from others (304)
To Sell Loans to other (305)
Net Disbursement (303+304+305)
within 3 months (306)
4-5 months (307)
over 6 months (308)
OTHER COMMIT. FUTURES & OPENING POSITIONS:
Short-put Options & Other
Commit. to Purchase V**(402)
Short-call Options & Other
Commit. to Sell (403)
Long-put & Long-call Options (404)
Short-put & Long-put Options (405)
Unreg Gains/Losses (put & opt) (406)
SAVINGS ACTIVITY DURING MONTH:
Int/Dividends Credited (506)
New Savings Received (502)
Savinqs Withdrawn (503)
Net Change (501+502+503) (550)
SELECTED INCOME/EXPENSE ITEMS (FISCAL YTD)
Interest on Mtge Loans & Contr (601)
Interest on Investments (602)
Other Operating Income (603)
Other Non-operating Income (604)
TOTAL INCOME (620)
Operating Expense (621)
Interest/Dividends on Savings (622)
Interest on Adv & Borrowed honey
Non-operating Expense
Federal & State income Taxes
TOTAL EXPENSE
NET INCOME
No. Months Included Fiscal YTD
Assets Acquired this month = 1
(623)(624)(625)(640)(650)(661)(701)
Notes:
: Beg 9/82 these flds are net of def liab items reclass as contra-assets items (exc Sep rptd L-I-P), see
Ins Reg 565.13 (B) (2).
*: Beq 9/82 fld 050=sum of 001 thru 009 less 010 and fld 150=sum of 101 thru 106 plus 107 thru 108.
*fl Prior to 1/83 data is old fld 401 (other commit to purch loans/securities).
N/C not collected this month.
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1104.9
892.0
704.2
108.6
1515.0
117.4
231.3
4673.5
89.4
1.5
0.0
26.6
14.7
49.6
69.2
7.1
7.3
6.2
0.0
14.6
804.6
779.1
40.2
STATUS:
20.8
15.4
5.1
0.9
42.2
8.3
17.1
13.0
0.3
0.1
38.9
3.3
N/A
0.0
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Chart D. 13
Total Assets, Puerto Rico Government Development Bank
Period 1974 to 1984 . (Billion $)
Legend:
$ BILLION
'1978 1980 1982
ASSETS
CASH. CD'S
SECURITIES
LOANS
1984
Source: Citibank of Puerto Rico, Department of Economics, San Juan, 1985.
3.5
3. 0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
1974 1976
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Table D.14
Total Deposits and Possession Corporation Deposits
Puerto Rico Domestic and Foreign Banks
(Million $
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND TOTAL DOMESTIC BANKS FOREIGN BANKS
Total Deposits 7 of Total Deposits X of Total
Total Poss.Corp. Total Poss.Corp. 7 of Total Poss.Corp Total Poss.Corp.7 of Total Poss.Corp.
Deposit Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposits Deposit Deposits Deposits Deposits
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1976 5242 986 3174 249 7.8 25.3 2068 737 35.6 74.7
1977 6426 1745 3367 383 11.4 21.4 3059 1362 44.5 78.1
1978 7209 1999 3768 423 11.2 21.2 3441 1576 45.8 78.8
1979 8344 2862 4547 886 19.5 31.0 3797 1976 52.0 69.0
1980 9663 3356 4956 812 16.4 24.2 4707 2544 54.0 75.8
1981 11760 4601 5710 1075 18.8 23.4 6050 3526 58.3 76.6
1982 11476 4704 5774 1242 21.5 26.4 5702 3462 60.7 73.6
1983 12260 5093 6230 1400 22.5 27.5 6030 3693 61.2 72.5
1984 13844 5593 7066 1507 21.3 26.9 6778 4086 60.2 73.1
7. of 1976-84 Total 25.3 74.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table D.15
Distribution of Possession Corporations Deposits
Total Total
Bank Poss.
Dep. Corp.
Dep.
Among All Banks in Puerto Rico:
Poss.Corp. Funds:
Through Through
'Repos' Redep.
1979 to 1984(Million $)
1981
Total Poss. Poss.Corp. Funds Poss.Corp. Excess
Poss. Corp. --------- Funds Eligible
Corp. Direct Through Through From Assets
Dep. Dep. 'Repos" Redep. 4\1980 4\1980
1984 *2*2
So1-------- ---- ---------
Total Corp. Poss.Corp. Funds: Poss.Corp. Excess
Poss. Direct ---- ------ Funds Eligible
Corp. Dep. I Through Through From Assets
Dep. 'Repos" Brokers Redep. 12\1981 12\1981
Chase Manhattan
Citibank
Bank of America
Continental 111.
Bank of Boston
Total U.S. Banks
1466 629 654 654 0 0 935
1327 686 734 734 0 0 1450
329 261 311 310 0 0 403
-- -- -- -- 0 0 307
,3122 1576 1699 1698
915
1289
341
285
1355
1429
421
196
148
0 0 3094 2829 170 95 1396
1355
1312
421
176
145
-24 3549 3409
0 0 420 125
117 0 21 114
0 0 19 7
13 7 -111 9
0 3 148 10
130 9 455 265
Banco Popular
Banco de Ponce
Banco Roig
Con. de Mayaguez
Bance Central
Banco de San Juan
Banco de Santander
Scotiabank
Other Local Banks t
Total Local & Domestic
Commercial Banks *t
Royal Bank of Canada
Bank of Nova Scotia
Total Canadian Banks
Savings Banks
1955 349 450 358 86 7 449
912 201 250 215 14 21 276
-- 
- -- -- 0 -- 53
-- -- - - -- - 37
-- -- -- -- -- -- 343
- - - - -- -- 77
- - - - - - 53
426 229 184 125 - 59 101
4546
12
26
16
16
34
'45
44
I
637
372
97
347
109
164
107
228
420
249
7
106
49
90
80
61
896 1183 789 185 209 1483 906 240 337 290 184 2061 1051 595 415 578 316
459 191 258 258 0 0 284 284 0 0 57
216 209 227 212 0 15 334 334 0 0 76
166
209
-118
-77
675 400 486 470 0 15 619 619 0 0 133 32 422 374 0 48 196 34
-- -- -- -- -- -- 543 2 534 7 410 486 809 181 . 619 9 266 247
Total All Banksittl 8344 2862 3142 * 2957 185 224 5301 4354 947 439 2027 678 , 6358 5015 1343
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury, Commercial Banks 936 Monthly Report.
Notes:
t Statistic for 'other local banks' was reported in 1984.$1 Deposits of smaller domestic and local banks are not displayed individually on this table. Their deposits are reflected in the subtotal for domestic and local banks.
.Att "Total all banks' refers to the sum of direct deposits and repurchase agreements. Total redeposits funds were not added to 'Total All Banks' to avoid counting the
same funds twice for the system as a whole.
tttt In April 1980 savings banks had $31 million of redeposits, $47 million through repos, and $3 million of redeposits. All banks, including savings banks, therefore
had a total of $3220 in possessions corporations funds.
Data on this table is based on the information available. Breakdown of the information per year is not uniform. There are minor discrepancies in some subtotals.
1979
Banks
1980
Total
Poss.
Corp.
Dep.
Poss.
Corp.
Direct
Dep.
481 1057 962
Table D.16
Distribution of Possession Corporation Funds
in Puerto Rico All Banks, Selected Dates
284
Total
Poss.Corp.
Funds in
Banks
(Mil.$)
1699
999
184
486
** 3142
3349
1334
727
422
809
** 6358
Total Bank Funds as % of:
Direct Repurchase
Deposits Agreements
54.0
21.1
4.0
15.0
94.1
54.0
11.6
5.0
5.9
2.9
79.9
Redeposits
Received
5.9 4.8
1.9
0.5
2.0
6.7
2.7
9.7
21.1
Banks 936 Monthly Report.
Notes: *Data were not available.
UThe total was adjusted to avoid double counting of
deposits. Direct deposits plus repurchase agreement
equal 100 percent.
Table D.17
Direct Possession Corporation Repurchase Agreement
by Rate, Term and Amount
Puerto Rico, Domestic and Foreign Banks - March 1985
DOMESTIC BANKS
Balance Rate
(Mil.$) (7)
1 - 90 days
91 - 180 days
181 days - 1 yr
1 - 2 years
2 - 3 years
3 - 4 years
4 - 5 years
5 - 8 years
8 years over
Total
308.2
40.4
11.0
6.51
7.90
11.31
359.6 6.81
FOREIGN BANKS TOTAL BANKS
Balance Rate Balance Rate
(Mil.$) (Q) (Mil.$) (z)
0 0 308.2 6.51
0 0 40.4 7.90
0 0 11.0 11.31
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 359.6 6.81
Banks
..APRIL 1980
U.S.
Domestic
Local
Other
Canadian
Savings
Total All
Banks
.. APRIL 1984
U.S.
Domestic
Local
Other
Canadian
Savings
Total All
Banks
555i~si~5--~--~----------~~-----~~-~-~-~~~~~~~~~-~
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Table D.18
Direct Possession Corporation Deposits
by Rate, Term and Amount
Puerto Rico, Domestic and Foreign Banks - March 1985
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOMESTIC BANKS FOREIGN BANKS TOTAL BANKS
Balance Rate Maturity Balance Rate Maturity Balance Rate Maturity
(Mil.$) (W) (Q) (Mil.$) (%) () (Mil.$) (X) (X)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 - 90 days 731.0 7.23 56.7 3288.0 6.92 73.4 4019.0 6.98 69.7
91 - 180 days 163.0 8.41 12.6 371.0 7.62 8.3 534.0 7.86 9.3
181 days - 1 yr 235.0 8.23 18.2 391.0 8.15 8.7 626.0 8.18 10.8
1 - 2 years 56.0 12.77 4.3 89.0 10.75 2.0 145.0 11.53 2.5
2 - 3 years 31.0 8.24 2.4 59.0 10.97 1.3 90.0 10.03 1.6
3 - 4 years 32.0 9.48 2.5 86.0 9.08 1.9 118.0 9.19 2.0
4 - 5 years 35.0 9.38 2.7 167.0 9.94 3.7 202.0 9.84 3.5
5 - 8 years 6.0 -9.27 0.5 -30.0 10.32 0.7 36.0 10.15 0.6
8 years over 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0
Total 1289.0 7.95 100.0 4481.0 7.39 100.0 5770.0 7.52 100.0
936T-fni~Tiiily~~C5misiciiT~rin~s ~~nthly-Report.
936 Monthly Report.
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Figure D.19
Possession Corporations Deposits Maturity Schedule
All Puerto Rico's Banks, Funds Received December 1984
31-60 Days-31 I
365 Days +-3 %
61-90 Days-13%
91-360 Days- 24 Z
Source: Citibank of Puerto Rico, Department of Economics, San Juan, 1985.
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Table D.20
Comparison of Possession Corporation
and Eurodollar Certificates of Deposit
Interest Rate in All Banks in Puerto Rico
(Every Three-Month Deposit Rate and Quarterly Average)
RATIO POSSESSION CORPORATION TO EURODOLLAR RATES
Quarterly
March June September December Average
1976 69 69
1977 66 67 64 69 67
1978 63 68 73 86 73
1979 95 93 89 83 90
1980 64 80 82 81 77
1981 87 87 85 90 87
1982 57 64 71 - 64 64
1983 61 79 83 80 76
1984 87 70 76 73 77
1985 75 82 74 81 78
1986 84 81 87 88 85
1987 83 77 80
Source: GDB of Puerto Rico "A Complementary View of
the 936 Issue," 1985 Report, Appendix 1, p.10. Manuel
Escobar, The 436 Market: An Introduction 1982, p.30,
U.S. Treasury, 1980, p.97; and 1985, p. 78.
Notes: 1. Data for the period 1976-1979 come from the
1980 U.S. Treasury Report.
2. Data for 1980 and 1981 come from M.Escobar's
article The 936 Market: An Introduction.
3. Data for 1982 come from the 1985 U.S.
Treasury Report.
4. Data for the period 1983-1985 come from the
GDB of Puerto Rico.
5. Data for the period 1985-1987 come from the
1987 U.S. Treasury Report.
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Figure D.21
Possession Corporations Deposit Rates Vs. Eurodollar Rates
All Banks in Puerto Rico, (Percentages)
1984 1985
Jan.1983 - July 1985
ource: GDB of Puerto Rico,
983 1986
1985.
289Table D.22
Possession Corporation Financial Market
Total Incremental Eligible Activity vs.
Total Investment Requirement - All Banks
(Monthly Averages in Million $)
Incremental
Month Eligible
Activity
May
June
September
December
March
June
September
December
March
June
September
December
March
June
September
December
March
April
4203.7
4158.0
4201.1
4776.1
4808.7
5197.7
5701.3
6202.0
5293.9
5085.3
5198.8
5397.8
5563.2
6641.2
6628.2
6978.0
7175.1
7384.2
Investment
Requirement
on Possession
Corporation
Funds
3414.2
3342.8
3094.2
3777.9
3854.5
4233.6
4855.3
5480.5
5137.4
4740.7
4860.5
5105.1
5323.7
5986.9
5967.7
6244.5
6387.0
6521.7
Table D.23
Chanqe in Total Possession Corporation Funds
and Eligi6le Assets from December 1980 to December 1981
(Monthly Averages in Million $)
December 1980 December 1981
Total Possession
Corporation Funds
Total Incremental
Eligible Assets
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Excess
Eligible
Assets
789.5
815.2
1106.9
998.2
954.2
964.1
846.0
721.5
156.5
344.6
338.3
292.7
239.5
654.2
660.5
733.4
787.5
862.4
3288
4776
4354
6202
Change
1066
1426
Table D.24
Possession Corporation Financial Market
Brokers Activities in February 1982 and April 1984
(Monthly Averages in Miliion $)
Eligible Activities
Directly Generated
Generated Through
Other Eligible
Institutions (Banks)
Possession Corporation
Received Directly
Through Repos With
Possession Corporation
Received Through
Loans and Repos
from Banks
February April %
1982 1984 Change
116 726 526
819 1287
385 1797
477 179 -62
Table D.25
Possession Corporation Deposits For Financial Institutions
Eligible Activity Generation Requirements
(Puerto Rico's Treasury Department Rulings)
Possession
Corporation as.%
Eurodollar Rate
to 64.5
to 69.9
to 74.9
to 79.9
to 84.9
to 89.9
and over
Additional Units
of Eligible Funds
Received
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Eligible Activity
Generation
Requirement
1.00
1.05
1.15
1.22
1.35
1.54
2.00
290
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Table D.26
Difference Between Possession Corporation Average Rates
and Commercial Paper Average Rates
TOTAL
NEW DEPOSITS
1 - 90 DAYS
Average
Balance
(Mil.$)
Average
Rate
()
1704 7.28
1237 8.153
1080 6.328
Commercial
Paper Average
1 - 90 Days
()
8.88
10.1
8.49
Difference
New Deposits Rate
To Commercial Paper
1 - 90 Days
(M)
-1.6
-1.947
-2.162
(Commercial Banks 936 Report); Federal Reserve Bulletin; and 90 Days
Commercial Paper.
Table D.27
Estimated Savings To Banks on Possession Corporation Deposits
-TOTT DIRNBNEC P SOI :
OUTSTANDING BALANCES 9
Average
Balance
(Mil.$)
1983 4526
1984 5060
1985 5544
Average
Balance
(Mil.$)
2711
3303
3839
i: Difference () of
I to 90 Days
Possession
Corporation
New Deposits Rate
to Commercial Paper
Estimated
Savings to
Banks
(Mil.$)
-1.600
-1.947
-2.162
th5FErasury Co~ P l afnkR s ~9957~Pu6 f 65ReporDp iiinf~5T~~~~~~~
the Treasury (Commercial Banks 936 Report).
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Average
Balance
(Mil.$)
1983 2040
1984 1496
1985 1338
Average
Rate
()
7.3
8.235
6.452
Figure D.28
Possession Corporations Deposits
Capital-Asset and Capital-Deposit Ratios
Domestic Banks of Puerto Rico
Percent (End of Dec.)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
CAPITAL TO
TOTAL ASSETS
CAPITAL TO
TOTAL DEP.
Source:GDB of Puerto Rico, 1985.
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9.0
8. 0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
293Table D.29
Possession Corporation Deposits
Capital-Asset and Capital-Deposit Ratios
Domestic Banks - December - (U)
Capital to Capital to
Years Total Assets Total Deposits
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
7.3
7.1
6.0
5.7
5.8
4.9
5.3
5.3
6.7
6.4
6.6
Source: GDB of Puerto Rico, 1985.
Table D.30
Possession Corporation Deposits
Commercial Banks' Resources and Selected Loans
Calendar Years 1974 to 1984
(Million $)
Bank Industrial
Resources Loans
5408
5940
6729
7749
8479
9922
11504
13791
13859
15303
16324
1530
1587
1580
1849
2099
2297
2762
3025
2857
3464
4167
Real
Estate
Loans
1246
1361
1380
1304
1207
1181
1282
1375
1334
1458
1598
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
------------
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Chart 0.31
Puerto Rico, Banks Resources and Gross National Product
Millions $
Gross National Product
In Current $
(End of June)
-- *Total Resources of
Commercial Banks
(End of December)
- -pp
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 19841974
Source: GDB of Puerto Rico, 1985.
17000
16000
15000
14000
13000
12000
11000
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
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Table D.32
Profitability All Commercial Banks (Thousands )
December December March
1/ 1/ 2/
1975 1984 1985
Estimated
December
1985
Net Income before
related taxes
Domestic Banks
Foreign Banks
Franchise tax
and other taxes
Domestic Banks
Foreign Banks
Charge - offs
Domestic Banks
Foreign Banks
7910 74189 37978 151912
8663 90357 27161 108644
(753) (16168) 10817 43268
3620
2230
1390
20491
11925
8566
28050
19260
8790
21676
18892
2784
8170 32680
7223 28892
947 3788
5785 23140
2420
3365
9680
13460
of the Treasury, Commercial Banks Annual Report, andQuarterly Income Statement of Commercial Banks
Notes: 1 Treasury Department, Commercial Banks Annual Report
2 Treasury Department, Quarterly Income Statement
of Commercial Banks
Table 0.33
Cost of Commercial, Industrial
Construction Loans Financed with
(Aggregate Totals of Four
Agricultural, and
ossession Corporation Funds
Selected Banks)
March 1975 March 1985
(Million $) 1488 2175
Yield
Average Rate
Adjus ted Rate
Average Monthly
Prime Rate
Differential Adjusted
Over Prime
10
11
8
+3.46
-----~--~--~P -Rii-~~~~~
Notes: Differential March 1985 to March 1975 : -4.05
Estimated Annual Savings to the four selected banks clients
(thousands $) : 87350.
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Table D.34
Government Development Bank
Analysis of Institutions Authorized to Received
Possession Corporation Funds: May 1985
(Monthly Grant Total - All Banks & Savings: Deposit and
Participation with the GDB for Puerto Rico; in Million of Dollars)
1985 1985 1985 1985 198
1. Daily Average of Deposits
and/or Investments in he
GDB During the Month.........
Change........
2. Daily Average for the Month
of Loans to and/or Investments
in Obliqations of the Government
of Puerto Rico, or any of its
Instrumentalities or Political
Subdivisions........ ......
Change..........
3. If Federally Chartered S&L
Daily Average for the Month of
Qualifying Mortgage Loans
Pursuant to Article 10(h)......
Change..........
924.6 909.6 868.4 980.2 961.1
0.8 -15.0 -41.3 111.8 -19.1
963.2 967.6 1046.7 1061.0 1081.8
5.8 4.4 78.6 14.9 20.8
463.2 449.8 380.7 372.9 368.2
77.8 -13.4 -69.1 -7.8 -4.7
through 3........
Change..........
2351.0 2327.1
84.5 -23.9
2295.2 2414.1 2411.0
-31.9 118.9 -3.0
5557-i-~-D-~-T--i---~----~----~~~~~~~~~-~~-~-~-~~-~-~
Total Items 1I
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Chart D.35
Puerto Rico's Obligations
Net Interest Cost vs Bond Buyer Index
(Dec . 1974 to Dec. 1984)
Dec. Nov. Dec. Dec. Dec. Jan. Jan. Jan. Dec. Dec. Dec.
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1981 1982 1982 1983 1984
Source: GDB of Puerto Rico, 1985.
14
12
10
8
6
4
Interest Costs in
Agency
1975 Commonwealth of P.R.
P.R. Urban Renewal &
Housing Corp.
P.R. Telephone Authority
Commonwealth of P.R.
P.R. Highway Authority
P.R. Water Resources
1976 P.R. Highway Authority
P.R. Telephone Authority
University of Puerto Rico
P.R. Water Resources
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer
1977 P.R. Highway Authority
Commonwealth of P.R.
P.R. Highway Authority
Puerto Rico Ports
1978 P.R. Public Buildings
P.R. Industrial Dev. Co.
P.R. Telephone Authority
P.R. Water Resources
P.R. Telephone Authority
Commonwealth of P.R.
1979 P.R. Public Buildings
P.R. Telephone Authority
P.R. Water Resources
1980 P.R. Telephone Authority
Commonwealth of P.R.
P.R. Public Buildings
1981 P.R. Telephone Authority
P.R. Electricity Authority
P.R. Electricity Authority
Table D.36
Puerto Rican Bond Issues Sold
1975 - 1981
(1) (2) (3)
Net Interest
Amount Date Cost on
(Million $) P.R. Bonds
80.0
67.0
75.0
75.0
50.0
50.0
35.0
50.0
22.7
60.0
35.0
62.5
300.0
75.0
29.5
110.0
40.0
100.0
125.0
25.0
100.0
125.0
110.0
100.0
50.0
300.0
100.0
75.0
75.0
100.0
1-29-75
2-26-75
4-17-75
5-22-75
7-18-75
11-13-75
2-27-76
5-13-76
8-18-76
10-13-76
12-10-76
2-18-77
4-14-77
8-10-77
11-17-77
2-14-78
3-31-78
6-29-78
9-26-78
11-15-78
11-17-78
4-05-79
6-06-79
10-18-79
1-24-80
5-07-80
8-07-80
3-12-81
6-11-81
7-30-81
8.00
7.98
9.13
9.00
9.42
9.92
9.96
8.99
9.15
8.23
7.88
7.61
7.89
6.99
7.33
7.72
7.98
7.99
7.70
7.56
7.98
7.90
7.56
9.07
8.95
9.37
10.31
11.20
11.97
12.35
(4)
Bond
Buyer
Index
6.54
6.40
6.86
7.09
6.98
7.43
6.98
6.71
6.60
6.33
5.96
Column(3)
Less
Column(4)
1.46
1.58
2.27
1.91
2.44
2.49
2.98
2.28
2.55
1.90
1.92
5.86 1.75
5.70 2.19
5.63 1.36
5.45 1.88
5.61
5.69
6.31
6.12
6.11
6.11
2.11
2.29
1.68
1.58
1.45
1.87
6.28 1.62
6.09 1.47
7.18 1.89
7.33 1.62
7.96 1.41
8.59 1.72
10.40
10.59
11.34
0.80
1.38
1.01
- - - - - ---DB -TPi f- --ii-~~ ~-~-~~ ~-~-~
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Table E.1
Commonwealth Government of Puerto Rico : Recurrent Receipts Fiscal Years, 1978 to 1987, (Million $)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
TOTAL
PUERTO RICO SOURCES
TAXABLE
Property Taxes
Income Tax, Total
Individuals
Corporations
Partnerships
Withheld to nonresidents
Tollgate Tax
Certificate of deposits
Interest Subject to 17%
Interest on Dividends at 20%
Inheritance and gift taxes
1,508 1,630 1,809 1,985 2,095 2,292 2,517 2,629 2,916 3,283
1,296 1,394 1,568 1,684 1,814 1,967 2,092 2,214 2,638 2,980
1,222 1,310 1,489 1,607 1,727 1,872 1,993 2,103 2,528 2,852
47 56 57 74 85 106 110 89 95 98
643 738 863 967 1,099 1,192 1,248 1,332 1,703 1,851
381 444 514 591 647 658 667 727 816 883
181 198 234 282 316 353 372 444 618 732
9 4 7 7 4 3 2 4 4 5
23 27 27 31 46 57 45 49 46 65
49 65 81 56 85 121 162 108 88 120
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 129 16
--- - -- -- - -- -- 3 9
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 20
9 10 10 12 14 20 8 7 5 5
Excise Taxes Total
Alcoholic heverages,
Distilled Spirits
Beer
Others
Other Goods Total
Tobacco Products
Petroleum Products
Motor Vehicles
Accessories
Electrical & Gas Appliances
Admissions Public Events
Horse Races
License Fees
Petroleum Imports
General Excise Tax of 5%
s/Petroleum&derivatives
Others
Licenses
Motor Vehicles
Alcoholic Beverages
Others
NON TAXABLE
Lottery Proceeds
Others
NON PUERTO RICO SOURCES
U.S.Customs Duties
U.S. Excises Off-shore Shipments
Federal Grants
380 352 396 380 349 366 430 468 514
71 72 83 91 95 89 95 96 96
5 6 6 5 5 5 6 7 6
90 100 82 93 66 75 117 141 151
14 14 15 14 12 14 15 16 18
26 34 34 32 29 34 42 37 39
4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
12 12 10 13 14 14 15 14 15
8 8 9 10 10 10 11 13 14
58 5 40 0.03 0.2 0.1 -- -- -
82 83 94 97 93 97 106 122 133
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 16
10 12 18 22 23 25 21 20 23
74 84 79 77 87 95 99 111 110 128
39 45 41 39 49 47 47 54 45 53
35 39 38 38 38 47 52 57 65 76
212 236 240 301 281 325 425 415 278 303
57 64 49 67 64 46 74 83 78 93
150 172 192 234 218 279 350 331 201 210
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury.
Notes: 1983, includes $127.7 millions in relation with the Amnesty (Law #2 January
1984, includes $18.9 millions in relation to certain taxable properties (Law
4 1983).
#37, October, 4, 1983)
Total
Parent Company &
SIC # Possession Corporations
Table E.2
Industry-By-Industry Analysis
List of C osing Agreements
1978. to 1985
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 300
Abbott Laboratories Company
2834 Abbott Pharmaceuticals Inc.
2833 Abbott Chemicals Inc.
3842 Abbott Hospitals, Inc.
Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corp.
2833 Puerto Rico Chemical Co. Inc.
2833 Chemical Processors, Inc.
2833 Hooker Chemical, Inc.
E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc.
2834 Surgicot of Puerto Rico, Inc.
2834 Renasa, Inc.
2834 Ersana
Eli Lilly and Company
2833 Elli Lilly & Co., Inc.
2834 Eli Lilly Industries, Inc.
Sandoz LTD (EX-LAX Pharmaceutical Co.
2834 Ex-lax, Inc.
Morton-Norwich Products, Inc.
2834 Eaton, Laboratories
Nestle S.A. (ALCON Laboratories Inc.)
2834 Alcon, Lab., Puerto Rico, Inc.
Bristol-Myers Company
2833 Brischem Inc.
2834 Bristol Alpha Corp.
2834 Bristol Laboratories Corp.
2833 Bristol de Puerto Rico, Inc.
2834 Bristol Caribbean, Inc.
Bohringer Ingeheim LTD
2833 Bilchem LTD
Smithline-Beckman Corp.
2819 Beckman Instruments, Inc.
Baxter
3841
2643
3841
2834
2834
2834
2834
3841
2834
2834
2834
2834
2834
2834
2834
3841
2834
3841
2834
Travenol
Travenol,
Laboratories,
Alaska
Travenol, Colorado
Travenol, Conneticu
Travenol, Idaho
Travenol, Illinois
Travenol, Iowa
Travenol, Maryland
Traveno, Montana
Travenol, Nevada
Travenol, North Dak
Travenol, South Dak
Travenol, Utah
Travenol, Vertsont
Travenol, West Virg
Travenol, Wyoming
Travenol,
Travenol, Delaware
Travenol Management
Parent Company &
SIC # Possession Corporations
American Cyanamid Company
2834 Cyanamid Agricultural de P.R., Inc
2834 Lederle Parentals Inc
2834 Lederle Piperacellin, Inc.
2834 Lederle Methotrexate, Inc.
3842 Davis & Geck, Inc.
A. H. Robins Company, Inc.
2834 A.H. Robins Manufacturing Co.
Johnson & Johnson Corp.
2834 Ortho Pharmaceutical, Inc.
2834 Mc Neill Pharmaceuticals, Co.
3842 Johnson & Johnson D.O.C., Inc.
3843 Johnson & Johnson D.G.C., Inc.
2844 Johnson & Johnson Baby Products, Inc.
2844 J&J Baby Products, Co., P.R., Inc.
2834 Arbrook Manufacturing, Corp.
2834 DERMCO, Inc.
3843 CERANC6  Co.
3843 Stim-U-bent, Incorp.
3079 Las Piedras Container Co.
2834 Janssen, Inc.
2834 J. J. Products Co,
Loctite Corporation
2891 Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc.
Merck
2833
2834
2834
& Co., Inc.
Merck, Sharp & Dohme Chem. MFG Co. P.R.
Merck Sharp & Dohme Quimica P.R., Inc.
MSD ARET Inc.
MerrelDow Pharmaceuticals Inc.
2834 Merrell-National Laboratories,
PCR Company, Inc.
2833 PCR-Puerto Rico, Inc.
Pfizer Inc.
2834 Pfizer Pharmaceutical Inc.
Inc.
t
ota
ota
inia
Warner-Lamber Co.
2067 Warner Lamber Inc.
2834 Warner Lamber Inc.
2065 Warner Lamber Inc. V.B.
Richardson-Vicks, Inc.
2834 Vicks Olay Company,
2834 Rhomu Corporation
2834 Vicks Vapor Company
Smith-Beckman Corporation
2834 Allergan America
2819 Beckman Instruments
2834 SK & F Lab. Co.
2834 SK & F Co.
2833 SK & F Lab. Co.
6.D. Searle & Company
2834 Searle & Co.
2834 Searle & Co. # 2
2834 Searle & Co. # 3
Inc.
Inc.
Sterling Drug Inc.
2834 Sterling Pharmaceuticals Inc.
USV Pharmaceutical Corp.
2834 USV Laboratories, Inc.
2834 USV P.R. Development Corp.
2834 USV Products Inc.
Table E.2
Industry-By-Industry Analysis
List of Closing Agreements
1978 to 1 985
Parent Company &
SIC I Possession Corporations
Beckton-Dickinson & Co.
2834 Temp-Away, Inc.
UpJohn Company
2834 UpJohn MFG Co.
Warner Communications, Inc.
2844 Cosmair Caribe, Inc.
4001 Cosmair Caribe, Inc.
Sterling Drug Inc.
2834 Winthrop Laboratories,
Parent Company &
SIC # Possession Corporations
Burgess Vibrocrafters, Inc.
38 BVI Vibro-Tools, Inc.
Gould, Inc.
3841 Gould-Statham Instruments, Inc.
E-Z-EM Com any Inc.
3841 1. Ei-EM Caribe, Inc.
Inc.
Peerless
2833 Peerless Del Caribe
Paradyne Caribbean
28
.Scherinq-Plough Corporation
2833 Schering Corp., P.R.
2819 Scherina Antibiotic Corp.
2834 Scherinj Biochemical Corp.
2834 Schering Industries, Inc.
2834 Schering Pharmaceutical Corp.
American Hospital Supply Corporation
2831 Dade Diagnostic, Inc.
2831 Arnar Stone, Inc.
2834 American Critical Care
3841 Edwards Laboratories, Inc.
3841 Heyer-Schulte del Caribe, Inc.
3841 Pharmaseal, Inc.
3841 McGaw Laboratories, Inc.
3841 Arnar-Stone del Caribe, Inc.
3841 Pharmaseal Laboratories Inc.
3841 V. Mueller del Caribe, Inc.
3841 Pharmaseal Corp.
3851 Amo del Caribe, Inc.
3841 Bentley Puerto Rico, Inc.
3841 American Hospital Supply del Caribe
Lutron Electronics Corp.
3823 Lutron S.M., Inc.
Nova Biomedical Corp.
3811 Nova Biomedical Caribe, Inc.
Orion Research, Inc.
3823 Orion Research Puerto Rico, Inc.
Sun Electric Corp.
3825 Suntester de Puerto Rico, Inc.
Emerson Electric Co.
3822 1. Emerson, Puerto Rico, Inc.
Dwyer Instruments Inc.
3823 1. Dwayer Instruments Inc. P.R.
Chesebrough-Pond's Inc.
3842 1. Chesebrough-Pond's Manufacturing Co.
Standard Oil of Ohio
3291 1. Carborundum Caribbean, Inc.
3843 2. Carborundum caribbean, Inc.
Bourns,Inc.
3823 1. Bourns Puerto Rico, Inc.
United States Surgical Corporation
3841 USSC Puerto Rico, Inc.
Instrumentation Laboratory, Inc.
38 Instrumentation Lab. de P.R. Ltd
OHMIC Instruments Inc.
3825 Ohio Medical Caribe, Inc.
Cont. Page 2
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Table E.2
Industry-By-Industry Analysis
List of Closing Agreements
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H. J.
2091
2091
2091
2091
Heinz Company
Star-Kist Foods, Inc.
Star-Kist Caribe, Inc.
Starkan, Inc.
Borinquen MFG Co.
Ralston Purina
2091 National
2091 National
Parent Company &
SIC # Possession Corporations
Time Inc.
2653 El Morro Corrugated Box Corporation
Lewis
2621
2621
2621Company
Packing Co.
Packing Co.
CPC International, Inc.
2079 Best Food Caribbean, Inc.
Coca Cola Company
2085 Caribbean Refrescos
Consolidated Food Corporation
20 PHF, Inc.
Air Product
20.
R.J. Reynolds Tabacco, Inc.
2111 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Inc.
Ham pshire Designers Inc.
2253 Glamourette Fashion Mills Inc.
Tork, Inc.
23 Tork International, LTD
Prince Matchabelli MFG Co. Inc.
23
Maidenform, Inc.
2342 Maidenform,Inc.
SERVISCO(National Work Clothes)
2328 Angus International Corp.
2328 Angus America Corp.
Rapid
2342
2342
merican Corporation
Playtex Barcelona Inc.
Playtex Manati, Inc.
Unifirst Corp. (Interstate Uniform)
2311 Interstate MFG of P.R., Inc.
Bestform Foundations, Inc.
2342 Ponce Fashions, Inc.
2342 Angela Products, Inc.
2342 Morris Fashion, Inc.
2342 Costa del Sol
2342 Gertrude Fashions Corp.
2342 Valencia Fashions Corp.
General Mills Inc.
2321 Expire Textile Corp.
2321 ACF Corp.
2321 General Mills Products Corp.
Health-Tex Inc.
2361 Health-Tex MFG. Co., Inc.
Blue Bell of Rincon
23
Banctec Supplies
2621 Banet ec Supplies Mfg., Inc.
Business Products, Inc.
Puerto Rico Envelopes, Inc.
Premier Envelope C.
Envelopes Inc.
Keith Clark Inc.
2752 NU Publishing
Manuel A. Casiano
27 Caribbean Business
Phillipps Petroleum Company
2911 Phillips Paraxylene Lnc.
2911 Phillips Puerto Rico Core Inc.
Sun Oil Company of Pensylvania
2992 Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co.
2911 Yabucoa Sun Oil Co;
Gulf Oil Corporation
2911 Caribbean Gulf Refining Corp.
The Charter Co. (CORCO)
29
Rheem MFG Co.
3079 Rheem of P R. Inc.
3412 Rhee2 Puerto Rico, Inc.
Converse, Inc.
3021 Converse de P.R., Inc.
Continental Caribbean Containers, Inc.
3079 The Continental Group, Inc.
Schmid Laboratories Inc.
3069 Schmid Products Corp. of P.R.
Tonka Footwear Co., Inc.
3149 Tonka Footwear Co., Inc.
Wellco Enterprises, Inc.
3143 MO-KA Shoe Corp.
Jumping-Jacks Shoes, Inc.
3149 Jumping-Jacks Shoes P.R., Inc.
Morse Shoe Inc.
3144 Isabela Shoe Corporation
Harman Automotive, Inc.
Harvard Industries, Inc.
3231 Harman Automotive, P.R., Inc.
Ford Gum & Machine Co. of Ponce, Inc.
33
Texas Pipe Bending Company
33 Texas Pipe Bending of P.R., Inc.
HI-Shear Corp.
3451 HI-Shear Caribe
Cont. Page 3
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Parent Company &
SIC # Possession Corporations
Storage Technology Corp.
3573 Storage Technology de P.R.
3573 Storage Technology de P.R.
Ransburg Corporation
3562 Ransburg Manufacturing Corp.
3599 Ransburg Part Inc.
Prime Computer, Inc.
3573 Prime Computer, Inc. de P.R.
General Industrial Machinery, NEC
3569 Pall Puerto Rico Inc.
3569 Pall Pneumatics Puerto Rico
3841 Pall Biomedical Puerto Rico
3569 Pall Hydraulics Puerto Rico
Omark Antilles, Inc.
3546 Omark Caribbean, Inc.
Micom System Inc.
3573 Micom Laribe
Millipore
3569 Millipore Cidra, Inc.
Able Computer
3573 Able Computer Technology, P.R., Inc.
Applied Magnetics Corp.
3573 Applied Magnetics, Caribe, Inc.
Diital Equipment Corp
35 3 Digital Equipment Corp. de P.R.
Atari
35
Bose Corporation
35 Bose Products, Inc.
Centronics Co., Inc.
35 Centronics of P.R., Inc.
Wang Laboratories, Inc.
3573 Wang Lab. de Puerto Rico
Honeywell Information System, Inc.
3573 Honeywell Infor. Sys. of P. R.
Intertel Inc.
36 Intertel MGF, Inc. del Caribe
Data Terminal System (DTS)
36
The Allen Group, Inc.
3679 The Allen Group, P.R., Inc.
Electronics Corp. of America
3621 Electronics Corp. of America
36 Gantel Puerto Rico Corporation
Sigma Instruments, Inc.
Parent Company &
SIC # Possession Corporations
Signal Transformer Co. Inc.
3612 Minitran, Inc.
Motorola Inc.
3629 Motorola Componentes de P.R., Inc.
3629 Motorola International Capital Corp.
3662 Motorola Portatiles de P.R .,Inc.
3651 Motorola Radiomovil de P.R. Inc.
(Motorola Sintetizado de P.R. Inc.)
3651 Motorola International Dev. Corp.
3662 Motorola Telcarro de P.R. Inc.
3662 Motorola Portavoz de P.R. Inc.
HTL Industries Inc.
3662 HTL Carie, Inc.
General Electric Co.
3613 Circuit Breakers, Inc.
3613 Controls, Inc.
3613 Pilots Devices, Inc.
3613 Low Voltage Products, Inc.
3613 Anasco Inc.
3613 Protective Relays, Inc.
3613 Protective Devices, Inc.
3613 GEPOL Inc.
3613 Industrial Products, Inc.
3613 Precision Protective Devices, Inc.
3613 Wiring Devices of P.R., Inc.
3613 Power Breakers Inc.
3613 Industrial Control of P.R., Inc.
3613 Indicating Devices, Inc.
3613 Power Products, Inc.
3613 Caribe Products, Inc.
GTE Products Corporation
3648 ZINSCO Switchgear Corp.
3678 Sylvania Circuit Braker Co.
3641 Gibson Electric of P R Inc.
3676 Chase Precision Materials Corp.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
3534 Ascensores Westinghouse Inc
3643 Bryloc Div. of Westinhouse of P.R.
3573 Computer and Instrumention of P.R. Inc.
3613 Fusibles Westinghouse de P.R.
3613 Ico Div. of Westinghouse de P.R.
3613 Interruptores, Inc.
3873 L.W.W. Inc.
3613 Materiales Plasticos
3613 Measurement & Control, Westinghouse of P.R.
3651 Measurement & Control, Westinghouse of P.R.
2521 Panel System a Div. of Westinghouse of P.R.
3679 Productos Circuitos de P.R.
3643 Productos Electromecanicos Inc.
3499 Productos Electronicos Industriales
3612 Productos Electronicos, Inc
3612 Productos Westinghouse
3612 Productos Westinghouse Inc.
3674 Semi-Conductores Westinghouse, Inc.
3585 Thermo King of Puerto Rico, Inc.
3585 Thermo King Caribbean Inc.
3612 Transformadores Westinghouse Inc.
3671 Tubos Electricos Westinghouse Inc.
3613 Westinghouse Breakers
Westinghouse Controls of P.R. Inc.
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Parent Company &
SIC # Possession Corporations
Perkin-Elmer Corporation
3679 Perkin-Elmer Caribbean Corp.
3832 P.K.N. Corp.
Emerson Electric Co.
3679 Terminal Products Inc.
Raychem Corp.
3643 Raychem Products, Inc.
3643 Raychem Industries, Inc.
RCA Corp.
3672 RCA Borinquen, Inc.
3672 RCA del Caribe, Inc.
Medtronics Inc.
3693 Med Rel, Inc.
Horizon Credit Corp.
39 Horizon Credit Corp.
Documentation Inc.
39 Documentation Inc. de P.R.
Padosa America Inc.
39 Padossa Productions Inc.
Insilco Corporation
3999 Rolodex de Puerto Rico, Inc.
Parent Company &
SIC # Possession Corporations
Zale
3911 Zale Caribbean, Inc.
Tri-Chem, Inc.
3951 Tri-Chem de P.R., Inc.
Brown
3911
3911
Forman Distillers Corp
J.R. Wood & sons P.R. Incorp.
Lenox Heritage, Inc.
Evans-Aristocrat Industries, Inc.
3999 E.R. Rule Co. of P.R., Inc.
Thomas & Betts
39
Western Fiter
39
Gibbs Trading Co. Inc.
39
Reed & Co.
39 Reed & Co.
Carlson Companies
Efficient Contracting Corp.
Eltra Corporation
Eltra of Puerto Rico, Inc.
Cont. Page 5
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Table E.3
Industry -By-Industry Analysis
Closing Agreements: Tollgate Tax,
Repatriation and Reinvestment Rates
(Se ected Firms & Closing Agreements)
1978 to 1985
Tollgate Tax Reinvestment
Industrial Repatriation
Development Income
Parent Company & Income 1 ($) (%) Income Rate
SIC # & Possession Corporations (W) ($) ($) (%)
COMPANY I
2833 SUBSIDIARY 1,003,584 752,688 52,688 7.00 250,896 25
COMPANY II 1,333,188,000 1,039,253,000 30,760,178 4.10 387,009,000 29
2833 SUBSIDIARY 1 364,523,000 263,206,000 7,013,140 3.5 144,244,000 42
2834 SUBSIDIARY 2 670,873,000 428,108,000 8,747,038 3.6 242,765,000 50
3842 SUBSIDIARY 3 347,939,000 347,939,000 15,000,000 5.0 0 0
COMPANY III 516,782,027 349,563,680 13,514,433 3.87 167,218,347
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1 ----------- ----------- ---------- ---- -----------
2834 SUBSIDIARY 2 152,091,360 76,045,680 3,802,284 5.00 76,045,680 50
2834 SUBSIDIARY 3 52,168,000 39,126,000 1,369,410 3.50 13,042,000 25
5,333,333 4,000,000 280,000 7.00 1,333,333 25
120,000,000 90,000,000 2,447,059 2.72 30,000,000 25
29,537,333 22,153,000 886,120 4.00 7,384,333 25
86,632,000 64,974,000 2,598,960 4.00 21,658,000 25
71,020,000 53,265,000 2,130,600 4.00 17,755,000 25
COMPANY IV 187,843,452 145,508,396 4,118,067 2.83 109,237,799
2833 SUBSIDIARY 1 ----------- ----------- --------- ---- -----------
2834 SUBSIDIARY 2 2,882,667 2,162,000 76,670 3.54 720,667 25
2,080,000 1,560,000 39,000 2.50 520,000 25
182,205,000 91,102,500 455,125 0.50 91,102,500 50
67,578,528 50,683,896 3,547,272 6.99 16,894,632 25
COMPANY V 800,000 800,000 8,000 10.00 0 0
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1
COMPANY VI 109,918,873 84,939,155 6,245,791 7.35 24,979,718
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1 ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- -----------
2834 SUBSIDIARY 2 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,000,000 10.00 0 0
2834 SUBSIDIARY 3 53,118,056 39,838,542 2,788,698 7.00 13,279,514 25
2833 SUBSIDIARY 4 4,991,295 3,743,471 262,093 7.00 1,247,824 25
2834 SUBSIDIARY 5 19,142,856 14,357,142 1,005,000 7.00 4,785,714 25
22,666,667 17,000,000 1,190,000 7.00 5,666,667 25
COMPANY VII
2833 SUBSIDIARY 1
14,238,819
-----------
4,000,000
1,333,333
666,667
666,667
666,667
2,450,000
2,588,819
1,866,667
11,291,614
-----------
3,000,000
1000,000
500,000
500,000
500,000
2,450,000
1,941,614
1,400,000
863,913
-----------
210,000
70,000
35,000
35,000
35,000
245,000
135,913
98,000
7.65
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
10.00
7.00
7.00
2,947,205
-----------
1,000,000
333,333
166,667
166,667
166,667
0
647,205
466,667
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Industry-By-Industry Analysis Closing Agreements
Tollgate Tax, Repatriation, and Reinvestment Rates
(Selected Firs & Closing Agreements) 1978 to 1985
Industrial Repatriation Tollgate Tax 
Reinvestment
Development Income
Parent Company & Income 1 ($) (%) Income Rate
SIC I & Possession Corporations ($) (0) ($) ()
COMPANY VIII TOTAL
Total 50-50% Rules
Total 75-25% Rules
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1
2834 SUBSIDIARY 2
2834 SUBSIDIARY 3
2834 SUBSIDIARY 4
2834 SUBSIDIARY 5
2844 SUBSIDIARY 6
2844 SUBSIDIARY 7
3079 SUBSIDIARY 8
3842 SUBSIDIARY 9
3843 SUBSIDIARY 10
3843 SUBSIDIARY 11
213,963,300
123,500,180
90,463,120
113,815,735
64,658,401
29,000,000
10,000,000
10,157,333
53,734,240
15,303,440
8,840,000
16,900,000
12,690,800
1,575,381
12,749,549
1,990,000
7,114,683
1,862,133
1,782,733
3,743,705
2,634,705
1,109,000
7,421,337
4,985,771
1,816,000
619,567
9,257,421
3,867,221
138,000
3,293,000
1,959,200
1,576,565
1,453,205
123,360
6,869,803
3,019,403
1,608,000
2,242,400
1,971,832
1,756,845
81,320
133,667
1,247,731
986,731
261,000
137,856,695
92,625,135
45,231,560
75,611,801
48,493,801
14,500,000
5,000,000
7,618,000
30,039,820
7,651,720
4,420,000
8,450,000
9,518,100
1,181,536
9,064,662
995,000
5,336,012
1,396,600
1,337,050
2,530,529
1,976,029
554,500
5,112,003
3,739,328
908,000
464,675
6,085,316
2,900,416
69,000
1,646,500
1,469,400
1,151,584
1,089,904
61,680
4,750,352
2,264,552
804,000
1,681,800
1,458,544
1,317,634
40,660
100,250
870,548
740,048
130,500
4,679,938
2,418,360
2,261,578
1,929,444
649,724
725,000
250,000
304,720
1,406,810
382,586
221,000
422,500
380,724
32,538
375,727
49,750
216,631
55,864
53,482
51,721
23,996
27,725
173,139
109,152
45,400
18,587
351,959
207,408
3,450
82,325
58,776
14,105
11,021
3,084
214,002
106,530
40,200
67,272
98,277
92,234
2,033
4,010
32,216
25,691
6,525
3.39 76,106,605
2.61 30,875,045
5.00 45,231,560
2.55
1.30
5.00
5.00
4.00
4.68
5.00
5.00
5.00
4.00
2.75
4.14
5.00
4.06
4.00
4.00
2.04
1.21
5.00
3.39
2.92
5.00
4.00
5.78
7.00
5.00
5.00
4.00
1.22
1.10
5.00
4.50
4.70
5.00
4.00
6.74
7.00
5.00
4.00
3.70
3.47
5.00
38,203,934
16,164,600
14,500,000
5,000,000
2,539,333
23,694,420
7,651,720
4,420,000
8,450,000
3,172,700
393,845
3,684,887
995,000
1,778,671
465,533
445,683
1,213,176
658,676
554,500
2,309,334
1,246,443
908,000
154,892
3,172,105
966,805
69,000
1,646,500
489,800
424,981
363,301
61,680
2,119,451
754,851
804,000
560,600
513,288
439,211
40,660
33,417
377,183
246,683
130,500
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Industry-By-Industry Analysis Closing Agreements
Tollgate Tax, Repatriation, and Reinvestment Rates
(Selected Firms & Closing Agreements) 1978 to 1985
Tollgate Tax Reinvestment
Industrial Repatriation
Development Income
Parent Company & Income 1 (3) (1) Income Rate
SIC # & Possession Corporations (8) () ($) (%)
COMPANY IX 119,338,207 89,503,655 2,252,743 2.52 29,834,552 25
3841 SUBSIDIARY 1 1,279,806
2834 SUBSIDIARY 2 63,356
2834 SUBSIDIARY 3 19,954
2834 SUBSIDIARY 4 102,007
2834 SUBSIDIARY 5 35,328
2834 SUBSIDIARY 6 752,292
COMPANY X 58,429,508 29,214,754 1,655,384 5.67 29,214,754
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1 ---------------
6,523,664 3,261,832 163,091 5.00 3,261,832 50
51,905,844 25,952,922 1,492,293 5.75 25,952,922 50
COMPANY XI 6,666,667 5,000,000 344,873 6.90 1,666,667 25
2891 SUBSIDIARY 1
COMPANY XII 138,434,762 103,833,434 7,230,935 6.96 34,601,328
2833 SUBSIDIARY 1 13,333,333 10,000,000 700,000 7.00 3,333,333 25
2834 SUBSIDIARY 2 33,333,333 25,000,000 1,750,000 7.00 8,333,333 25
37,845,249 28,383,937 1,977,990 6.97 9,461,312 25
2834 SUBSIDIARY 3 29,450 29,450 2,945 10.00 0 0
53,893,396 40,420,047 2,800,000 6.93 13,473,349 25
COMPANY XIII 90,316,028 70,986,977 3,562,864 5.02 19,329,051
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1 13,998,105 10,498,579 419,943 4.00 3,499,526 25
12,999,823 12,999,823 1,299,582 10.00 0 0
33,342,633 25,006,975 1,000,279 4.00 8,335,658 25
29,975,467 22,481,600 843,060 3.75 7,493,867 25
COMPANY XIV 7,491,667 5,675,000 404,000 7.12 1,816,667
2833 SUBSIDIARY 1 225,000 225,000 22,500 10.00 0 0
7,266,667 5,450,000 381,500 7.00 1,816,667 25
COMPANY XV 3,400,000 3,400,000 340,000 10.00 0
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1 2,000,000 2,000,000 200,000 10.00 0 0
1,400,000 1,400,000 140,000 10.00 0 0
COMPANY XVI
2834 SUBSIDIARY
2834 SUBSIDIARY
2834 SUBSIDIARY
112,459,628
65,792,962
46,666,667
84,344,721
49,344,721
35,000,000
4,410,028
3,010,028
1,400,000
5.23 28,114,907
6.10 16,448,240
4.00 11,666,667
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Industry-By-Industry Analysis Closing Agreements
Tollgate Tax, Repatriation, and Reinvestment Rates
(Selected Firms & Closing Agreements) 1978 to 1985
Tollgate Tax Reinvestment
Industrial Repatriation _____________________
Development Income
Parent Company & Income 1 ($) () Income Rate
SIC I & Possession Corporations ($) ($) ($) (%)
COMPANY XVI 247,995,033 197,496,275 10,001,732 5.06 50,498,758
2819 SUBSIDIARY 1 53,333,333 40,000,000 1,200,000 3.00 13,333,333 25
2833 SUBSIDIARY 2 6,000,000 6,000,000 557,108 9.29 0 0
2834 SUBSIDIARY 3 30,000,000 30,000,000 3,000,000 10.00 0 0
2834 SUBSIDIARY 4 10,000,000 10,000,000 784,773 7.85 0 0
2834 SUBSIDIARY 5 148,661,700 111,496,275 4,459,851 4.00 37,165,425 25
2834 SUBSIDIARY 6
2834 SUBSIDIARY 7
COMPANY XVII- 171,276,209 103,457,157 4,646,565 4.49 67,819,052
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1 80,000,000 40,000,000 2,000,000 5.00 40,000,000 50
2834 SUBSIDIARY 2 20,000,000 10,000,000 500,000 5.00 10,000,000 50
2834 SUBSIDIARY 3 71,276,209 53,457,157 2,146,565 4.02 17,819,052 25
COMPANY XVIII
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1 1,900,000 1,900,000 190,000 10.00 0 0
2834 SUBSIDIARY 2 ----
2834 SUBSIDIARY 3
COMPANY XIX 260,000,000 130,000,000 6,500,000 5.00 130,000,000
2067 SUBSIDIARY 1 ----
2834 SUBSIDIARY 2 200,000,000 100,000,000 5,000,000 5.00 100,000,000 50
2065 SUBSIDIARY 3 60,000,000 30,000,000 1,500,000 5.00 30,000,000 50
COMPANY XX
22,485,573 16,864,180 674,567 4.00 5,621,393
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1 10,000,000 7,500,000 300,000 4.00 2,500,000 25
12,485,573 9,364,180 374,567 4.00 3,121,393 25
COMPANY XXI 26,666,667 20,000,000 1,389,003 7.00 6,666,667 25
28 SUBSIDIARY 1 -
COMPANY XXII 20,000,000 10,000,000 500,000 5.00 10,000,000 50
2834 SUBSIDIARY 1
COMPANY XXIII 545,971,888 374,314,521 22,834,783 6.40 149,293,125 29
2831 SUBSIDIARY 1 183,891,075 109,935,478 10,539,203 6.0 47,527,237 33
3841 SUBSIDIARY 2 360,845,965 263,761,619 12,273,970 6.1 101,148,464 31
3851 SUBSIDIARY 3 1,234,848 617,424 21,610 3.5 617,424 50
65,379,276COMPANY XXIV
3811 SUBSIDIARY 1
49,034,457 3,432,412 7.00 16,344,819
Table E.3 (Continued, Page 5) 309
Industry-By-Industry Analysis Closing Agreements
Tollgate Tax, Repatriation, and Reinvestment Rates
(Selected Firms & Closing Agreements) 1978 to 1985
Tollgate Tax Reinvestment
Industrial Repatriation ______________________
Development Income
Parent Company & Income 1 (3) (1) Income Rate
SIC I & Possession Corporations ($) (8) ($) ()
COMPANY XXV 24,000,000 18,000,000 1,260,000 7.00 6,000,000 -
24,000,000 18,000,000 1,260,000 7.00 6,000,000
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
Appendix F.1
FIRST CASE STUDY : LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of JANUARY 27, 1981
REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
POSSESSION TOTAL NON 101 101 TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
SIC CORPORATIONS DIVIDENDS SOURCE AMOUNT % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAC CORPORATION
2833 LAP CORPORATION
3842 LAH CORPORATION
Source Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.This closing agreement is different to the others, it covers the installation of an earth station communications system.
This closing agreement has not been included as part of this analysis or to adjust the estimates.
This type of closing agreement did not apply in relation to the tollgate tax rules. However, it has been presented in
this study to demonstrate the lack of structure of this contract. Moreover, it is difficult to determine the intention
behind this closing agreement. A very realistic guess is that it is the basis to provide the corporation certain benefits
which reduces the effect of the tollgate tax.
2.The earth station cost at factory was $101,947.
3.The applicable excise tax rate was 70% of cost, or $71,362.90.
4.Effective excise tax rate will be $14,129.85 (15% of the taxable price in Puerto Rico).
5.In the event additional channels are used, the Puerto Rico Treasury shall reimburse LA Company $2,018.55 times the additional channels used.
6.It should be pointed out that in this agreement there is no ceiling for the P.R. Treasury reimbursements.
CD)
IABLE F.1.1
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of DECEMBER 30, 1983
POSSESSION
SIC CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION
TOTAL
DIVIDENDS
OF PROFITS
NON 101
SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
101 TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT % AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAC CORPORATION
1970 to 1973
Prior to 1/1/78
1919 to 1982
Subtotal
2834 LAP CORPORATION
1971 to 1976
1980 to 1982
Subtotal
3842 LAH CORPORATION
1976 to 1982
TOTAL
18,657,000
0
0
18,657,000
111,136,000
0
111,136,000
47,939,000
177,732,000
18,657,000
0
0
18,657,000
111,136,000
0
111,136,000
0 47,939,000 0
0 177,732,000 0
100 18,657,000
0 0
0 0
18,657,000
111,136,000
0
111,136,000
0 100 47,939,000
0 177,732,000
181,960
106,413
447,781
736,154
1,478,880
2,840,867
4,319,747
0 0 0
0 5,055,901
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.This closing agreement was an adjustment of
.LAC's income tax returns for taxable years
.LAP's income tax returns for taxable years
.LAH's income tax returns for taxable years
a U.S.A. IRS
1970 through
1971 through
1976 through
tax audit
1982 are
1982 are
1982 are
for all three subsidiaries of LA Company. As a result:
amended.
amended.
amended.
.LA Company was able to repatriate $177,732,000 of 101 dividends free of tollgate taxes.
2.LA Company was able to generate $5,055,901 worth of tax credits. LA Company subsidiaries could use the tax credits as follows:
.LAC can apply $288,373 to future 101 distributions accumulated prior to 1/1/78
up to 50% of the tax for a given year can be paid with the credits. $447,781 can be used against tollgate taxes until the credit is used.
.LAP could apply $1,478,880 to future 101 distributions accumulated prior to 1/1/78, up to 50% of the tax for a given
year can be paid with the credits. $2,840,867 can be used against tollgate taxes until the credit is fully used.
3.In the event LAC and/or LAP is unable to use the tax credit, a direct or indirect
subsidiary of LA Company could use the remaining credits.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE F.1.2
TABLE F.1.3 FIRST CASE STUDY : LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of JUNE 27, 1984
POSSESSION
Sic CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION
TOTAL
DIVIDENDS
OF PROFITS
NON 101
SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
101 TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT % AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
3842 LAN CORPORATION
300,000,000 0 300,000,000 5 15,000,000 100 300,000,000 0 0 0
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1. The amount to be distributed is fros 101 accumulated beginning on or after 1/1/76 to LAN Holding Company.
2. The distribution is in partial liquidation, it is a sale or exchange of the stock of an exempted business.
3. Closing agreement does not take any reference to reinvestment requirements.
4. The 5% tax of $15,000,000 was paid to Puerto Rico Treasury on 6/27/84, check # 101.
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of SEPTEMBER 19, 1980
POSSESSION
SIC CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION OF PROFITS
TOTAL NON 101
DIVIDENDS SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
101 TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT ' % AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAP CORPORATION
Prior to 1/1973
12/31/72-12/31/77
6,960,000 0 13,920,000 4 278,400 50 6,960,000
54,600,000 14,991,000 79,218,000
50 6,960,000 278,400
4 1,584,360 50 39,609,000 50 39,609,000 1,584,360
1,362,000 0 1,362,000
5,009,000 5,009,000
0 100 - 1,362,000
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
2,069,000 0 2,069,000
70,000,000 20,000,000 96,569,000
0
1,862,760
100 2,069,000
50,000,000
0 0 0
46,569,000 1,862,760 0
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Tresaury
NOTES: 1.Total dividends between $30 million and $70 million to be paid prior to 12/31/80'.
2.$20 million in non Puerto Rico source dividends shall be paid and will not be subject to taxation.
3.101 dividends not exceeding $50 million shall be distributed as follows::
A. $3,431,000 101 from the interest on obligations of the Puerto Rican government and shall not besubject to taxation.
B. Up to $6,960,000 from 101 accumulated prior to 1/1/73, redistributed amount will be subject to the 4% tax.
C. Up to $39,609,000 from 101 accumulated from 12/31/72 to 12/31/77, redistributed amount will be subject to a 4% tax.
4.Pre 1973 101 redistributions shall not exceed 50% of such accumulated 101.
5.For those investments which the 5 year period has elapsed for years 1973 to 1975, all 101 could be distributed at the 4% tax rate.
6.A tollgate tax between $1,063,000 to $1,860,000 shall be paid, actually $3,000 less than the full amount.
7.Taxes payable will be carried forward indefinitely for future taxable years as a credit against P.R. income taxes.
8.A portion of the investment tax credits was used to reduced the tollgate tax. The other portion can be carried forward.
Interest
1/1/78-12/31/80
Interest
Total
---- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE F.1.4
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEHENT of
LAP CORPORATION QUALIFYING INVESTMENTS 1973 TO 1978
SEPTEMBER 19, 1980
ITEN/YEARS 1973 1974 1975. 1976 1977 1978 TOTAL
Plant&Equipment 250 194 130 188 536 355 1,653
2(j) Investments
GNHA's P.R. mortgages 8,014 5,955 (266) 4,475 5,202 0 23,380
Loans 0 2,719 10,008 7,273 0 0 20,000
CD's & TO's 0 0 0 310 6,185 15,000 21,495
Govt. Bonds 0 0 0 0 6,000 3,193 9,193
Subtotal Invest. 8,264 8,868 9,872 12,246 17,923 18,548 75,721
TOTAL 101 16,528 17,736 19,744 24,491 33,528 37,095 149,122
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.Corporation had a total of $34.5 million in certificates of deposits, including above amounts.
These amounts were invested 's follows: $19.5 million in Citibank, $5 million in
Chase Manhattan Bank, $5 sillion in Banco Popular, and $5 million in the Royal Bank of Canada.
2. A total of $20 million in loans were made to another tax exempt 936 corporation during this period.
3. A total of $149,122,000 of 101 was accumulated in this period.
TABLE F.1.5
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of OCTOBER 21, 1981
POSSESSION
SIC CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION
TOT AL
DIVIDENDS
OF PROFITS
NON 101
SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
101 TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT % AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAP CORPORATION
Prior to 1/1/73
12/31/72-12/31/77
6,960,000 0 13,920,000
57,052,000 13,263,000 87,578,000
4 278,400 50 6,960,000 50 6,960,000
4 1,751,560 50 43,789,000 50 43,789,000
0 1,362,000 0
9,500,000 9,500,000 0 0
0 5,126,000 0
0 100 1,362,000
0 0 0 0
0 100 5,126,000
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
80,000,000 22,763,000 107,986,000
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1. Total dividends to be paid prior to December 31, 1981 range between $30 million to $80 million.
Up TO $22.7 million in non Puerto Rico source dividends shall be paid and will not be subject to taxation.
101 dividends not exceeding $57,237,000 shall be distributed as follows::
Up to $6,488,000 101 from the interest on obligations of the Puerto Rican government and shall not be subject to taxation.
$6,960,000 from 101 accumulated prior to 1/1/73, redistributed amount will be subject to the 4% tax.
Between $23,040,000 to $43,789,000 from 101 accumulated from 12/31/72 to 12/31/77, redistributed amount will be subject to a 4% tax.
Pre 1973 101 redistributions shall not exceed 50% of such accumulated 101.
For those investments which the 5 year period has elapsed for years 1973 to 1975, all ID! can be distributed at the 4% tax rate.
A tollgate tax of between $1,200,000 to $2,030,000 shall be paid, depending upon the amount repatriated.
Taxes payable will be carried forward indefinitely for future taxable years as a credit against P.R. income taxes.
Income tax credits will not be used, unused investment tax credits say be carried forward.
1,362,000Interest
1/1/78-12/31/8
Interest 5,126,000
TOTAL
0 0
0 0
2,029,960 57,231,000 50,749,000 0 0
--------------------------------------------- - --------------- - ------------------- - ------------------------------------------------ - ----
TABLE F.1.6
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of
LAP CORPORATION QUALIFYING INVESTMENTS 1973 TO 1978
OCTOBER 21, 1981
ITEM/YEARS 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 TOTAL
Plant&Equipment 250 194 130 188 536 355 1,653
2(j) Investments
GNHA's P.R. mortgages 7,628 5,586 (904) 3,427 1,951 0 17,688
Loans 0 2,719 10,008 7,273 0 0 20,000
CO's & TO's 0 0 0 310 6,185 14,597 21,092
Govt. Bonds 0 0 0 0 6,000 0 6,000
Subtotal Invest. 7,878 8,499 9,234 11,198 14,672 14,952 66,433
TOTAL IDI 15,756 16,998 18,468 22,396 29,343 29,903 132,864
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.Corporation had a total of $34.5 million in certificates of deposits, including above amounts.
These were invested as follows: $19.5 million in Citibank, $5 million in
Chase Manhattan Bank, $5 million in Banco Popular, and $5 million in the Royal Bank of Canada.
2. A total of $20 million in loans were made to another tax exempt 936 corporation during this period.
3. A total of $132,864,000 of IDI was accumulated between 1973 to 1978.
TABLE F.1.7
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of NOVEMBER 5, 1982
POSSESSION
SIC CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION
TOTAL
DIVIDENDS
OF PROFITS
NON IDI
SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
101 TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT % AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAP CORPORATION
31,696,000 19,000 63,354,000
33,000 33,000
78,271,000 4,132,000 148,278,000
110,000,000 4,184,000 211,632,000
4 1,267,080 50 31,677,000 50 31,677,000 1,267,080
0 0
3.5 2,594,865
3,861,945
0 0
50 74,139,000
105,816,000
0 0 0 0 0
50 74,139,000 0
105,816,000 1,267,080
295,000
295,000
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1. Total dividends to be paid prior to December 31, 1982
2.$4.2 million in non Puerto Rico source dividends shall
range between $30 million to $110 million.
be paid and will not be subject to taxation.
3. IDI dividends between $25,816,000 to $105,816,000 shall be distributed as follows:
A. From $25,797,000 to $31,677,000 of 101 accumulated from 12/31/72 to 12/31/77, redistributed amount will be subject to a 4% tax.
From $19,000 to $74,139,000 of 101 accumulated on or after 1/1/80, redistributed amount will be subject to a 3.5% tax.
For those investments which the 5 year period has elapsed for years 1973 to 1977, all 101 for those years can be distributed
An estimated tollgate tax between $1,033,000 to $3,567,000 shall be paid, depending upon the amount redistributed.
The 4% tollgate taxes payable ($1,267,080) will be carried forward indefinitely for future taxable years as a credit against
Income tax credits will not be used, unused investment tax credits may be carried forward.
If maximum 101 dividends amount is distributed, up to $295,000 of accumulated investment tax credits could be used to offset
All 101 accumulated prior to 1/1/78 can be distributed tax free pursuant to a liquidation plan.
at the 4% tax rate.
P.R. income taxes.
tollgate taxes.
12/72 to 12/77
1/1/78-12/31/79
1/180-12/31/81
TOTAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE F.1.8
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of DECEMBER 30, 1983
POSSESSION
SIC CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION
TOTAL
DIVIDENDS
OF PROFITS
NON 101
SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
101 TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT % AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
101 % AMOUNT IDI t AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAP CORPORATION
Previous Years
9,424,502 0 38,849,004
4,347,498 0 28,694,996
3,200,000 3,200,000 0
36,972,000 3,200,000 67,544,000
3.5
3.5
0
679,858 50 19,424,502 50 19,424,502
502,162 50 14,347,4.98 50 14,347,498
0 0
1,182,020
0 0
33,772',000
0 0 0
33,772,000 1,478,880 0
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1. Total dividends to be paid prior to December 31, 1983 were $36,972,000.
2.S3.2 million in non Puerto Rico source dividends shall be paid and will not be
3. $33,772,000 101 dividends shall be distributed as follows:
subject to taxation.
A. $19,424,502 of 101 accumulated during 1981, redistributed amount will be subject to a 3.5% tax.
B. $14,347,498 of 101 accumulated during 1982, redistributed amount will be subject to a 3.5% tax.
4. Fifty percent (50%) of the 101 has to be invested for a period of five years.
Afterwards, fifty percent (50%) of the amount invested must be maintained for three tore years.
5. An estimated tollgate tax of $1,182,020 was due; however 50% of this amount was offset by carryover tax credits.
Thus, the net tollgate tax paid was $591,010 which represents 1.75% of the taxable 101 distributed.
6. Previous years carryover tax credits were $1,4718,880; after subtracting $591,010 of credits used, they had $887,870 of
7. Income tax credits will not be used, unused investment tax credits may be carried forward.
8. Loans to possessions corporations shall be considered as qualified loans for 2(j) investment purposes.
9. All IDI accumulated prior to 1/1/78 can be distributed tax free pursuant to a liquidation plan.
10. Investment requirements from previous years were adjusted by the U.S. I.R.S., as documented in the amended qualifying
carryover credits.
investments table.
0 0 0 0
1981
1982
1982-1983
TOTAL
0 0 0 0 0 1,478,880
0 0
0 0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
T ABLE F.1.9
1
1
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of
LAP CORPORATION QUALIFYING INVESTMENTS 1973 TO 1982
DECEMBER 30, 1983
ITEK/YEARS 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 TOTAL
Plant&Equipment 250 194 130 188 536 355 0 0 1,973 7,841 11,467
2(j) Investments
GNHA's P.R. mortgages 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 861 6,140 7,842 14,843
Loans 5,425 4,343 4,549 5,219 404 0 0 0 0 0 20,000
Co's & TO's 0 0 0 0 831 6,982 10,316 5,860 4,166 0 28,155
Govt. Bonds 0 0 0 0 6,000 0 0 5,000 0 0 11,000
Subtotal Invest. 5,675 4,537 4,679 5,467 7,771 7,337 10,316 11,721 12,279 15,683 85,465
TOTAL 101 11,349 9,073 9,358 10,934 15,542 14,674 20,631 23,442 24,557 31,366 170,926
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.Corporation had a total of $28,155,000 in certificates of deposits, including above amounts. These were invested as follows:
$19.5 million in Citibank, $5 million in Chase Manhattan Bank, and $3,655,000 in Banco Popular.
2. A total of $20 million in loans were made to another tax exempt 936 corporation during this period.
3. A total of $170,926,000 of 101 was accumulated in this period.
4. The $14,843,000 in GNHA's and a $5 million AFICA Bond investment were made after 12/31/79 in order to comply with Resolution No.3 of 11/7/79.
TABLE F.1.10
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of JUNE 27, 1984
REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
POSSESSION TOTAL NON 101 101 TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
SIC CORPORATIONS OIVIDENDS SOURCE AMOUNT % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAP CORPORATION
12/72 to 12/77 2,633,618 0 5,267,236 4 105,345 50 2,633,618 50 2,633,618 105,345 0
Interest Govt. Obl. 3,050,000 0 3,050,000 0 0 100 3,050,000 0 0 0 0
On/after 1/1982 3,225,382 0 6,450,764 3.5 112,888 50 3,225,382 50 3,225,382 887,870 0
TOTAL 8,909,000 0 14,768,000 218,233 8,909,000 5,859,000 993,215 0
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.Total dividends to be paid are $8,909,000 on or before 12/31/85, as amended.
2.The dividends are distributed as follows:
A. $2633,618 are from 101 accumulated from 12/31/72 to 12/31/77 and subject to a 4% tax.
B. $3,225,382 are from 101 accumulated on or after 1/1/82 and are subject to a 3.5% tax.
C. $3,050,000 in dividends are to be paid from IDI derived interest on obligations to P.R. government and is not taxable.
3.Annual distributions of manufacturing 101 say not exceed 50% of the total manufacturing 101 accumulated in a given period.
4.A five year investment was required for the 101 earned during 12/31/72 to 12/31/77 and on or after 1/1/82.
5.101 say be distributed at a 4% tax for those investments where the 5 year period has elapsed between 1973 to 1977.
6.The $218,233 tollgate tax will be reduced by 50%, using $109,117 of the tax credits giving a net tax payable of $109,116.
7. Tax payment of $109,117 corroborated by cancelled check.
8.Unused investment tax credits caused by application of 5% minimum tax may be carried forward to succeding years.
9.The 4% tax ($105,345) on $2,633,618 maybe carried forward as a credit for future taxes.
10.A five year investment was required for 101 accumulated after 1982.
Afterwards, 50% of the amount invested could be repatriated and the other 50% invested for three more years.
TABLE F.I1ll
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of JUNE 27, 1984
POSSESSION
SIC CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION
TOTAL
DIVIDENDS
OF PROFITS
NON 101
SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
101 TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT % AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAP CORPORATION
0 122,227,000 0
0 0 0
0 122,227,000
0 100 122,227,000
0 0 0 0
0 122,227,000
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.The dividends to be distributed are a result of a U.S. I.R.S. audit on a portion of manufacturing 101.
2.The amount to be distributed is $122,227,000. from manufacturing 101 accumulated during taxable years 1971 to 1976.
3.A tax credit in the amount of $1,478,880 represents the 4% tax paid on previous dividend distributions ($36,972,000) accumulated
during taxable years 1971 to 1976. The tax credit can be used for up to 50% of the tax liability in any year.
4.An income tax credit of $3,564,555 represents the excess P.R. taxes paid for taxable years 1980, 1981 and 1982.
LAP Corporation can credit this amount for any future income taxes until credit is fully used.
In the event it cannot use the tax credit in full, any direct or indirect subsidiary of LA Company may utilize such unused credit up
to 50% of that subsidiary's tax liability for a particular year.
5.This adjustment represents the latest adjustment in fact $$111,136,000 from the closing agreement of 12/30/83 and $11,091,000 from 1984.
These two amounts combined represent the amount to be repatriated under this agreement.
1971 -1976
1980 - 1982
TOTAL
122,227,000
0
122,227,000
0 1,478,880
0 3,564,555
0 5,043,435
TABLE F.1.12
TABLE F.1.13 FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of JUNE 27,1984
LAP CORPORATION QUALIFYING INVESTMENTS 1973 TO 1982
ITEM/YEARS 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 TOTAL
Plant&Equipment 250 194 130 188 536 355 0 0 1,913 5,069 8,695
2(j) Investments
GNHMA's P.R. mortgages 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 861 6,140 5,069 12,070
Loans 5,425 4,343 4,549 5,279 404 0 0 0 0 0 20,000
CD's & TO's 0 0 0 0 831 6,982 10,316 5,860 4,166 0 28,155
Govt. Bonds 0 0 0 0 6,000 0 0 5,000 0 0 11,000
Subtotal Invest. 5,675 4,537 4,679 5,467 7,771 7,337 10,316 11,721 12,279 10,138 79,920
TOTAL 101 11,349 9,073 9,358 10,934 15,542 14,674 20,631 23,442 24,557 20,275 159,835
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.Corporation had a total of $28,155,000 in certificates of deposits, including above amounts. These were invested as follows:
$19.5 million in Citibank, $5 million in Chase Manhattan Bank, and $3,655,000 in Banco Popular.
2. A total of $20 million in loans were made to another tax exempt 936 corporation during this period.
3. A total of $170,926,000 of 101 was accumulated in this period.
4. The $14,843,000 in GNMA's and a $5 million AFICA Bond investment were made after 12/31/79 in order to comply with Resolution No.3 of 11/7/79.
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of NOVEMBER 15, 1979
POSSESSION
SIC CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION
TOTAL
DIVIDENOS
OF PROFITS
NON 101
SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
101 TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT % AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAC CORPORATION
Prior to 1/1/73
12/31/72-12/31/78
Interest
1/1/78-12/31/78
Interest
16,085,000 52,000 32,066,000
14,852,000 14,852,000
826,000
0 0
0 826,000 0
2,596,000 2,596,000
641,000
0 0
0 641,000 0
4 641,320 50 16,033,000 50 16,033,000 641,320
0 0 0 0
0 100 826,000
0 0 0 0
0 100 641,000
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
35,000,000 17,500,000 33,533,000 641,320 17,500,000 16,033,000 641,320
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.Total dividends to be paid are between $20 to $35 million prior to 12/31/79.
2.Between $10,000,000 to $17,500,000 in dividends could be from non 101 sources
A. $52,000 accumulated prior to 1/1/173 could be distributed.
and not subject to taxation. They are:
B. Between $9,948,000 to $14,852,000 accumulated from 12/31/72 to 12/31/77 could be distributed.
C. Between 0 to $2,596,000 accumulated from 1/1/78 to 12/31/78 could be distributed.
3.The balance of the 101 dividends, $10,000,000 to $17,500,000, come from two sources, wich are as follows:
A. Interest on obligations of Puerto Rican government, not subject to taxation, from two years.
i. $826,000 accumulated from 12/31/72 to 12/31/77.
ii. Between $347,000 to $641,000 accumulated from 1/1/78 to 12/31/78.
B. Manufacturing 101 between $8,827,000 to $16,033,000 accumulated prior to 1/1/73 was subject to a 4% tax.
4.Annual distributions of 101 accumulated prior to 1/1/73 may not exceed 50% of such accumulated 101.
5.Depending on the actual amount of dividends distributed a tax between $353,080 to $641,320 shall be withheld.
6.Laxes payable will be carried forward indefinitely to future taxable years as a credit against Puerto Rico taxes on 101.
TOTAL
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---
TABLE F.1.14
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of NOYEMBER 15, 1979
LAC CORPORATION QUALIFYING INVESTMENTS 1973 TO 1977
ITEH/YEARS 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 TOTAL
Plant&Equipment 489 3,157 4,266 2,110 922 10,944
2(j) Investments 5 plus years
GNHMA's P.R. mortgages
Loans
Co's & To's
8,181 6,238
0 0
0 0
4,461
0
0
0 7,385 26,265
3,012 3,012
0 4,000 4,000
Subtotal 51 Inv. 8,1
2(j) Investments 5 less years
P.R. Government
Time Deposits
Subtotal 5- Inv.
PlantEq.&2(j)Inv.
TOTAL 101
181 6,238 4,461 0 14,397 33,277
0 0
0 5,519
0 4,998
0 10,517
8,670 9,395 8,727 12,627
17,339 18,790 17,454 25,251
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1. The $3,012,000 loan was made to another possession corporation.
2. The $4 million certificate of deposit was invested in Citibank.
3. The $4,998,000 time deposit was invested in the Bank of Nova Scotia.
4. Modified pass through securities with 30 year maturity, in residential mortgages in Puerto Rico (GNHMA guaranteed).
A. $12,422,000 of GNHMA's were purchased in 1971-1972, different amounts were used as a qualifying investment (1973-1975).
8. $4,734,000 of GNHMA's were purchased in 1976, however $3,384,000 was used as a qualifying investment in 1975.
5. In addition to the above investments, LAC had almost $25 million which could meet the requirements of Section 3(i)(7).
A. $8 million in certificates of deposit were invested in Citibank, and $5 million in Banco Popular.
B. An additional $11,988,000 was loaned to the same possession corporation.
TABLE F.1.15
5,513
4,998
(6) 10,511
15,313 54,732
30,629 109,463
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of SEPTEMBER 19, 1980
POSSESSION
SIC CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION
TOTAL
DIVIDENDS
OF PROFITS
NON IDI
SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
101 TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT % AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAC CORPORATION
Prior to 1/1/73
12/31/172-12/31/77
12/31/78-12/31/80
Interest in
Govt. Obligations
23,689,000 0 47,378,000 4 947,560 50 23,689,000
17,740,000 1,749,000 31,982,000
8,251,000 8,251,000
320,000
50 23,689,000 947,560
4 639,640 50 15,991,000 50 15,991,000 639,640
0 0
0 320,000 0
0 0 0 0
0 100 320,000
0 0 0
0 0 0
50,000,000 10,000,000 79,680,000 1,587,200 40,000,000 39,680,000 1,587,200
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
1.Total dividends to be paid are between $25 to $50 million prior to 12/31/80.
2.Up to $10 million in dividends could be from non 101 sources and not subject to taxation. They are:
A. $1,749,000 accumulated from 12/31/72 to 12/31/77.
B. $8,251,000 accumulated from 1/1/78 to 12/31/80.
3.Annual distributions of 101 accumulated prior to 1/1/73 may not exceed 50% of such accumulated 101.
4.To satisfy 50% investment requirement for 101 accumulated from 1/1/73-12/31/75, it was allowed to c
5.For investments which the 5 year period has elapsed (1973 through 1975) all 101 can be distributed
(Section 4(h)(1)).
oomit retroactively qualifying investments.
at a 4% tax rate.
6.To satisfy the 5 and/or 8 years investment requirements, they could commit prospectively any 2(j) investments after 12/31/77.
7.Depending on the actual amount of dividends distributed a tax between $1,000,000 to $1,587,200 shall be withheld.
8.Taxes payable will be carried forward indefinitely to future taxable years as a credit against Puerto Rico taxes on 101.
9.Unused investment tax credits caused by application of 5% minimum tax may be carried forward to succeding years until utilized.
TOTAL
NOTES:
TABLE F.1.16
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of OCTOBER 21, 1981
POSSESSION
SIC CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION
TOTAL
DIVIDENDS
OF PROFITS
NON 101
SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
IDI TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT % AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX
101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS
2833 LAC CORPORATION
Prior to 1/1/73 12,649,000
12/31/72-12/31/77 21,201,000 243,00
0 25,298,000 4 505,960 50 12,649,000 50 12,649,000 505,960
0 41,916,000 4 838,320 50 20,958,000 50 20,958,000 838,320
12/31/78-12/31/81
Interest
TOTAL
10,559,000 10,559,000 0 0
591,000 0 591,000 0
45,000,000 10,802,000 67,805,000
0 0 -0 0
0 100 591,000
1,344,280 34,198,000
0 0 0
0 0 0
33,607,000 1,344,280
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.Total dividends to be paid are between $20to $45 million prior to 12/31/81.
2.Up to $10,802,000 in dividends could be from non 101 sources and not subject to
A. $243,000 accumulated from 12/31/72 to 12/31/77.
B. $10,559,000 accumulated from 1/1/78 to 12/31/81.
taxation. They are:
3.Annual distributions of 101 accumulated prior to 1/1/73 say not exceed 50% of such accumulated 101.
4.To satisfy 50% investment requirement for 101 accumulated from 1/1/732/31/75, it was allowed to commit
5.For investments which the 5 year period has elapsed (1973 through 1977) all 101 can be distributed at 4%
retroactively qualifying investments.
tax rate.
6.Depending on the actual amount of dividends distributed a tax between $800,000 to $1,344,000 shall be withheld.
7.Taxes payable will be carried forward indefinitely to future taxable years as a credit against Puerto Rico taxes on 101.
8.Unused investment tax credits caused by application of 5% minimum tax say be carried forward to succeding years until utilized.
INVESTMENT
CREDITS
-- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
T ABLE F.1.17
TABLE F.1.18 FIRST CASE STUDY:-LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of
LAC CORPORATION QUALIFYING INVESIMENTS 1973 TO 1978
OCTOBER 21, 1981
ITEM/YEARS 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 TOTAL
Plant&Equipment 489 3,157 4,266 2,110 922 4,685 15,629
2(j) Investments 5 plus years
GNHMA's P.R. mortgages 7,667 5,711 3,951 0 5,202 0 22,531
Loans 0 0 0 9,463 3,012 0 12,475
Co's & TD's 0 0 0 0 4,000 6,315 10,315
Subtotal 5+ Inv. 7,667 5,711 3,951 9,463 12,214 6,315 45,321
PlantEq.&2(j)Inv. 8,156 8,868 8,217 11,573 13,136 11,000 60,950
TOTAL 101 16,311 17,736 16,433 23,146 26,272 21,692 121,590
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1. The full loan amount,$12,475,000, was made to another possession corporation.
2. A $4 million certificate of deposit was invested in Chase Manhattan Bank and one for $2,315,000 in Citibank.
3. Modified pass through securities with a 30 year maturity, in residential mortgages in Puerto Rico, were guaranteed by GNMA.
A. $12,422,000 of GNHMA's were purchased in 1971-1972, different amounts were used as a qualifying investment from 1973-1975.
B. $4,734,000 of GNHMA's were purchased in 1976, however $3,384,000 of this amount was used as a qualifying investment in 1975.
4. In addition to the above investments, LAC had almost $19,259,000 which could meet the requirements of Section 3(i)(7).
A. $8 million in certificates of deposit were invested in Citibank, and $5 million in Banco Popular.
B. An additional $2,525,000 was loaned to the same subsidiary.
C. Also an additional $3,734,000 was invested in GNHMA's.
TABLE F.1.19 FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of DECEMBER 30, 1983
REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
POSSESSION TOTAL NON 101 101 TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
SIC CORPORATIONS DIVIDENDS SOURCE AMOUNT % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAC CORPORATION
Previous Years
7/1/79-12/31/79
1/1/82-12/31/82
0 0
8,189,430
21,734,570
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 181,960 500,040
0 16,378,860 3.5 286,630 50 8,189,430 50 8,189,430
0 43,469,140 3.5 760,710 50 21,734,570 50 21,734,570
0 0
0 0
4,625,000 4,625,000 0 0
34,549,000 4,625,000 59,848,000
0
1,047,340
0
29,924,000
0 0 0
29,924,000 181,960 500,040
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.Total dividends to be paid are approximately $34,549,000 on or before 12/31/83.
2. $4,625,000 in dividends are to be paid from 1982 & 1983 non 101 sources and not subject to taxation.
3.The balance of the dividends shall be up to $29,924,000 from 101. These monies are broken down as follows:
A.$8,189,430 are from 101 accumulated from 7/1/79 to 12/31/79 and subject to a 3.5% tax.
B. $21,734,570 are from 101 accumulated from 1/1/82 to 12/31/82 and are subject to a 3.5% tax.
4.Annual distributions of 101 accumulated between 1/1/79 to 12/31/79 and 1/1/82 to 12/31/82 may not exceed 50% of total 101 for each year.
5.Repatriation was subject to a 50% reinvestment of such accumulated 101 in LAC Section 2(j) II for each given year.
6.A five year investment is required for the 101 earned during these years.
7.The $1,047,430 tollgate tax was to be reduced by $500,040 of investment credits and $181,960 of tax credits; the net tax was $365,340.
8.The $181,960 of income tax credits was a result of an adjustment from a U.S.I.R.S. tax audit.
9.The $500,040 of investment tax credits were earned through investments in qualified property, Section 231(a)(2)(8).
10.Unused investment tax credits caused by application of 5% minimum tax may be carried forward to succeding years until utilized.
1982-1983
TOTAL
---------- - ---- --- - ------ - --------- - ------------ - --- ------ - -- -- - -- ---------- - ------- - ----- - ------ - ----------------- - -----------------
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEHENT of
LAC CORPORATION QUALIFYING INVESTMENTS 1973 TO 1982
DECEMBER 30, 1983--81
lIEN/YEARS 1973 1974 1915 1976 1977 1978 1979a 1979b 1980 1981 1982 TOTAL
Plant6Equipment 489 3,157 4,266 2,110 922 4,685 0 0 11,090 552 5,861 33,138
2(j) Investments
GNHA's P.R. mortgages 6,992 5,066 3,333 0 4,612 0 0 0 0 6,417 5,868 32,348
Loans 0 0 0 8,602 6,398 0 0 0 0 0 15,000
Co's & TO's 0 0 0 0 0 5,331 6,515 5,480 305 5,864 0 23,495
Subtotal Invest. 7,481 8,223 7,599 10,712 11,992 10,016 6,515 5,480 11,395 12,833 11,735 103,981
TOTAL 101 14,962 16,446 15,198 21,423 23,983 20,032 13,029 10,959 22,789 25,666 23,469 207,956
Source Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.$19.5 million in certificates of deposit were invested in Citibank, and $4 million in Chase Manhattan Bank.
2. A $15 million loan was made to another possession corporation.
3. A total of $207,956,000 of manufacturing 101 was accumulated during this period.
4. The 1981 and 1982 GNHA investments were made in order to comply with Resolution No.3 of 11/7/79.
5.Total 101 reported in this table sight be different to total 101 reported in closing agreements.
TABLE F.1.20
FIRST CASE STUDY: LA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEHENT of DECEMBER 31, 1984--42
POSSESSION
SIC CORPORATIONS
REPATRIATION
TOTAL
DIVIDENDS
OF PROFITS
NON 101
SOURCE
101 REPATRIATION
101 TOLLGATE TAX
AMOUNT t' AMOUNT
REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTHENT
101 % AMOUNI 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
2833 LAC CORPORATION
12/31/12-12/31/17
1/1/79-12/31/79
1/1/80-12/31/80
TOTAL
55,000,000
4,619,000
0
20,380,634
79,999,634
0 55,000,000 4.0
0 9,238,000 3.5
0 40,761,268
0 104,999,268
2,200,000 100 55,000,000 0 2,200,000
161,665 50 4,619,000 50 4,619,000
713,322
3,074,9871
50 20,380,634 50 20,380,634
79,999,634
0 0
0 0
24,999,634 2,200,000
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1.Total dividends of $80,000,000 could be repatriated on or before 12/31/84.
2.The dividends were to be distributed from manufacturing 101 accumulated in three periods, as follows:
A. $55 million accumulated from 12/31/72 to 12/31/77 was subject to a 4% tollgate tax.
8. $4,619,366 accumulated from 7/1/19 to 12/31/179, was subject to a 3.5% tollgate tax.
C. $20,380,634 accumulated between 1/1/80 to 12/31/80, was subject to a 3.5% tollgate tax.
3.The $55 million represents the investment for which the 5 year period elapsed (1973 to 1911) and all its
4.To satisfy 50% investment requirement for 101 accumulated from 1/1/73-12/31/77, it was allowed to commit
5.The reinvestment requirement for the monies to be repatriated after July 1, 1979 were the same.
101 can be distributed at a 4% tax rate.
retroactively qualifying investments.
A.Dividends shall not exceed 50% of total manufacturing 101 for each period plus up to an equal amount of 2(j) investments.
B.At least 50% of the manufacturing 101 earned in each period had to be invested for five years.
C.At the end of each five year investment period, 50% of said investment shall be reinvested for three years in Section 231(a)(2)(C) activities.
6.To satisfy the 5 year investment requirements of Sect. 4(h)(A) and/or more than 8 years of Sect. 231(a)(2)(C)(ii) they could commit
prospectively any 2(j) investments after 12/31/17.
7.The tollgate taxes to be paid add to $3,015,000. (Section 421 PRITA).
8.The 4% tax payable on the $55,000,000 dividend will be carried forward indefinitely for future tax years. This credit amounts to $2.2 million.
9.Unused investment tax credits caused by application of 5% minimum tax may be carried forward to succeding years until utilized. (Section 4(h)(4)).
-- ------- - - ------------ - ------ - -- - --------------------- - ------------------------------------------------------------ - ----------- - ----------
TABLE F.1.21
Appendix F.2
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TABLE F.2.1 SECOND CASE STUDY: SHEA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT OF JUNE 28, 1979
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS IDI REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON IDI II TOGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE AMOUNT % AMOUNT IDI %AMOUNT 101 % AMOUiT CREDITS CREDITS
PRE 10/1/76
2831 SHEA ADO 879,027 0 3,516,108 7 61,532 25 879,027 25 879,027 0 0
SHEA BAS 1,499,581 0 5,998,324 7 104,971 25 1,499,581 25 1,499,581 0 0
2831 SUBTOTAL 2,378,608 0 9,514,432 166,503 2,378,608 2,373,608 0 0
3841 SHEA DEL 1,393,566 0 5,574,264 7 97,550 25 1,393,566 25 1,393,566 0 0
SHEA EHS 382,422 0 1,529,688 7 26,770 25 382,422 25 382,422 0 0
SHEA FPI 3,241,467 0 12,965,868 7 226,903 25 3,241,467 25 3,241,467 0 0
SHEA IML 1,580,255 0 6,321,020 7 110,618 25 1,580,255 25 1,580,255 0 0
3841 SUBTOTAL 6,597,710 0 26,390,840 461,840 6,597,710 6,597,710 0 0
TOTAL PRE 10/1/76 8,976,318 0 35,905,272 628,342 8,976,31.8 8,976,318 0 0
1/1/78 - 12/31/78
2831 SHEA ADO 6,436,430 0 8,581,907 7 450,550 75 6,436,430 25 2,145,477 0 0
SHEA BAS 6,301,954 0 8,402,605 7 441,137 75 6,301,954 25 2,100,651 0 0
2831 SUBTOTAL 12,738,384 0 16,984,512 891,687 12,738,384 4,246,128 0 0
3841 SHEA DEL 3,354,539 0 4,472,719 7 234,818 75 3,354,539 25 1,118,180 0 0
SHEA EHS 1,930,917 0 2,574,556 7 135,164 75 1,930,917 25 643,639 0 0
SHEA FPI 6,229,455 0 8,305,940 7 436,062 75 6,229,455 25 2,076,485 0 0
-SHEA IML 5,893,679 0 7,858,239 7 412,558 75 5,893,679 25 1,964,560 0 0
3841 SUBTOTAL 17,408,590 0 23,211,453 1,218,601 17,408,590 5,802,863 0 0
TOTAL 1978 30,146,974 0 40,195,965 2,110,288 30,146,974 10,048,991 0 0
GRAND TOTAL 39,123,292 0 76,101,237 2,738,630 39,123,292 19,025,309 0 0
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES:
1.Subsidiaries say pay SHEA Company total dividends of $39,123,292 ID! by May 31, 1980.
2.Dividends totalling $30,146,974 were derived from 1978 IDI, represents 75% of total IDI for that year.
3.Dividends totalling $8,976,318 were derived from ID! before 10/1/76, represents 25% of ID! accumulated by 1/1/77.
4.All dividends are taxable at a 7% rate.
S.May 31,1980 dividends paid shall not exceed 75% of the 1978 101 undistributed balance as of 12/31/78.
6.The eight year reinvestment requirement shall be at least 25% of 101 in 12/31/78.
7.May 31,1980 dividends paid shall not exceed 25% of the pre 10/1/1976 101 undistributed balance as of 1/1/77.
8.Pre 10/1/1976 101 reinvestment requirement is for only twelve months; the reinvestment amount shall be equal the repatriation.
9.Reallocations/adjustments by IRS are subject to 29% Puerto Rico withholding tax or up to a 50% credit per year for future taxes.
10.Tax amount shown is estimated at the appropriate tax rate.
11. Pre-1976 101 total amount was $35,905,272. Only 25% of this ID! can be repatriated annually, and the same percentage (25%)
should be reinvested. The percentage of IDI reinvested can be repatriated, if desired, at the end of the 12 months free of taxes.
At this closing agreement, 50% of total II was accumulated in Puerto Rico.
TABLE F.2.2 SECOND CASE STUDY: SHEA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of JUNE 24, 1980
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POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON 101 TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
1979 II
9,695,660 0
6,999,967 0
12,927,547 7 678,696
9,333,289 7 489,998
16,695,627 0 22,260,836
7,146,916
2,733,578
6,785,358
8,085,088
9,529,221
3,644,771
9,047,144
10,780,117
24,750,940 0 33,001,253
41,446,567 0 55,262,089
1,168,694
500,284
191,350
474,975
565,956
1,732,566
2,901,260
Pre 10/1/76 IDI
1,758,054 0 2,637,081 7 123,064
2,999,162 0 4,498,743 7 209,941
4,757,216
2,787,132
Z64,844
6,482,934
3,160,510
7,135,824 7 333,005
4,180,698
1,147,266
9,724,401
4,740,765
13,195,420 0 19,793,130
195,099
53,539
453,805
221,236
923,679
PRE 10/1/76 TOTA 17,952,636 0 26,928,954 1,256,685
59,399,203 0 82,191,043 4,157,944
75 9,695,660
75 6,999,967
16,695,627
75 7,146,916
75 2,733,578
75 6,785,358
75 8,085,088
24,750,940
41,446,567
50 1,758,054
50 2,999,162
4,757,216
50 2,787,132
50 764,844
50 6,482,934
-50 3,160,510
13,195,420
17,952,636
59,399,203
25 3,231,887
25 2,333,322
5,565,209
2,382,305
911,193
2,261,786
2,695,029
8,250,313
13,815,522
25 879,027
25 1,499,581
2,378,608
25 1,393,566
25 382,422
25 3,241,467
25 1,580,255
6,597,710
8,976,318
22,791,840
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Source: Puerto Rico Departsent of the Treasury
NOTES:
1.Total asount to be distributed prior to May 31, 1981 was $50,872,885.00. However, this agreesent only stated $50,422,88
The closing agreement had an addition error of $450,000.00 in the pre 10/1/76 line items and only listed $8,976,318.00.
2. Total 101 accumulated in 1979 was $55,262,089.00, up to 75% of this amount could be repatriated.
3. Total undistributed 101, accumulated prior to October 1, 1976, was $37,705,272; up to 25% of undistributed PRE 10/1/76 IDI balance as of 1/1/77 could be distributed.
4. Tollgate taxes for the 101 dividends were at a 7% rate.
5. Total taxes due were $3,561,102.00, however, of this amount $2,901,260.00 was corroborated by copies of cancelled checks or Puerto Rico Treasury Department records.
6. Seventy five percent of the 1979 101 could be repatriated and twenty five percent reinvested for at least eight years.
7. Twenty five percent of the pre 10/1/76 101 could be repatriated and at least an equal amount had to be reinvested for twelve sonths.
8. Tax credits cannot be used to reduce the tax liability in any given year by more than fifty percent.
9. Pre-1976 101 was adjusted: 25% were repatriated in 1979, 50 % were repatriated on this closing agreesent (25% tax-free II and 25% taxable 101).
25% of the pre-1976 101 was reinvested for on year, and- at the end of that year it can be repatriated free of taxes.
2831 SHEA DD
SHEA BAS
2831 SUBTOTAL
3841 SHEA DEL
SHEA ENS
SHEA FPI
SHEA IL
3841 SUBTOTAL
1979 TOTAL
2831 SHEA DD
SHEA BAS
2831 SUBTOTAL
3841 SHEA DEL
SHEA ENS
SHEA FPI
SHEA IML
3841 SUBTOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
TABLE F.2.3 SECOND CASE STUDY: SHEA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of JUNE 24, 1980
SUMMARY OF SIGNED STATEMENTS ON JANUARY 27, 1981 UNDER ARTICLE 231 - 3(C) OF THE REGULATIONS PRITA
TOTAL TOTAL
POSSESSION DIVIDENDS UNDISTRIBUTED DISTRIBUTED ACCUMULATION PERIOD PUERTO RICO INVESTMENTS DURING 1980 TAXABLE 101 1980
CORPORATIONS DECLARED DIVIDENDS DIVIDENDS TAX YEAR 1979 PRIOR TO 10/1/76 3ANUARY 1, 1980 DECEMBER 31,1980
SHEA ADD 10,549,584 5,741,861 4,807,723 9,670,557 879,027 8,345,022 7,685,751 14,900,000
SHEA BAS 8,499,548 4,159,969 4,339,579 6,999,967 1,499,581 8,603,691 7,520,483 11,800,000
SHEA DEL 8,540,482 4,293,850 4,246,632 7,146,916 1,393,566 6,711,307 5,756,472 15,400,000
SHEA EHS 3,108,307 2,350,973 757,334 2,725,885 382,422 2,442,688 2,155,871 4,200,000
SHEA FPI 10,026,825 6,310,383 3,716,442 6,785,358 3,241,467 9,766,077 8,968,378 11,000,000
SHEA IML 9,665,343 7,519,132 2,146,211 8,085,088 1,580,255 9,062,268 8,003,377 11,900,000
TOTAL 50,390,089 30,376,168 20,013,921 41,413,771 8,976,318 44,931,053 40,090,332 69,200,000
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
CA)
TABLE F.2.4 SECOND CASE STUOY: SHEA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of MAY 29, 1981
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
334
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON IDI TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE II % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
------------ --- ---- -------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRE 10/1/76
2831 SHEA DO
SHEA BAS
2831 SUBTOTAL
3841 SHEA DEL
SHEA EHS
SHEA FPI
SHEA IMt
3841 SUBTOTAL
219,759
374,896
594,655
348,393
95,607
810,369
395,066
1,649,435
TOTAL PRE 10/1/7 2,244,090
1977
2831 SHEA
1980
SHEA
1980
SHEA
1978
1979
1980
TO 1980 101
AOO
IDI
BAS
101
CAS
101
IDI
101
2831 SUBTOTAL
3841 SHEA
1980
SHEA
1980
SHEA
1980
SHEA
1977
1978
1979
1980
SHEA
1977
1978
1979
1980
SHEA
1980
3841 SUBTOTAL
0 879,036 7 15,383
0 1,499,584 7 26,243
0 2,378,620
1,393,572
382,428
3,241,476
1,580,264
0 6,597,740
0 8,976,360
11,335,352 37,547 15,063,740
8,923,738 46,079 11,836,879
419,030 0 558,707
542,425 0 723,233
947,450 11,126 1,248,432
22,167,995 94,752 29,430,991
11,521,428 28,749 15,323,572
3,290,781 34,717 4,341,419
8,421,091 69,241 11,135,800
102,576
338,829
304,522
219,440
130,278
279,987
286,040
483,805
0
0
2,950
0
5,953
136,768
451,772
406,029
288,653
173,704
373,316
381,387
637,136.
8,986,169 55,313 11,907,808
34,364,946 196,923 45,557,364
TOTAL 1977-1980 56,532,941
GRAND TOTAL 58,777,031
291,675 74,988,355
291,675 83,964,715
41,626
24,388
6,692
56,726
27,655
115,460
157,086
7 790,846
7 621,436
29,332
37,970
65,543
1,545,127
7 804,488
7 227,924
7 584,630
7 7,180
7 23,718
7 21,317
7 15,154
7 9,119
7 19,599
7 20,023
7 33,450
7 625,160
2,391,762
3,936,889
4,093,975
25 219,759
25 374,896
594,655
348,393
95,607
810,369
395,066
1,649,435
2,244,090
75 11,297,805
75 8,877,659
75 419,030
75 542,425
75 936,324
22,073,243
75 11,492,679
15 3,256,064
75 8,351,850
102,576
338,829
304,522
216,490
75 130,278
75 279,987
75 286,040
75 477,852
75 8,930,856
34,168,023
56,241,266
58,485,356
219,759
374,896
594,655
348,393
95,607
810,369
395,066
1,649,435
2,244,090
25 3,765,935
25 2,959,220
139,677
180,808
312,108
O 0
0 0
O 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0
0
30,011
7,357,748 30,011
25 3,830,893 0 0
25 1,085,355 108,425
25 2,783,950
34,192
112,943
101,507
72,163
43,426
93,329
95,347
159,284
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
25 2,976,952
11,389,341 108,425
18,747,089
20,991,179
138,436
138,436
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES1. This closing agreement did not specify a time period to make the distributions.
The Closing Agreement specified a tollgate net balance in the amount of $3,953,243.
This amount is after discounting $138,436 in tax credits from tollgate taxesJ4,093,975; however, the agreement has a different amount, $4,091,679.
The net tollgate taxes balance due of $3,953,243 for 1981 was corroborated as paid by cancelled checks and/or transmital letter.
This closing agreement covered part of the distribution of dividends of the pre-1976 period.
Pre 10/1/76 101 was distributed in previous agreements (1978,1979,1980 and 1981) but amounting to less than 100% of total 101 for said years.
The total amount of pre 10/1/76 101 was approximately the same amount which was distributed in the first two agreements (1979, 1980).
Repatriation for 1977 to 1980 manufacturing 101 was ubject to an eight year reinvestment requirement.
Closing agreement did not specify how the reinvestment money would be used in eligible Section 2(j) investments.
Repatriation for Pre 10/1/1976 manufacturing 101 was ubject to a 12 month reinvestment requirement, afterwards, it was repatriated free of taxes.
Pre-1976 amount of 101 for distribution was $8,976,318. 25% were repatriated, 25% were reinvested, and 50% were accumulated in Puerto Rico.
The full amount will be repatriated, if desired, in 1982 free of taxes.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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TABLE F.2.5 SECOND CASE STUDY: SHEA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of JUNE 25, 1982
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON 101 TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTHENT TAX INVESTMENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
1981 101
12,044,514
8,983,161
2,407,204
32,217
9,540
4,635
16,016,396
11,964,828
3,203,425
23,434,879 46,392 31,184,649
16,312,069
3,944,351
9,438,470
235,777
7,388,447
633,517
7,199
16,920
13,741
2,061
26,025
1,301
241,680
154,911
178,684
38,527,906 67,247
21,739,827
5,236,575
12,566,305
311,621
9,816,563
842,955
322,240
206,548
238,245
51,280,879
840,861
628,153
168,180
1,637,194
1,141,341
274,920
659,731
16,360
515,370
44,255
16,918
10,844
12,508
2,692,246
12,012,297
8,973,621
2,402,569
23,388,487
16,304,870
3,927,431
9,424,729
233,716
7,362,422
632,216
241,680
154,911
178,684
38,460,659
4,004,099
2,991,207
800,856
0 96,610
0 40,106
80,747 2,387
7,796,162 80,747 139,103
5,434,957,
1,309,144
3,141,576
77,905
2,454,141
210,739
80,560
51,637
59,561
0
82,719
0
0
0
0
10,667
0
0
68,045
19,107
44,537
8,180
257,685
10,290
2,018
0
0
12,820,220 93,386 409,862
Adjustment Pre-1976 I 6,732,228 0 6,732,228 0 100 6,732,228
68,695,013 113,639 89,197,756 4,329,440 68,581,374 20,616,382 174,133 548,965
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES1. The total dividends to be distributed during 1982 was $61,962,785.
2. The Closing Agreement specified a net balance due on 6/30/82 of $1,582,905
3. SHEA IHL had additional investment credits of $52,337.00 still available to
from tollgate taxes ($54,213 was from prior year correction).
be used to reduce future tollgate tax payments.
SHEA HPL had additional investment credits of $3,427.00 still available to be used to reduce future tollgate tax payments
The net tollgate taxes balance due of $1,582,905 for 1982 was corroborated by cancelled checks and transmital letter.
Closing agreement did not specify how the reinvestment money would be used in eligible Section 2(j) investments.
Fifty percent of the tollgate taxes could be paid up to a year later or the fifteenth day of the month following the distribution.
$61,962,785 101 was subject to a tollgate tax of 7%, approximately $4,329,440 in taxes.
Total taxes owed in 1982, $4,329,440 were reduced by $723,098 of tax credits and 3% investment credits; yielding a tax rate of 5.8%.
. The total II accumulated in 1981 was $82,020,735.00.
The other 50% of the taxes, $2,077,657, which was due by the next year was paid (corroborated by cancelled checks and transmittal memo).
Pre-1976 amount of 101 for distributions was $6,732,228; after 1-year reinvested, it could be distributed free of taxes.
2831 SHEA
SHEA
SHEA
2831 SUBTOTAL
3841 SHEA DEL
SHEA EHS
SHEA FPI
SHEA HPL
SHEA IHL
SHEA JVN
SHEA GPC
1981 101
1980 IDI
1979 101
3841 SUBTOTAL
TOTAL
0 0 0 0
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TABLE F.2.6 SECOND CASE STUDY: SHEA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT JUNE 30, 1983
REPATRIATION OF PROFITS IDI REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON 101 101 TOGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE AMOUNT % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT IDI % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
1982 101
14,097,133 60,422 18,715,615 7.0
18,553
18,553
1,238,079
18,553
0
9,799
6,198,645
24,737
2,456,560
15,372,318 88,774 27,395,557
20,547,061
1,936,967
175,623
13,727,822
646,688
11,062,428
1,608,680
54,438
43,100
0
12,560
84
30,519
0
27,323,497
3,787,734
351,246
18,287,016
862,139
14,709,212
2,144,907
982,570 75 14,036,711 25 4,673,904
0
1,299
42,990
0
18,553
1,223,280
1,026,858 15,283,544
1,434,484
66,285
6,147
960,068
45,262
772,234
112,608
20,492,623
1,893,867
175,623
13,715,262
646,604
11,031,909
1,608,680
6,193,645
6,184
1,228,280
0 3,580
0
0
141,467
0
12,864
555
12,112,013 141,467 16,999
6,830,374
1,893,867
175,623
4,571,754
215,535
3,677,303
536,227
0
196,425
15,236
0
0
0
0
49,245
3,212
0
130,801
847
39,093
3,303
49,705,269 140,701 67,465,751
65,077,587 229,475 94,861,308
3,397,088 49,564,568 17 ,901,183 211,661 226, 506
4,423,946 64,848,112 30,013,196 353,128 243,505
Source : Puerto
NOTES:
Rico Department of the Treasury
1.Possession corporations may pay SHEA Company total dividends of $65,077,587
2.Dividends totalling $64,829,559 were derived from 1982 101 and $18,553 from
101 during 1983 and later years.
1981 IDI, represents 75% of total 101 for that year.
3.Dividends totalling $229,475 were derived from non source 101 during 1982, this amount is not taxable.
4.Taxable dividends have a 7% and 3.5% tax rate.
5.Dividends to be paid shall not exceed 75% of the 101 accumulated from 1/1/82 to 12/31/82.
6.The eight year reinvestment requirement shall be at least 25% of the accumulated 101 in 1982.
7.Dividends paid by SHEA CAS, SHEA GPC and SHEA EHS shall not exceed 10% of their 1982 101.
8.The five year reinvestment requirement, for the above referenced companies, shall be 50% of the 1982 1D1.
9.Reallocations/adjustments by IRS are subject to the provisions of Section 4.8.6 of Regulation 2721 U.S. Dept. of Treasury.
10.Tax amount shown is estimated at the appropriate tax rate.
11.Taxes paid as per this closing agreement was $1,926,739 (Tax amount - Tax & Investment Credits).
12.50% of the tollgate tax was due on 6/30/83, after deducting for tax credits and 3% investment credits it ended being $1,926,739.
13.Possession corporations were to withhold 50% of the taxes, payable in two equal installaents on 6/28/34 and 6/28/85.
14.Income tax credits were used against each corporation's tollgate taxes. Three corporations had a total carryover of $237,706.
15.The three were SHEA CAS $98,477, SHEA EHS $$130,140 and SHEA GPC $9,089.
16.Carryover investment credits were $555 for SHEA CAS, $12,864 for SHEA BAS and $3,212 for SHEA EHS.
17.SHEA BAS 1982 distribution of $13,553 was from 1981 10I, 1982 101 was $6,198,645 but it was not distributed during 1983.
18.The tollgate taxes to be paid were reduced from $4,422,648 to $4,080,352, a reduction of 8% after adjusting for the credits.
19.The effective overall tollgate tax for this agreement resulted in approximately 6.3%.
POSSESSION
2831 SHEA ADD
SHEA BAS
1982
1981 101
SHEA CAS
2831 SUBTOTAL
3841 SHEA
SHEA
SHEA
SHEA
SHEA
SHEA
SHEA
3841 SUBTOTAL
TOTAL
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE F.2.7 SECOND CASE STUDY: SHEA COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT of JUNE 29, 1984
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON IDI TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE IDI % AMOUNT IDI % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
15,063,915
1,392
4,918,581
79,580
23,085
696
2,472
0
20,054,440
696
9,832,218
159,160
20,063,468 26,253 30,046,514
26,144,805
6,007,198
253,741
787,084
13,436,854
369,187
13,841,423
1,307,149
413,462
0
7,361
0
177
896
18
1,693
0
0
34,859,740
12,000,874
507,482
1,573,814
17,914,611
492,225
18,452,973
1,742,865
826,924
2831 SHEA ADD
SHEA BAS
SHEA CAS
SHEA CAS
2831 SUBTOTAL
3841 SHEA DEL
SHEA EHS
SHEA EHS
SHEA GPC
SHEA FPI
SHEA HPL
SHEA IML
SHEA JVM
SHEA KBP
3841 SUBTOTAL
3851 SHEA LAC
TOTAL
1,052,858
0
172,064
5,571
1,230,493
1,830,136
210,015
17,762
27,542
940,517
25,842
968,781
91,500
14,471
4,126,567
617,424 0 1,234,848 3.5 21,610
83,242,395 36,398 119,652,871 5,378,669
75 15,040,830
LOD 696
50 4,916,109
50 79,580
20,037,215
75 26,144,805
50 6,000,437
50 253,741
50 786,907
75 13,435,958
75 369,169
75 13,839,730
75 1,307,149
50 413,462
62,551,358
50 617,424
83,205,997
5,013,610
0
4,916,109
79,580
0
0
236,919
7,530
0
9,520
10,009,299 236,919 17,050
8,714,935
6,000,437
253,741
786,907
4,478,653
123,056
4,613,243
435,716
413,462
0
168,029
130,140
29,115
0
0
0
0
0
109,710
9,453
6,000
0
0
3,240
21,658
223
0
25,820,151 327,284 150,284
50 617,424 0 0
36,446,874 564,203 167,334
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES1. The dividends to be distributed during 1984 and later years was $83,242,395.
A. $15,763,292 of 101 was accumulated between 1/1/83 to 12/31/83; dividends were subject to tax
B. $7,442,705 of 101 was accumulated between 1980-1982; dividends were subject to tax (Sections
under Section 231(a)(2)(C)(ii).
4(h)(1)) of Act 26 and 231(a)(2)(C)(ii) of PRITA).
C. $36,398 of non 101 source earnings during 1983; these monies are not subject to tax under Section 231 (c) of the ITA.
2. The Closing Agreement specified that a minimum of $5,000,000.00 of tollgate taxes would be paid by 6/30/84, in effect $5,003,410.00 was paid.
3. Corporations using the 50% credit can use a 3.5% tollgate tax as long as the combined total exceeds a 5% tollgate tax.
4. Amount of taxes paid, $5,003,410, have been corroborated by cancelled checks separate memo to Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury.
5. SHEA BAS was liquidated this year; that is the reason why dividends only amounted to $1,392.
6. Total 101 and reinvestment amounts are estimated, based on their respective rate of repatriation.
7. Up to 75% of the 101 accumulated during 1983 could be distributed, provided 25% was reinvested for 8 years, Section 231(a)(2)(C)(ii) of PRITA.
8. Dividends distributed by five corporations , including from 1983 II, qualified for the 50% credit (Sections (i)(7)(8) and 4(h)(1) of ACT 26).
SHEA C S, SHEA HS, SHEA GPC, SHEA KBP, and SHEA L C had to invest 50% of 101 in 2(j) activities for at least 5 years.
9. Closing agreement did not specify how the reinvestment money would be used in eligible Section 2(j) investments.
10. $12,734,339 101 was subject to a tollgate tax of 3.5%, approximately $445,702 in taxes.
11. $70,471,678 101 was subject to a tollgate tax of 7%, approximately $4,932,967 in taxes.
12. The total taxes owed in 1984, $5,378,669, were reduced by $375,259 worth of tax credits. Thus yielding an effective tax rate of 6%.
13. SHEA CAS had $64,855 and SHEA GPC had $1,573 worth of income tax credits available for carryover.
14. SHEA HS used $59,748 of last years $130,140 of income tax credits to reduce its taxes to zero.
15. SHEA EHS still had $70,392 for future taxes.
16. SHEA C S had $9,520, SHEA EHS had $9,453, and SHEA GPC had $6,000 of investment credits for carryover.
62,561,503 10,145 88,371,509
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Appendix F.3
TABLE F.3.1 THIRD CASE STUDY: MAC COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT APRIL 15, 1980
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON 101 TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
3573 MACCA CORPORATION
Grant I
First Closing Agreement 6/20/78
Prior to 10/1/1976
9/30/76 to 1/1/78
TOTAL
766,175
632,523
1,398,698
0 1,532,350 7 53,632 50 766,175
0 843,364 7 44,277
0 2,375,714 97,909
75 632,523
1,398,698
50 766,175 0 0
25 210,841 14,759 0
977,016 14,759 0
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1. Total 101 dividends of $1,398,698 were distributed in 1978. This amount represented money from the pre
2. A one year investment of $766,175 had to be made from pre 10/1/76 101 and a $210,841 investment had to
9/30/76 101.
4.Reinvestment requirements would be covered by maintaining $1,393,290 in the following investments:
Puerto Rico GNMA's $882,627 (original value)
Inventory $255,000
Accounts Receivable $255,663
10/1/76 and after 9/30/76 periods.
be made for 8 years from after
5.The investment period for the pre 10/1/76 101 $766,175 had lapsed and was to be repatriated at a 7% tax.
6.The eight year investment, $210,841 , would be complied by an annual average inventory balance of $255,000 and accounts receivable of
$1716,666 until 6/20/86.
7.After compliance with the eight year investment period, the $210,841 could be repatriated at a 7% tollgate tax.
This 7% tollgate tax ($14,759) would be available as a credit for future tax years up to 50% of tax liability per year, unused portions
could be carried forward.
8.After the repatriation of the 8 year investment, there would not be any further investment requirements.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE F.3.2 THIRD CASE STUDY: MAC COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT APRIL 15, 1980
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON 101 TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
3513 MACCA CORPORATION
Grant I
Second Closing Agreement 11/28/78
Prior to 10/1/1976 574,632 0 1,149,264 7 40,224 50 574,632 50 574,632 3,476 0
After 9/30/76 1,208,550 0 1,611,400 7 84,599 75 1,208,550 25 402,850 0 0
TOTAL 1,783,182 0 2,760,664 124,823 1,783,182 977,482 0 0
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury ,
NOTES: 1. Total 101 dividends of $1,783,182 were distributed in 1978. This amount represented money from the pre 10/1/76 and after 9/30/76 periods.
2. A one year investment of $574,632 had to be made from pre 10/1/76 101 and a $402,850 investment had to be made for 8 years from after 9/30/76 101.
The latter amount was composed of two sources:
A. $49,664 was from 101 accumulated between 9/30/76 to 1/1/78.
B. $353,186 was from 101 accumulated after 12/31/77.
3. The one and eight year reinvestment requirement were satisfied by maintaining a $2.1 million investment in working capital (assets over liabilities).
4. Since the one year investment period had lapsed the pre 10/1/76 101 could be repatriated at a 7% tollgate tax. Thus, the reinvestment requirements
for the after 9/30/76 101 was modified to only maintaining an annual average working capital balance of $977,482 until 11/28/86. Afterwards, it
could be repatriated at a 7% tollgate tax rate. The investments in working capital were in addition to the ones in inventory ($255,000) and
accounts receivables ($176,666) of the first closing agreement.
5. The 7% tollgate tax ($3,476) which would be paid on the $49,664, could be made available as a credit to offset up to 50% of yearly taxes.
CA3
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TABLE F.3.3 THIRD CASE STUDY: MAC COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT APRIL 15, 1980
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON 101 TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTHENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE 101 t AMOUNT 101 t AMOUNT IDI t AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
3573 MACCA CORPORATION
Grant I
Distributions on 12/31/79
Prior to 1/1/78
1/1/178 to 12/31/178
PRIOCO Bonds
Rental Income
TOTAL
901,637
215,537
78,218
37,807
1,233,199
0 1,803,275 4 36,065 50 901,637
0 431,074 5 10,777 50 215,537
0 78,218 0 0 100 78,218
371,807 0 0 0 0 0
37,807 2,312,567 46,842 1,195,392
50 901,637 36,065
50 215,537 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0
1,117,174
0
36,065
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
1.It is important to point out that the distribution of dividends occurred prior to the execution of this closing agreement. Under the
the execution of a closing agreement and/or the payment of 10% tollgate tax on the amount distributed is required. These conditions
Moreover, the corporation filed the closing well after the distribution and it was able to negotiate a beneficial agreement, includin
tollgate tax without the imposition of interest and penalties.
2.The four year 101 reinvestment requirement will be satisfied as follows:
A. Puerto Rico GNNA's $742,377
B. PRIOCO Bonds $374,797
3.The reinvestment amounts ($901,637 and $215,537) could distributed after 12/31/83, subject to a 4% and 5% tollgate tax, respectively.
tollgate tax rules
were not satisfied.
g a reduced rate of
The tollgate tax ($36,065) for pre 1978 IDI could be available as a future tax credit. The amount reinvested qualifies as a tax credit upon repatriation.
4.The above referenced total 101 amount does not include previous 101 committed for reinvestment purposes.
For example, earnings and profits available for distribution on 12/
A. 101 accumulated under Grant I prior to 1/1/78 2,063,780
Less, Investments required by first and
second closing agreements (260,505) 1,803,275
B. 101 accumulated under Grant 1 1/1/78 to 12/31/78 784,260
Less, Investments required by first and
second closing agreements
Interest PRIOCO bonds (101) 12/31/78
Rental income (non-IDI) 12/31/78
TOTAL AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION
(353,186) 431,074
78,218
37,807
2,350,374
5.The rental income was a non 101 source income. As such, it was was only counted as part of the total dividends to he renatriated
NOTES:
TABLE F.3.4 THIRD CASE STUDY: MAC OMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT APRIL 15, 1980
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS II REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON 101 TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE 101 % AMOUNT 11 % AMOUNT I01 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3573 MACCA ORPORATION
Distributions on 12/31/81
0 2,375,994 7 124,740 75 1,781,995 24 569,039 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 35,638
PRIOCO Bonds Interest
Leasehold Improvements
P.R. GNKA's Interest
TOTAL
33,000 0 33,000 0 0 100 33,000 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,780
32,031 0 42,709 7 2,242 100 32,031 0 0 0 0
1,847,026 0 2,451,703 126,982 1,847,026 604,677 0 4,780
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
IOTES: 1. Undistributed alance of 181 ($2,451,103)
A.Manufacturing 101
B.PRIDCO Bonds interest (181)
C.Puerto Rico GNMA's Interest
accumulated during calendar year 1979 was as follows:
$2,375,994
33,000
42,709
2.A distribution in the amount of $1,847,026 was to be made prior to 12/31/81 as follows:
A.Manufacturing 101 $1,781,995
B.PRIOCO Bonds Interest (101) 33,000
C.Puerto Rico GNMA's Interest 32,031
3.An eight year einvestment in theamount of$604,677 wasrequired until 12/31/87. 181 reinvested appears to be higher than
the amount required. However, MACCA Corporation has been able to repatriate PRIOCO bond interest income as a tax-free 101 source.
As such, itis not areinvestment activity. Leasehold improvements was not accounted as a reinvestment activity for several reasons:
1. to avoid double counting since it will be used to satisfy other reinvestment requirements, and 2. these improvements, based on Section 231
of PRITA of1954 only qualified as an investment credit. There are no provisions of the 1978 IIA defining them as reinvestment activities.
Also, the use of these improvements as reinvestment activities sees questionable since they are deducted in their income tax return. Further, it
frees the 25% 181 ($593,999) for other investment purposes.
4.PRIDCO Bonds ($89,565) was the difference from committed investments ($374,797 and $35,638) and the principal ($500,000). It could be used to reduce future tollgate taxes.
5.If the $89,565.00 were distributed prior to 12/31/87, they would be subject to a 10% tollgate tax. Afterwards, the distribution would not be subject to taxes.
6.Tollgate taxes were 73, Section 231 (a)(2)(B) of the Act authorizes a 3% investment credit for acquisition, construction and enlargement of buildings/fixed structures.
7.Twenty eight percent (28%) of the leasehold improvements ($569,039) listed below qualify for the computation of the 3% investment credit. This amounts to $4,780.
8.The $33,000 interest from PRIDCO bonds can be repatriated tax free.
9.A tollgate tax payment in the amount of $122,202 would satisfy the repatriation of $1,847,026. This payment takes into consideration a deduction for the 3% investment credit.
10.After 12/31/87, the amount invested in leasehold improvements ($569,039) could be distributed at a 7% tollgate tax.
I.Also, the $35,638 in PRIDCO Bonds could be distributed after 12/31/87 butnot subject to axes
12.Section 3(a)(8) of the 1978 Act authorizes an amount equal to 5% of their production payroll, provided it does not exceed 50% of 181. No amount was listed nor deducted.
13. Investments in Puerto Rico as of 4/15/80 (made to satisfy previous closing agreements) were as follow:
A. Leasehold Improvements: AMOUNT ofTOTAL
(i) Electrical Substation 43,895 ---------------
(ii) Acoustical cei ing I lavatories 13,800
(iii) Air conditioning & air compressor 157,805
(iv) Clean room,lighting system,electrical distribution
installations,vaccum ystes,fence,building partit ons,
and miscellaneous 353,539
SUBTOTAL Leasehold Improvements 569,039 0.08
B. Puerto Rico GNMA's (Inv. 1976,Mat. 2004,Orig. Value $882,627) 882,627 0.12
C. PRIOC Bonds (acquired in 1978) principal amount 500,000 0.07
0. Inventory 909,316 0.12 -
E. Accounts Receivable 1,398,177 0.19
F. Working Capital 3,223,000 0.43
TOTAL INVESTMENTS 7,482,159
14.The manufacturing operations covered under Grant I occupied approximately 28% of the total manufacturing area of MACCA Corporation buildings in Carolina, P.R.
1/1/79 to12/31/79
PRIOCO Bonds
1,781,995
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TABLE F.3.5 THIRD CASE STUDY: MAC COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT JUNE 28, 1982
Undistributed Balance of Earnings and Profits as of October 3, 1981
Accumulation Manufacturing Investment
Period 101 IDI TOTAL
GRANT I
PRE 12/1/78
1/1/78 - 12/31/78
1/1/79 - 12/31/79
1/1/80 - 9/27/80
10/1/80 - 10/3/81
1,165,126 (a
568,723 (b
593,999 (c
1,275,840
1,337,754
GRANT I SUBTOTAL 4,941,442
GRANT II
10/1/79 - 9/27/80
10/1/80 - 10/3/81
667,830
891,185
GRANT II SUBTOTAL 1,559,015
GRANT III
4/26/80 - 9/27/80
10/1/80 - 10/3/81
290,440
875,795
GRANT III SUBTOTAL 1,166,235
TOTAL GRANTS 7,666,692
0
0
10,678
53,402
318,798
382,878
0
0
0
0
0
0
382,878
1,165,126
568, 723
604,677
1,329,242
1,656,552
5,324,320
667,830
891,185
1,559,015
290,440
875,795
1,166,235
8,049,570
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES:
(a) Pursuant
$210,841
(b) Pursuant
$215,537
(c) Pursuant
(d) Includes
(e) Includes
to 1980 Closing Agreement $1,162,142 could be distributed as follows:
after 6/20/86; $49,664 after 11/28/86; and $901,637 after 12/31/83.
to 1980 Closing Agreement $568,723 could be distributed as follows:
after 12/31/83; and $353,186 after 11/28/86.
to 1980 Closing Agreement $604,677 could be distributed after 12/31/87.
$24,750 of interest from bonds issued by PRICO after 3/31/77.
$33,000 of interest from PRICO bonds issued after 3/31/77.
TABLE F.3.6 THIRD CASE STUDY: MAC COMPANY CLOSING AGREENENT JUNE 28, 1982
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON II TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTNENT TAX INVESTHEN
DIVIDENDS SOURCE 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3573 NACCA CORPORATION
Grant I
Interest PRIOCO Bonds
1/1/80 -9/27/80 24,750 0 53,402 0 0 100 24,750 0 0 0 0
10/1/80 - 10/3/81 33,000 0 318,798 0 0 100 33,000 0 0 0 0
Grant II
10/1/79 - 9/27/80 500,872 0 667,830 7 35,061 75 500,872 25 166,958 0 0
10/1/80 -10/3/81 668,388 0 891,185 7 46,787 75 668,388 25 222,797 0 0
Grant III
4/26/80 -9/27/80 217,830 0 290,440 7 15,248 75 217,830 25 72,610 0 0
10/1/80 -10/3/81 656,846 0 875,795 7 45,979 75 656,846 25 218,949 0 19,168
Total 2,101,686 03,097,450 143,075 2,101,686 681,314 19,168
Source : Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1. After 6/30/82 a distribution of $401,686 could be made fros Grant II manufacturing 101 accumulated between 10/1/80 to 10/3/81.
2. Prior to 9/30/82 there was to be a dividends distribution of $1,700,000. This was composed as follows:
a) Grant I - interest from PRIOC bonds $57,750, not subject to tax.
b) Grant II - sanufacturing 101 $767,574, subject to 7% tollgate tax.
c) Grant III - manufacturing 101 $874,676, subject to 7% tollgate tax.
3. The eight year reinvesteent requiresent for this distribution was $681,134. Afterwards, it could be distributed at a 7% tollgate tax.
4. The reinvestment requirement was to be saintained as an annual average inventory balance until 6/30/90.
5. Note 13 from Table A.4 of the 4/15/80 closing agreesent applies in relation to the leasehold improvements and PRIOCO bond interests.
6. A 3% investment credit ($19,168) was allowed on $638,948 of leasehold isprovements. Investsents listed below and those in prior
closing agreesents are included.
8. The total tollgate taxes to be paid for the $1,700,000 distribution was $95,790, after deducting the 3% investment credit.
9. This closing agreesent provides a breakdown of leasehold improvements (firs building) done between during 11/80 to 4/82:
A. Building Isprovements :
- Air Lines for Grant III Program 3,155
- Forsica Tops for Grant I Production Oepartment 1,000
-Stockroos Extension 1,027
-later Pusp for Air Conditioning Systes 950
-Grant III Offices 3,393
-Grant III Pneumatic Lines 251
- Grant II Pneumatic Lines 120
- Triad Electrical Connections 2,810
-Triad New Benches, Electrical Connections 3,081
- Miscellaneous Improvements 1,500
Subtotal Building Improvements 17,287
B. Construction -Guard Shack 1,444
C. Machine Shop Improvements 712
0. Construction -Septic Tank 1,400
E. Cyclone Fence 4,989
F. Building Extension for Esployee Lounge I Cafete-ia 203,405
TOTAL LEASEHOLD INPROVEMENTS PRIOC BUILDING 229,237
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TABLE F.3.7 THIRD CASE STUDY: MAC COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT JULY 29, 1983
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS 101 REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON 101 TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
OLVIDENDS SOURCE 101 % AHOUNT 101 % AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
3573 MACCA CORPORATION
PRIOCO BONDS 0 0 374,797 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 35,638 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1982 GRANT I
Manufacturing 101 0 0 974,785 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PRIOCO Bonds 33,000 0 33,000 0 0 100 33,000 0 0 0 0
1982 GRANT 111 3,229,013 0 4,305,351 7 226,031 75 3,229,013 25 1,076,338 46,842 0
GNhA'S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 215,738 0 526,639
1983 PRIOCO Building 0 0 860,600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25,818
TOTAL 3,262,013 0 6,584,171 226,031 3,262,013 1,292,076 46,842 552,457
Source: Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
NOTES: 1. PRICO bonds in the amount of $374,797 had to be invested until 12/31/83 and $35,638 until 12/31/87, these agreements represent 101 accumulated in Puerto Rico..
2. The corporation purchased on 6/30/83 a PRICO building for $860,600. This acquisition qualifies as a 3% investment credit, which amounts to $25,818.
3. The eight year investment of $1,076,338 shall be maintained by retaining the PRICO building and by $215,738 in Puerto Rico GNHA's until 6/30/83.
The reinvestment amount represents 25% of the 1982 Grant III. The amount of $215,738 represents about 25% of the purchase price of the industrial building.
The last amount was covered by certain investment in GNHA's the company already had. However, the company was able to impose the following conditions: that the
corporation has complied with the investment requirement by retaining the title to the facilities and by such portion of unencumbered investments mentioned below.
4. After the eight years the full amount can be repatriated at a 7% tollgate tax.
5. The $33,000 of interest from Grant 1 1982 PRIDCO bonds issued after March 31, 1977 could be repatriated free of taxes.
7. Effective 1/1184 corporation would have uneacumbered $526,639.00 of Puerto Rico GNHA's. These monies could be used to reduce future tollgate taxes.
The difference between the original amount (4/15/80 closing agreement) in Puerto Rico GNHA's,$742,377.00, and the amount, $215,738.00, reinvested in this agreement.
8. A tollgate tax prepayment in the amount of $46,842.33 shall be made on or before 8/15/83.
This amount shall be made available as a credit against future tollgate taxes..
9. The 1982 Grant I manufacturing 101 $974,785.00 will not be repatriated under this closing agreement.
TABLE F.3.8 THIRD CASE STUDY: MAC COMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT JUNE 28, 1985
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS' 101 REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON 101 TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTHENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE 101 % AHOUNT 101 AMOUNT 101 % AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
3573 NACCA CORPORATION
Prior to 1/1/78
GRANT 1 210,841 0 210,841 7 14,759 100 210,841 0 0 14,759 0
49,664 0 49,664 7 3,476 100 49,664 0 0 3,476 0
0 0 0 0 0- 0 0 0 0 36,065 0
12/31/77 TO 12/31/78
GRANT I 353,186 0 353,186 7 24,723 100 353,186 0 0 0 0
1981
GRANT 11 401,686 0 401,686 7 28,118 100 401,686 0 0 0 0
1982
GRANT 1 690,391 0 920,521 7 48,327 75 690,391 25 230,130 0 0
GRANT 11 411,955 0 549,274 7 28,837 75 411,955 25 137,319 46,842 0
GRANT 111 3,229,013 0 4,305,351 7 226,031 15 3,229,013 25 1,076,338 0 0
PRICO BOND INTEREST 33,000 0 33,000 0 2,310 100 33,000 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 1982 4,364,359 0 5,808,146 305,505 4,364,359 1,443,787 46,842 0
1983
GRANT 1 366,859 0 489,145 7 25,680 15 366,859 25 122,286 0 0
GRANT 11 333,516 0 444,688 7 23,346 75 333,516 25 111,172 0 0
GRANT 1I1 1,015,404 0 1,353,872 7 71,078 75 1,015,404 25 338,468 0 0
PRICO BOND INTEREST 16,500 0 16,500 0 1,155 100 16,500 0 0 0 0
PUBLIC INPROVEMENTS INTEREST 26,750 0 26,150 0 1,813 100 26,750 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 1983 1,759,029 0 2,330,955 123,132 1,759,029 571,926 0 0
PRIOCO BUILDING
Acquisition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25,818
4/30/82 TO 9/29/84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,934
TAX REFUND CLAIN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94,208 0
01
TOTAL 1,138,765 0 9,154,478 499,1714 7,138,765 2,015,713 195,350 31,752
Source Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
TABLE F.3.9 THIRD CASE STUDY: HAC OMPANY CLOSING AGREEMENT JUNE 28, 1985
ADJUSTED DATA TO AVOID DOUBLE COUNTING FROM PREVIOUS CLOSING AGREEMENTS
POSSESSION REPATRIATION OF PROFITS ID0 REPATRIATION
SIC CORPORATIONS TOTAL NON 101 TOTAL TOLLGATE TAX REPATRIATION REINVESTMENT TAX INVESTMENT
DIVIDENDS SOURCE 101 t AMOUNT 1011 AMOUNT 101 AMOUNT CREDITS CREDITS
3573 MACCA CORPORATION
Prior to 1/1/78
GRANT I
12/31/77 TO 12/31/78
GRANT I
1981
GRANT 11
1982
GRANT I
GRANT II
GRANT III
PRIDCO BOND INTEREST
SUBTOTAL 1982
1983
GRANT I
GRANT II
GRANT III
PRIOCO BOND INTEREST
PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS INTEREST
SUBTOTAL 1983
PRIOCO Leasehold Improvements
4/30/82 TO 9/29/84
TAX REFUND CLAIM
TOTAL
o o 0 0 0
o 0 0 0 0
690,391
411,955
0
33,000
1,135,346
366,859
333,516
1,015,404
16,500
26,750
1,759,029
920,521
549,274
0
33,000
0 1,502,795
0 489,145
0 444,688
0 1,353,872
0 16,500
0 26,750
0 2,330,955
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
48,321
28,837
0
0
77,164
25,680
23,346
71,078
0
0
120,105
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
2,894,375 0 3,833,750 197,269
690,391
411,955
0
33,000
1,135,346
366,859
333,516
1,015,404
16,500
26,750
1,759,029
230,130
137,319
0
0
367,449 0 0
122,286
111,172
338,468
0
0
571,926 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 5,934
0 0
2,894,375
0 0
939,315
94,208
94,208
0
5,934
Source Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury
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NOTES TO TABLE F.3.8 AND TABLE F.3.9
1. The Grant 1 1982 IDI included $33,000.00 in interest from PRIDCO bonds issued after March 31, 1977.
2. The Grant I 1983 IDI included $16,500.00 in interest from PRIOCO bonds issued after March 31, 1977.
It also included $26,750.00 in Puerto Rico Public Improvement Bonds issued after March 3, 1977.
3. Uncommitted investments qualifying under Section 2(j):
TYPE INVESTMENT AMOUNT AMOUNT ACQUISITION DATE RELEASED
VALUE COMMITTED UNCOMMITTED DATE PRIOR INVESTMENT
P.R.Public Improvement Bonds
10.70%, 7/1/90
Face Value $500,000.00 541,832 35,638 506,194 7/21/83 6/30/34
P.R. Conservation Trust Fund Obligations
10.1467%, 5/31/87
Face Value $1,500,000.00 1,500,000 n/a 1,500,000 5/3/84 n/a
First Federal Savings Bank Teri Notes
11.125%, 9/1/89
Face Value $500,000.00 500,000 n/a 500,000 9/6/84
Puerto Rico GNMA's
Pool no. 3733, 2004
Original Value $882,627.00 405,390 215,738 189,652 1976 1/1/84
TOTAL 2,947,222 251,376 2,695,846
4. PRIDCO Building Improvements from April 30, 1982 to September 29, 1984:
a) Electrical Installations 13,645
b) Floor Tiles & Rugs 18,045
c). Air Handle Relocation 29,882
d) Partitions 5,832
e) Office Remodeling 7,652
f) Production Area Improvement 8,238
g) Leasehold Improvements 43,541
h) Legal Fees and Expenses PRIDCO Building Purchase 5,941
i) Design, Construction and Landscaping Costs 64,822
TOTAL 197,598
5. Total tax credits available were $180,260.87. It reduced the tollgate tax from $494,376 to $314,115. This amount was to be pre paid by 6/30/85.
6. The eight year reinvestment was to be maintained until 6/30/92, the /amount was $939,375.
